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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D. 

EDITED BY 
t T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. 

t E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. t W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. 

L, A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. 



ARISTOTLE 

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 

ON THE COSMOS 



ARIS^ JTLE.s4'^ 

/// 

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

ON COMING-TO-BE AND 
PASSING-AWAY 

BY 

IE. S. FORSTER, M.A. 

KMERlTUb PROFESSOR OF OREF.K IN THF. UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 



ON THE COSMOS 

BY 

D. J. FURLEY, M.A. 

LEC'TORER IN OREEK AND LATIN IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON 




LONDON 

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD 

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

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625842 

?8. /I. Sy 



Printed in Great liritain 



CONTENTS 





PAGB 


Prefatory Note ..... 


vii 


De Sophisticis Elenchis — 




Introduction ..... 


2 


Text and Translation 


10 


De Generatione et Corruptione — 




Introduction ..... 


. 159 


Text and Translation 


. 162 


De Mundo — 




Introduction ..... 


. 333 


Text and Translation 


. 344 


Indices — • *' ' 




To De Sophisticis Elenchis 


. 411 


To De Generatione et Corruptione 


. 415 


To De Mu7ido .... 


. 419 



PREFATORY NOTE 

Professor E. S. Forster completed his versions of De 
Sophisticis Elenchis and De Generatione et Corruptione 
before he died. I have checked the proofs and added 
a brief index. 

D. J. FURLEV 
London 
January 1955 



DE SOPHISTICIS 
ELENCHIS 



INTRODUCTION 

I. The Place of the Topica 

IN THE Org A SON 

Both the Topica and the I)e Sophistids Elenchis have 
always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. 
The two treatises are closely connected ; the De 
Sophistids Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and 
its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises ; 
indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard 
the two as forming a single work, since he twice 
quotes the De Sophistids Elenchis under the title of 
the Topica. 

It is generally admitted that what we call logic 
and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre- 
occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome 
of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic 
Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted 
a formal treatment of the subject and the theories 
put forward, for example, in the Theaetetus, Sophist, 
Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into 
a regular system. But while Aristotle's systematic 
treatment of the process of inference and, above all, 
his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it 
has been generally recognized that the Platonic dia- 
logues contain some of the germs from which the 
Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for 
2 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the cate- 
gories is already implicit in the recognition of the 
abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re- 
lation, activity and passivity. 

Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since 
about A.D. 200 have passed under the title of the 
Organon or ' instrument ' of science, the most im- 
portant are (1) the Prior Analytics, in which he sets 
forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect 
without reference to the subject-matter with which 
it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he 
discusses the characteristics which reasoning must 
necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, 
(3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of 
reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall 
short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The 
Categories and the De Interpretatione are subsidiary 
treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the 
proposition. 

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been 
expended, particularly by German scholars, in an 
attempt to fix the exact order in which the various 
treatises which constitute the Organon were com- 
posed. The problem is complicated by the fact that 
the treatises, in the form in which they have come 
down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which 
were evidently subjected to a certain amount of 
revision due to the modification and development 
of his original doctrines. This process has naturally 
given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would 
naturally occur if corrections were made or additions 
inserted which were not completely adapted to the 
context in which they were placed. 

It has been generally recognized that the whole 



ARISTOTLE 

of the Topica does not belong to the same date. 
H. Maier " holds that the oldest portion consists of 
Books II-VII. 2 and that it was written under the 
direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the 
same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have 
survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points 
out that the term croAAoy/cr/xov is not used in the 
technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it 
is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late inser- 
tion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the 
term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and 
that, consequently. Books II-VII. 2 were composed 
before the philosopher made his greatest contribu- 
tion to logic. He holds that Books I and VIII belong 
to the sanie period as Book VII. 4-5, and form an 
introduction and conclusion to the treatise WTitten 
after the discovery of the syllogism and that the De 
Sophisticis Elenckis was a subsequent addition to 
the Topica. On the other hand, F. Solmsen " and 
P. Gohlke « hold that Books I-VII form the earlier 
portion of the w^ork and that Book VIII and the De 
Sophisticis Elenckis were added subsequently. 

As regards the relation of the Topica to the rest of 
the Organon, Maier considers the Topica as a whole 
to be earlier than the Analytics ; Solmsen suggests 
that the order was (1) Topica I-VII, (2) Posterior Ana- 
lytics I, (3) Topica VIII and De Sophisticis Elenchis, 
(4) Posterior Analytics II, (5) Prior Analytics ; Gohlke 
holds that the traditional order of the two Analytics 
is correct, and that the Topica and De Sophisticis 
Elenchis presuppose the Analytics. 

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk 
of the Topica embodies Aristotle's earliest contribu- 

" See Bibliography. 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was 
written in part before his discovery of the syllogism. 



II. The Content of the Topiua 

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its 
author (100 a 18 ff.), ' to discover a method by which 
we shall be able to reason from generally accepted 
opinions about any problem set before us and shall 
ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying 
anything self-contradictory ' ; that is to say, it aims 
at enabling the two participants, the ' questioner ' and 
the ' answerer,' to sustain their parts in a dialectical 
discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may 
be described as the dialectical syllogism based on 
premises which are merely probable as contrasted 
with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which 
is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based 
on premises which are true and immediate. The 
probable premises which make up the dialectical 
syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as ' those which 
commend themselves to all or to the majority or to 
the wise.' The uses of dialectic are, we are told, 
three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general 
conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, 
because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, 
we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and 
falsehood, and (b) since the first principles of the 
sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the 
approach to them must be through the study of 
the opinions generally held about them. 

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, 
in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the tottoi which 

5 



ARISTOTLE 

give their name to the treatise. The term tottoi is 
somewhat difficult to define. They may be described 
as * commonplaces ' of argument or as general prin- 
ciples of probability which stand in the same relation 
to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the 
demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are 
' the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning 
is to draw its arguments.' " 

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident ; 
Books IV and V with those of genus and property ; 
Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books 
VII. 4-5 and Book VIII, after giving some additional 
notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice 
of dialectical reasoning. 



III. The De Sophisticis Elenchis 

Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and 
the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and 
the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which 
forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with 
the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is 
part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not 
in order that he may himself make use of it but that 
he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be 
ensnared in the toils of sophistical argument ; in 
fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and early- 
Platonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who 
taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the 
worse cause appear the better. 

The term eXeyx"^ is strictly applied to the confuta- 
tion of an actual adversary, but it is also used more 

" W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 59. 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

widely of the confutation of an imaginary opponent. 
The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general, 
which are classified under various headings and fall 
into two main classes, those which depend on the 
language employed and those which do not. Some 
of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most 
simple minds ; others, which Aristotle seems to have 
been the first person to expose and define, are capable 
not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping 
the notice of arguers who are employing them. 

After two introductory chapters the work naturally 
falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of 
fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies, 
while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work. 



IV. The Manuscripts 



The chief manuscripts for 


the Topica and De 


Sophisticis Elenchis are : 




A Urbinas 35 


saec. ix-x ineunt. 


B Marcianus 201 


an. 955 


C Coislinianus 330 


saec. xi 


D Coislinianus 170 


saec. xiv 


u Basileensis F. 11.21 


saec. xi-xii 


C Vaticanus 1024 


' satis vetustus ' 


P Vaticanus 207 


' non recens ' 


f Marcianus App. IV. 5 


saec. xiv 


q Ambrosianus M. 71 


saec. XV 


N Laurentianus 72. 18 


saec. XV 


i Laurentianus 72. 15 


saec. xiv 


T Laurentianus 72. 12 


saec. xiii 


Marcianus 204 


saec. xiv 



Of these A and B are in a class by themselves. 

7 



ARISTOTLE 

Bekker preferred A, Waitz B ; the Teubner Editors 
give a slight preference to B, the readings of which 
are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C 
sometimes preserves the true reading. 



V. Select Bibliography 



J. T. Buhle, Text, Latin Translation and Notes, 
Biponti, 1792. 

L Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837. 

T. Waitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1844-1846. 

Y. Strache and M. Wallies, Teubner Text, Leipzig, 
1923. 

E. Poste (De Sophisticis Elenchis only), Text, Para- 
phrase and Notes, London, 1866. 

TRANSLATIONS 

T. Taylor, London, 1812. 

O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), London, 1902. 
W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation), 
Oxford, 1928. 

In French : 
J. B. Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837. 

In German : 
J. H. von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877 
E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922. 

ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS 

P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik, 
Berlin, 1936. 

8 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoieles, Tubingen, 

1900. 
F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik 

und Rhetorik, Leipzig, 1929- 
J. L. Stocks, ' The Composition of Aristotle's Logical 

Works,' Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124. 



In translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis I 
have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, 
and when I translate any other reading this is noted 
at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred 
to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does 
not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable 
advance on that of Bekker. I have found Waitz's 
edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin 
version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently 
consulted the Oxford translation by W. A. Pickard- 
Cambridge. For the De Sophisticis Elenchis the notes 
and paraphrase in Poste's edition are often enlighten- 
ing, though I cannot always agree with his interpreta- 
tion. 

My aim in translating has been to represent Aris- 
totle's meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in 
simple English without resorting to paraphrase or 
trying to express it in modern terminology. 

I have to thank my friend and former colleague 
Professor W. S. Maguinness, of King's College, 
London, for reading through my version and giving 
me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy. 
He has suggested several improvements in the text 
which I have been glad to adopt. 



API2TOTEAOT2 OEPI 
20<M2TIKi2N EAETXflN 

164 a 20 I. riept 8e twv Go^i(nLK(x)v ^Xeyxoiv /cat rojv 
<j)aivoix€vo)v iikv iXeyxoJv ovrcov 8e TTapaXoyiGfiwv 
dXX' ovK eXeyxwv Xeywfxev, dp^dfjuevoi Kara. (f>vaLV 

(1770 rCOV TTpCJTWV. 

"Ot6 jxev ovv ol fji€v elal cruXXoyiafMOL, ol 8' ovk 

6vT€s SoKovai, (f)av€p6v. coGTTep yap Kal cttl ru)v 

25 aXXwv TovTo yiverat 8ia rivos ojxoiorr^ro^ , Kal 

em rcbv Xoywv (Laavrws e'x^'- '^^^ Y^P '^^ ^^'-^ 

OL fiev €)(ovaLv ev, ol 8e (^atVorrat, (fivXerLKcbs 

164 b 20 (jivarjaavTes Kal eTTLOKevdaavres avrovs, kol KaXol 

OL fxev 8ta. KoXXo^, ol he (jiaivovraL, KopLfiwaavres 

avTovs- €7TL re rcov dijjv^^cov waavTws' Kal yap 

TOVTCJV rd fxev dpyvpos rd 8e xp^^^os ioTLv dXrjdoJs, 

rd 8' ecTTt pLev ov, ^aiveraL 8e Kard rrjv ataO-qaLV, 

OLOV rd p,ev XLdapyvpLva Kal rd KarrLrepLva dpyvpd, 

25 rd 8e ;^oAo^a<^it'a xP^^d. rov avrdv 8e rporrov 

Kal avXXoyLcrpLos Kal eXeyxos 6 fiev eariv, 6 8' ovk 

" The reference appears to be provision of members of the 
tribal choruses at Athens for choral competitions (see Xen. 
Mem, iii. 4, 5). 

10 



ARISTOTLE ON 
SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

I. Let us now treat of sophistical refutations, that 
is, arguments which appear to be refutations but 
are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning, 
as is natural, with those which come first. 

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but intro- 
that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings, (^hs^^-^n^ 
is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres The dis- 
from a similarity between the true and the false, so between 
it happens also in arguments. For some people reasonings 
possess good physical condition, while others have tions which 
merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves aiid^those*^ 
out and dressing themselves up like the tribal which are 
choruses " ; again, some people are beautiful because ent, i.e. 
of their beauty, while others have the appearance sophistical, 
of beauty because they trick themselves out. So too 
with inanimate things ; for some of these are really 
silver and some gold, while others are not but only 
appear to our senses to be so ; for example, objects 
made of litharge ^ or tin appear to be silver, and 
yellow-coloured objects appear to be gold. In the 
same way also reasoning and refutation are some- 
times real and sometimes not, but appear to be real 

* Protoxide of lead, a by-product in the separation of 
silver from lead. 

11 



ARISTOTLE 

164 b 

kari jJiev, (fyatverai 8e Sta rrjv aTreipiav ol yap 

airetpoL uiOTxep av amiypvre's TToppcoOev dewpovaiv . 

165 a o ixev yap crvXXoyiafjios €k tlvwv earl reOevrwv 

(Lare Xlyeiv erepov tl ef dvdyKTjg ra)v KeipLevwv 
8ia Tcov KeLfievwv, eXeyxos 8e crvXXoyiapLos pier 
avrtcfxiaecos rov avpLTrepdcrpLaro?. ol 8e rouro 
TTotovai fiev ov, hoKovat 8e 8ia iroXXas alrias, (Lv 
5 €1? roTTog €V(f)V€arar6s icrrt, /cat S-qfioacwraros 6 
Sta rwv 6vop,drwv. eTret yap ovk eariv avrd rd 
7Tpdyp,ara hiaXeyeadai (f)€povrag, dXXd rolg 6v6- 
pbaaiv dvrl rcov Trpaypiarojv p^pco/xe^a avpu^oXotg, 
ro avpLpalvov cttl rojv ovopiarcov /cat em rcov Trpay- 
pidrixiv rjyovpieda avpc^aLveiv, Kaddirep em rwv 

10 ifjTJ(f)OJV rots' Aoyt^o/xeVots". ro 8 ovk eariv bpioiov. 
rd fjuev ydp ovopLara TreTrepavrai, /cat ro rcx)V Xoywv 
TrXrjdos, rd 8e Trpdypuara rov apidpiov ctTvetpa eariv. 
dvayKalov ovv TrXeiw rov avrov Xoyov /cat rovvopLa 
ro ev aripuaiveiv. axjirep ovv /ca/cet ol p/rj heivoi. 

15 rds tjiTj^ovs cjiipeiv vtto rdjv emarripioviov napa- 
Kpovovrai, rov avrov rpoTTOv /cat evrt ra)v Xoyiov ol 
rcov ovopidrwv rrjs hvvdpiecos drreLpoL TrapaXoyi- 
t,ovrai /cat avrol hiaXeyopievoi /cat dXXwv aKovovres. 
8ta piev ovv ravrrjv rrjv alrtav /cat rag Xexdr^ao- 
pcevas eart /cat avXXoytapios Kal eXeyxos (f)aLv6p,evos 

20 piev OVK CUP' 8e. CTret 8' iarl ricn pidXXov npo epyov 
ro SoKelv etvaL ao(f)ols r^ rd elvat Kal p,r] hoKeiv 
(cCTTt ydp r) ao(f>iarLKrj cf)aLVopLevrj ao(f)ia ovaa 8 ov, 
12 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i 

owing to men's inexperience ; for the inexperienced 
are like those who view things from a distance. 
Reasoning is based on certain statements made in 
such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of 
things other than those statements and as a result 
of those statements ; refutation, on the other hand, 
is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the 
conclusion. Some refutations do not affect their 
object but only appear to do so ; this may be due 
to several causes, of which the most fertile and wide- 
spread division is the argument which depends on 
names. For, since it is impossible to argue by intro- 
ducing the actual things under discussion, but we 
use names as symbols in the place of the things, we 
think that what happens in the case of the names 
happens also in the case of the things, just as people 
who are counting think in the case of their counters. 
But the cases are not really similar ;(ffor names and 
a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are 
infinite in number ; and so the same expression and 
the single name must necessarily signify a number 
of things.N As, therefore, in the above illusti-ation, 
those who are not clever at managing the counters 
are deceived by the experts, in the same way in 
arguments also those who are unacquainted with the 
power of names are the victims of false reasoning, 
both when they are themselves arguing and when 
they are listening to others. P'or this reason, there- 
fore, and for others which will be mentioned here- 
after, there exist both reasoning and refutation which 
appear to be genuine but are not really so. But 
since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable 
to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming 
to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and 

13 



ARISTOTLE 

165 a 

/cat o aocfuarrjs p^pryjuartCTTT)? drro (fyaivoixevqs 
ao(f)Lag dAA' ovk ovcnqs), SrjXov on dvayKalov tov- 
Tot? /cat TO Tov ao^ov 'ipyov SoKelu iroielv jxdXXov 
25 rj TToielv Koi firj SoKelv. eon 8' to? ev Trpos ev 
€L7T€Lv kpyov 776/31 cKaoTov TOV elSoTos difj€vheiv [xev 
avTov nept a>v olhe, tov he i/reySo/xevov ifM(f)avi^eLV 
Svvaadai. TavTa 8' ecrrt to /jlcv ev tco Bvvacrdai 
oovvat Xoyov, to 8' et- tw Xa^eZv. dvdyKiq ovv 
Tovs povXofJbivovs ao(f)LaT€V€LV TO Ta)v elprjpieucov 
30 Xoywv yevos ^rjT€iv rrpo epyov yap ioTLV rj yap 
ToiavTrj Svvafiis Trotr^cret ^aiveadai ao(f)6vy ov Tvy- 
XOuVOVoL TTjv TTpoaipeaiv ^xovTes. 

On fxev ovv ecrri tl tocovtov Xoywv yevos, Kal 
OTL ToiavTTjg €(f)L€VTaL SvvdfX€OJ5 OV9 KaXovjxev ao- 
(piOTas, SrjXov. TToaa 8' icTTiv etSrj tlov Xoywv twv 
35 ao(pi(7Tt,Kwv , Kal €K TToawv TOV dpidjxov 7] 8vva- 
jjiLs avTT] avveoTrjKe, Kat rroaa fiepr] Tvy)(dv€L ttjs 
TTpayixaTCLas ovTa, Kal irepl twv dXXwv twv avi-Te- 
XovvTwv etV TTjv Texvqv TavTXjV rjSr] Xi.ywp.ev. 

II. 'EffTt hrj TWV ev Tw hcaXeyeaOai Xoywv reV- 
Tapa yevrj, SiSaaKaXiKol Kal StaXeKTiKol Kal rreipa- 
165 b GTiKOL Kai iptOTLKoi, SiSacT/coAt/coi p.ev ol eK twv 
oiKeLwv apxiov eKaoTov p,adrjp.aTo<5 /cat ovk e/c 
TWV TOV arroKpivopievov So^wv (TvXXoyLl,6p,evoL (Set 
yap rrtOTeveiv tov p^avddvovTa), StaXe ktlkoI 8' ol 
€/c twv €v86^wv avXXoyioTLKol dvTL(f)dcrewg , ireipa- 
14 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i-ii 

not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes 
money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear 
that for these people it is essential to seem to perform 
the function of a wise man rather than actually to 
perform it without seeming to do so. To take a single 
point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has 
knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain 
from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his 
knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses 
them. Of these functions the first consists in being 
able to give a reason, the second in being able to 
exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who 
wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argu- 
ment which we have mentioned ; for it is well worth 
his while, since the possession of such a faculty will 
cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real 
purpose which sophists have in view. 

It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this 
kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists 
aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what 
are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and 
what are the various component parts of this faculty, 
and into what different divisions the treatment of 
the subject falls, and all the other elements which 
contribute to this art. 

II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four Four kinds 

kinds. Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments usldln'di"-* 

and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are f"f2^?" • . . 

those which reason from the principles appropriate to 

each branch of learning and not from the opinions of 

the answerer (for he who is learning must take things 

on trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, (2) Dia- 

starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to ^®^*'*'*'- 

establish a contradiction. Examination-arguments (3) Exami- 
nation. 

15 



ARISTOTLE 

165 b 

5 ariKOi 8' ol eK rcov Sokovvtcov ro) aTTOKpivo^evoj 
/cat avayKaLwv elSevai ro) 7TpoaTTOLovyb4.va) ^^(eiv 
T'qv emoTTJixrjv {ov rporrov Se, hichpiarai iv eripois), 

epLOTLKOi 8 OL €K TCOV (f)aLVOfX€VOJl' ivSo^WV JJLT] 

bvrojv 8e avWoyiuTLKol ■^ (f)aiv6pievoi avXkoyiari- 
Kot. TTepi ixev ovv rcov dTToSeiKTLKcov iu rols 'Ara- 
10 XvTCKots eiprjrai, nepl 8e rojv SiaXeKTiKwv /cat 
■neipaariKaJv iv rot? aAAoty rrepl 8e Tchv dycoviari- 
Kwv /cat epiariKcov vvv Xeywp,ev. 

III. WpcjTov Srj XrjTTriov ttocjojv aro)(d^ovraL ol 
tv roZ's Aoyot? dyojvil^ojxevoi /cat SLacJuXoveiKouvres . 
CCTTt 8e TTevre ravra rov dpidp^ov, e'Aey;^©? /cat 

15 ijjevhos /cat TTapdho^ov /cat aoXoLKLupios /cat TreyLTTTov 
ro TTOLrjaaL dhoXeax'fjcrai rov TrpoahLaX^yopbevov 
rovro 8 ecTTt to TroAAa/ct? dvayKal^eadaL ravro 
XeyeLV rj ro jxtj 6v, dXXd ro (j)aLv6p,evov exaarov 
eti'at rovrwv. jjidXcara jxev yap npoaipovvrai 
<f)aiveadai iXeyxovres, Sevrepov 8e ip€vS6p.€v6v Tt 

20 SeiKvvvai, rpirov els TrapdSo^ov dyeiv, reraprov 
Be ooXoLKLl,etv rroLelv rovro 8' earl ro TToirjaat 
rfj Aefet ^ap^apl^etv e/c rov Xoyov rov drroKpivo- 
fjLevov reXevralov he ro nXeovoKLg ravro Xeyeiv. 

IV. TpoTTot 8' etcrt rov fxev eXeyxeiv hvo' ol fxev 
yap eiai Trapd rrjv Xe^tv, ol 8' e^oi rrjs Aefeo*?. 

25 eon 8e rd puev Trapd rrjv Xe^iv ejXTTotovvra rrjv 
(j>avraaiav e$ rov dptdfxov ravra 8' earlv ojuojvu/xta, 
dpL(j)L^oXia, avvdeoLS, hiaipeais, irpoacphia, a^rj/xa 
Xegeojg. rovrov Se iriarLS rj re 8td rrfs eTrayojyrjs 
/cat CTuAAoytCT/Ltd?, dv re Xrj(f)6fj rig dXXos, /cat ort 



Topics 159 a 25 if. 
* Topics i-viii. 
16 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ii-iv 

are those which are based on opinions held by the 
answerer and necessarily known to one who claims 
knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner, 
has been described elsewhere **). Contentious argu- W Con- 
ments are those which reason or seem to reason 
from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, 
generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have 
been treated in the Analytics, and dialectical argu- 
ments and examinations have been dealt with else- 
where.'' Let us now deal with competitive and 
contentious arguments. 

III. We must first of all comprehend the various the per- 
objects at which those aim who compete and contend tion of 
in argument. They number five : refutation, fallacy, S^^Ajl 
paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one's iii-xv). 
opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him Jj^t&nUous'^ 
to say the same thing over and over again ; or, if argument 
not the reality, at any rate the appearance of each number. 

of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation, 
their second to show that their opponent is lying, 
their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to 
make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the 
answerer, as a result of the argument, speak un- 
grammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the 
same thing over and over again. 

IV. There are two modes of refutations ; one has (A) Re- 

to do with the language used, the other is unconnected fc^^^™xi). 

with the lanffuaffe. The methods of producinsr a («) Refuta- 

tion by 
false illusion in connexion with language are six m fallacies 

number : equivocation, ambiguity, combination, di- ^g^Jj^' 

vision, accent and form of expression. The truth of diction, 

this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic Zxln ^^^ 

proof based on this (thouffh some other assumption number, 

is also possible), that this is the number of ways in to : 



17 



ARISTOTLE 

165 b 

roaavra)(^u)? o.v rots avroXs ovofiaai, Kal Adyois" fMT] 
30 ravTo SrjXwaaifjLev . elal Be napa fxev rrjv ofxaj- 
vviiLCLv ol Toioihe rcbv Xoycov, olov otl fxavdavovaiv 
OL eTnarajjievoi' to. yap aTxoCTTo/x.art^o/xep'a jxavOa.- 
vovGLV OL y/Da/x/xart/cot. to yap fxavdaveLv ofxco- 
vvjjLov, TO T€ ^vvievai XP^H'^^^^ '^fj €7TLaTrjfjirj /cat 
TO Xajx^dvetv eTnaT'qixrjv. Kal ttolXlv oti to, /ca/ca 
35 dyadd' to. yap hiovTa ay add, to. 8e /ca/ca Seovra. 
htTTOv yap TO Seov, to t' dvayKalov, o avfjL^aLvei 
TToAAa/ct? Kal €7tI TcJov KaKcbv (eaTL yap KaKov tl 
dvayKalov), Kal Tdyadd Se Seovra (f)aiJi€v etvai. 
€Tt Tov avTov Kadrjadat /cat eoTavat, /cat Kdyiveiv 
Kal vyiaLveiv. barrep yap avtOTaTo, eaT7]K€v, Kal 
i66di ooTTcp vyidt,eTo, vyiatvef dviOTaTo S o KaOy^fievos 
Kal vyid^eTo 6 Kdpivcov. to yap tov Kdp,vovTa 
OTCovv TTOLelv r) 7Td(T)(^€i,v ovx €V orip^aivet, oAA' ore 
p,kv OTL 6 vvv Kafxvwv,^ 6t€ S' OS" eKafive npoTepov. 
6 ttXtjv uyia^ero fjLev Kal KdpLVcov Kal 6 KapLvwv 
vyLaiv€L 8' ov KdpLViov, aAA' o KdfMvwv, ov vvv, dXX* 
6 TTpoTepov. napd 8e Trjv dp,^L^oXiav ol tololSc, 
TO ^ovXeadat Xa^eXv /xe tovs noXep^Lovs. Kal dp* 
6 Tt? yLvojoKeL, TovTo yLvd>aK€L ; Kal yap tov yivu)- 
OKovTa Kal TO yLvwoKopLevov ivSex^Tai a»? yLvco- 
OKOVTa crqp^rjvaL tovtw to) Adyoi. /cat dpa o opa 
^ Deleting rj KaO-qnevos after KayLvutv with Wallies. 

" i.e. can write or spell. 
' i.e. ' ought to be.' 

18 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv 

which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the 

same terms or expressions. Arguments such as the (D Equi- 
r- 11 . I J • . • < T-i 1 vocation, 

lollowing are based on equivocation : Ihose who 

know, learn ; for it is those who know the use of 
letters that learn <* what is dictated to them.' Here 
' learn ' is equivocal, meaning ' understand by using 
knowledge ' and ' acquire knowledge.' Or again, 
' Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and 
evil must exist.' Here ' must exist ' is used in 
two senses ; it means ' what is necessary,' which is 
often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we 
also say that good things ' must exist.' ** Or again, 
' the same man is seated and standing and is 
a sick man and restored to health ; for it is the 
man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who 
was recovering his health that is restored to health, 
but it was the man who was seated that stood up and 
the man who was sick that was recovering.' For that 
' the sick man ' does such and such a thing or has 
such and such a thing done to him, has not one 
meaning only but at one time means ' the man who 
is now sick,' and at another time ' the man who was 
formerly sick.' But it was the sick man who began 
to recover his health when he was actually sick, but 
he is in good health when he is not sick and is not 
the sick man now but the man who was formerly 
sick. The following examples are connected with (2) Am- 
ambiguity : ' To wish me the enemy to capture,' ^'^uity. 
and ' when a man knows something, surely there is 
knowledge of this ' ; for it is possible by this expres- 
sion to signify both the knower and the thing known 
as knowing.'' And ' what a man sees, surely that 

' i.e. ' knowledge of this' can mean either knowledge on the 
part of the knower or knowledge of the thing known, 

19 



ARISTOTLE 

166 a 

10 Tts", Tovro opa; opa 8e top Kiova, djcrre opS. 6 
KLOJV. /cat dpa 6 av (f)rj^ elvai, rovro av <f>'f]s etvai; 
(f}f]s 8e XlOov etvat, av dpa (f)rjg Xtdos elvat. Kal 
ap kari atyoJvra Xeyeiv ; htrrov yap koI to ai- 
ycovra Xeyeiv, ro re tov Xeyovra aiydv Kal to rd 
Xeyofieva. elal 8e rpels rponoL rdJv Trapd ttjv 

15 opoxivvpiLav Kal rrjv a/x^ijSoAtW, et? piev orav •^ o 
Xoyos ^ Tovvopia Kvpicos oiqpiaivr] TrXeio), otov derog 
/cat Kvwv elg Se orav elwdores (Lpuev ovrw Xeyetv 
rpiro's he orav ro avvredev TrXeico a'qpiaivr], /ce;^cu- 
piapievov 8e ctTrAcus", otov ro errLararai ypdp,p.ara. 
eKarepov p-ev yap, el ervx^v, ev ri arjpLaivei, ro 

20 emararaL /cat ra ypap-piara- dpi^oi he nXeio), r^ ro 
ra ypapipiara avra eTriarrjpbrjv e;\;etv' ■^ rcov ypap,- 
pLarwv dXXov. 

H piev ovv apL(f)L^oXia Kal opicovvpiia Trapd rov- 
rovs rovs rpoTTovs eariv, rrapd he rrjv avvdeaiv rd 
roLahe, olov ro hvvaadat, Kadijpievov ^ahil^eiv Kal 

25 ^1^ ypdtjiovra ypd(f)eLv. ov ydp ravro (rqpLaivei , 
av hieXcov rt? ^'^ttJI Kal avvdetg, ws hvvarov ro^ 
KaOrjpievov jSaSt^eti^^- /cat rovd^ d)aavrojs dv ris 
avvdi], ro /xt) ypd(f)Ovra ypdcjyeiv arjp,aLV€L ydp cos 
ex^i hvvapiLv rov p,r) ypd^ovra ypd<j)eLv. edv he 

30 p,ri crvvdfj, on e;^ei hvvapLLv, ore ov ypd^ei, rov 

^ Reading to for t6v. 

* Deleting /cat yiT) ■ypd<j>ovTa yP'^'f'^'-^ after ^aBi^eiv witii 
Wallies. 

" The personal pronoun not being expressed in Greek, 
TovTo. l)eing neuter, can be either the siiliject or object of the 
verb dpa. '' ' eagle ' or ' pediment.' 

" ' Dog,' 'dogstar' or 'Cynic philosopher.' 
^ In which case the meaning is that a man, while sitting, 
has the power to walk (if he wishes to do so). 

20 



ON- SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv 

(he) '^ sees : a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar 
sees.' Again, ' Surely you insist on being what you 
insist on being. You insist on a stone being : there- 
fore, you insist on being a stone.' Again ' Surely 
speaking is possible of the silent.' ' Speaking of 
the silent ' can also be taken in two ways, either 
that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of 
are silent. There are three modes connected with 
equivocation and ambiguity : (1) when the expres- 
sion or name properly signifies more than one thing, 
such as deros '' and Kvoiv," (2) when we customarily 
use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word 
has more than one meaning in combination with 
another word, though by itself it has only one mean- 
ing, for example, ' knowing letters ' ; for it may 
so happen that taken separately ' knowing ' and 
' letters ' have only one meaning, but taken together 
they have more than one meaning, namely, either 
that the letters themselves have knowledge or that 
someone else has knowledge of the letters. 

Ambiguity and equivocation then take these (3) Corn- 
forms. The following examples are connected with orword". 
the combination of words, for instance, ' A man can 
walk when sitting and write when not writing. ' The 
significance is not the same if one utters the words 
separately ** as it is if one combines them, namely, ' a 
man can walk- while-sitting,' ^ and, similarly, in the 
other example, if one combines the words and says 
' a man can write-when-not-writing,' for it means 
that he can write and not write at the same time ; 
whereas if one does not combine the words it means 
that, when he is not writing, he has the power to 

' In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a 
man to walk and sit at the same time. 

21 



ARISTOTLE « 

166 s 

ypd<ji€iv. Kal, fxavdavei vvv ypdfxyiara, etVep ifidv- 
davev a iiriararai. eVi to ev fxovov Bwdfievov 
<f>€p€iv 77oAAa hvvaadat <^epeiv. 

Ylapd 8e rrjv StaipeaLv, ore to, irevr' icrrl 8vo 
Kai rpia, Kal TTepirrd Kal dpria, Kal to fiell^ov icrov 

35 Touovrov yap Kal krt Trpos. 6 yap avros Xoyos 
SiTjprjixevos Kal avyKeipuevog ovk del ravTo arjpial- 
vetv dv So^etev, olov " iyo) a eOrjKa SovXov ovt^ 
iXevdepov " Kal to " TrevrrjKovr^ dvSpojv eKarov 
AtTTe Sios" ^ K^i-XXevs ." 
166 b Ylapd Se Tr]v irpoacphiav iv fiev rot? dvev ypa<j)i]s 
hiaXeKTLKols ov pdhiov iroirjaai Xoyov, iv 8e rots: 
yeypaixfievois /cat TrotT^/xaat [xdXXov, olov /cat rov 
'Op,rjpov eVtot ScopdovvTai jrpog tovs eXey^ovTas 
5 (hs dTOTTOJS elprjKOTa " ro fxev ov KaTaTrvderai 
ofiPpo)." Xvovat yap avro Trj TrpoawSia, XeyovTes 
TO ov o^vrepov. Kal to Trepl to evvnvLov tov 
^Ayafiefjivovos, oVt ovk avTos 6 Zeuj elnev " 8t8o- 
p,€v 8e ol ev)(os dpiadai," dXXd tco evvTTvicp eve- 
TcAAero 8t8di^at. Ta pikv ovv TOiavTa irapa T-qv 
TTpoacphiav iariv. 

10 Ot 8e TTapd TO a)(fjp,a Trjs Xe^ews avfi^aivovaiv, 

" With a different combination of words this can mean, 
' He understands now what he knows because he has under- 
stood letters.' 

* This can also be taken to mean, ' Being able to carry 
many things, you can carry one single thing only.' 

' If 5 =2 and 3, 5 =2 and 5=3, and so 5 is l)oth odd and 
even : again, if 5=2 and 5=3, then 3=2, i.e. the greater = 
the less, since 3 is also 2 + 1 . 

'' From an unknown source in Greek comedy imitated by 
Terence, Andria 37. 

22 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv 

write. Again, ' He now understands letters, since 
he has understood what he knows ' ** ; and further, 
' One single thing being able to carry, many things 
you can carry.' * 

The following propositions are connected with divi- (4) Division 
sion : ' 5 is 2 and 3,' ' 5 is odd and even,' ' the 
greater is equal to the less,' for it is so much and 
something more.'' For the same sentence divided 
would not always seem to have the same meaning 
as when taken as a whole, for example, ' Free I made 
thee a slave ' ** and ' goodly Achilles left a hundred 
(and) fifty men. ' " 

It is not easy to construct an argument relating (5) Accent, 
to accent in discussions which are not written down, 
but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For 
example, some people emend Homer to meet the ob- 
jection of critics that his phrase ' to /xev ov KaTanvdiTai 
o/xf3pw ' is a strange one.^ For they solve the difficulty 
by a change of accent, pronouncing the ov more 
sharply.^ Also in the passage about Agamemnon's 
dream ^ they say that Zeus himself did not say, ' But 
we grant * him to secure the fulfilment of his pi:ayer ' 
but bade the dream to grant it.^ Such examples, 
then, depend on accentuation. 

Refutations which depend on the form of expres- (6) Form of 

expression. 

* Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can 
mean either ' left 150 men ' or ' left a hundred men fifty.' 

f II. xxiii. 338 : ' part of which decays in the rain.' 

" i.e. substituting ov, ' not,' for oiJ: 'and it does not decay 

in the rain.' 

'' II. ii. 1-35 ; but the actual words quoted occur in //. xxi. 

297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following 

example see Poet. 1461 a 22-23. 

* i.e. biBofxev. 

^ i.e. 8t8o/iev = StSdvai, the infinitive being used as an 
imperative. 

23 



ARISTOTLE 

166 b 

orav TO fXT] ravro coaavTcos epjxrjvevrjTaL, olov to 

appev drjXv rj to drjXv dppev, rj to jLtera^j) da.T€pov 

TOVTWV, ^ TToXtV TO TTOIOV TTOOOV ^ TO TTOOOV TTOLOV, 

7] TO 7TOIOVV 7Ta.a-)(ov rj TO hLaK€L[j,€vov TTOielv, /cat 
15 TaXXa 8', ws Si'^prjTaL irpoTepov. euTi yap to pLTj 
Tiov TTOieiv ov (h's tCjv TTOtelv Ti TTJ Xe^€L arjjjiaiveiv. 
OLOV TO vytaLveLV o/jlolo)? tco axTJfJLaTL Trjg Xe^ecos 
XeycTai to) TepLveiv t) olKohojxeZv /cairot to fxev 

TTOLOV Tt KOL hLaKeijXeVOV 770)9 §17X01, TO 8e TTOLelv 
TL. TOP aVTOV Se TpOTTOV Kal CTTL TOJV dXXiov . 

20 Oi fiev ovv rrapd ttjv Xe^LV eXey)(OL e/c tovtcov 
TOJv TOTTOiv ciaLv Tcov 8' efo) TTJs Xe^eojg vapa- 
XoyLopicov e'ihrj eoTLV eVra, ev fxev Trapd to avfi- 
^e^TjKos, SevTepov 8e to ciTrAcas' t^ jJirj dirXo)? dAAa 

TTTJ ri TTOV ^ TTOTC Tj TTpOS TL XcyeodaL, TpLTOV 8e TO 

TTapd TTjv Tov iXeyxov dyvoLav, T€TapTov 8e to 
25 TTapd TO irrop^evov, tt€jjltttov 8e to Trapd (^to} to iv 
d.pxfi Xapb^dveiv,^ cktov 8e to p,rj atVior 6t>s" alTLov 
TLdevaL, €^Sop,ov Be to Td ttXclo} ip<oTT^p,aTa ev 
TTOietv. 

V. Ot pi€v ovv TTapd TO avpL^e^rjKos TrapaXo- 

yLOfJLOL eloLV, OTaV 6p,OLWS OTLOVV d^Livdfj TO) TTpdy- 

30 /xttTi Kal TO) crvpL^e^-qKOTL VTrdpx^LV. CTrel ydp to) 
auToj TToAAa crvp,^€^rjK€v, ovk dvdyKrj Traot toi? 
KaT-qyopovpicvoLS , Kal Kad^ ov KaTTjyopeLTaL, TauTct" 
vdvTa VTTapx^iv. otov el 6 Ko/Jio/co? eTcpov dv- 

^ Reading napa Kto^ to eV apx^ Xafi^dvfiv with Strache. 
* Reading ravra with Casaubon. 

S4 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv-v 

sion occur when what is not the same is expressed 
in the same form ; for example, when the mascuHne 
is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter 
by the masculine or feminine ; or again Avhen a 
quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the 
active by a passive or a state by the active, and so 
forth according to the distinctions previously made." 
For it is possible for something which is not of the 
nature of an action to signify by the language used 
something which is of the nature of an action ; for 
example, to ' flourish ' is a form of expression like 
to ' cut ' or to ' build ' ; yet the former denotes a 
quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action. 
So too with the other possible examples. 

Refutations, then, connected with language are (6) Byfal- 

, T ,1 1 r^r r 11 • lacies which 

based on these commonplaces. Ui lallacies un- ^^g ^( ^. 
connected with language there are seven kinds : pendent on 
(1) those connected with Accident ; (2) those in These are 
which an expression is used absolutely, or not abso- number, 
lutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or depending 
relation ; (3) those connected with ignorance of the 
nature of refutation ; (4) those connected with the 
consequent ; (5) those connected with the assump- 
tion of the original point to be proved ; (6) those 
which assert that what is not a cause is a cause ; (7) 
the making of several questions into one. 

V. Fallacies connected with Accident occur when (i) Acci- 
it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to ^^^^' 
the thing and to its accident ; for since the same 
thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily 
follow that all the same attributes belong to all the 
predicates of a thing and to that of which they are 
predicated. For example, ' If Coriscus is different 

« Topics 103 b 20 if. 

25 



ARISTOTLE 

166 b 

OpciiTTov, avros avrov erepog- eon yap avdpojTTOs. 

Tj et TiWKpdrovs erepog, 6 Se HojKpdrrjg dvdpwTTOs, 
36 erepov avdpwTTOV cf)aalv (hpLoXoyrjKevai Sto, to avfi- 
^e^rjKevai, ov €cf)rjcrev erepov elvat, rovrov elvai 
dvdpcoTrov. 

Ot 8e TTapd TO aTrXcos ToSe r) tt^ XeyeaOai /cat {xtj 
KvpLws, orav to ev fxipei Xeyop^evov (Ls (XTrXcos 

167 a eiprjixevov Xrj(f)6fj, olov el to fxr} 6v ecm ho^aoTov , 

OTL TO jjLrj ov koTLv OV ydp TavTov elvai re tl Kal 
eivaL dTrXo)?. ^ ttolXlv otl to ov ovk eoTiv ov, el 
TOiv ovTOJV Tl jx-q icTTLV, otov el fXT] dvdpioTTOS. ov 
5 yap TavTO jjltj elvai tl /cat dTrXcjs [xrj elvai- (jyaiveTai 
be 8ta TO TTapeyyvg Trjg Xe^eiog /cat fxiKpov hia<j)e- 
peiv TO etvat rt tov eti^at /cat to jxt) elvai ti tov fxr) 
elvai. ofxoiios 8e /cat to irapd to trfj /cat to d/nXios. 
olov el 6 'IvSo? dXog pieXas cov XevKog eoTi tovs 
ohovTas' XevKO^ dpa /cat ov Aeu/co? icTTiv. rj el 
10 a/jiffxx) TTrj, OTL djjia Ta evavria vrrdpx^f'- to he 
TOLOVTOV 677 cvicov jxev TTavTL dewprjaai pdSiov, olov 
el Aa^coi' TOV AWiona elvai /zeAai^a tovs dSovTas 
epoLT* el XevKog- el ovv TavTTj XevKos, otl jxeXas 
/cat ov jLteAa?, o'ioiTO StetAe;^^at cryAAoytcrrt/cois' 
TeXeiiLaas ttjv epcoTTjaiv. e-n eviojv he Xavddvei 
26 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 

from " man," he is different from himself, for he is a 
man ' ; or ' if he is different from Socrates, and 
Socrates is a man,' they say that it has been admitted 
that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is 
an accident that the person from which he said that 
Coriscus is different is a man. 

Fallacies connected with the use of some particular (2) The 
expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not absolutely 
in its proper sense, occur when that which is pre- gQj^g"?yj^,i. 
dicated in part only is taken as though it was predi- flcation. 
cated absolutely. For example, ' If that-which-is-not 
is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is ' ; 
for it is not the same thing ' to be something ' and 
' to be ' absolutely. Or again, ' That-which-is is not, 
if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not 
a man.' For it is not the same thing ' not to be some- 
thing ' and ' not to be ' absolutely ; but, owing to 
the similarity of the language, * to be something ' 
appears to differ only a little from ' to be,' and ' not 
to be something ' from ' not to be.' In like manner 
when something is predicated in a certain respect 
and absolutely ; for example, ' If an Indian, being 
black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then 
he is white and not white.' Or if both attributes 
belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary 
attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this 
sort of fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone ; 
if, for example, after securing an admission that the 
Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is 
white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white 
in this respect, were to think that he had finished 
the interrogation and had proved dialectically that 
he was both black and not black. In some cases, on 
the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely, 

27 



ARISTOTLE 

167 a 

15 TToAAaKLs , €(f) oawv, orav tttj Xeyrjrai, Kav to 
aTrAcu? S6^€L€v aKoXovOelv, Kal ev oaotg nrj pdSiov 
dewpyjaat, iroTepov avrojv Kvpiios aTToSoreov. ytve- 
rai Se to toiovtov iv ols o/xoto)? virap^^ei to. olvti.- 
Kcifieva' SoKct yap ^ dfji(f)Oj t) fxr^heTepov SoTeov 
dirXcos etvai KaTrjyopeiv, olov el to fxev rjixiav 

20 XevKov TO 8' rjfXLcrv fxeXav, iroTepov XevKov t] 
fieXav; 

Ot oe TTapa to fxrj Stajpiadai rt ioTi avXXoyiofjios 
rj TL eXeyxos, dXXd Trapd Tr]v eXXeLtjjiv yivovTai tov 
Xoyov eXeyxos p-ev yap dvTL<f)aaLs tov avTov /cat 
evos, p,rj ovo/xaTog dXXd TrpdyfxaTog, Kal oi^o/xaro? 

25 jj,rj arvviovv/jiou dXXd tov avTov, e/c Td)v SodevTwv, 
i^ dvdyKr)s, p,r] avvaptdp^ovp^evov tov iv dpxfj, 
KaTa TavTO Kai Tipos TavTo Kal cvaavTOJS Kal iv 
Tcp avTcp xpovo). TOV avTov Se Tpoirov Kal to 
t/jevaaadai Trepi tivos. eVioi 8e dTroXiTTovTeg tl 
Twv X€)(6€VTwv (f>aivovTat iXeyx^cv, olov otl TavTO 

30 onrXaaiov Kal ov SnrXdatov Ta yap Svo tov p,ev 
evos SiTrXdoca, tcov 8e Tpiwv ov SnrXdata. rj et to 
avTO TOV avTov StrrXdaiov Kal ov BiTrXdaLov, oAA' 
ov KaTa TavTO' KaTa jxev yap to p,rJKos SnrXdaiov, 
KaTa Se to TrXaTos ov SiTrXdatov. ^ el tov avTov 
Kai KaTa rauro /cat ojaavTcos, oAA* ovx dfxa' Stoirep 

35 ccTTt <j>a(,v6pi€vos eXeyxos- cXkol S' dv rtj tovtov 
Kal els Tovs Trapd Tr)v Xe^iv. 

Oi 8e Trapd to iv dpxfj Xapi^dveiv yivovTai fxkv 
28 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 

where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect 

only, an absolute attribution would also seem to 

follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the 

attributes can be properly assigned. An instance 

of this occurs when both the opposite attributes 

belong similarly ; for then it is generally held that 

it must be conceded that either both or neither can 

be predicated absolutely ; for example, if something 

is half white and half black, is it white or black ? 

Other fallacies arise because no definition has been (3) ignora- 

given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation, 

and there is some defect in their definition. For a 

refutation is a contradiction of one and the same 

predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of 

a synonymous name but of an identical name, based 

on the given premisses and following necessarily 

from them (the original point at issue not being 

included) in the same respect, relation, manner and 

time. A false statement about something also occurs 

in the same manner. Some people, however, appear 

to refute, omitting some of the above-named points, 

showing, for example, that the same thing is double 

and not double, because two is the double of one but 

not the double of three. Or, they show that if the 

same thing is double and not double of the same 

thing, yet it is not double in the same respect ; for 

it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, 

if it is double and not double of the same thing and 

in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at 

the same time ; and so there is only an apparent 

refutation. One might, indeed, force this fallacy 

also into the category of those connected with 

language. 

Fallacies connected with the assumption of the (4) PetUio 

principii. 

29 



ARISTOTLE 

167 a 

ovTws Kal Toaavraxoos oaaxc^S ivBex^rai to e| 
apX^S" alrelaOai, ^atVorrat 8' eXiyx^^v Sta to firj 
Svvaadat avvopdv to TavTov Kal to eTcpov. 
167 b '0 8e TTapa to irropbevov cXeyxos 8ta to oteadat, 
avTL(jTp€(f)€iv TTjv aKoXovdiqaLV . oTav yap TovSe 
ovTos i^ dvdyKTjs To8t t^, Kal TovSe ovtos otovTai 
Kal daTepov etvai ef dvdyKrjg. odev Kal at Trepl 
5 T7]v Bo^av CK TTJs alaOrjcrecos dndTai, yivovTai . 
TToXXaKts yap t^v xoXtjv fxeXt VTreXa^ov Sid to eire- 
aOai TO ^avdov xpd^l^^ '^V /^f'^tT'' Kal inel avp.- 
^aivei TTjv yrjv vaavTos yiveadat Sid^poxov, kov 
fj otappoxos, V7ToXap,^dvop,€v vaai. to 8' ovk 
avayKOLov. ev re toIs prjTopiKolg at Kara to ar)- 
pLclov a7ro8et^€ts" eK tcov irropievwv elaiv. ^ovXo- 
10 pievoL yap Sei^at otl pcoixos, ro iiropievov eXa^ov, 
oTi KaXXcoTTiaTrjg r) otl vvKTwp oparat TrXavojpievos. 
TToXXois 8e TavTa p,€v vrrdpx^i,, to 8e KaTrjyopov- 
pLevov ovx VTrdpx^t-- opboiws 8e /cat iv rot? cryAAo- 
yiaTLKoZs , OLOV 6 MeXiaaov Xoyog ort direipov to 
drrav, Xa^cbv to pi€v dirav dyevrjTov (eV yap p,r) 
15 OVTOS ovhev dv yeviadai), to 8e yevopLevov i^ dpx^js 
yeveadat. et pirj ovv yeyovev, dpx^v ovk ex^i to 
vdv, uiOT aTTi-Lpov. OVK dvdyKrj 8e tovto crvpL- 
paiveiv ov ydp et to yevop-evov dirav dpx^jv ex^i, 
Kal €i TL dpx'^v e'x^t, yeyovev, toaTrep oi38' ei o 

20 TTVp€TTiX)V deppLOS, Kal TOV deppLOV dvdyKTj 7TVp€TT€lV. 

30 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 

original point to be proved arise in the same manner 
and in the same number of ways as it is possible to 
beg the original point ; they have an appearance of 
achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at 
the same time what is the same and what is different. 

The refutation connected with the consequent is (5) The 
due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For ''°°^^*i'^®° • 
whenever, if A is, B necessarily is, men also fancy 
that, if B is, A necessarily is. It is from this source 
that deceptions connected with opinion based on 
sense-perception arise. For men often take gall for 
honey because a yellow colour accompanies honey ; 
and since it happens that the earth becomes drenched 
when it has rained, if it is drenched, we think that 
it has rained, though this is not necessarily true. In 
rhetorical arguments proofs from signs are founded 
on consequences ; for, when men wish to prove that 
a man is an adulterer, they seize upon the consequence 
of that character, namely, that the man dresses him- 
self elaborately or is seen wandering abroad at night 
— facts that are true of many people, while the 
accusation is not true. So, too, in dialectical reason- 
ings ; for example, the argument of Melissus that 
the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has 
not come into being (for nothing could come into 
being from what does not exist) and that everything 
which has come into being has come from a beginning; 
if, therefore, the universe has not come into being, 
it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But 
this does not necessarily follow ; for even if what 
has come into being always has a beginning, anything 
that has a beginning need not have come to be, any 
more than it follows that a man who is hot must be 
in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot. 

31 



ARISTOTLE 

167 b 

'0 Se TTapa to /X17 airiov ws airtov, orav irpoa- 

Xrj<f>6fj TO avairiov (l)s irap* eKeivo yivofievov rov 
iXly^^ov. avfx^alveL 8e to tolovtov ev tois els to 
ahvvarov avXXoyiafjLols' iv rovrots yap dvayKOLov 

25 dvat,p€Lv TL roiv Keip,lvoiv. idv ovv iyKaTapid[xrjdij 
ev Tot? avayKaioLS epwrrjixacn npos ro avfi^oLvov 
dSvvarov, Sd^et irapd rovro yiveadai ttoXXukis 6 
eXeyxos, otov on ovk eari tpv^'^ xal ^w^ ravrov 
el yap (f)dopa ylveais ivavrlov, /cat ri] tlvI (f)dopa 
earai tls yeveais ivavrlov 6 Se Odvaros <f>6opd ti? 

30 Kal evavriov ^cofj, ware yeveais rj l,iorj Kal to l,rjv 
yiveadav tovto 8' dSwaTov ovk dpa TavTov r] 
^Xh '^^^ '^ ^^V- ^^ S"*? cryAAeAdy tCTTttt • avpL^alvei, 
ydp, Kov fx'q TLS TavTO (f)fj TTjv l,wr]v TTJ i/jvxfj, TO 
dBvvaTov, oAAa fiovov ivavTLOv t,wrjv fxev davdTCO 
ovTL (f)9opa, (f)dopa he yeveaiv. davXXoyLGTOL jxev 

85 oSv dirXcbs OVK elalv ol tolovtol Adyot, npos 8e to 
■npoKeifxevov dorvXXoyiaTot,. Kal Xavddvei TToXXaKig 

OV\ -^TTOV aVTOVS TOVS ipiOTCOVTas TO TOLOVTOV. 

01 pL€V OVV TTapd TO eTTo/jievov Kal rrapd to p.rj 
aiTLov Adyot tolovtol eloLV ol Se Trapd to tcx 8uo 
ipcoTTJfxaTa ev iroLeLV, OTav Xavddvrj ttXclw ovTa Kal 

168 a ojs evog ovtos dTToSodfj dTTOKpLais fila. ctt' evioiv 

fxev ovv pq^Lov Ihelv otl 7rAeia» /cat oti ov hoTeov 
32 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 

The refutation connected with taking as a cause (6) Mis- 
what is not a cause, occurs when that which is not t^^^^n cause, 
a cause is foisted into the argument as though the 
refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in 
reasonings leading up to an impossibihty ; for in 
these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses. 
If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among 
the questions which are necessary for the production 
of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will 
often seem to come about as the result of it ; for 
example, in the argument that ' soul ' and ' life ' are 
not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary 
to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-into- 
being will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing; 
now death is a particular kind of perishing and con- 
trary to life ; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being 
and to live is to come-into-being. But this is im- 
possible ; and so the soul and life are not identical. 
But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning ; 
for the impossibility occurs even if one does not 
assert that life is identical with the soul but merely 
says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing, 
and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing. 
Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but 
only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and 
the questioners themselves are often equally uncon- 
scious of such a state of affairs. 

Such, then, are the arguments connected with the (7) Plur- 
consequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those questions, 
which are connected with the union of two questions 
in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are 
more than one and one answer is given as though 
there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy 
to see that there is more than one question and 

c 33 



ARISTOTLE 

168 a 

aTTOKpicTLV, oLov TTOTepov Tj yfj ddXaTTO, ianv rj 6 
ovpavos; eV €vlwv 8' rjrrov, /cat ojs ivos ovros 
7] OfioXoyovari rep pir} airoKpiveadai, to ipo)rwp,evov, 
6 rj eXeyxeadai ^alvovraiy olov dp' ovros Kal ovros 
ear IV avOpconos; coar av ris rvrrrrj rovrov Kal 
rovrov, dvdpwTTov aAA' ovk dvOpconovs rvTrrijaei. 
Yj TTttAtv, J)v rd p,ev ianv dyadd rd S' ovk dyadd, 
TTOvra dyadd rj ovk dyadd; onorepov ydp av (f)i], 
kari [xev cbs eXeyxov ^ ipevSos (f)aLv6p.€vov So^clcv 

10 av TTOietv ro ydp (f)dvai rwv pir) dy adwv rt elvai 
ayadov ^ rdJv dyaOcov pcrj dyadov ipevSos. ore Se 
TTpoaXrjcjidevrwv rivcov Kav eXey^os yivoiro dXrjOivos, 
oiov e'i rLS Solt) opLolojs ev Kal ttoAAo. Xeyeadai 
XevKd Kal yvpuvd Kal rv(f)Xd. el ydp rv^Xov rd 
p.rj exov oifjLV TTe<j)VK6s S' e^eir, koI TV<f)Xd earai 

15 rd piTj exovra 6i/jlv 7Te(f)VK6ra 8' ex^tv. orav ovv 
TO piev exj) TO Se p^rj exj), rd dpcf)co earai rj opcovra 
r] rv(f>Xd- orrep dSvvarov. 

VI. ""H Brj ovrcos Siaipereov rovs (jiaivopevovs 
avXXoyiapLovs Kal eXeyxovs, r} irdvras dvaKreov 
els rrjv rod eXeyxov dyvoiav, dpxrjv ravrrjv noir]- 

20 aap,€vovs' eart ydp drravras dvaXvaai rovs XexOev- 
ras rpoTTOvs els rov rod eXeyxov hiopiapov. rrpcorov 
piev el aavXXoyiaroL- Sel ydp e/c rcov Keipevwv 
avp^aiveiv ro avpurepaapia, coare Xeyeiv i^ dvdyKrjs 
dXXd pr] <j)aiveadai. erreira Kal Kard rd pieprj rov 
34. 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v-vi 

that an answer should not be given, for example, 
when it is asked ' Is the earth sea, or is the sky ? ' 
Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking 
that there is only one question, people either give 
in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent 
refutation. For example, ' Is A and is B a man ? ' 
' If so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man, 
not men ? ' Or again, ' Where part is good and part 
evil, is the whole good or evil ? ' Either answer 
might possibly seem to involve an apparent refuta- 
tion or false statement ; for to say that something 
is good when it is not good or not good when it 
is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however, 
if certain premisses are added, there might be a 
genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that 
a single thing and a number of things are alike called 
' white ' or ' naked ' or ' blind.' For if ' blind ' is 
used of something which does not possess sight 
though it is its nature to possess it, it will also describe 
a number of things which do not possess sight though 
it is their nature to possess it. When, therefore, 
one thing has sight while another has not, they will 
either both be able to see or both be blind ; which is 
impossible. 

VI. We must either divide apparent reasonings [Note (a). 
and refutations in the manner just described or else faiildes^a 
refer them all to a false conception of refutation, all be repre- 
making this our basis ; for it is possible to resolve all forms of a 
the kinds of fallacy which we have mentioned into iacv^^>'" 
violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we igrwraiw 
must see if they are inconclusive ; for the conclusion * ^^ 
ought to follow from the premisses laid down, so that 
we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to 
do so. Next, we ought to see if they accord with the 

35 



can 



ARISTOTLE 

168 a 

8iopt,afxov. Twv fiev yap ev rfj Xe^et, ol fxev elai 

25 TTapa TO ScTTov, olov 7] T€ ofxojvvfjiia Kal 6 Xoyos 
/cat T) 6fjiOioaxr)iJioavv7] {avvrjdeg yap to Trai^ra cos 
ToSe Ti arj fxaiveiv), -q Se avvOeats Kal Stat/oecrts' Kal 
TTpoGcpSia TO) fxrj Tov avTov elvai tov Xoyov rj 
Tovvofxa Bia(f)€pov. eSei 8e Kal tovto, Kaddnep 
Kal TO Trpdypia, TavTov, el fxeXXei eXeyxos rj avX- 

30 XoyicfMos eaecrdai, otov et Xcottlov, jxtj IfxaTtov avX- 

Xoylaaadai aAAa Xwmov. dXrjOeg pcev yap KaKelvo, 

oAA' ov avXXeXoyLOTai, dAA' ert ipcoT'qp^aTos Set, 

OTi TavTov arjfjbaivei, irpog tov ^rjTovvTa to 8ta rt. 

Ol Se Trapd to avjjL^e^rjKos opcaOevTos tov crvX- 

35 Xoyiapbov (f)av€pol yivovTai. tov avTov yap opiapiov 
Set Kal TOV iXeyxov yiveaOai, ttXtjv TrpoaKeiadai 
TTjv dvTL(f)aoLV 6 ydp eXeyxos avXXoycafxos dvTL- 
(j)d.aea)5' ei ovv p,'q ioTi avXXoytafxos tov avfx- 
^e^TjKOTOS, ov yiVerat eXeyxos. ov ydp ei tovtwv 
ovTOiv dvdyKTj toS' eii^at, tovto S' eart XevKov, 

40 dvdyKTj XevKov elvaL Sta tov avXXoyiofxov. ovS* 
168 b et TO Tpiywvov 8volv opdaiv tcra? €;)^et, avpb^e^TjKe 
S' avTcp ax'^iP'O.Ti elvai ^ TrpcoTco rj dpxfj, otl 
ax'TjP-o. Tj dpx^] ^ TTpcoTOV TOVTO. OV ydp fj (Txrjfia 
oyS' 1^ rrpcoTov, dAA' fj Tpiycjvov, r] aTToSet^t?, 
ofioiws Se Kal irrl twv dXXwv. cuctt' et o eXeyxos 
5 avXXoyiaiios tls, ovk dv e'irj 6 /card avp-^e^r^Kos 
eXeyxos. dAAd Trapd tovto Kal ol Te;ft'tTat /cat 
36 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi 

remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies illustrations 
connected with language, some are due to a double j^°jeg ^g'. 
meaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous pending 
phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is (i) diction. 
customary to indicate everything as a particular 
substance), whereas composition, division and accen- 
tuation are due to the phrase not being the same or 
the name different. For the name also, like the thing 
signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or 
reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject 
is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about 
a mantle, not about a cloak ; for the latter con- 
clusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not 
complete, and a further question must be asked to 
prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer 
asks how you have refuted him. 

Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious (2) Acci- 
when ' proof ' has been defined. For the same 
definition ought to be true also of refutation, except 
that ' the contradictory ' is added ; for refutation is 
a proof of the contradictory. If, therefore, there 
is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place. 
For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it 
does not necessarily follow that it is white because 
of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its 
angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be 
a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily 
follow that because it is a figure, element or principle 
it has this character ; for the demonstration is con- 
cerned vdth it not qua figure or qua element but qua 
triangle. And so likewise with the other instances. 
Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument 
depending on an accident could not be a refutation. 
Yet it is along these lines that specialists and men of 

37 



ARISTOTLE 

168 b 

oXcog OL eTncrT-qfMoves vtto rchv dv€7n<JTr]fi6vojv 
iXeyxovrai' Kara avix^e^-qKos yap TToiovvrai rovs 
avXXoyLa/jLovs rrpos rovs etSoras". ol 8' ov Svvd- 
jxevoi Staipelp r) ipcoTcvpievoi StSoauiv t] ov Sovres 
10 olovrai SeSco/ceVai. 

t oe Trapa to tttj Kai aTTAws, on ov rov avrov 

rj Kara^aais Kai rj aTrd^acrts'. rov yap tttj XevKov 

TO TTTJ ov XevKov, Tov 8' ctTrAcos' XevKov TO olttXcjs 

ov XevKov OLTTot^aais . el ovv hovTO's Trfj elvat XevKov 

15 <x)s clttXcos elprjfjievov Xafx^dvet, ov Troiet eXey^ov, 

(f)aLveTai Se Sid ttjv dyvoiav tov tl Iotiv eXeyxos. 

^avepwTaToi 8e iravTOiv ol irpoTcpov Xe^OevTes 

Trapd TOV tov iXey^ov SiopLGfxov 8td /cat irpoa- 

7]yop€v9rjaav ovtcos' Trapd yap tov Xoyov T7]v 

20 eXXeiipLv 7} <f)avTaaia yiVerai, /cat Scaipovfievois 

OVTCOS Koivov em Tracrt tovtols deTeov ttjv tov 

Xoyov eXXeiifjLV. 

Ol re Trapa to Xap,^dv€iv to ev dpyrj Kai to dvai- 
Tiov (hs a'LTiov Tidevai hrjXoL 8ta tov opiapiov. Set 
ydp TO avp,7T€paapia tw TavT^ elvat} avfi^atveLv, 
25 OTTep ovK rjv €v Tots dvaiTLois' Kai ndXiv /X17 dpiQ- 
ixovfjicvov TOV €^ dpxrJ9, oTrep ovk exovcriv ol irapd 
TTjV aLTTjaiv TOV €v apxfj • 

01 8e Trapd to eTTop-evov fiepos elal tov avp,^e- 
^rjKOTOS' TO ydp eTTOpLevov avp,p€Pr}K€, Sia(f)€pei 8e 
* Omitting alna tov after etvai with ABC. 

" 167 a 21 flF. 

* napaXoyiafioi from napd and Xoyos in the sense of ' de- 
finition.' 

38 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi 

science in general are refuted by the unscientific ; for 
they argue with the men of science with reasonings 
based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of 
making distinctions, either give in when questioned, 
or think that they have done so when they have not. 

Fallacies which depend on whether a statement (3) The 
is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur be- of'atoo^ute 
cause the affirmation and denial are not of the same and quali- 
thing. For ' not partly white ' is the negation of ments. 
' partly white,' and ' not absolutely white ' of ' abso- 
lutely white.' If, then, one takes the admission that 
something is partially white to mean that it is abso- 
lutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only 
seems to do so owing to ignorance of what a refuta- 
tion is. 

The clearest fallacies of all are those already (4) Defec; 
mentioned " as connected with the definition of ^-q^ deflm- 
refutation (hence also their name) ^ ; for the semblance 
of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition, 
and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must 
put down ' defect of definition ' as common to all these 
cases. 

Fallacies due to assuming the original point and (5) PetUio 
stating as a cause what is not a cause are clearly i""»'^J^*- 
exposed by means of the definition. For the con- 
clusion ought to follow because this and that is so, 
which is not the case when the alleged cause is not 
the cause ; and, again, the conclusion should follow 
without the original point being included, which is 
not true of arguments based on the begging of the 
original point. 

Fallacies connected with the consequent form part (6) The 
of those due to accident ; for the consequent is an <'o°sequent. 
accident but differs from the accident because the 

39 



ARISTOTLE 

168 b 

Tov av/ji^e^rj KOTOS, on to /xev av^^e^-qKos eoTiv 

30 60' ivos fiovov Xa^elv, olov TavTo etvai to ^avdov 

Kat fxeXt Kal to XevKov /cat kvkvov, to 8e Trapeno- 

fievov del ev TrXeioaLV to. yap evl TavTco TavTO, 

Kai aXXrjXoLs d^tovfxev elvat raura- 8to yiVerai 

Trapd TO iiTOfxevov eXeyxog. eart 8' ov ttolvtws 

aXiqdes, olov av fj XevKov Kara avpi^^^r^Kos- Kal 

35 yap rj p^tcoi' /cat o kvkvos to) XevKO) TavTov. r) 

ttolXlv, CO? €v TO) MeAiaCTou Xoycp, to avTo elvat 

Xap,^dv€L TO yeyovdvat Kal dpxrjv ex^iv, rj to toa^ 

yiveadac Kal TavTo fieyedos Xapi^dvciv. oti yap 

TO yeyovos ex^t dpx'qv, Kal to exov dpxrjv yeyovevai 

d^ioL, d)s dfjicfxju TavTa ovTa tw dpx'rjv ^X^''^> '^^ 

40 T€ yeyovos Kal to TreTrepaajxevov .^ o/xoiios Be Kal 

169 a 6771 Tcov tawv yLvopiivojv el tcl to avTo fxeyedog 

Kai ev Xafi^dvovTa taa yiVerat, /cat Ta taa yuvofieva 
ev pbeyedos Xajx^dvet. cooTe to errofxevov Xafi^dvei. 
eirei ovv 6 Trapd to avpi^e^rjKos eXeyxos ev ttj 
ayvota tov eXeyxov, (ftavepov otl Kal 6 irapd to 
6 eTTOfievov. emcTKeTTTeov 8e tovto Kal dXXoiS- 

Ot 8e TTapd TO Ta irXeiw ipojT-qp.aTa ev Troielv ev 
TO) jXT] htapdpovv rjfxds rj fx-q Biatpelv tov ttjs npo- 
Taaecos Xoyov. rj yap irpoTaai's eaTiv ev /ca^' evos. 

^ Reading Taa for taois. 
* Bekker misprints TTf.TTepaoy.ivov as TreTrepaofievajv. 



" But it does not follow that because snow is white and 
swan is white, therefore snow is swan. 

* Cf. 167 b 13 f. 

" Cf. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 fF. 
40 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi 

accident can be secured in the case of a single thing 
by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are 
identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas 
the consequent always exists in more than one thing ; 
for we claim that things which are the same as one 
and the same thing are the same as one another ; 
and this is how refutation proceeds when the con- 
sequent is involved. It is not, however, always true, 
for example, in the case of accidental whiteness ; 
for both ' snow ' and ' swan ' are the same in respect 
of whiteness." Or again, as in the argument of 
Melissus,* someone takes ' to have come into being ' 
and ' to have a beginning ' as the same thing, and 
' to become equal ' as the same thing as ' to take on 
the same magnitude.' For because what has come 
into being has a beginning, he claims also that what 
has a beginning has come into being, on the ground 
that * having come into being ' and ' being finite ' 
are both the same thing, because both have a begin- 
ning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which 
become equal, he assumes that, if things which take 
on one and the same magnitude become equal, then 
also things which become equal take on the same 
magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the conse- 
quent. Since, then, the refutation where accident 
is concerned depends on ignorance of the nature of 
refutation, so also, it is clear, does the refutation 
where the consequent is concerned. But we must 
examine this question from other points of view also." 

Fallacies connected with the union of several (7) The 
questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate ""veraf 
or distinguish the definition of the term ' proposi- questions 
tion.' For a proposition is a single predication about 
a single subject. For the same definition applies 

41 



ARISTOTLE 

169 a 

o yap avTos opos €v6s (Jlovov koL olttXcjs tov Ttpdy- 

10 fiarog, olov avdpwTTOV /cai evos p,6vov avdpcuTTov 
ojjioicog he /cat e-nl tojv aAAcuv. el ovv /xta irporaais 
7] ev Kad €v6g d^iovcra, /cat dnXaJS earat Trporaais 
7] roiavrrj epwrrjcns. eVet S' o avWoyta/xos e/c 
TTporaaeoiv, 6 S' eXey^os avXXoyLcrp.6s , /cat o cAey- 
Xos karat e/c Trpordaewv. el ovv rj Trporaais ev 

15 Kad evos, (fiavepov on /cat ovros ev rfj rod iXeyxov 
ayvoLO.' cfyatverai yap elvat, Trporaais r) ovk ovaa 
Trporaais . ei piev ovi^ heSwKev aTTOKpiaiv (hs Trpos 
jLtt'ai' epwrrjaiv, earai eXey^os, el Se jxr) beSojKev 
aXXd (fyaiverai, ^aivopievos eXey^os. ware TTOvres 
OL rpoTTOi TTiTrrovaiv et? rrjv rov iXey^ov dyvoiav, 

20 OL fxev ovv TTapd rr)v Xe^iv, on (fyaivofxevq rf 
avri<j)aais , OTrep rjv iSiov rov eXeyxov, oi 8' aAAot 
TTapa rov rov avXXoyiajxov opov. 

VII. H S avarr] yiverai rcov jxev Trapd rrjv 
ofxwvvfjiiav /cat rov Xoyov ru) fir] Svvaadai Statpeii^ 
ro TToXXaxdJs Xeyofievov {evia yap ovk evrropov 

25 SieAeti', olov ro ev /cat to ov /cat ro ravrov), rcov 
Se TTapa avvdeaiv /cat hiaipeaiv rco p,rjhev oieadai 
hia(f)epeiv avvride/Jievov r) hiaipovfxevov rov Xoyov, 
KadaTTep ctti rwv TrXeiarwv. opioiojs Se /cat rcov 
TTapa rrjv TTpoacpSiav ov yap dXXo So/cet arjixaiveiv 
avUfxevos /cat eTTireivofievos 6 Xoyos, ctt' ovSevos 

^ Reading rponoi for tottoi with Michael Ephesius. 
* Adding tj with ^V allies. 
42 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi-vii 

to ' one single thing ' and to ' the thing ' simply ; 
the definition, for example, of ' man ' and of ' one 
single man ' is the same, and so, too, with the other 
instances. If, therefore, a ' single proposition ' is 
one which claims a single predicate for a single sub- 
ject, a ' proposition,' simply, will also be a question 
of this kind. And since reasoning is based on pro- 
positions, and refutation is a process of reasoning, 
refutation will also be based on propositions. If, 
therefore, a proposition is a single predication about 
a single thing, clearly this fallacy also depends on 
ignorance of the nature of refutation ; for what is 
not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore, 
a man has given an answer as though to a single 
question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not 
given it but only appears to have done so, there will 
be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds 
of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the 
nature of refutation — ^those connected with language 
because the contradiction, which is a particular char- 
acteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the 
rest because of the definition of reasoning. 

VII. In fallacies connected with verbal equivoca- [Note (/s). 
tion and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from above^fal- 
the inability to distinguish the various meanings of a |?cies arise 
term (for there are some which it is not easy to distin- fused think- 
guish, for example, the meanings of ' unity,' ' being ' |n|b1lity*^to 
and ' identity '). In fallacies connected with combina- make dis- 
tion and disj unction the deception is due to the supposi- 
tion that it makes no difference whether the term is 
combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case. 
So, too, in those connected with accentuation ; for 
it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter 
the significance of the word whether it is pronounced 

43 



ARISTOTLE 

169 a 

30 r) ovK eiTL TToWayv. tcov he rrapa to (T)(fjiia 8ta 

rrjv ofjLoiorrjra rrjg Xe^ewg. ^(^aXeTTOv yap hieXelv 

TToZa (haavrojs Kal rrola co? irepcos Xeyerat- crp^eSoi' 

yap 6 Tovro Sum/xcvo? TToielv eyyvs icm rod 

decopeiv rdXrjdes. /xaAicrra S' eTnoTTarai^ avveiTL- 

veveiv, on ttoLv to Karrjyopovpievov Tivos vtto- 

35 Xajx^dvojxev roSe rt kol d>s ev VTraKovofiev rep yap 
evl /cat rfj ovaia fxaXiara Sokcl TTapeTrecrdai ro 
roSe TL Kal ro ov. 8i6 Kal rcJov rrapd rrjv Xe^iv 
ovrog 6 rpoTTOS dereos, TrpaJrov jxev on pbdXXov rj 
aTTarrj yiverai jxer* dXXwv OKOTTovixevoig t] Kad 
avrovs {rj p.kv yap /xer^ dXXov cr/cei/fis" hid Xoywv, 

40 rj 8e KaO^ avrov ovx rjrrov St avrov rod rrpay- 
169 b /xaros'), etra Kal Kad^ avrov dTrardadai avpL^aivei, 
orav iirl rod Xoyov rroirjr ai rrjv (JKei/jw en rj jxev 
drrdrrj ck rrjs ojxoiorrjros , rj S' 6p.oiorrjs €K rrjs 
Ac^eajs'. TOJv he rrapa ro avpi^e^rjKOS hid ro [xrj 
hvvaaOai hiaKpiveiv ro ravrov Kal ro erepov /cat 
5 €1^ KOI TToXXd, [xrjhe rois rroiois rcov Karrjyoprjjxdrwv 
rravra ravrd Kal rep rrpdyfjian avji^e^rjKev. ojioiws 
he Kal rcov rrapd ro enojievov jiepos yap n rod 
avpi^e^rjKoros ro eirofxevov. en Kal errl ttoXXcov 
(f)aiverai Kal d^iodrai ovrcog, ei rohe dno rodhe 
jxrj )(0)pi^erai, p-rjh^ drro darepov ■)(a>pii[,eadai 6d- 

10 repov. rctjv he Trapd rrjv eXXeiifjiv rod Xoyov Kal 

^ Reading with Poste itnaTrdrai. for fTTiaTarat. 

44 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vii 

with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected 
with the form of expression the deception is due to 
similarity of language ; for it is difficult to distinguish 
what sort of things belong to the same and what to 
different categories ; for he who can do this very 
nearly approaches a vision of the truth. What in 
particular seduces us into giving our assent to the 
fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predi- 
cate of something is an individual thing and it pre- 
sents itself to our ears as a single thing ; for it is to 
the one and to substance that ' individuality ' and 
' being ' are generally held most truly to be attached. 
On this account also this kind of fallacy must be 
classed among those connected with language ; firstly, 
because the deception occurs more commonly when 
we are inquiring with others than by ourselves (for 
an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of 
words, whereas in our own minds it is cai-ried on quite 
as much by means of the thing itself) ; secondly, 
because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be 
deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of 
words ; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the 
similarity, and the similarity arises from the language. 
In fallacies connected with accident the deception is 
due to inability to distinguish the identical and the 
different, the one and the many, and what kinds of 
predicates have all the same accidents as their sub- 
ject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the con- 
sequent ; for the consequent is a branch of the 
accident. Furthermore, in many cases it appears 
to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A 
is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable 
from A. In fallacies connected with the defect in 
the definition of refutation and with the distinction 

45 



ARISTOTLE 

169 b 

rcjv TTapa to tttj Kal aTrAcDs" iv ro) irapa jxiKpov rj 
aTTarrj- cos yap ovSev TrpoaorjfxaLVov ro ri r^ tttj ^ 

TTCOS 7) TO VVV KadoXoV avy)(W pOV jXCV . OfJiOLWS §€ 
KaL 6771 Ttbv TO eV 0,p)(fj Xafl^aVOVTCDV Kal TOJV 

avaiTLwv, Kal oaoi to. TrXeico ipcoTrjfjiaTa cos ev 

15 TTOiovatv €V (ZTraCTt yap rj aTrdTTj 8ia to Trapa 
pLiKpov ov yap hiaKpi^ovpiev ovt€ ttjs npoTciuecos 
ovT€ Tov (TvXXoytcrpiov Tov opov Sta rrfv elp-qpevrjv 
air Lav. 

VIII. 'ETret 8' e^o/xev Trap' ooa yivovTai ol cftai- 
vopievoL ovXXoyLcjpoi, €)(op,€v Kal Trap* oiroaa ol 

20 ao^iGTLKol yevoLVT^ av avXXoyiapol Kal eXeyxot. 
Xeyco 8e aocjyLOTLKOv eXeyxov Kal avXXoyiapov ov 
fxovov TOV c/)aiv6p,evov ouAAoyio/xov ■^ eXeyxov, p,r) 
ovTa 8e, aAAa Kal rov ovTa p,€v, <f)aLv6pievov 8e 
oLKelov rov tt pay pharos, elal 8' ovtoi ol prj Kara 
TO TTpdypia eXeyxpvTes Kal SeiKvvvres dyvoovvTas , 

25 OTTep rjv Trjs TTCLpacjTtKrjs . eari 8' r) TretpacrTtKr) 
pbepos TTJs StaXe KTiKTJs- avrrj 8e 8uvaTat oyAAoyt- 
^eaOat ipevSos 8i' dyvoLav rod SlSovtos tov Xoyov. 
OL 8e ao^iaTLKol eXeyxoi, av Kal avXXoyit,covTai ttjv 
dvTL^aoLV, ov TToiovat SrjXov el dyvoel- Kal yap rov 
etSoTtt ipLTToSLl^ovcn TOVTOLS Tols XoyoLs • 

30 "Otl 8' €xop.€v avTovs Tjj avTrj piedoScp, SrjXov 
Trap oaa yap (f)ai,v€Tai tols aKovovaiv cl>s rjpcorr]- 
/xeva avXXeXoyiadaL, irapd TavTa Kav tco dnoKpivo- 
pievcp 86^€i€v, oiOT eaovrai awAAoyta/xot ipevSelg 
8ia TovTCOv 7] TravTCov r] evLCov o yap fx'q ipcxJTtjdels 
46 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vii-viii 

between a qualified and an absolute statement the 
deception is due to the minuteness of the difference ; 
for we regard the qualification of a particular case or 
respect or manner or time as having no extra signifi- 
cance and concede the universality of the proposition. 
So, too, when people assume the original point and 
when the wrong cause is assigned and when several 
questions are united in one ; for in all these cases 
the deception is due to the minuteness of the differ- 
ence ; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition 
of ' proposition ' and ' reasoning ' from the above- 
mentioned cause. 

V^III. Since we know the various sources from (c) J5j/ r«- 
which apparent reasonings arise, we also know those ^.^^J^ 
from which sophistical reasonings and refutations though valid, 
would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I to be germane 
mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or re- unde/dfs-'^^ 
futation but also one which, though real, only seems cmsion. 
to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand. 
These are those which fail to refute and show up 
ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand, 
and this is the function of examination. Now this is 
a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false con- 
clusion owing to the ignorance of the person under 
examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they 
prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear 
whether he is ignorant ; for men try to entrap even 
the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments. 

That we know them by the same method is clear ; [Note (a). 
for the same reasons which make the hearers think fe°futaUon8 
that a conclusion has been reached as a result of proceed on 
questions, would make the answerer think so too, lines a™^ 
so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or apparent 
some of these causes ; for what a man thinks he has 

47 



ARISTOTLE 

169 b 

35 oterat SeScoKevai, Kav ipcorrjOels deir], 7tXt]v cttI 

ye TLVOiv d/xa ay/x^atVei Trpoaepiordv to eVSee? /cai 

TO ifjcvhog €fJi(f)aVLl,€LV, oloV €V TOiS TTapO. TTjV Xi^LV 

/cat Tov aoXoLKLUpLov. el ovv ol TTapaXoyidf^ol TTJg 

avTi(f>da€a>s Trapd tov (j^aivofxevov eXeyxov elai, hi]- 

Xov OTL Trapd ToaavTa dv /cat tcov ipevhwv ctrjaav 

40 cruAAoytCT/xoi Trap' daa /cat o ^aivop.evo's eXeyxos. 

170* o 8e (j>aLv6pi€vos irapd ra /Ltopta tov dXrjOLvov- eKd- 

cfTov ydp cKXeLTTovTOS (f)av€Lrj dv eXeyxos, otov 6 

rrapa to ^t) avpL^alvov Sid tov Xoyov, 6 els to 

aSvvaTov /cat o Tds Svo ipwTrjaeis fxlav ttoiwv Trapd 

TTjv TTpoTacriv, /cat dvTi tov Ka9* avTO 6 Trapd to 

5 av/jb^ePrjKog, /cat to tovtov pbopiov, 6 Trapd to 

eTTOfjievov ctl to jjirj eVt tov TTpdypt.aTOS dXX iirl 

TOV Xoyov avix^alveiv etr' ai^rt tov KadoXov tt^v 

avTi(f)a(nv /cat /cara rauro /cat Trpog rauro /cat 

ojcravTcos Trapa re to CTrt rt ry 77a/3 e/caarov towtoji'* 

ert rrapd to p.r] evapid p,ovp.evov tov iv dpxfj to ev 

10 dpxfj Xafx^dveiv. coot e;^ot/uev av Trap ooa yivovTai, 

ol TTapaXoyia/JLol' vapd TrXeitu fiev ydp ovk dv elev, 

Trapa 8e to, elprjfieva eaovTai vavres. 

"EcTTt S' o aot^LOTLKos eXey^os ovx aTrXcos eXey- 
XOS, dXXd TTpog Ttva- /cat o avXXoyiapLOS (haarrrajg. 
48 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, viii 

conceded without being questioned, he would grant 
if he were to be questioned. But of course it some- 
times happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite 
question, we make the falsehood obvious, as happens 
in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If, 
therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on 
the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of 
false conclusions must be also due to the same 
number of causes as the apparent refutation. Now 
the apparent refutation depends on the elements 
which compose a genuine one ; for, if any one of 
these is lacking, there would only be an apparent 
refutation, for example, that which is due to the 
conclusion not resulting from the argument (the 
reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites 
two questions in one and is due to a fault in the pro- 
position, and that which is due to the substitution 
of an accident for the essence of a thing, and—a 
subdivision of the last mentioned — that which is due 
to the consequent ; moreover, there is the case where 
the result follows in word only and not in reality, and 
also where, instead of the contradiction being uni- 
versal and in the same respect, relation and manner, 
there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with 
another of these qualifications ; and then again there 
is the case of the assumption of the original point due 
to a disregard of the principle of not reckoning it in. 
Thus we should know the various conditions under 
which false proofs occur, for there are no further 
conditions under which they could occur, but they 
will always result from the above causes. 

A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refuta- [Note O). 
tion but is relative to some person, and so likewise ^af refuta- 
is a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which tion is not 

49 



ARISTOTLE 

170 a 

av [lev yap ixrj Xa^rj 6 re Trapa ro oiioivvjJLOv ev 
15 orjf^aiveLV Kat o Trapa rrjv 6fX0L0(Jxy]IJ'0avv7}v ro 
fMOvov ToSe Kat ol aAAot cLaavrws, out* eXeyxoi 
ovre uvAAoyLapLol eaovrai, ov9^ 0.77X0)5 oure Trpog 
rov epojTCjojJLevov eav he Xa^oiai, irpos fxkv tov 
epuJTOJfxevov kaovrai, aTrXcos S' ovk eaovTai- ov yap 
ev arjixalvov elXyjcfiaaLV, dXXa (fiaivofievov, kol Tra^a 
TovSe. 

20 IX. riapa TToaa 8' iXeyxovrai ol iXey)(6p,€Voi, 
ov Set TretpdadaL Xa^^dveiv dvev rrj? tojv ovtojv 
eTTicrrrjiJirjs aTravrcov. tovto S' ovSe/xta? icrrl re;^- 
V7]5- aTTeipoi yap 'laojg at eVtcTT^/xai, otare S-^Aov 
OTL /cat at aTToSei^et?. eXeyxot 8' etcrt koX dX'qOels' 
oaa yap kariv aTToSet^aL, eari /cat eXey^ai rov 

26 Be/xevov rrjv avri^aaiv rov dXrjdovs, olov el avfi- 
puerpov rrjv Biafxerpov edrjKev, eXey^eiev av rt? rfj 
aTToSet^et oVt davpup^erpos. ioare Trdvrcov Se'qaec 
€7narT]p,ovas elvai- ol p,ev yap eaovrai irapd rds 
ev yecop,erpLa ap^o-s /cat rd rovrojv avpTrepdapara, 
OL he Trapa ret? ev larpiKjj, ol he Trapa rds rcov 

80 aAAtov eTTLorrjpwv. dXXd p,rjv /cat ol ijjevhetg eXey^oi 
opiOLCog ev dTTeipoi'S' /ca^' eKaarrjv yap rexyr]v earl 
i/jevhrj? avXXoyiapiog , olov Kara yeojpberplav 6 yeoj- 
p,erpiK6s Kal Kara larpiKTjv 6 larpiKos. Xeyco he 
ro Kara rrjv re^y^v ro Kara ra? eKelvtjs dp^ds. 

36 hrjXov ovv OTi ov Trdvrcov rdJv eXey^iov dXXd rcov 

50 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vni-ix 

depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal absolute 
term has only a single meaning, and unless that which relative 
depends on similarity of termination assumes that ^ *^he 
there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation 
nor proof will be possible, either absolutely or rela- 
tively, to the answerer ; whereas, if they do make 
these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to 
the answerer, but not absolutely ; for they have not 
secured a statement which has a single meaning but 
only one which appears to be such, and only from a 
particular person. 

IX. Without a knowledge of everything which [Note (y). A 
exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways ^^p of aU 
in which the refutation of those who are refuted is refutations 
brought about. This, however, is not the function sible, be- 
of any art ; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and a?etnflnft^ 
so clearly demonstrations are also infinite. Now in number.] 
there are true as well as false refutations ; for wher- 
ever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to 
refute him who maintains the contradictory of the 
truth ; for example, if a man maintains that the 
diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides, 
one should refute him by proving that it is incom- 
mensurate. So we shall need to have scientific 
knowledge of everything ; for some refutations will 
depend on the principles of geometry and their con- 
clusions, others on those of medicine, and others on 
those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refuta- 
tions also are among things which are infinite ; for 
every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a 
geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By 
' peculiar to an art ' I mean ' in accordance with the 
pi-inciples of that art.' It is clear, then, that we 
need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations 

51 



ARISTOTLE 

170 a 

napa rrjv ScaXeKTiKrjv XrjTrreov rovs tottovs' ovtol 
yap KOLvoL TTpos o-Traaav rexvqv /cat BwafiLV. Kai 
Tov pbkv Kad^ eKdarrjv €7Ti,arrjjjirjv eXeyx^ov rod ein- 
OTT^p^ovos iaTL deojpelv, etre pbr^ wv (^atVerat ei t 
eari, 8ia rl eari' rov 8' e/c reov koivcov /cat vtto 
40 pLrjhepbiav rixvrjv rwv StaAe/crt/ccor. et yap cxofxev 
i^ (Lv ol evho^ot avXXoyLupiol irepl otlovv, kyop^€V 

170b e^ cLv ol eXey^oi' 6 yap eXey^os iariv dvTtcfiaaecos 
avXXoyiapLos, cScrr' -^ et? r] Suo ovXXoytup^oL avri- 
<j)daeois eXey^ds eariv. e)(op,ev dpa Trap o-rroaa 
rrdvres etcrtv ot tolovtol. et he rovr e;)^o/xev, /cat 
5 TO.? Xvoeis e)(opi€v at yap toutwv ivardaei'S Xvaeis 
elaiv. €)(op,€v he, Trap oTvoaa yivovrai., /cat rovs 
(f)aLVOfji€vovs, cf)aivop,€vovs Se ovx otwovv dXXd rot? 
TOtotaSe* aopLora ydp iariv, idv rts" gkottt] Trap 
OTToaa (jyaivovrai roZs rv^ovatv . a>are cf>avep6v 
OTL rov SiaXeKriKov iarl ro Svvaadai Xa^elv rrap 
daa ycverai. Sta rcov KOLvaJv fj d)V eXey^os rj cfjaivo- 
10 puevos eXeyxos, /cat rj StaAe/crt/co? r) ^atvo/xevo? 
StaAe/CTt/co? t) TreipaarLKOS . 

X. OvK ear I 8e hia<j)opd rd)v Xoycov r^v Xiyovai 
rives, ro elvai rovs pt,€V rrpos rovvofia Xoyovs, 
erepovs 8e irpos rrjV Bidvoiav droTTOv ydp ro vtto- 
16 Xap^fidveiv dXXovs pev elvai rrpos rovvop,a Xoyovs, 
erepovs he irpds rrjv Sidvoiav, aAA' ov rovs avrovs. 
Tt ydp CCTTt ro p,rj rrpos rr]v Btdvoiav aAA' t) orav 
p,r) p^p-^rat rep ovopiari, e0' a) olopievos epwrdadai^ 

^ Heading witli I'oste e^' c5 olofitvos ipwraoBai for olofitvos 
ipujTdadaL e'<^' at of the mss. 

52 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ix-x 

but only those which concern dialectic ; for these are 
common to every art and faculty. And it is the func- 
tion of the scientific man to examine the refutation [Note («). 
which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is tions of the 
apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so ; diiUectician 
whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a scientLst 
refutation which depends on common principles which g^ghed.] 
do not fall under any one art. For if we know the 
sources of generally accepted proofs about any par- 
ticular subject, we know also the sources of the refu- 
tations ; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory, 
and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a 
refutation. We know, then, the various sources of all 
such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their 
solutions ; for the objections to these are the solu- 
tions. We also know the various sources of apparent 
refutations — apparent, that is, not to everyone but 
only to a certain kind of mind ; for it would be an 
endless task to examine the various ways in which 
they are apparent to the man in the street. It is, 
therefore, clear that it is the function of the dia- 
lectician to be able to grasp the various ways in 
which, on the basis of common principles, a real or 
apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently 
dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about. 

X. No real distinction, such as some people pro- [Note (e). 
pose, exists between arguments used against the word tincttons J 
and those used against the thought ; for it is absurd («) Argu- 
to suppose that some arguments are used against against the 
the word and others against the thought, and not the ^°J^*^ ^ 
same in both cases. For what is failure to use the against the 
argument against the thought except what happens °"^ " 
when a man does not apply the term in the meaning 
about which the man questioned thought that he 

5S 



ARISTOTLE 

170 b 

o epa>rcofX€vo? eScu/cev; ro S' avTo rovro ecrrt /cat 

77/30? TOVVOfXa. TO §6 77/30S" TT^V' StCtVOta;^, OTttV €^' 

20 o) eScfj/cev Siavorjdeis. el Sr^^ TrAetco ar]fxaLvovTOS 
rod ovofjiaros o'lolto ev arjixaiveiv /cat o epcorajv 
/cat o epajra)[M€Vos, olov tao)? to 6V ■^ to ev ttoXXo. 
arj[j,aLveL, aAAa /cat o oiTTOKpLvofievos /cat o epojrcov^ 
ev OLOfjuevos etrat Tqpojrrjae, /cat eanv 6 Aoyo? oVt 
ei^ 77ai'Ta, oi5Tos' Trpo? rovvofxa earai r) Trpos" tt^v 

25 Stavotav Tou epcDTcofxevov StetAeyyu-evo?; et 8e ye 
Tt? TToAAct oieTat arjfjiaiveiv, SrjXov on ov Trpos ttjv 
OLoivoiav. TTptoTOV jxev yap irepl rovs tolovtov^ 
ecTTL Xoyovs to Trpos Tovvofxa /cat Trpos ttjv hidvoiav 
OCTot irXeio} ar^ixaivovaiv , eiTa irepl ovtlvovv eoTiv 
ov yap ev TCp Xoyco earl to Trpos ttjv SidvoLav elvai, 

30 aAA' ev TO) Tov aTTOKpivopLevov e^^i-v ttios Trpos to. 
oeoofjieva. elra Trpos Tovvofxa TrdvTas evSex^rac 
avTOVs etv'at. to yap Trpos rovvofia to /xtj Trpos 
TTjv Stavotav eti^at eaTtv ivTavda. el yap fir) TrdvTes, 
eaovTat, rives erepot ovre Trpos TouVo/xa outc Trpos 
rrqv hidvoiav ol he <f)aai ndvras, /cat hiaipovvrai 
36 rj Trpos rovvo/Jia r) Trpos rrjv Sidvoiav etvai Trdvras, 
dXXovs S' ov. dXXd fi'qv oaoi (JvXXoyiap.OL elai 
irapa ro TrXeova^ajs , tovtojv elai rives ot vapd 

^ Omitting ns after et 817. 
* Omitting Ti-qvotv after epcoru^v as a gloss. 

54 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 

was being questioned when he made the concession ? 
And this is equivalent to using it against the word ; 
whereas to use it against the thought is to. apply it 
to the sense about which the man was thinking when 
he made the concession. If, then, when the word has 
more than one meaning, both the questioner and 
the man questioned were to think that it had only 
one meaning — as, for example, ' unity ' and ' being ' 
have several meanings but both the answerer answers 
and the questioner puts his question on the supposi- 
tion that there is only one meaning and that the 
argument is that all things are one — will the argu- 
ment have been directed against the word and not 
rather against the thought of the man questioned ? 
If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word 
has several meanings, obviously the argument is not 
directed against the thought. For application to 
the word and application to the thought belong 
primarily to arguments which signify several things 
ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument what- 
soever ; for the application to the thought does not 
depend on the argument but on a certain attitude 
of mind in the answerer towards what has been con- 
ceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be 
applied to the word ; for in the case under dis- 
cussion ' to be applied to the word ' means ' not to 
be applied to the thought.' For if all are not applied 
to the word or the thought, there will be a third class 
not applied to either ; but they declare that the 
classification is exhaustive and divide them into those 
applied to the word and those applied to the thought, 
and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact, 
reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those 
dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an 

55 



ARISTOTLE 

170 b 

Tovvofia. aroTTO)? /iev yap koL e'iprjrai ro Tiapa 

Tovvojjia (f)dvaL Travras tovs rrapa rrjv Xe^LV aAA' 

ovv elai rive? TrapaXoyiap.ol ov rep rov arroKpivo- 

fjuevov Trpo'S rovrovs €)^€lv ttojs, dXXa ro) tolovSI 

40 epcurrj/xa top Xoyov avrov e-)(eiv, o TrAetco arjpbaivei. 

171 a "OAco? re droTTov to Trepl iXeyxov biaXeyeadaL, 

dXXd fMrj irporepov irepl avXXoyiafxov' 6 yap eXey^os 
avXXoyia/Jios eariv, (Lare XP'^ '<o.i nepl avXXoyLap.ov 
irporepov r] nepl ipevSovs eXeyxov eari yap 6 tolov- 
6 ros eXeyxos (f>aLv6jjievos cryAAoyiCT/xo? dvTL(f>dcr€(x)g . 
Sio rj ev TO) avXXoyiupid) earai ro airiov rj ev rfj 
dvrL(f)da€L {TrpocrKelaOai yap Set r'qv dvTL<f)aaiv) , 
ore 8' ei^ dfjicfyolv, dv fj t^aivoixevos eXey^os. eari 
8e o fiev rod criyuyvra Xeyeiv ev rfj dvri^daet, ovk 
ev ro) (jvXXoyiapiai, 6 he, d [mtj exoi rts", hovvai, ev 

10 dp,(f}OLV, 6 he on rj 'Ojxiqpov rroir^oL^ crx'^P'O- hid rod 
kvkXov ev rep avXXoyLafMco. 6 8' ev firjherepcp 
dXrjdrjs avXXoy(,ap,6s. 

'AAAa Brj odev 6 Xoyos rjXde, irorepov ol ev TOt? 
liadriixaai Xoyoi rrpos rrjv hcdvoidv elcnv ri ov; /cat 
el rivi hoKeZ TToXXd ar^fiaLveiv ro rpiycavov, /cat 

16 ehojKe p.7] (hg rovro ro ax'fjfia €(f>' ov avveTrepdvaro 
on hvo opdai, vorepov irpos rrjv hidvoiav ovros 
hietXeKrat rrjv eKeivov r) ov ; 

"Ert el TToXXd p.ev arjixaivei rovvopLa, 6 he fx-q voel 
56 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 

absurd statement that ' dependent on the name ' 
describes all arguments connected with language. 
The truth is that there are some false arguments 
which do not depend on a particular attitude of 
mind on the part of the answerer towards them but 
are due to the fact that the argument itself involves 
the kind of question which can bear more than one 
meaning. 

It is quite absurd to discuss refutation without (Refutation 
previously discussing proof ; for refutation is a proof, 
and so we ought to discuss proof before discussing 
false refutation ; for such refutation is an apparent 
proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of 
falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contra- 
diction (for the contradiction must be added), but 
sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent 
refutation. In the argument that ' the silent speaks,' 
the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the 
proof ; in the argument that ' a man can give away 
what he has not got,' it lies in both ; in the argu- 
ment that ' Homer's poetry is a figure ' because it 
forms a ' cycle,' it lies in the proof. The argument 
that errs in neither respect is a true proof. 

But to resume from the point whence the argu- 
ment digressed," Are mathematical arguments always 
apphed to the thought or not ? If anyone thinks 
that the term ' triangle ' has several meanings and 
has granted it in a sense other than a figure which 
he has proved to contain two right angles, has the 
questioner reasoned against the answerer's thought 
or not ? 

Further, if the name has several meanings but the 
answerer does not think or imagine that this is so, 

« 170 b 40. 

57 



ARISTOTLE 

171 a 

jLtrjo otWat, TTco? ovto? ov rrpos rrjv Sidvoiav Stei- 

AeKTai; rj ttcDs" Set ipcordv ttXtjv StSovat Staipeaiv, 
20 etT epuiTiqaei} ti? ei eart criyoii'Ta Aeyetv "^ ou, "^ 
kari, ixev co? ou, eWt 8' a»? vat; et Si^ Ti? Soi'tj 
fxrjSafico^ , 6 Se StaAe;)^0et7y, dp' oj3 Trpo? ti^v Stdvotav 
SietAeKTat; /caiVot o Aoyos' So/cet tcDv rrapd rov- 
vofxa eivat. ou/c apa eart yevog tl Xoycov to Trpos 
TTjv SidvoLav. aAA' ot /xev Trpos" Tovvofxa elaf /cat 

25 TOLOVTOt, ov TTaVTCS, OV)( OTt Ot €,Xey)(oi , dAA' Ol5S' 
ot <f>aiv6{M€VOL eAey;^ot. etat yd/a /cat /xt) vrapd tt^v 
Xe^iv (fyaivojJLevoi, eXeyxot, olov ol Trapd to o-fjLt- 

^e^TjKOS Koi €T€pOl. 

Et 8e Tt? d^tot Statjoetv, ort Ae'yoj 8e aiywvra 
Xeyeiv rd piev d>Bl rd 8' co8t, dAAd rovro y' eVrt 

30 7Tpa)Tov juev droTrov, to d^tow (evt'oTe ydp ou So/cci 
TO epcoTOjpievov TToXXax^Js e-)(^eiv, dhvvarov 8e 
Stat/aeiv o /X7y oteTat) • eVeiTa to 8t8dor/<:etv ti d'AAo 
earai; (f>avep6v yap TvoL-qcret a»s" e\'ei rd) fi'qT^ 
CCT/ce/A/xeVoj /xt^t etSoTt p-TJd* vTroXapL^dvovri otl dX- 
Xcog Xeyerai. inel /cat iv rots p^rj StTrAotS" Tt KcoXvei 

3b rovro TTaOeiv; dpa 'laai at piovdhes raZs hvdaiv iv 
rots rerrapcnv ; etat 8e bvdhes at /xev a»8i evouaai 
at Be a»8t. /cat dpa tojv ivavricov {.ua eTTLcrry'jpiT^ rj 
ov; eari 8' ivavria rd p,ev yvcoard rd 8' dyva;o'Ta. 

^ Reading efr' ipwrrjan, for eir' tpwrrfoeie, 

58 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 

has not the questioner reasoned against his thought ? 
Or how else must the question be asked except by 
oflPering a distinction ? In which case one will ask, 
' Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when 
silent, or is the answer in one sense " No," in another 
" Yes " ? ' But if the answerer were to refuse to 
grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner 
were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued 
against the thought of his opponent ? Yet the argu- 
ment is generally regarded as among those connected 
with the name ; there is not, therefore, any class 
of argument which is directed against the thought. 
Some arguments are directed against the name, and 
such arguments are not all of them even apparent 
refutations, still less true refutations. For there are 
also apparent refutations which are not connected 
with language, for example, amongst others, those 
connected with accident. 

But if one claims to make distinctions, saying, 
' By " the silent speaking " I mean sometimes one 
thing and sometimes another,' this claim is, in the 
first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does 
not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impos- 
sible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is 
suspected) ; and, secondly, what else \vill didactic 
argument be but this ? For it will make clear the 
position to one who neither has considered nor knows 
nor conceives that a second meaning is possible. 
For why should not the same process be used where 
there is no double meaning ? ' Are the units in four 
equal to the twos ? Bear in mind that the twos are 
contained in one sense in one way and in another 
sense in another way.' Again, ' Is the knowledge 
of contraries one or not ? Notice that some contraries 

59 



ARISTOTLE 

171 b OJOT eoLK€v ayvoelv 6 rovro d^Lwv on erepov ro 
oioacTKeLV rod SiaXeyeadat, /cat on Set rov jjiev 
SiSdaKovra jxrj ipcurdv dAA' avrov SrjXa TroLelv, rov 
S ipcordv. 

XI. 'Ert TO (f)dvaL rj dnocjidvai d^iovv ov §ei- 

Kvvvros iOTiv, dXXd rrelpav Xafi^dvovros . r) yap 

5 TTeLpaariK-q eart hiaXeKriKiq tls kol Oeojpel ov rov 

etoora aAAa rov dyvoovvra /cat irpoaTTOLovfxevov . 

piev ovv Kara ro irpdyfia detopcov rd Kotvd Sia- 
XeKTLKOs, 6 Se rovro cf)ai,vop,€VOJS ttolcov ao(f>i(jriK6s . 
Kal avXXoyiapios ipiariKos Kal aofjiianKos ianv 
els p-ev 6 (f)aLv6p,€vos avXXoyiap-os, Trepl d>v rj 8ta- 

10 XeKrLKrj TretpaariK-q eart, kov dXrjdes ro crvpLTrepaapba 
fj' rov ydp 8ta ri dTrarrjriKos iarf Kal oaoi p,r] 
ovres Kara rrjv CKaarov pbldohov TrapaXoyiupLol 
SoKovatv elvai Kara rr)v r€)(yr]v. rd ydp ipevSoypa- 
(f)ripLara ovk ipiariKa (/cara ydp rd vtto rrjv r€-)(yrjv 

01 TTapaXoyLap^oi) , ovBe y' et ri iari ili€vSoypd(f}rjp,a 
15 Trepl dXrjdeg, otov ro 'iTTTTOKpdrovs rj 6 rerpayw- 

viapLos 6 8ta ru)v p,r)VLaKcov. aAA' ws Bpvatov 
ererpaya)Vi^€ rov kukXov, el Kal rer payoivi^eraL 6 
kvkXos, aAA' oTt ov Kard ro Trpdypba, hid rovro 
ao^iarLKos. aycrre 6 re Trepl rcovhe <j>at,v6p.evos 
avXXoyiapios ipiariKos Xoyos, Kal 6 Kard ro Trpdypba 

" On the method of squaring the circle by means of 
lunules and those employed by Hippocrates and Bryson see 
Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical Works (Loeb Classical 
Library), vol. I, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314- 
317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph. El. pp. 245 ff. 

60 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x-xi 

are knowable, others are not.' Thus the man who (6) Didactic 
makes this claim seems not to know that didactic is ^ai argu- 
one thing and dialectic another, and that the man ^ent. 
who employs didactic should not ask questions but 
himself make things clear, while the dialectician 
asks questions. 

XI. Further, to demand that the answerer should (c) Exami- 
either affirm or deny is not the function of one who contentious 
is displaying something but of one who is making ^ifi"™icai^ 
an examination. For the art of examination is a argument. 
kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who 
knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends 
to know. The man, then, who views general prin- 
ciples in the light of the particular case is a dia- 
lectician, while he who only apparently does this is 
a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic 
reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with 
which dialectic deals as a method of examination, 
even though the conclusion be true ; for it is deceptive 
in the matter of cause. Then there are those false 
reasonings which do not accord with the method of 
inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to accord 
with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures 
are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies accord 
with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is 
the case with any false figure illustrating something 
which is true, for example, Hippocrates' figure or the 
squaring of the circle by means of lunules." On the 
other hand, Bryson's method of squaring the circle, 
even though this be successful, is nevertheless 
sophistical, because it does not accord with the sub- 
ject-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent 
reasoning on these topics is a contentious argument, 
and any reasoning which merely appears to accord 

61 



ARISTOTLE 

171 b 

20 ^aivo^Levos avXXoyiafxos, kolv fj avWoyiaixos , ipi- 
OTLKos Aoyo?- (f)aiv6iX€vos yap eari Kara to Trpa.yp,a, 
oictt' aTTarrjTLKos koL aBiKog. warrep yap r] ev 
dycovi dStKTta etSo? rt e;)^et /cat cariv ahiKo^xa^^ia 
Tig, ovTCJS €v avTiXoyia ahiKop^a^ia rj epiOTiKr] 
eariv eKel re yap ol TravTco? vlkolv Trpoaipovfievot 

25 TTavTOiv OLTTTOVTai Ktti €vrav6a OL eptOTLKOL. OL jxev 
odv TTJs VLKTjg avrrjs X^P''^ tolovtol ipiarLKol av- 
dpojTTOL Kal (/itAepiSes" Sokovolv etvai, ol 8e ho^rjs 
;^aptv TTJg elg ^^p-qpLaTLafiov ao(f)LarLKOL' r] yap 
cro(f)LurLKTj eoTLV, ojarrep eiTro/xev', ;^p7j/xaTtcrTt/cr^ 
TLg aiTO ao^iag (fyaLvofievrjg, Sto (f>aLVoiJLevr}s oltto- 

30 Seifew? €(f)L€VTaL. Kal rcov Xoytov twv avrcbv fxiv 
eloLV ol ^iXepiheg Kal ao<f)LaraL, aXX ov rajv avroJv 
ev€Kev. Kal Xoyos o avros jjLev karaL ao(f)LaTLK6g 
Kal ipiaTLKos, aAA' ov Kara ravrov, aAA' t^ fxev 
VLKTjg (f)aLvofX€vr]g, ipLOTLKog, fj Be ao(f)Lag, ao<j>La- 
TLKog- Kal yap rj aocfiLaTLKT] ean <j)aLvopLev7j ao(f)La 

35 TLg aAA' ovK ovcra. o 8 epiariKog earL rrcog ovrcog 
€)(^a>v TTpog rov SiaAe/crt/cov wg 6 ifi€vSoypd(j)og vpog 
rov yeoiixerpLKOv Ik yap rcov avraJv ru) StaAe/CTt/caJ^ 
TTapaXoyi^eraL Kal o ifjevSoypacpog rco yeuipierprj.^ 
aAA' o jiev OVK epLOTLKog , on €k rcov apx^iv Kal 
172 a avpLTTepaafMarojv roJv vtto rrjv r€-)(yrjv ^€vhoypa.(f>€i • 
6 S' 0770 TTjV hiaXcKTLKrjv TT€.pl jikv TcxAAa OTL ipi- 

1 Reading roi hiaXeKTiKco with Wallies for hiaXeKTLKfj. 
^ Reading ru) yeoi/jLeTpT] with Poste for tov yeajfxeTpTjv. 

« 165 a 22. 
62 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi 

with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine 
reasoning, is contentious argument ; for it only 
apparently accords with the subject-matter and so 
is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an 
athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair 
kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an un- 
fair kind of fighting in argument ; for in the former 
case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick 
at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious 
arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely ['^'^ ^po'^^" ^ 
to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious sophistical 
and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a argument. 
reputation which will help them to make money are 
regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said," the 
art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades 
on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent 
proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same 
arguments, but not for the same reasons ; and the 
same argument will be sophistical and contentious 
but not from the same point of view. If the semblance 
of victory is the motive, it is contentious ; if the 
semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical : for sophistry 

is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The («) Further 
^' . , , 1 .• J. comparisons 

contentious arguer bears much the same relation to between 

the dialectician as the drawer of false geometrical and^^ia."'^* 

figures bears to the geometrician ; for he reasons lectical 

falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while *''K"™®'^ • 

the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis 

as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a 

contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false 

figure on the principles and conclusions which come 

under the art of geometry, whereas the former, 

arguing on principles which come under dialectic, 

will clearly be contentious on the other subjects. 

63 



ARISTOTLE 

172 a 

(jTLKos ecrrat SijXov. olov 6 rerpayiovia^os 6 fjbkv 
oia Tcov firjviaKCDv ovk epLariKos, 6 8e 3pvaa)vos 
epLGTLKos- /cat rov fiev ovk eari fMereveyKelv aXX' 
5 rj TTpo's yecufierpiav /xovov Sta to e/c tcov Ihicov 
€LvaL apxoJv, Tov Se rrpos ttoXXovs, oaoL /xr) taaoL 
TO hvvaTov iv eKoiaTcp Kal to aSvvaTov dpfwaei 
yap. T] (Lg 'AvTLcfywv iTeTpaycovilev. rj et rt? jxr] 
(f>alrj ^cXtiov elvai (xtto SeiTrvov TrepiTTaTelv Sia tov 
7.7]vcovog Xoyov, ovk laTpiKog- kolvos yo-p- et ftev 
10 ovv navTr] o/jlolcos €*X^^ ^ ipLOTtKos Trpos tov 8ta- 
XcKTLKov Tcp i/j€vBoypd(/)cp 77/30? TOV yeiojjbeTprjv, ovk 

dv -qV TTCpl €K€LVCOV CpLOTLKOS. VVV S' OVK CGTiV 6 

SiaXeKTLKos TTepl yevos tl dipiapbivov, ovhe heiK- 
TiKos ovSevos, ovSe TotovTog otos 6 KadoXov. ovt€ 
yap eoTiv diravTa iv evi tlvi yeVet, ovt€ el eirj, olov 

15 re VTTo ras" aura? dpxd's elvai to. oVra. cuctt' ov- 
Be/Jiia Texvrj tcov SeiKwovcrcov Ttvd <j>vai,v ipcoTrj- 
TLKYj eoTLV ov ydp e^eoTLV OTTOTcpovovv tcov fioptcov 
Sovvai- (jvXXoycap^os ydp ov ytVerai e^ dp,<^olv. t] 
he. hiaXeKTiKT] ipcxJTTjTiK'q iuTiv. el S' iSeiKwev, 
el Kal fxrj TrdvTa, dXXd Ta ye npcoTa Kal rd? oiKeias 

20 dpxds OVK dv rjpcoTa. fxr) SiSovto?^ ydp ovk dv en 
etx^v e^ cLv ert SiaAe^crai Trpos ttjv evoTacxiv. -q 
^ Bekker's 8i86vras is a misprint for StSovros. 

' See Phys. 185 a 17 ; Ivor Thomas, op. cit. pp. 310-317. 
' That motion is impossible ; see Phys. 239 b 10 ff. 

64 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi 

For example, the squaring of the circle by means of 
lunules is not contentious, whereas Bry son's method 
is contentious. It is impossible to transfer the 
former outside the sphere of geometry because it 
is based on principles which are peculiar to geo- 
metry, whereas the latter can be used against many 
disputants, namely, all those who do not know what 
is possible and what impossible in any particular 
case ; for it will always be applicable. And the 
same is true of the way in which Antiphon used to 
square the circle." Or, again, if someone were to 
deny that it is better to take a walk after dinner 
because of Zeno's argument,'' it would not be a 
medical argument ; for it is of a general application. 
Accordingly, if the contentious argument stood in 
every respect in the same relation to the dialectical as 
the constructor of false figures stands to the geo- 
metrician, there would be no contentious argument 
on those topics. But, as it is, dialectical argument 
has no definite sphere, nor does it demonstrate any- 
thing in particular, nor is it of the nature of the 
universal. For there is no genus which includes all 
things, and, if there were, it would not be possible for 
them to come under the same principles. So no art 
which aims at showing the nature of anything pro- 
ceeds by interrogation ; for it is impossible to grant 
either one of two portions of the question ; for a proof 
cannot result from both of them. Dialectic, however, 
does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed 
at showing something, it would refrain from ques- 
tions, if not about everything, at any rate about 
primary things and particular principles ; for if the 
opponent refused to grant these, dialectic would no 
longer have any basis on which to argue against the 

D 65 



ARISTOTLE 

172 a 

o avTTj /cat TTeLpaarLKrj. ovhk yap rj TTeipaaTLKrj 

roiavrrj iarlv ota rj yeco/xerpta, dAA' 7]v av e;^oi 
Kat /XT] elSwg tls- e^ean yap rrelpav Xafielv /cat 
rov p,7] elSora to irpdypia rod fxrj elSoros, etVep 

25 /cat 8i8a)CTtv ovK i^ wv otSei^ ouS' e/c tcjv Ihiiov, 
aXK e/c Tcbv €7TOfj,€va)v, oaa roiavTO. iartv a eiSora 
fjiev ovSev KcoXvei fxrj etSeVai rrjv re^vrfv, fxr) etSdra 
8 avayKT] ayvoelv. (Zcrre (jiavepov on ovSevos 
(hpiapLevov 7] TreipaaTLKYj eTnariqixrj eariv. 8to /cat 
Trept TravTcov ecrrf Trdaat yap at T€)(vaL )(p(JovraL 

30 /cat /cotvot? riaiv. 8to iravTes /cat ot tSta/rat rponov 
TLvd ;^pcijVTat tt^ StaAe/crt/c^ /cat TreipaoTiKfj- navres 
yap P'^XP'' "^^^^^ eyx^tpova-LV avaKptveiv rovs inay- 
yeXXop,evovs. ravra 8 eart ra kolvo.- ravra yap 
ovSev rjrrov 'laaaiv avrol, Kav So/ccuat Atay e^a> 
Xeyeiv. iXeyxovaiv ovv airavres- drexvcog yap 

35 p,€rexovaL rovrov ov ivrexyoiS rj StaAe/crt/c?^ eari, 
/cat o T€XV7) avXXoyLcrriKJ] TreipaariKos StaAe/cTi/cd?. 
67761 8' €<TTt TToAAct /xev TauTa^ /caTo. TTavroiv, ov 
roiavra 8' ojar€ (f>vatv TLvd eivaL /cat yero?, dAA' 
olov at d7TO(f)da€Lg, ra 8' oi; roiavra dXXd t8ta, 
eoTLV e/c Toyro^v Trept d.TrdvTCtJi' Trelpav Aa/XjSdvetv, 

^ Reading Taurd for ratJra with BC and omitting koi with 
AB. 

66 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi 

objection. Dialectic is at the same time an art of 
examination ; for neither is the art of examination 
of the same nature as geometry but it is an art which 
a man could possess even without any scientific 
knowledge. For even a man without knowledge 
of the subject can examine another who is without 
knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based 
not on what he knows nor on the special principles 
of the subject but on the consequential facts, which 
are such that, though to know them does not prevent 
him from being ignorant of the art in question, yet 
not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of 
it. Clearly, therefore, the art of examination is not 
knowledge of any definite subject, and it therefore 
follows that it deals with every subject ; for all the 
arts employ also certain common principles. Accord- 
ingly, everyone, including the unscientific, makes 
some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examina- 
tion ; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to test 
those who profess knowledge. Now this is where the 
common principles come in ; for they know these of 
themselves just as well as the scientists, even though 
their expression of them seems to be very inaccurate. 
Thus they all practise refutation ; for they perform 
unmethodically the task which dialectic performs 
methodically, and the man who carries out an 
examination by means of an art of reasoning is a 
dialectician. Now there are many identical principles 
in every sphere, but these are not such as to have 
a particular nature and form a particular class — 
resembling, in this respect, negations — while others 
are not of this kind but limited to special spheres ; 
it is, therefore, possible by means of these to hold ex- 
aminations on every subject, and that there can be an 

67 



ARISTOTLE 

172 b Kai elvai rex^qv rivd, Kal fjurj roiavr'qv elvai oiai 
at oeiKvvovaaL. Sionep 6 epiartKos ovk eoTiv 
ovTOj-s €)(OJV TTavTTj oj? o ifj^vhoy pd(f)os ' ov yap earai 
TTapaAoytariKO? e^ (vpcapievov rtvos yevovs dpx^ov, 
dXXd TTepl rrdv yevos earat 6 epicrriKos . 
5 ipoTToi jiiev oiiv elalv ovtol tcov ao^iaTiKcov eXey- 
)(0)v OTL S earl rod SiaXeKriKov to deojprjaai TrepX 
rovrcjv Kal Svvaadat ravra TTotelv, ov ^(^aXeTrov 
ISelv Tj yap rrepl rds npordcreLS fxedoSos drraaav 
e;(et ravr'qv Tr)v deoipiav. 

XII. Kat TTepl fiev t<vv iXeyxcov etprjTai tojv 

10 (f)aLVopLeva}v irepl he rod ijjevhojxevov ri hel^ai Kal 
TOP Xoyov €t? dho^ov dyayelv {tovto yap rjv Sev- 
repov rrjs ao(f)LarLKrjs 7Tpoaipeaea>s) vpdjrov fxev ovv 
e/c Tov TTVvdaveadai Tra>s Kal 8ta t'^s' epcoWjaecos 
(Jvpi^aiveL pudXiara. to yap npos ixrjhev opiaavra 
Keifievov ipcordv OrjpevnKov eari tovtwv eiKfj yap 

15 Xeyovres dpLaprdvovaL fxaXXov elKjj Se Xeyovaiv, 
orav firjSev exojcri' TrpoKeifievov. to re epcordv 
TToXXd, Kav (Lpiafievov fj irpo's o SiaXeyeraL, Kal ro 
ra SoKovvTa Xeyetv d^tovv vroiet tlv' eviropiav rod 
eis dho^ov dyayelv t) i/jevSo?- idv re epixiTOiy^evos 
(pfj Y] a7TO(f>fj rovrcov ri, dyeuv Trpo? a eTrti^etpr^jLtaTOS' 

20 evTTopel. hvvarov he vvv rjrrov KaKovpyeZv hid 
rovTOiv rj Trporepov arraLTOvvTai yap tl tovto rrpos 
TO ev apxfj- GToixeiov he tov tvx^lv tj i/jevBovs 
rivos t) dSo^ov TO ixrihep.iav evdvs ipioTav deaiv, 
68 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi-xii 

art of doing this, though not of the same kind as the 
demonstrative arts. For this reason the contentious 
arguer is not in all respects in the same position as 
the constructor of a false geometrical figure ; for the 
contentious arguer will not reason falsely on principles 
of a definite class but will deal with every kind. 

These, then, are the modes of sophistical refuta- 
tions. It is easy to see that to investigate them and 
to be able to apply them is the task of the dialectician ; 
for the method of dealing with propositions constitutes 
the whole of this study. 

XII. We have now dealt with apparent refutations. (B) Fai- 
As for showing that the answerer is stating a fallacy (C) para- 
and leading the argument towards a paradox — for ^^- , 
this was the second aim of the sophist — this is, in the are to be 
first place, best achieved by some kind of inquiry ^'^'^ ' 
and by questioning. For to ask a question without («) By ask- 
defining it in relation to a subject laid down is a good questions. 
method of hunting out things of this sort ; for people 
are more likely to fall into error when they speak at 
random, and they speak at random when they have no 
definite subject set before them. Also to ask a number (6) By ask- 
of questions, even though the point against which one ou^ qu'es^/" 
is arguing is defined, and to demand that the answerer tio^s. 
should say what he thinks, gives ample opportunity 
of leading a man into a paradox or fallacy, and also, 
if, when asked, he says ' yes ' or ' no ' to any of the 
questions, of leading him to topics on which one has 
abundant material for attacking him. This unfair 
method, however, is much less practicable than 
formerly ; for people demand, ' What has this to do 
with the original question ? ' An elementary rule 
for obtaining a fallacious or paradoxical statement 
is not to put any thesis directly but to pretend that 

69 



ARISTOTLE 

172 b 

aAAa (f)daK€iv epojrdv fxaOeiv ^ovXa/xevov x^P^^ 

yap eTTLX^Lprjfjbaros r] UKeifjis TTOiel. 
25 rTpo? Se TO i/j€vS6p,€vov Set^at tSio? tottos 6 GO(f>i- 

(jTLKo?, TO dyeiv Ttpos Toiavra irpos d evTTopel 

Xoyojv earai 8e /cat KaXcos Kal [xtj KaXoJs rovro 

TToteiv, Kaddrrep iXexOrj irporepov. 

riaAtv TTpos TO TTapdSo^a Xeyetv GKOTretv ck rivos 
30 yevov; 6 hiaXeyopbevos , elr' eirepoirdv o rot? ttoX- 

Aot? ovTOL XeyovoL TrapdSo^ov ean yap eKdarois 

TL TOLOVTOV. arOLX^loV Se TOVTCOV TO TO,? eKdcTTWV 

€LXr](f)€vaL diaeis iv rat? TrpoTdaeatv. Xvais 8e Kal 
TovTcov T) TTpoarjKovaa ^eperat to e/x^avt^etv otl 
ov Std Tov Xoyov avpb^aivet to dSo^ov dei Be tovto 
35 Kal povXeTaL 6 dycovi^ofxevos . 

"Ert 8' e/c T(x>v ^ovXrjaecJv Kal tcov cf)av€pcdv 
Bo^wv. ov yap rauTO, ^ovXovTai re Kal (^aaiv, 
dXXd Xeyovai fxev Tovg evoxTjP'OvecrTdTovs tcov X6- 
yuiv, ^ovXovTai he ra ^aivopieva XvaiTeXelv , olov 

173 a Tedvdvat KaXws fidXXov rj t,rjv rjSeiOS <f>aal helv Kal 

Treveadai hiKaioj? fxdXXov rj rrXovTelv alaxpcos, ^ou- 
XovTaL 8e TdvavTia. tov p,ev ovv XeyovTa Kara Tas 
^ovXrjcreis els Tas (f>av€pds Bo^as aKTCOv, tov 8e 
/caret. TavTas els Tas dnoKeKpufjifievas' dii^oTepixys 
5 yap dvayKalov irapdho^a Xeyeiv rj yap Trpos Tas 
(f)avepds ">} Trpos Tas d(f)aveZs Bo^as epovaiv evavrta. 

» Topics 111 b 32 ff. 
70 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xii 

one is asking from a desire to learn ; for this method 
of inquiry gives an opening for attack. 

A special method of showing up a fallacy is the (c) By in- 
sophistical method, namely, to lead one's opponent opponent 
to the kind of statements against which one has *° make 
plenty of arguments ; it will be possible to do this in which can 
a right and in a wrong way, as has already been said." refuted.^ 

Again, to elicit a paradox, you should see to what (d) By 
school the person who is discussing with you belongs, him^on'the 

and then question him on some pronouncement of tenets of the 

1 111.1 1 1 1-1 philosophi- 

that school which most people regard as paradoxical ; cal school to 

for every school has some tenet of this kind. An ^J^Jf^g^^or 

elementary rule in this connexion is to have a ready- his views in 

made collection of the theses of the different schools ^'^'^'^^^ • 

among your propositions. The proper solution here 

too is to make it clear that the paradox does not 

result because of the argument ; now your opponent 

always desires that this should be so. 

Furthermore, you should seek for paradoxes in 

men's wishes and professed opinions. For they do 

not wish the sanae things as they declare that they 

wish, but they give utterance to the most becoming 

sentiments, whereas they desire what they think is 

to their interest. They declare, for example, that a 

noble death ought to be preferred to a pleasurable 

life and honourable poverty to discreditable wealth ; 

but their wishes are the opposite of their words. He, 

therefore, whose statements agree with his wishes 

must be led to express the opinions usually professed, 

and he whose statements agree with the latter must 

be led to state the opinions usually hidden ; for in 

both cases they must necessarily fall into paradox, 

for they will contradict either their professed or their 

secret opinions. 

71 



ARISTOTLE 

173 a 

YlXelaros 8e tottos earl rod rroielv TrapdSo^a 
Xeyetv, a)a7T€p /cat o KaAAt^ATys" iv ro) Topyia yi- 
yparrrat Xeycov, Kal ol dp)(aLOL Se iravres coovro 

10 crvfi^aiveLV, rrapd ro Kara <f)vaLv Kal Kara rov 
vopbov evavria yap etvai </)vaLv Kal v6fj,ov, Kal rrjv 
SiKaioavvTjv Kara vojxov fiev elvai KaXov Kara <^v- 
atv o ov KaXov. SeXv ovv irpos p,kv rov elirovra 
Kara ^vaiv Kara vojmov (XTravrdv, Trpos Se rov Kara 
vofMov €7Ti rrjv (ftvGLv dyeiv dfi(/>orep(os yap earai^ 

15 Xeyetv rrapdho^a. rjv 8e ro fj,€v Kara (f>vaiv 
avroLS ro dX-qdes, ro he Kara vojxov ro rots ttoXXols 
ooKovv. ware SijXov on KdKetvoi, Kaddnep Kal ol 
vvv, Tj iXey^ai rj -napdho^a Xeyetv rov dnoKpivo- 
[xevov e7Te)(€ipovv rroielv. 

' KvLa Se rcov epcor'qfxdrojv e-^^ei dpL^orepo)^ dSo^ov 

20 eivac rrjv aTTOKptaiv, olov TTorepov rots ao(f)OLS rj rto 
irarpi Set veWeadat, Kal rd avpi(f)epovra rrpdrreiv 
rj rd St/cata, Kal dStKeladai alpercorepov rj ^Xdirreiv. 
Set S' ayeiv et? rd rols ttoXXoXs Kal rols ao(f)ols 
evavria, edv fiev Xeyj] rt? cu? ol rrepl roiis Xoyovs, 

25 ei? ra rot's ttoXXoZs, edv S' cos" ol ttoXXoL, irrl rd 
rolg ev Xoycp. (f)aal ydp ol puev ef dvdyKTjs rov 
evhaipiova hiKaiov elvai- rols Se 77oAAotS' dSo^ov ro 
^aaiXea firj euSaLpiovelv . eari Se to et? rd ovrojs 
aSofa avvdyetv ro avro rw els rrjV Kard (j)vaiv Kal 
Kara vofxov VTrevavricoaiv dyeiv 6 fxev ydp vofios 

30 Sofa rojv ttoXXcov, ol Se ao(f)ol Kard (fyvaiv Kal Kar* 
aXrjdeiav Xeyovatv . 

^ Reading earai for efvat. 

» Plato, Oorgias 482 e. 
73 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xii 

A commonplace rule which makes men utter para- 
doxes in abundance is the application of the standards 
of nature and law, which Callicles is represented as 
applying in the Gorgias " and which all the ancients 
regarded as valid ; for according to them Nature and 
Law are opposites, and justice is a good thing accord- 
ing to law but not according to nature. Therefore, 
to a man who speaks in terms of nature you must 
reply in terms of law, and when he speaks in terms 
of law you must lead the argument to terms of nature ; 
for in both cases the result will be that he utters 
paradoxes. In the view of the ancients what accorded 
wdth nature was the truth, while what accorded with 
law was the general opinion of mankind. It is, there- 
fore, clear that they also, like the men of to-day, tried 
to refute the answerer or to make him utter paradoxes. 

Some questions involve a paradox whichever way J*') By ask- 
they are answered ; for example, ' Ought one to tions, the 
obey the wise or one's father ? ' and, ' Ought one ^h^^h'j^ugt 
to do what is expedient or what is just ? ' and ' Is be para- 
it preferable to suffer or to inflict a wrong ? ' You °^'''* " 
ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of 
the majority and of the wise — if a man speaks as 
trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions 
opposed to the majority ; if he speaks as do the 
majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. 
For some say that the happy man is necessarily just, 
but in the view of the majority it is paradoxical that a 
king should not be happy. To lead a man to paradoxes 
of this kind is the same thing as to bring him into 
opposition to the standards of nature and law ; for 
law is the opinion of the majority, but the utterances 
of the wise accord with the standards of nature and 
truth. 

73 



ARISTOTLE 

173 a 

XIII. Kat ra jxev Ttapdho^a e/c tovtojv Set ^r]T€iv 

Tcov TOTTCJv 7T€pl Se Tov TTOcrjaai dSoXeax^iv, o jxev 

Aeyofxev to aSoAecr;^etr, elpt^Kajjiev TJSrj. TrdvTCs Se 

OL TototSe Xoyoi rovro ^ovXovrat ttol€iv el fxrjSev 

35 hia^epei to 6vop,a rj tov Xoyov etVetv, hLrrXdaiov 

he Koi StTrXduLov rjp,iaeo? Tavro, el dpa ecrrlv r)fJ.l- 

aeos SiTrXdaiov, earai rjixiaeos rjfiiaeos StTrAaatoV. 

/cat TrdXiv dv avrl rod SLrrXdaiov SirrXdaiov rj/jblaeos 

Tcdfj, rpls earai elpT]p.evov, rjfxiaeog -q^iaeos r)p.ia€os 

OLTrXdoLov. Kal dpd ecrriv rj eTTidvpLia rjheos ; rovro 

40 S' eCTTiv' ope^LS -qSeos' eariv dpa rj enidvixia dpe^is 

rjSeos rjSeos. 

173 b EtCTt 8e Trdvreg ol roiovroi rwv Xoyojv ev re rolg 

npos rt, oaa p,r] piovov rd yevq dXXd /cat auTCt rrpos 

TL XeyeraL, /cat npog ro avro /cat ev dnoSiSoraL [olov 

Tj re ope^LS rivos ope^is Kal rj emOvfXia nvos eVi- 

5 dvpaa, /cat to StTrActo-tor rtvos StTrAaaiov /cat St- 

TrAaCTtor rjpiiaeos) " /cat ooojv rj ovaia ovk ovtcjov 

TTpos ri oXcj^, cLv elcTLV e^ets r) Trddrj rj ri roiovrov, 

ev TO) Xoycp avrwv tt poahr]Xovr ai Karrjyopovp,ev(x)v 

€771 TOUTOt?. otov' ro vepirTov dpidfxos jxeaov exiov 

CCTTt S' dpidpLos rrepirros' earcv dpa dpidfio^ pLeaov 

10 e)(<x)v dptdpios. /cat ei to aipiov KoiXorrjg pivos 

eoTLV, earn Se pis aipL-q, eariv dpa pis pis kolXtj. 

^aivovrai he TToieZv ov rroiovvres ivlore 8ta ro firj 
TrpoaTTVvOdveadat el aTjiMalvei ri Kad' avro Xe^dev 

» 165 b 16. 
74 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xiii 

XIII. It is, then, by these commonplace rules that (D) Bab- 
you should seek to obtain paradoxes. Next, as to How this 
making people babble, we have already said what fn^^gg^ 
we mean by this term." Arguments of the following 
kind all have this end in view ; ' If it makes no 
difference whether one uses the term or the definition 
of it, and " double " and " double of half" are the same 
thing, then if" double " is " double of half," it will be 
" double of half of half " ; and if " double of half" be 
substituted again for " double," there will be a triple 
repetition, " double of half of half of half." ' Again, 
' Is not " desire " " desire of pleasure ? " Now " desire 
is an appetite for pleasure " : therefore " desire is an 
appetite for pleasure of pleasure." ' 

All arguments of this kind take place (a) when 
relative terms are used, where not only the genera 
but the terms themselves are relative and are ren- 
dered in relation to one and the same thing (for 
example, appetite is appetite for something, and 
desire is desire of something, and double is double 
of something, namely, double of half), and (6) where 
terms are used of which, though they are not relative 
at all, the substance (namely, the things of which they 
are states or affections or the like) is indicated in their 
definition, since they are predicated of these things. 
For example, ' odd ' is a ' number which has a middle 
unit,' and an ' odd number ' exists, therefore an ' odd 
number ' is ' number-that-has-a middle-unit number,' 
Again, if ' snubness ' is ' concavity of the nose,' and 
there is a ' snub nose,' then a ' snub nose ' is a ' con- 
cave-nose nose.' 

Men sometimes appear to induce ' babbling ' when 
they do not really do so, because they do not further 
inquire whether ' double ' used by itself has a signifi- 

75 



ARISTOTLE 

173 b 

TO StTrAacrioi' ■^ ovSev, Kal e'l tl arffxaiveL, TTorepov 

15 TO avro ^ erepov, dXXa to (n;/x7repa<T/Aa Ae'yetv 
evdvs. aAAo. ^atVerat Sta to to ovofxa TavTo elvai 
TavTO Kal arjpbaiveLv. 

XIV. 2oAoi/ctcr/i.o? 8' oiov jxev iaTiv (iprjTaL rrpo- 
repov. eaTL he tovto Kal rroielv Kal [jltj iroLovvTa 
<j)aiv€aOaL Kal iroLOVVTa pur) Sok€lv, Kaddrrep 6 

20 UpojTayopas e'Aeyev, el 6 pirjvL? Kal 6 tt^Xt]^ dppev 
ecTTLV 6 piev yap Xeycov ovXopievrjv aoXoLKLC,€L p,€V 
/car' iK€LVOv, ov (^atVerai 8e rots' a'AAots", o Se owAd- 
p^evov (^atVerat pi,ev dAA' ov GoXoiKit,et,. hrjXov ovv 
oTi Kav T€xvr] TLS TOVTO SvvaiTo TTOielv Slo TToXXol 
Tojv Xoywv ov avXXoyil,6p,€voi aoXoLKiapLOV ^aivov- 

25 rat avXXoyit,eadai, KadaTrep iv toIs eXey)(Oi^. 

EtCTt Se TrdvTCS a^eSov ol <j>aiv6pievoi aoXoLKLopiol 
TTapd TO ToSe, /cat otov rj TTTOJais p-r^Te dppev p^-qTe 
drjXv SrjXoi dXXd to pbCTa^v. to p,€v ovtos dppev 
arjp,aLveL, to 8' avTrj drjXv to 8e tovto deXei p,ev to 

30 pi€Ta^v arjpLaiveLV , TzoAAct/cts" Se arjp,aivei KdKeivcov 
cKdTepov, olov Tt tovto; KaAAioTrry, ^vXov, Ko/ot- 
CT/cos". Tov pL€V ovv dppevos Kal Tov d-qXeos 8ta- 
(f)€povaiv at TTTCocreLS drraaaL, tov 8e pbCTa^v at p,€v 
at 8' ov. SodevTos 817 77-oAAa/ct? tovto, avXXoyl- 
l,ovTaL (1)9 elprfpievov tovtov 6pLoi(xiS 8^ Kal dXXrjv 

35 TTTcbcnv dvT^ dXXris. 6 he 7rapaXoyiap,6s yiveTai 
8ta TO Koivov elvac to tovto TrXeiovatv TTTwaeajv 

" 165 b 20. * Because it is in fact feminine. 

76 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xiii-xiv 

cation or no, and, if it has, whether the same or a 
different one, but they appear to draw the conclusion 
immediately. It appears, however, to have the same 
signification also because the word is the same. 

XIV. What solecism is has already been stated.* (E) Sole- 
It is possible to commit it, and not to commit it. How this 
yet to seem to do so, as well as to commit it, yet ?'*?'^''j 
seem not to do so. If, as Protagoras used to say, 
fiyuLs (wrath) and ttijXi]^ (helmet) are masculine, 
according to him, he who calls wrath a ' destruc- 
tress ' (ovX.oiJi€vrjv) commits a solecism, though he 
does not appear to anyone else to do so,** but he 
who calls it a ' destructor ' (ovXofxevov) appears to 
commit a solecism but does not do so. It is obvious, 
therefore, that one might produce this effect by art 
also ; therefore many arguments appear to infer a 
solecism, when they do not really do so, as happens 
also with refutations. 

Almost all apparent solecisms occur owing to the 
word ' this ' or ' it ' (joSe) and when the inflection 
denotes neither the masculine nor the feminine but 
the neuter. ' He ' (ovtos) denotes a masculine, ' she ' 
(aurr;) a feminine, whereas ' this ' or ' it ' (tovto), 
though meaning to signify a neuter, often signifies 
either a masculine or a feminine. P'or example, 
' What is this (tovto) ? ' ' It is Calliope,' or ' It is 
a log ' or ' It is Coriscus.' The case-forms of the 
masculine and feminine are all different, but some 
of those of the neuter are different and others not. 
Often, therefore, when ' it ' (tovto) has been granted, 
people argue as if ' him ' (tovtov) had been used, and 
they similarly use another case in place of some 
other. The false reasoning arises because ' it ' (tovto) 
is common to more than one case ; for it signifies 

77 



ARISTOTLE 

173 b 

TO yap TovTo crrj /xatVet ore fiev ovros 6t€ 8e tovtov. 

Set 8' ivaXXa^ ar^fiaivciv, /xera /xev tov earrc to 

ovrog, fiera Se rod elvai to toutoi^, olov kari 

J^opLGKOs, etvaL KopiCTKor. /cat evri raJv drjXeojv 

40 ovopidrcov (Joaavrws , Kal cttl tcov Xeyofxevoiv p,€v 

174 a aKevoJv €x6vro)v 8e drjXetas rj dppevos KXrjaiv. oaa 

yap et? to o /cat to v reXevra, ravra puova oKevovs 

€)(€i KXijaiV, olov ^vXoV, G)(OlVlOV, TO. 8e jLtr^ outoj? 

appevo? r] diqXeos, (hv evta (f)epojxev irrl rd (TKevrj, 
5 otov (ZCT/co? /xev dppev rovvofia, kXivt] 8e drjXv. 
SiOTTcp /cat eTTt TCOV TotouTCOv ojaavTO)? TO ecTTt /cat 
TO etvat Stoioet. /cat rpoirov TLvd opLOto^ ecrriv o 
aoXoLKtapbOS TOiS" Trapd rd rd p,rj o/xoia opoLcog 
Xeyop.evoL'5 eAey;^otS". warrep ydp eKeivois evrt tcDv 
TTpayp,drojv, rovroig irrl rcJov ovopbdroiv avpTTLTrrei 
aoXoiKit^eiv dvdpojTTos ydp /cat XevKov /cat irpdypi^a 
/cat ovopbd iariv. 

10 CDavepov oi5v OTt rov ooXoLKiapidv Treipareov e/c 
Tojv elprjpieviov TrrajaeoiV auXXoyi^eadaL. 

KlStj p,€V ovv ravra rd>v dycovLorriKcbv Xoycjv /cat 
jLtep?7 TCOV etScov /cat rpOTTOi ol elprjpievoi. 8ta0epei 
8' ov p,LKp6v, idv raxdfj ttcjs rd rrepl rrjv €pa)rr]aiv 

15 TTpds rd Xavddvetv, cjaTrep ev rolg StaAe/CTt/coi?. 

i(f)€^rjs ovv rolg elprjp^evocs ravra rrpaJrov XeKreov. 

XV. "EoTt 87) TTpds rd eXeyx^LV €v fiev firJKos' 



" i.e. the fallacy from the figure of speech (^t/wra dictionis). 
78 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xiv-xv 

sometimes ' he ' (oPros) and sometimes * him ' 
(rofrov). It ought to signify them alternately ; with 
the indicative ' is ' (iari) it ought to signify the 
nominative ' he ' (o?tos) ; with the infinitive ' to be ' 
(cu'at) it ought to signify ' him ' (toGtov), for example, 
It is Coriseus,' ' [I believe] it to be Coriscus.' So 
likewise with feminine nouns and with so-called 
articles of use, which can have either a mascuUne 
or a feminine designation ; for only those which end 
in -ov have the designation which belongs to an 
article of use, e.g., ^vXov (log), o-xou'tor (rope). Those 
which do not take this form have a masculine or a 
feminine termination, and some of these we apply 
to articles of use ; for example, uo-kos (wine-skin) is 
masculine and kAii't/ (bed) is feminine. Therefore, in 
such cases there will be the same difference when 
the indicative ' is ' (ecm) is used and the infinitive 
' to be ' (^eivai). Also, in a way, solecism resembles 
the kind of refutation which is due to the use of 
similar tei*ms for dissimilar things " ; for as in the one 
case it happens that we commit a solecism in the 
category of actual things, so in the other we commit 
it in that of names ; for ' man ' and ' white ' are both 
names and things. 

Clearly, then, we must try and argue up to a sole- 
cism on the basis of the above-mentioned case-forms. 

These are the branches of competitive arguments 
and their sub-divisions, and the above are the methods 
of employing them. Now it makes no small difference 
whether the accompaniments of the question are 
arranged in a certain way with a view to concealment, 
as in dialectics. Therefore, as a sequel to what has 
been said above, we must first treat of this subject. 

XV. To effect a refutation one expedient is length ; How to ask 

79 



ARISTOTLE 

174 a 

^aAeTTov yap dfia 770 AAd avvopdv. els 8e to ^tjkos 

TOLS 7TpO€Lpr)[X€VOig arOiX€LOLS XPV^'''^^^- ^^ ^^ 

ZOraxos- vaTepll,ovT€s yap rjrrov Trpoopcoaiv. en S' 
opyr] Kai (/uXoveiKta- raparropievoL yap rjrrov Sv- 
vavrai (jivXarreadai rravres. aroLX^la 8e rrjs opyrjs 
ro re cfiavepov iavrov rroLelv ^ov\6p,evov dSt/cetv 
Kai ro TTapdrrav dvataxwreXv . en ro evaXXd^ rd 
epcorrjp,ara ndevai, idv re rrpos ravro TrAetous" rt? 

25 exj] Aoyovg, idv re Kal on ovrojg /cat on ovx 
ovrcos' d/za yap avp^^aivei. t) vpos rrXeico rj Trpog 
ravavna rroLeladaL rrjv cjyvXaKrjv. oXws 8e rrdvra 
ra rrpos rrjv Kpvipiv XexOevra Trporepov ;^/[)7^CTiju.a 
/cat TTpos rovs ayoiVionKovs Xoyovs' rj yap Kpvifjis 
earn rod XadeZv ^dptv, ro he XadeXv rrjs dTrdrrjs. 

30 Xlpos Se rovs dvavevovras drr^ dv olrjdaxTLV 
etvat TTpos rov Xoyov, e^ dTro(f)daeojs epcorrjreov, 
a»? rovvavriov ^ovX6p,evov, rj /cat e^ lcjov TToiovvra 
rrjv epcorrjcriv dS-qXov yap dvros rov ri ^ovXerai 
Xa^elv rjrrov hvaKoXaivovaiv . orav r' errl rcjv 
fxepaJv StSoj ns ro /ca^' eKaarov, ivdyovra ro 

35 KaOoXov TToAAd/ciS" OVK epojrrjreov, dAA' ojs SeSo- 
p,eva) xP'^(^i^^ov eviore yap olovrai /cat avrol Se- 
ScoKcvai /cat rols dKovovai </)aivovraL 8td rr)v rrjs 

" Topics viii. 1 . 
80 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 

for it is difficult to keep many things in view simul- questions 
taneously. To produce length the above-mentioned (ifV/pro- 
elementary rules must be employed. One resource Hxity and 
is speed ; for when people lag behind they see less 
far ahead. Further, there are anger and contentious- 
ness ; for when people are agitated they are always 
Jess capable of being on their guard. Elementary 
rules for rousing anger are to make it plain that one 
wishes to act unfairly and to behave in an altogether 
shameless manner. Another device is to put one's (2) By 
questions alternately, whether one has several argu- questions. 
ments leading up to the same point or whether one 
has arguments proving both that this is so and that 
this is not so ; for the result is that the answerer is 
on his guard at the same time against either several 
or contrary attacks. In a word, all the resources for 
concealment mentioned before " are also useful against 
competitive arguments ; for concealment is for the 
purpose of escaping detection, and escape from 
detection is for the purpose of deception. 

When dealing with those who refuse to consent to (3) By in- 
anything which they think is in favour of your from^'^*'°" 
argument, you must put your question in a negative negation. 
form, as though you wanted the opposite of what you 
really want, or, at any rate, as if you were asking 
your question with indifference ; for people are less 
troublesome when it is not clear what one wants to 
secure. Often, when in dealing with particulars a (4) By as- 
man grants the individual case, you ought not, in th^unfver- 
the process of induction, to make the universal the sal lias been 
subject of your question but assume that it is granted 
and use it accordingly ; for sometimes people think 
that they have themselves granted it and appear 
to their hearers to have done so, because they recall 

81 



ARISTOTLE 

174 a 

eTTayojyrjs [xveiav, cos ovk av rjpa)r7]fj,€va ixdTrjv. 

€v OLS re fjLT] ovojJiaTL arjfjbaivcrai to KadoXov, dAAa 

Tjj oiJiOLor7]Ti -x^prjareov irpos to av[Jt,(f)€pov Xavddvet 

iO yap 7) ofioLorrjs ttoXXolkls. irpos re to Xa^elv ttjv 

174 b TTpoTaaiv TovvavTLOV Trapa^dXXovTa )(^p'q Trvvddve- 

adai. otov el Seot XajSelv otl Set iravTa tw Ttarpl 

■netdeaoaL, rroTepov airavTa Set neideadai Tolg yo- 

vevaiv fj Travr' dTreideZv ; Kal to 77oAAa/<:t? 77oAAa, 

TTOTepov TToXXd GvyxojprjTeov rj oXlya; fxaXXov ydp, 

5 etVep avdyKT], So^eiev dv elvai, -rroXXd- irapaTide- 

jxevcov ydp eyyvs twv evavTicov, Kal fxel^co Kal 

fxeydXa ^atVerat /cat X^^P^ '^"^^ ^eArtco rots' dvdpui- 

TTOLS. 

lji(j)6hpa he Kal noXXdKis Troiel So/cetv iXr]Xeyxdai 
TO /xaAtcTTa ao(f)LaTiK6v avKO(f)dvT7]p,a Tix)v ipcoTcuv- 

10 TCDV, TO firjhev avXXoyiaap.evovs fxrj epwTrjfia TTOielv 
TO TeXevTalov, dXXd avpLTrepavrcKaJs etTretv, d)S 
avXXeXoyiafievovs , ovk dpa to Kal to. 

HocfytaTLKov Se Kat to Keifxevov irapaho^ov to 
(f>aiv6pievov d^Lovv diTOKpiveadai, TrpoKeipievov rod 
SoKOvvTos i^ dpxT]S, Kal rrjv epojTrjaiv tu)V toiou- 

15 Tojv ovToj TTOieladai, TioTepov aoL hoKel; dvdyKH) 
yap, dv fj TO epwTTjpia e^ cbv 6 avXXoyiapios, t] 
eXeyxov t) Trapdho^ov yiveadai, Soi'to? p^ev eXeyxov, 

« Cf. Topics 156 b 10 ff. 
82 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 

the process of induction and think that the question 
would not have been asked without some object. 
Where there is no term to signify the universal, you 
should nevertheless use the resemblance of the 
particulars " for your advantage ; for the resemblance 
often passes unnoticed. Also, in order to secure your (5) By 
premiss, you should contrast it with its contrary in thatTpro- 
your question. For example, if you want to secure ^5?'*^°? ** 
the premiss that one ought to obey one's father in through 
all things, you should ask whether one should obey ofTh(f"^°° 
one's parents in all things or disobey them in all contrary. 
things. If you want to establish that the multiplica- 
tion of a number many times over results in a large 
number, you should ask whether it should be con- 
ceded that it is a large or that it is a small number ; 
for, if pressed, one would rather that it should seem 
to be large. For the juxtaposition of contraries 
increases the quantity and quality of things, both 
relatively and absolutely, in the eyes of men. 

Often the most sophistical of all frauds practised (6) By 
by questioners produces a striking appearance of|"stetement 
refutation, when, though they have proved nothing, ^""^^.j 
they do not put the final proposition in the form of 
a question but state conclusively, as though they had 
proved it, that ' such and such a thing, then, is not 
the case.' 

Another sophistical trick is, when the thesis is a (7) By 
paradox, to demand, when the generally accepted opponenton 
view is originally proposed, that the answerer should the horns 
reply what he thinks about it, and to put one's dilemma, 
question in some such form as ' Is that your opinion ? ' 
For, if the question is one of the premisses of the 
argument, either a refutation or a paradox must 
result. If he grants the premiss, there will be a 

83 



ARISTOTLE 

174 b 

/at) Sovtos 8e jxrjSe SoKelv c/xxaKovros dbo^ov, jxr] 

SovTOS" 8e SoK€iv 8' ofjLoXoyovvrog eAey;^oei8e?. 

"Ert KadoLTTep Kal ev rols prjropLKoZs, Koi ev rolg 

20 iXeyKTLKolg ojjlolws to. ivavruofiara B^coprjreov rj 

npos TO. v(f)^ iavTOV Xeyofxeva, rj irpos ov^ opLoXoyel 

KaXaJs Xiyecv rj irpaTreiv, en Trpog tovs ^OKOvvTas 

TOLOVTOVS rj TTpoS TOVS OjXOLOVS Tj TTpOS TOVS TtAcI- 

arovs rj vpos Travras. iooTrep re koi aTTOKptvopbevot 
TToXXoiKLS, orav eAeyp^covrat, ttolovoi hirrov, av 

25 fjueXXfi avpL^aLveLV iXeyxOT^creadat,, /cat ipcorcovTas 
)(p7]ar€ov TTore tovtco npos rov? iviarapievovs , oiv 
a>8i pLev crvpb^aLvrj c58t 8e pirj, on ovrojg eiXrjcfyev, 
otov 6 KAeo^oiv TToiet iv to) MavSpo^ovXo) . 8et Se 
Kal d(f)Larapbevovs rov Xoyov rd XoiTrd rcov imx^i'' 
prjpbanov eTrire/xveii/, /cat rov aTTOKpivopievov , av 

30 TTpoaicrddvrjTaL, Trpoeviaraadai Kal Trpoayopcveiv. 
€Tn-)(eLprireov 8' evtore Kal Trpos dXXa tov elprjpii- 
vov, e/cetvo cKXa^ovrag, idv pirj rrpos ro Ketpbevov 
^XV '^'■^ e7n-)(eLp€lv drrep 6 AvK6(f>pcov eTroiiqae tt/do- 
^XrjdevTos Xvpav iyKO)pn,dl,€i,v. Trpos 8e tovs (xtt- 
aiTovvras npos n iTTix^Lpeiv, e7T€t8i7 So/cei 8etv 

35 a7ro8i8ov'at Trjv alrtav, XexOevrcov 8' evLCov €V(f)v- 
XaKTorepov, TO KadoXov avpL^atvov iv rot? eAe'y^^oi? 
Xeyeiv, ttjv dvri^aaiv, 6 n kcftrjoev aTTO^Tyaat, ^ o 

" It has been conjectured that the author of this dialogue 
was Speusippus. 

84 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 

refutation ; if he refuses to grant it and even denies 
that it is the generally accepted view, he utters a 
paradox ; if he refuses to grant it but admits that 
it is the generally accepted view, there will be the 
appearance of a refutation. 

Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise (8) By seek- 
also in refutations, you ought to look for contradic- JiictionV^*" 
tions between the answerer's views and either his between the 
own statements or the views of those whose words your op- 
and actions he admits to be right, or of those who are f'^rschool'^ 
generally held to bear a like character and to re- to which he 
semble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind. *'*'"^^- 
Also, just as answerers, when they are being refuted, (9) By 
often draw a distinction, if they are on the point of ^^1* a"tlrin 
being refuted, so questioners also ought sometimes, has a double 
when dealing with objectors, if the objection is valid 
against one sense of the word but not against another, 
to resort to the expedient of declaring that the 
opponent has taken it in such and such a sense, as 
Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus." They ought also (lO) By 
to withdraw from the argument and cut short their ftomyour^' 
other attacks, while the answerer, if he perceives this position to 
move in time, should raise anticipatory objections and attack. 
get his argument in first. One should also sometimes (ii) By 
attack points other than the one mentioned, excluding fn-eievanl, 
it if one can make no attack on the position laid down, points, 
as Lycophron did when it was suggested that he 
should deliver an encomium on the lyre. To those (12) By 
who demand that one should take some definite that"your"^ 
point of attack (since it is generally held that one object is^^ 
ought to assign the object of a question, whereas if contradlc- 
certain statements are made the defence is easier), opponent^s'^ 
you should say that your aim is the usual result of thesis, 
refutation, namely, to deny what your opponent 

85 



ARISTOTLE 

174 b 

a7Te(f)r)ae (firjaai,, dXXa /xtj otl twv ivavriwv rj avrrj 
eTTiaTrj^r] ■^ ov)(^ rj avrrj. ov Set 8e to aviMTrepaafMa 
TrporaTiKcos epcordv evia 8' ou8' epojrrjrdov, dXX* 
40 (x)s oixoXoyovjxevoLs^ XPI^'^^^^ • 

175 a XVI. 'E^ Sv pi€V ovv at epmrrjaeL'; , Kal ttcos 

ipcoT'qTeov iv tols dycovtaTLKals hiarpL^aZs, etprjr ai' 
nepl 8e dTTOKpicrecos, Kal ttcos XPV Xveiv /cat rt, /cat 
TTpos TLva ;\;pr^(Ttv ol tolovtol tojv Xoycov oi^e'AijLtot, 
fierd ravra XcKreov. 
5 ^p-qaLfXoi, fiev ovv elal npog fxev ^iXocro^iav 8ta 
hvo. TTpcoTOv p-kv yap (Lg irrl ro ttoXv yivop^evoi 
TTapd TTjV Xe^iv dp,€ivov e^^cv TTOLOVCTL TTpOS TO 
TToaax^S €Kaarov Aeyerat, Kal nola 6p,OLOJS Kal 
TTola erepajg evrt re rwv Ttpayp^drcov avpi^aivei Kal 

10 evrt rcbv ovopbdroiv. Sevrepov 8e rrpo? rds Kad^ 
avTov t,7]Trjaeis' 6 yap vcf)' iripov paSicus napa- 
Xoyit,6pi,evos Kal rovro p,rj aladavopievos Kav avros 
v(f)^ avTov TOVTo TTadoL TToXXaKis- rpirov 8e /cat 
TO XoLTTOv en TTpos So^av, TO mepl iravra yeyv- 
[Mvaudai SoKCiv Kal pbrjSevos dnelpcos e;\^eiv to yap 

15 KOLVcovovvra Xoycjjv ipeyeiv Xoyovs, p^rjSev e^ovTa 
Siopi^eiv TTepl TTjS (f)avX6T'r)Tos avTcov, VTToifjiav 
StSojat Tov SoKelv hvax^po.iveiv ov hid rdXriOks 
dXXd 8t' dTTeipiav. 

^ KnoKpivopbevoLS 8e 7ra>? dnavTTjTCov npos tovs 
ToiovTOVS Xoyovs, (f)avep6v, eiTrep opdcos elprjKap.€V 
npoTepov e^ a>v elalv ol TrapaXoyiapLoi, Kal Tas iv 

20 TO) TTwddvecrdai rrXeove^las lkovcos StetAo/xev. ov 
ravTov 8' iarl Xa^ovTa re tov Xoyov tSeiv Kal Xvaai, 
TTjV p,oxQf]P''<^v , Kal €pa)Ta)p,€vov aTTavTav Svvaadat 

^ Reading ofioXoyovfievois with Wallies for o^ioXoyovfiivip. 
86 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv-xvi 

affirmed and affirm what he denied, and not to prove 
that the knowledge of contraries is the same or not 
the same. One should not ask the conclusion in the 
form of a proposition, and some propositions should 
not be asked at all but treated as admitted. 

XVI. We have now dealt with the sources of ques- the 
tions and how they ought to be asked in competitive qf^fal?''^ 
arguments. Wemust next treat of answering, and how LACIES 
solutions are brought about, and what are their sub- xvi-xxxiii). 
jects, and for what purpose such arguments are useful, ^^^^^j^g 

They are useful for philosophy for two reasons. The reasons 
In the first place, as they generally turn on language, solutions.'"^ 
they put us in a better position to appreciate the 
various meanings which a term can have and what 
similarities and differences attach to things and their 
names. Secondly, they are useful for the questions 
which arise in one's own mind ; for he who is easily 
led astray by another person into false reasoning and 
does not notice his error, might also often fall into this 
error in his own mind. A third and last reason is that 
they estabhsh our reputation, by giving us the credit 
of having received a universal training and of having 
left nothing untried ; for that one who is taking part 
in an argument should find fault with arguments with- 
out being able to specify where their weakness lies, 
rouses a suspicion that his annoyance is apparently 
not in the interests of truth but due to inexperience. 

How answerers should meet such arguments is The neces- 
obvious if we have adequately described above " the prrctice. 
sources of false arguments and distinguished the 
fraudulent methods of questioning. To take an argu- 
ment and see and disentangle the fault in it is not 
the same thing as to be able to meet it promptly when 

« 165 b 24 if. 

87 



ARISTOTLE 

175 a 

rap^eo)?. o yap tafxev, TToXXaKig neraTiOefievov dy- 

voovfiev. €TL 8', wcTTTep iv TOLS a'AAois' TO ddrrov /cat 
TO ^pahvTepov ii< tov yeyvpivdadaL ytVerat fidXXov, 

25 ovTCt) Kal em tcov Xoyojv ^x^i, cocrre, dv SrjXov 
fjbev rj[.uv fj, a/xeAeri^Tot S' co/xev, vaTepovjJiev Td>v 
Kaipcbv TToXXdKLS • avfM^aivet Se 7tot€, Kaddrrep iv 
Tols SiaypapLfxauLV /cat yap eKel dvaXvaavTcs evt'ore 
avvOelvai rrdXiv dSwaToOfxev ovtco /cat iv tols 

30 eAey;^ot9, etSdre? Trap' o o Aoyo? avfi^aivei avv- 
eZpai, BiaXvcraL tov Xoyov aTTopoupiev. 

XVII. YlpdJTOv pi€v oiiv, d)G7T€p avXXoyil,eadai 
(f)api€V ivSo^co? 7TOT€ pidXXov t) dXrjddjg irpoaipelGdai 
heZv, OVTCO /cat XvTeov ttotc p,dXXov ivSo^ws rj /caret 
TaXrjdis- oXa>s yap irpos tov? ipLaTLKovs p-o-X^~ 

35 Teov ovx d>s iXiyxovTas aAA' to? ^atvo/xeVous" ov 
ydp (f)ap,€v avXXoyit,eadai ye avTovs, oiOTe Trpds 
TO p,rj So/c€tv SiopdcoTeov . el ydp ioTiv 6 eXey^os 
dvTLcf)aois P'Tj opLOJVvpLos e/c TLvoiv, ovhev dv Sioi 
StatpelaOaL Trpds rdjLtc^tjSoAa /cat ttjv 6p,a)vvp.iav 
ov ydp TTotet cryAAoytcrjiiov. dAA' ovSevos dXXov 

40 X^P''^ TTpoahiaipeTeov dAA' ry ort to avp,TTepaap.a 
^atVerat iXeyxoethes. ovkovv to iXeyxdfjvaL dXXd 
TO BoK€LV evXa^TjTeov , irrel to y' ipcoTav dpu<f)i^oXa 

176 b '^ctt Tct irapd ttjv opLcovvpiiav, oaai t' ctAAat rotaurat 

TTapaKpovaeis , /cat ror dAT^^tvov eXeyxov d<f>avit,eL 
/cat TOV iXeyxop'^vov /cat ju-t) iXeyxdfMevov dBr]Xov 
TToieZ. inel ydp e^eoTiv ctti re'Aet avpLTrepavafxivov 
88 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi-xvii 

one is asked a question. For we often fail to 
recognize something which we know when it is pre- 
sented in a different form. Furthermore, as in other 
spheres a greater degree of speed or slawness is 
rather a question of training, so in argument also ; 
therefore, even though something may be clear to us, 
yet, if we lack practice, we often miss our opportuni- 
ties. The same thing happens sometimes as with geo- 
metrical diagrams ; for there we sometimes analyse 
a figure but cannot reconstruct it ; so too in refuta- 
tions we know how the argument is strung together, 
but we are at a loss how to take it to pieces. 

XVII. In the first place, then, just as we say that Apparent 
we ought sometimes deliberately to argue plausibly rather than 
rather than truthfully, so too we ought sometimes real, must 
to solve questions plausibly rather than according to be sought. 
truth. For, generally speaking, when we have to 
fight against contentious arguers, we ought to regard 
them not as trying to refute us but as merely appear- 
ing to do so ; for we deny that they are arguing a 
case, so that they must be corrected so as not to 
appear to be doing so. For if refutation is unequi- 
vocal contradiction based on certain premisses, there 
can be no necessity to make distinctions against 
ambiguity and equivocation ; for they do not make 
up the proof. But the only other reason for making 
further distinctions is because the conclusion looks 
like a refutation. One must, therefore, beware not 
of being refuted but of appearing to be so, since the 
asking of ambiguities and questions involving equi- 
vocation and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even 
a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is 
refuted and who is not. For when it is possible in 
the end, when the conclusion is reached, to say that 

89 



ARISTOTLE 

175 b 

6 fjirj oTTcp €(f>rja€v a7TO(f>rjaaL Xeyeiv, dAA' o/xojvu/xcos", 

€i Kal on fMaXicTT* ervx^v IttI ravrov <f)€pojv, dSrjXov 
el cAryAey/crat • a^iqXov yap el dXrjdrj Aeyei vvv. el 
8e SieAcuv TJpero to ofiwvvfjbov rj to dfjL(f)L^oXov, 
ovK dv dSrjXos -^v 6 eXeyxos. o t' eTTit^rjTovai vvv 
[xev rfTTov irporepov he jjidXXov ol epiariKoi, ro rj 

10 vat, rj ov dnoKplveadaL rov epcorco/xevov, eyiver* 
dv. vvv he Sia to p,rj KaXcos epcordv tovs irvvdavo- 
jjievovs dvdyKYj TrpoaaTTOKplveadai tl tov epojTOj- 
jxevov, htopOovvra tt^v p^oxdripiav ttjs Trpordaecos, 
eTTet, hteXofjievov ye LKavdjs rj vai ■^ ov dvdyKrj Xeyetv 
TOV a7TOKpLv6p,evov . 

15 Et he Tig VTToXri^eTai tov KaTa 6pbCDVvp,iav eXeyxov 
eivai, TpoTTov Tivd ovk eoTai hia^vyelv to eXey- 
X<^crdaL TOV drroKpLvop^evov enl yap tu)v oparthv 
dvayKalov o e(f>r]aev d7TO(f>-r]aaL ovofxa, /cat o (xtt- 
€(/)7iae (f)i](Tai. cos yap hiopdovvTal Tives, ovhev 

20 o0eAos". ov yap K.opiaKov ^aalv elvai puovaiKov 
Kal djxovcrov, dXXd tovtov tov K^oploKov p,ov(nK6v 
Kal TOVTOV TOV l^oploKov dfJiovdov . 6 yap avTOS 
earai Aoyo? to tovtov^ tov K^optoKov tw tovtov 
TOV KopiCTKov dfiovaov etvai rj p^ovaiKov oTrep dfxa 
(f>7](ji Te Kal dTTOi^'qaLV . aAA' ictco? ov TavTO arj- 
ixaivei' ovhe yap CKel Tovvofxa. cocttc tL hta(f>€pei;' 

^ TOVTOV added by Waitz. 
* Poste reads rl for n and adds the question mark. 

90 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii 

one's opponent contradicted what he asserted only 
by means of an equivocation, however true it may be 
that he happened to be tending in the same direction, 
it is uncertain whether a refutation has taken place ; 
for it is uncertain whether he is speaking the truth 
now. If, however, one had made a distinction and 
questioned the equivocal or ambiguous term, the re- 
futation would not have been uncertain. Also, the 
object of contentious arguers — though it is less their 
aim in these days than formerly — would have been 
carried out, namely, that the person questioned 
should answer ' Yes ' or ' No ' ; as it is, however, 
because the questioners put their questions im- 
properly, the person questioned is obliged to add 
something in his answer by way of correcting the 
unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner 
makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say 
either ' Yes ' or ' No.' 

If anyone is going to imagine that an argument if one sup- 
which rests on equivocal terms is a refutation, it will an^^gu* 
be impossible for the answerer to avoid being refuted ^gj^*^*^'*'*' 
in a certain sense ; for in dealing with visible things equivoca- 
one must necessarily deny the term which he asserted refutation, 
and assert that which he denied. For the correction the answerer 
which some people suggest is useless. For they do escape being 
not say that Coriscus is musical and unmusical, but rgfut*^"^® 
that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus is un- 
musical. For it will be making use of the same 
expression to say that this Coriscus is unmusical (or 
musical) as to say that this Coriscus is so ; and one 
is affirming and denying this at the same time. But 
perhaps it does not mean the same thing ; for 
neither did the name in the former case ; so what 
is the difference ? But if he is going to assign to the 

91 



ARISTOTLE 

175 b 

25 et Se rep /xev to OLTrXaJs Aeyetv KopioKov aTTohojaei, 

TO) o€ TTpoadi/^aei ro nva t) rovSe, arovov ovSev 
yap ndAAov darepcp- oTTorepco yap av ovhev Sca- 

(f)€p€l. 

Ov fxrjv aAA' eTTCLhrj dSrjXos /xeV iartv 6 firj htopt- 
CTa/Ltevo? Tiqv d/x<^ij8oAtW TTorepov eX-qXeyKr at rj ovk 
30 eAr^Aey/crat, SeSorat S' ev rots' Adyots" to SteAetv, 
(pavepov on to p,r^ StoptaavTa Sovvai, tyjv epojT'qaiv 
aAA aTrAcDs" ap,dpTr]p,d iaTtv, coare Kav el /xt) avTos, 
aXX 6 ye Adyo? iXrjXeyfjbevo) opoios eariv. avfx- 
^aivei p,4vTOL jroXXaKis dpcovra? ttjv dpL(f)L^oXiav 
• oKveiv hLaipelcrOai Std tt^v TTVKvoTTjTa twv to. tol- 

35 aVTa TTpOT€Lv6vTO)V, OTTCli'S fXT] TTpOS dlTaV SoKCtJOt 

hvoKoXaiveiv etr' ovk av otr^OevTOjv irapd tovto 
yevecrdat top Xoyov, TvoXXaKLS d.TT'qvT'qae Trapdho^ov . 
ojaT* €7T€i,Srj SeSorai Staipetv, ovk OKvrjTCOv, Kaddnep 
iXexOr] TTpOTepov. 

Et Se Ta hvo ipojT'qp.aTa fxr} ev ttolcI tcs iptoT-qfia, 

40 oi)8' dv 6 TTapd Trjv d/xcuvu/xiav /cat ttjv diX(j>t.^oXiav 

iylveTO TTapaXoyiap.6s , dXX r] eXey^o? t) ov. tl 

176 a yap Bi,a(f)€p€L ipcoTrjaai, et KaAAia? /cat QepnaTOKXfjs 

pLovatKOL elaiv t] et dpL<f>oTepois ev dvopa rjv irepois 
ovaiv ; et yap TvAeico St^Aoi evos, TrAetoi r^pcoTTjaev . 
el ovv fxrj opdov rrpos Suo iputrrjaeis /ittav dTrd/c/jtotv 
d^iovv Xapt^dveiv aTrAcD?, <j>av€p6v otl ouSevt irpoa- 
6 T^/cet TcDv ofjiujvvijicov aTTOKpiveadai aTrXcj?, ovh* el 
92 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii 

one person the simple appellation ' Coriscus,' while 
to the other he adds ' a certain ' or ' that,' it is absurd ; 
for the addition belongs no more to the one than to 
the other ; for it makes no difference to whichever 
of the two he adds it. 

However, since, if one does not distinguish the The am- 
meanings of a doubtful term, it is not clear whether must be 
he has been confuted or not, and since the right to explained. 
draw distinctions is conceded in arguments, it is 
obvious that to grant the question simply, without 
making distinctions, is a mistake ; so that, even if 
the man himself does not appear to be refuted, yet 
his argument certainly appears to be so. It frequently 
happens, however, that, though people see the 
ambiguity, they hesitate to make the distinction, 
because of the numerous occasions on which people 
propose subjects of this kind, in order to avoid seeming 
to be acting perversely all the time. Then, again, 
though people would never have thought that the 
argument would hinge upon this point, they are often 
confronted with a paradox. So, since the right to 
draw a distinction is conceded, we must not hesitate 
to use it, as was said before. 

If one does not make two questions into one, the The ques- 
fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity amblgiSty 
would not exist either, but either refutation or absence makes two 
of refutation. For what is the difference between ask- h^to one.^ 
ing whether Callias and Themistocles are musical and 
asking the same question about two people both with 
the same name ? For if one indicates more things 
than one, one has asked more questions than one. If, 
therefore, it is not correct to demand simply to 
receive one answer to two questions, clearly it is not 
proper to give a simple answer to any equivocal 

98 



ARISTOTLE 

176 a 

Kara -navrcjov aXrjdes, coa-rrep a^iovai rives, ovhkv 
yap TovTo 8ta0epet rj el rjpero, KopiaKos /cat 
aAAtas irorepov oikol eiOLV i] ovk olkol, eire irapov- 
rojv aiJL(j)OLV e'ire purj Trapovrojv ap.^oTepws yap 
nXeiovs at TTpoTaaei?- ov yap el aXrjdes elirev,^ Std 

10 TOVTO [xla T) €pa)Tr]aLS. ey;^aj/)et yap Kal p,vpia 
eTepa epa)T7]9evTa ipcoTTJfMaTa aTravra r) vat ■^ ov 
aX-qdes elvai Xeyeiv aAA' ofxayg ovk aiTOKpiTeov pud 
aTTOKplaei' dvaipeiTai yap to hiaXeyeadai. tovto 
8' opLOLOv 6l»? el Kal TO avTO ovofia Tedeir] Tolg 
eTepois. ei oiiv pirj Set rrpo? hvo epcuri^aeis pLiav 

15 arroKpiOLV StSdvat, <f)avepov ort ovh^ errl tcov o/x- 

o)vvp.cov TO vai r^ ov XeKTeov. ovhe yap 6 elirwv 

anoKeKpLTai aXX eiprjKev. dXX' a^tourat* ttoi? iv 

TOis" otaAeyo/LteVoi? Sta to XavOdveiv to avpL^alvov. 

ilaTTep ovv eiTTOfiev, eTreihrjTTep ou8' eXey^^ol 

20 TLves ovTeg Sokovglv etvat, /cara tou avTov Tponov 
/cat AuCTets' Bo^ovoLV elvai Tives ovk ovaai Xiiaeis' 
as StJ (^a/xev evioTe pbdXXov Selv (f^epeiv rj tcls dXr]~ 
dels iv TOLS dya)VLaTLKOLS Xoyots Kal ttj irpos to 
hiTTOv diravTijaet,. d-noKpiTeov 8' errl j^cev twv 
ooKovvTcov TO ecTCD XeyovTa' Kal yap ovTots rJKLOTa 

26 ytVotr' dv nape^eXeyxos' dv 8e rt Trapdho^ov dvay- 
Ka^rjTai Xeyetv, evTavda /LtaAiara irpoadeTeov to 
BoKelv ovTio yap dv ovt* eXey^os ovTe napdSo^ov 
yiveadai ho^eiev. eirel he nebs atretrat to ev dpxfj 

^ Reading dnev for elireZv. 
* Reading a^ioCral for d^ioCvTai with Waliies. 

94 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii 

question, even though the term is true of all the 
subjects, as some people claim that one ought. For 
this is just the same as asking ' Are Coriscus and 
Callias at home or not at home ?,' whether they are 
both at home or not there ; for in both cases the 
number of propositions is more than one. For if the 
answer is true, it does not follow that the question 
is a single one. For it is possible that it is true to 
say ' yes ' or ' no ' when asked a countless number 
of questions ; but, for all that, one ought not to 
answer them with a single reply, for that means 
the ruin of discussion. This resembles the case of 
the same name being applied to different things. If, 
therefore, one must not give one answer to two 
questions, it is obvious that neither should one say 
' yes ' or ' no ' where equivocal terms are used ; for 
then the speaker has not given an answer but made 
a statement, but it is regarded in a way as an answer 
amongst those who argue, because they do not 
realize what is the result. 

As we said, then, since there are some seeminglfiow the 
refutations which are not really refutations, in like jfe^made. 
manner also there are some seeming solutions which ' 
are not really solutions. These we say that we ought , 
sometimes to bring forward in preference to true \ 
refutations in competitive argument and in meeting \ 
ambiguity. In the case of statements which appear to 
be true one must answer with the phrase ' granted ' ; 
for then there is the least likelihood of any accessory 
refutation ; but if one is obliged to say something 
paradoxical, then in particular one must add that it 
seems so, for then there can be no appearance either 
of refutation or of paradox. Since it is clear what 
' begging the original question ' means and since 

95 



ARISTOTLE 

176 a 

SrjXov, OLovrat Se iravresy av^ fj avveyyvs , dvaipe- 
T€ov /cat fjir) avyxwprjreov elvat, evia co? to iv apxij 

30 aiTovvTo? , orav ro^ tolovtov d^iol rts" o dvayKatov 
fiev avfi^aLveiv e/c rfjs deaeojs, fj 8e i/jevSos t) dho^ov, 
ravTO XeKT€ov rd yap i^ dvdyKTjg avfi^aivovra 
TTJs awTTy? elvat 80/cet Oeaeojg. en orav to KaOoXov 
fMT] ovojjiaTL X'r]cf)6fj dAAa Trapa^oXfj , XeKreov on ov^ 

35 CO? ehodr] oi)S' (hs rrpovreive Xap,^dv€L- Kal yap 
irapa rovro yiverai jroXXaKis €X€y)(os. 

EgetpyojLtevov 8e tovtcov €7tl to firj KaXcos 8e- 
S€l)(dai TTopevreov, dTravroJVTa Kara rdv elpr^p^evov 

BlOpLOflOV. 

Ev jjiev ovv TOis Kvpiojs Xeyopievois dv6p.aaiv 

avayKT] airoKpiveaOaL ■^ aTrAcD? y] hiaipovp^evov . d 

40 8e avvvTTovoovvTes ridepiev, olov oaa pLj] aa(f)a)s 

176 b aAAa KoXo^cjs ipcoTarai, irapa rovro avp^^aivei 

6 kXey)(os, olov dp* o dv fj ^ Kdiqvaiojv , Krrjp.d eariv 

Adrjvaicov ; vai. opioiojs 8e Kal iirl rcov dXXcov. 

aAAa pLTjv o avdpoirros icrri rcov t^wcov; vai. Krrjpba 

apa o avupojTTog rcov t,ci)cov. rov yap dvOpconov 

6 rcov l,cpiov Xeyopiev, on ^a>6v ian, Kal AvaavBpov 

rwv AaKcovcov, on AaKcov. SijXov ovv cos iv ols 

aaa(f)€s ro Trporeivopbevov ov avyxcoprjreov aTrAce)?. 

OTav 0€ 8i;otv ovroLV darepov puev ovros i^ 

^ Reading av for av with Wallies. 
* Reading to for re with Wallies. 

" 168 a 17 ff. 

96 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii 

people always consider that assumptions which lie 
near the conclusion must be demolished and that 
some of them must not be conceded on the ground 
that the opponent is begging the question, so when 
someone claims something of such a nature that it 
must necessarily follow from the thesis and it is false 
or paradoxical, we must use the same plea ; for the 
necessary consequences are generally regarded as 
part of the same thesis. Furthermore, when the 
universal which has been obtained has no name but 
is indicated by a comparison only, we must say that 
the questioner takes it not in the sense in which it 
was granted nor as he proposed it ; for a refutation 
often hinges on this point too. 

When we are excluded from these expedients, we 
must have recourse to the plea that the argument 
has not been properly set forth, attacking it on the 
basis of the classification of fallacies given above." 

When terms are used in their proper senses, one What is 
must answer either simply or by making a distinction. an^argu-'° 
It is when our statement implies our meaning without ment must 
expressing it — for example, when a question is not simply 
asked clearly but in a shortened form— that refutation ("onceded. 
ensues. P'or instance, ' Is whatever belongs to the 
Athenians a property of the Athenians ? ' ' Yes ; and 
this is likewise true of everything else.' ' Well, then, 
does man belong to the animals ? ' 'Yes.' 'Then man 
is a property of the animals. For we say that man 
" belongs to " the animals because he is an animal, 
just as we say that Lysander " belongs to " the Laco- 
nians because he is a Laconian.' Obviously, there- 
fore, when the premiss is not clear, it must not be 
conceded simply. 

When it is generally held that, if one of two things other de- 

K 97 



ARISTOTLE 

176 b 

avayKTj^ ddrepov elvai SoK-rj, daripov 8e rovro fxrj 

10 eg avdyKT^s, epajrioixevov Trorepov^ Set to eXarrov 
SiSovai- )(aX€7Ta)r€pov yap avWoyiaaadai €K TrXeio- 
vojv. idv 8' imx^i-pfj on tco yuev ianv evavriov 
TO) 8' ovK eariv, civ 6 Xoyos dXrjdrjs fj, ivavriov 
<f>dvat,, ovopia 8e pi^rj Kelcrdai tov erepov. 

Ettci 8' eVta /xev d)V Xiyovaiv ol ttoXXol tov prj 

15 avyxcopovvTa ifjevheadai dv ^alev evca 8' ov, olov 
daa dpL(f}Lho^ovaLV {rroTepov yap (f)dapTr] r) dddvaTos 
rj i/jvx'^ ra}v ^(pcov, ov huopiOTaL Tot? TroAAots"), iv 
Ol? ovv dSr)Xov TTOTepcos etcode Xeyeadai to Tvpo- 
Tecvopbevov, iroTepov cos" at yvdjp,ai {KaXovat yap 
yvivpias /cat Tag dXrjOels So^ag /cat ra? oAas" d7TO(f)d- 

20 cret?), ^ cos rj Sta/aerpo? davp,p.eTpos, ctl re* ov 
TdXrjdes dp,(f)i,8o^€iTat, pudXtaTa /xera^epcov dv Tig 
XavddvoL ra wd/xara Trepl tovtcov. 8ia. pLev yap to 
dSrjXov €Lvac TTOTepcog e;\;et TdXrjdeg, ov 8d^ei ao(j>L- 
^€adai, Sto. 8e to dpL(f>iho^€Zv ov Sd^et ifjevheadaf 

25 7] ydp^ pb€Ta<j>opd TTOLTjaeL tov Adyov dve^eXeyKTov . 

"Ert ocra dv Tig TrpoaiaddvrjTai tcov ipojTrjpbdTOJV, 

7Tpo€vcrTaT€ov Kal TTpoayopcvTcov ovTOi yap dv 

pbdXiaTa TOV 7Tvv9av6pb€VOV KOjXvaciev. 

' Reading TTorepov for Trportpov. 

* Inserting re after eVi. 
' Reading yap for Be with AB. 

98 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii 

is true, then the other is necessarily true, but, if the vices to be 
second is true, the first is not necessarily true, when ^'"P°i''^ • 
asked which is true, we ought to concede the less 
inclusive ; for the greater the number of premisses, 
the more difficult it is to draw a conclusion. If the 
disputant tries to establish that A has a contrary 
while B has not, if his contention is true, we ought 
to say that both have a contrary but that no name 
is laid down for one of the two. 

Regarding some of the statements which they 
make, most people would declare that anyone who did 
not concede them was lying, while they would not 
say so about others, for example, about subjects on 
which people disagree (for instance, most people have 
no decided opinion whether the soul of living creatures 
is destructible or immortal). Therefore, when it is 
uncertain in which sense the suggested premiss is 
generally used, whether as maxims are employed (for 
people call both true opinions and general affirmations 
by the name of ' maxims ') or like the statement, 
* the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its 
sides,' and further, where the truth is a matter of 
uncertainty, — in these cases one has an excellent 
opportunity of changing the terms without being 
found out. P'or, because it is uncertain in which sense 
the premiss bears its true meaning, one will not 
be regarded as playing the sophist, and, because of 
the disagreement on the subject, one will not be 
regarded as lying ; for the change will make the 
argument proof against refutation. 

Furthermore, whenever one foresees any question, 
one must be the first to make one's objection and say 
what one has to say, for thus one can best disconcert 
the questioner. 

99 



ARISTOTLE 

176 b 

XVIII. Ettci S' iarlv rj /xev opdrj Xvais e/x^a- 
30 vicrts" ipevSovs crvXKoyiayiov, Trap* ottolov ipoiTt^aiv 

avfji^aLV€L TO ipevSog, 6 8e i/j€vSr)9 cruAAoyta^o? 
Aeyerat, 8l)(^cos {'q yap el (TvXXeXoytaTaL ipevSos, rj 
et [JLT] ojv avXXoyicrfios So/cei elvat avXXoyLcrp,6s) , 
elrj av -rj re elprjjjievrj vvv Xvaus /cat rj rod (f>aLvo- 
fxevov avXXoyiGfiov Tvapa tl (jiaiverai rcuv ipcoTTj- 

35 /jbaTCDV oiopdoiOis . ware avfx^aLvei rojv Xoyojv rovs 
fiev auXXeXoyicrfxevovs dveXovra, rovs 8e (j)aivo- 
fxevovs SieXovra Xvecv. ttolXlv S' eTrel roJv avXXe- 
XoyiafievcDv Xoycov ol fxev dXrjdes ol Se ipevSos 
e)(ovcn ro avfiTrepaajxa, rovs fiev Kara, ro avfx- 
TTepaafJba t/jevSeis St;\;ai? evhe^^rai Xvetv Kal yap 

40 ra> dveXelv ri riov rjpcor'qfjieviov, /cat ru) Bel^aL ro 
m tL avfiTTepaafia exov ovx ovrcos' rovs 8e /caret rcts" 
TTporaaeis rib aveAetv ri pLovov ro yap avpLTrepaapLa 
dXrjdds. ware rols ^ovXopievoLS Auetv Xoyov rrpwrov 
/Ltev aKerrreov el avXXeXoyiarai r) davXXoyiaros , 
eira rrorepov dXrjdes ro avpLTrepaap,a r} i/jevSos, 
5 OTTCos T) Siaipovvres ■r) dvaipovvres Xvcofxev, /cat 
dvaipovvres y) cLSe r) <5Se, Kaddirep eXexdrj rrporepov. 
hta^epei 8e rrXelarov €pa>ra)pi€v6v re /cat pbrj Xveiv 
Xoyov ro piev yap Trpo'CSelv xaXenov, ro 8e Kara 
axoXrjV Ihelv paov. 

XIX. Tu)v pt,€V ovv Ttapd rrjv opLOJvvp^lav Kal rrjv 
10 d/i^ijSoAtav eXeyxojv ol puev e^ovai rcov epajrrjpbdrojv 

Tl 7rAeta> ar)p,alvov, ol Se to avp,7Tepaapia voXXaxoJs 

" In ch. xvii. " 176 b 36 ff. 

100 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xviii-xix 

XVIII. Since a correct solution is an exposure of Genuine 
false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question ^"'"tioD- 
on M'hich the fallacy hinges, and since ' false reason- 
ing ' can mean one of two things (for it occurs either 

if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is 
not a proof appears to be such), there must be both 
the solution described just now," and also the rectifica- 
tion of the apparent proof by showing on which of the 
questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the 
correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them, 
the apparent reasonings by making distinctions. 
Again, since some correctly reasoned arguments 
are true, while others are false, in their conclu- 
sions, it is possible to solve those which are false 
in their conclusion in two ways, either by demolishing 
one of the questions or by showing that the conclusion 
is not as stated. Those arguments, on the other hand, 
which are false in their premisses can only be solved 
by the demolition of one of the premisses, since the 
conclusion is true. Those, therefore, who wish to 
solve an argument should observe, firstly, whether 
it has been correctly reasoned or is not reasoned, 
and, next, whether the conclusion is true or false, 
in order that we may achieve a solution either 
by making a distinction or by demolishing a pre- 
miss and doing so in one or other of the two ways 
just described.* There is a very wide difference 
between solving an argument when one is being 
questioned and when one is not ; for in the latter case 
it is difficult to see what is coming, but when one is 
at leisure it is easier to see one's way. 

XIX. Of the refutations which hinge upon equi- (A) The 
vocation and ambiguity some involve a question refuta-*' 
which bears more than one sense, while others have tions (chs. 

XlX-XXXll). 

101 



ARISTOTLE 

177 a 

Aeyofxevov, olov iv fxev tw criycovra Ae'yeiv to cru/x- 

TTepaa-jxa Slttov, iv Se rep fXT] (TweTTtaraaOaL rov 

cmurayievov ev r&v ipcorrjfjidrojv dfKJil^oXov . /cat 

TO SiTTov OTe fxev earLV, ore 8' ovk cotlv, dAAa 

15 arjixaivei to Slttov to fj,€v ov to 8' ovk 6v. 

Oaois [xev ovv ev tw TeXet to 7ToX\ax<-os , dv fxr] 
TTpoXd^rf TTjv dvTL^aaiv , ov yiveTai eXey^^os, olov 
ev TO) Tov TV<f)X6v opdv dvev yap dvTL<j)daea)s ovk 
r^v eXeyxo'S. oaois 8' ev toIs epcoTrjfxaaiv , ovk 

20 avayKf] TrpoaTTOcfjijcraL to Slttov ov yap -npos tovto 
dXXd hid TOVTO 6 Aoyo?. ev dpxfj P'€V ovv to 
SlttXovv Kal ovo/JLa /cat Aoyor ovtcj's diroKpiTeov, 
OTL ecTLV CO?, ecTTt 8' (I)s ov, wanep to OLyoJVTa 
XeyeLV, otl euTiv wg, eWt 8' cus" ov. Kal Ta SdovTa 
TTpaKTeov euTLV a, eWt 8' a ov- rd ydp heovTa 

25 XeyeTaL TToXXa^d^S • edv he Xddr), enl TeXeL TrpooTi- 

devTa Tjj epojTiqaeL hLopdojTeov dp* eoTL aiydyvTa 

XeyeLV ; ov, dXXd Tovhe OLydJVTa. Kal ev tols 

exovGL he ro rrXeovaxdJ^ iv Tat? irpoTdaeaiv opiOLCos. 

OVK dpa avveTTLCTTavTai 6 ti iTT lot avT ai ; vai, aAA' 

ovx OL ovrois emaTdpLevoi' ov ydp TavTOV ioTiv otl 

^ Reading npoXdPjj with B. 
102 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix 

a conclusion which can bear several meanings ; for (a) Those 
example, in the argument about ' the speech of the d^Hon-!^ °" 
silent,' the conclusion has a double meaning, and (ch?. xix- 
in the argument that ' a man who knows is not (i) Equi- 
conscious of what he knows,' one of the questions vocation, 
involves ambiguity. Also, that Avhich has a double 
meaning is sometimes true and sometimes false, the 
term ' double ' signifying that which is partly true 
and partly untrue. 

When the diversity of meaning occurs in the con- (2) Am- 
clusion, no refutation takes place, unless the ques- "'^^y* 
tioner secures a contradiction beforehand, as, for 
example, in the argument about the ' seeing of the 
blind ' ; for there never was refutation without con- 
tradiction. Where the diversity of meaning occurs 
in the questions, there is no need to deny the ambi- 
guity beforehand ; for the argument is not directed 
towards it as a conclusion but carried on by means 
of it. At the beginning, therefore, one ought to 
reply to an ambiguous term or expression in the 
following manner, that ' in one sense it is so and in 
another it is not so ' ; for example ' the speaking of 
the silent ' is possible in one sense but not in another. 
Or again, ' what needs must is to be done sometimes 
and not at other times ' ; for the term ' what needs 
must ' can bear several meanings. If one does not 
notice the ambiguity, one should make a correction 
at the end by adding to the questioning : ' Is the 
speaking of the silent possible ? ' ' No, but speaking 
of this particular man when he is silent is possible.' 
So likewise also where the variety of meaning is 
contained in the premisses : ' Are not people conscious 
of what they know ? ' ' Yes, but not those who know 
in this particular way ' ; for it is not the same thing 

103 



ARISTOTLE 

177 a 

30 ovK eoTL ovveTncrraaOaL /cat on tovs d>hl iTTiara- 

fj.€Vovs OVK kuTLV. oXoJs Te /xap^ereov, av /cat 

aTrAcSs' CTyAAoyt'^T^Tat, ore ov^ o €(f)7]a€v d7T€(f)ria€ 

TTpdyiJba, aAA ovofjia' coctt' ovk eXeyxos. 

XX. Oavepov 8e /cat rous' Trapd rrjv Statpeatv 

/cat crvvOeaLV ttcos Xvreov dv yap hiaipovpbcvos /cat 

35 awTLdefxevos 6 Xoyos erepov (Tr)[jLaivrj, avp,7T€patvo- 
fievov rovvavTLOv XeKreov. etcrt Se Trdvres ol roi- 
ovTOi XoyoL TTapa rrjv avvdeaiv •^ hiaipeaiv. dp^ 
<1) etSes" cry rovrov rvirropbevov, tovtoj €TV7tt€to 
ovTOS ; Kal (p irvTTTeTO, rovrco av etSes ; ex^t 
177 b jLtev ovv Tt Ka/c tcov dp^^i^oXcov ipcorrjfidrcov, aAA' 
eart rrapd avvdeaiv. ov ydp iart Slttov to Trapd 
rrjv htaipeaiv [ov ydp 6 avrds Xoyos yiverai hiaipov- 
pi€vos), €L7T€p pLTj Kal TO opos Kal opos rfj TTpoacphia 
Xe^dev arjixatvei erepov. (dAA' ev fiev tol<; yeypap,- 
5 fxevois ravTov ovofxa, drav ck tcx)V avriov aroixf^iOiv 
yeypajxfievov fj Kal coaavTOJS , Ka/cet 8' rjSr] Tvapd- 
a7)p,a TTOLovvrai, rd Se ^^eyyojueva ov ravrd.) war 
ov hiTTOv rd Trapd Siaipeaiv. (f)avepdv 8e /cat ort 
ov navres ol eXeyxoi TT-apa to Sittov, Kaddvep 
TLves <j>aaLV. 

10 Ataipereov ovv Ta> dTTOKpivopbivcp- ov ydp Tavrov 

" In both examples the meaning can be either ' with a 
stick ' or ' with your eyes.' 
* i.e. breathings and accents. 

104 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix-xx 

to say that it is not possible for those who know to 
be conscious of what they know and that those who 
know in a particular way cannot be conscious of their 
knowledge. Generally speaking, too, even though 
one's opponent argues in a straightforward manner, 
one must contend that what he has contradicted is 
not the actual fact which one affirmed but merely its 
name, and so there is no refutation. 

XX. It is evident, too, how fallacies which turn (3) Am- 
on the division and combination of words should be division, 
solved ; for, if the expression signifies something ^^'^ (*) ^"^" 
different when it is divided and when it is combined, combination 
when the opponent is drawing his conclusion we must ° ^""^d*- 
take the words in the contrary sense. All such 
expressions as the following turn upon the combina- 
tion or division of words : ' Was so-and-so being 
beaten with that with which you saw him being 
beaten ? ' and ' Did you see him being beaten with 
that with which he was being beaten ? ' " The argu- 
ment here has something of the fallacy due to 
ambiguous questions, but it actually turns on com- 
bination. For what turns on the division of words 
is not really ambiguous (for the expression when 
divided differently is not the same), unless indeed opos 
and o/)os, pronounced according to the breathing, 
constitute a single word with different meanings. 
(In written language a word is the same when it is 
written with the same letters and in the same manner, 
though people now put in additional signs, ** but the 
words when spoken are not the same.) Therefore an 
expression whose meaning turns on division is not 
ambiguous, and it is clear also that all refutations do 
not turn upon ambiguity, as some people say. 

It is for the answerer to make the division ; for 

105 



ARISTOTLE 

177 b 

toelv Tolg 6c/)daX[jiOLS TVTTTOfjievov Koi TO (f)dvai ISetv 
rols 6(/)9aXfjio'iS rvTrrofxevov. koL 6 'Evdvhrjiiov Se 
Xoyos, ap' olhas av vvv ovaas iv Tleipaiel rptrjpeLS 
ev HiKeXla a)v ; kol ttolXlv, ap' eariv dyaOov ovra 
l5(TKVT€a fMox6rjp6v elvai; etr) S' aV rig dyados tov 
aKvrevg /xoxdrjpos' oiar earac dyadog GKvrevs 
fxoxdrjpos. dp' a)v at eTTtarrjixai aTTov^aZai, gttov- 
Saia rd /xa^i^/xara; rod hk KaKov airovhalov to 
fxadrjpia- aTrovSalov dpa ixddrjij,a ro KaKov. dXXd 
jj,r]v /cat KaKov /cat p^dd-qjjba to KaKov, mgtc kukov 
[xdOrjixa to KaKov. dXX eVrt KaKwv (jTrovhaia eVt- 

20 CTTTjiJiT] . dp' dXrjdes etVeii/ vvv otl av yiyova^ ; 
yeyovas dpa vvv. ^ dXXo a-qfxaivei hiaipeOiv; dXrj- 
de^ ydp €t7T€LV vvv OTL av yeyovas, dXX ov vvv 
yeyovas. dp' ojs hvvaaai /cat a Swao-at, ovtio's 
/cat TavTa rroirjaais dv ; ov Kidapi^wv 8' e;\;et? 
SvvaiJiiv Tov Kidapit^eiv Kidapiaats dv dpa ov Kidapi- 

25 l^cov. -q ov TOVTOV ex^i ttjv ^vvafxiv tov ov Kidapi- 
^cov Kidapi^eiv, dXX' ot€ ov Trotet, tov ttouZv ; 

AvovoL 84 Tiveg TOVTOV /Cat dXXojs. et yap e8a>/cev 
cos SvvaTai TTotelv, ov (f>a<jL avix^aiveiv jxt] Kidapi- 
l,ovTa Ki9apL^€LV ov ydp irdvTcos cos SvvaTat. ttouIv, 

30 SeSoCT^at TTOL-qaecv ov TavTov 8' eti^at (vs SvvaTai 



" See Rhet. 1 Wl a 27 and Cope and Sandys' note. 
106 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx 

I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes ' is not 
the same thing as to say ' I saw a man being-beaten- 
with-my-eyes.' — Then there is Euthydemus' saying, 

Do you know now in Sicily that there are triremes 
in Piraeus ? " ' — And, again, ' Can a good man who 
is a cobbler be bad ? ' ' No.' ' But a man who is 
good can be a bad cobbler ; therefore he will be a 
good-bad cobbler.' — Again, ' Things of which the 
knowledge is good are good objects of learning, are 
they not ? ' ' Yes.' ' But the knowledge of evil is 
good ; therefore evil is a good object of learning.' 
' But, further, evil is both evil and an object of 
learning, so that evil is an evil object of learning ; 
but it has already been seen that the knowledge of 
evils is good.' — ' Is it true to say at the present 
moment you are born ? ' ' Yes.' ' Then you are born 
at the present moment.' Does not a different division 
of the words signify something different ? For it is 
true to say-at-the-present-moment that you are 
born, but not to say you are born-at-the-present- 
moment. — Again, ' Can you do what you can and as 
you can ? ' ' Yes.' ' And when you are not playing 
the harp you have the power of playing the harp ; 
and so you could play the harp when you are not 
playing the harp. ' In other words, he does not possess 
the power of playing-when-he-is-not-playing, but he 
possesses the power of doing it when he is not doing 
it. 

Some people solve this in another manner also. 
If he has granted that a man can do what he can do, 
they say that it does not follow that he can play the 
harp when he is not playing it ; for it has not been 
granted that he will do it in every way in which he 
can, — for it is not the same thing to do it in the way 

107 



ARISTOTLE 

177 b 

/cat TTavTiO'S (li'S hvvarai TToietv. dXXa (f>avep6v on 
ov KaXcjs XvovaLV rcx)v yap napa ravrov Aoycuv tj 

aVTT] AuCTlS", aVTYj 8' OVX dp[x6(J€L €7tI TTOiVTas OvSc 

rravTCDS ipcoTCOfjLevovs, aAA' eari npos rov epojToJvra, 
ov TTpos rov Xoyov. 
35 XXI. riapd he TTjv -npoacohiav XoyoL fiev ovk 
eiaiv, ovre tojv yeypafifxevojv ovre ru)v XeyofMevwv, 
TrXrjv ei rives oXlyoi yevotvr^ dv, otov ovros 6 Xoyos. 
dpa y eart, ro ov KaraXveiS oiKta; vai. ovkovv ro 

178 a ov KaraXveig rov KaraXvecs d7T6(f)acns ; vai. €(f)r]aas 

8' etvai ro ov KaraXveis oIkmv rj oiVt'a dpa dno- 
(jiaois. CO? 817 Xvreov, hrjXov ov yap ravrd arjp,aiveL 
o^vrepov rd hk ^apvrepov prjdev. 

XXII. At^Ao;^ Se Kal rols irapd ro ojaavrojs Ae- 
5 yeadai ra piTj ravra ttcjs dnavrTqreov , eTreiirep 
k)(oixev ra yevrj rdJv KanqyopLtov. o fxkv ydp eScDKev 
ipcorrjdels fir] VTrdp)(eLV ri rovrcov oaa ri eari 
cqixaivef 6 8 eSei^ev V7Tdp)(ov rt rwv npos ri rj 
TToadJv, SoKovvrojv 8e ri eari arji.iai.vetv 8ia rrjv 
Xe^LV, olov ev rcphe ra> Xoyco. dp* evSe)(eraL ro 
10 avro dp,a rroielv re Kal TTeTrofqKevai ; ov. dXXd 
jxrjv opdv ye n dfxa Kat, ecjpaKevai rd avro Kal 
Kard ravrd evSex^rac. dp* eari ri rchv Trdax^iv 
TToieZv rt; ov. ovkovv rd repLverai Kaierai aladd- 
verai dfjboicus Xeyerat, Kal rrdvra rrdax'^iv ri arj- 



" The point here is the difference of breathing and the 
presence or absence of the circumflex accent. 

108 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx-xxii 

in which he can and in every way in which he can. 
But clearly this solution is not a good one ; for the 
solution of arguments which turn on an identical 
principle is identical, whereas this solution will not 
suit every argument nor every form of question into 
which it can be put, but is directed against the 
questioner, not against the argument. 

XXI. Arguments do not arise owing to accentua- (5) Wrong 
tion either in written or in spoken language, though 

a few might occur such as the following : A house 
is ' where you lodge ' (oS KaroAi'tt?), isn't it ? Yes. 
Is not ' you do not lodge ' (ov KaraAi'ets) the nega- 
tion of ' you lodge ' (/caTaAveis) ? Yes. But you said 
that ' where you lodge ' (ov Karakv^fi) was a house ; 
therefore a house is a negation. It is obvious how 
this must be solved ; for the spoken word is not the 
same with the acuter and with the graver accent.* 

XXII. It is plain also how we must meet arguments (6) similar 
that turn on the identical expression of things which fo/dWeren^t 
are not identical, seeing that we possess the various things. 
kinds of categories. Suppose that one man when 
questioned has granted that something which denotes 

a substance is not an attribute, and another man has 

shown that something is an attribute which is in the 

category of relation or quantity but generally held, 

because of its expression, to denote a substance, as 

for example in the following argument : Is it pos- Examples. 

sible to be doing and to have done the same thing 

at the same time ? No. But it is surely possible to 

be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same 

time and under the same conditions. Or again, Is 

any form of passivity a form of activity ? No. Then 

' he is cut,' ' he is burnt,' ' he is affected by a sensible 

object ' are similar kinds of expression and all denote 

109 



ARISTOTLE 

178 a 

fjuatvcL- TToXtv 8e ro Xeyeiv rpe^^eiv opdv ofxoLios 

15 aXXijXois Xeyeraf aAAa fxrjv to y' opdv alaOdveadai 
TL eariv, ojare /cat Trdax^iv tl d'/xa Kal 7tol€lv. el 
Se Tis €K€L hoy's jxrj €vSe)(€crdai dpia ravro ttocclv 
/cai TTeTTOLTjKevat, to opdv Kal ecopaKevai (f)aLrj 
€'yx<^p^tv, ovTTCi) eXrjXeyKrai, el pLrj XeyoL ro opdv 
TTOielv TL aAAd 7Taar)(eLV npoahel yap tovtov tov 

20 epcoTT^pbaros' dAA' vtto tov aKovovTos VTToXap,- 
PdveTai SeScoKevat, ore to repLveiv noLelv tl /cat ro 
rerpir)K€vat, TreTTotrj/ceVat eSco/ce, /cat oaa aAAa 
OjLtotcos" Xeyerai. ro yap Xolttov avros Trpoarid'qaLV 
6 aKovcov (Ls 6p,oio)s Xeyopievov ro Se Aeyerai [xev 
ov)( 6p.ouos, (f)atveTai 8e 8td rrjv Ae^tv. to auTO 

25 Se av/jb^aivei orrep ev rals oficovvfJiLaLS' oierat yap 
ev rotg opucovvpiois 6 dyvdis rojv Xoyojv o e(j)7]aev 
a7TO(f)7Jaai Trpdyfia, ovk 6vop,a' ro Se en Ttpoahel 
epcor-qfjiarog, el e^' ev ^XeTTOiv Xeyei ro opuLvvp^ov 
ovrcos yap Sovto? ear at eXey)(os. 
"0/ioioi he /cat oiSe ot Aoyot toutois, el 6 ris 

30 exojv varepov fir] ex^i aTre^aXev 6 yap eva p.6vov 
d7To^aXd)v darpdyaXov ov^ e^et §e/ca daTpayaAous'. 
Tj o puev [j,r] €^€1 TTporepov e^oiv, aTTo^e^XrjKev , oaov 
he pLT] e-)(ei r] oaa, ovk avdyKt] roaavra aTTO^aXelv . 

" Knucklebones were used as dice by the Greeks. 
110 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxii 

some form of passivity ; and, on the other hand, ' to 
say,' ' to run,' and ' to see ' are forms of expression 
similar to one another ; but ' to see ' is surely a way 
of being affected by a sensible object, so that passivity 
and activity occur at the same time. In the former 
case, if someone, after granting that it is impossible 
to be doing and to have done the same thing at the 
same time, were to say that it is possible to see a 
thing and to have seen it, he has not yet been refuted 
supposing that he declares that seeing is a form not 
of activity but of passivity. For this further question 
is necessary, though he is supposed by the hearer to 
have granted it when he granted that ' to cut ' is ' to 
be doing something ' and ' to have cut ' is ' to have 
done something,' and so with similar forms of expres- 
sion. For the hearer himself adds the rest, on the 
supposition that the significance is similar, whereas 
it is not really similar but only appears so owing to 
the expression. The same thing occurs as in fallacies 
of ambiguity ; for in dealing with ambiguous terms 
the man who is not an expert in argument thinks 
that his opponent has denied the fact which he 
asserted, not the term, whereas yet another ques- 
tion needs to be asked, namely, whether he is 
using the ambiguous term with his eye upon one 
meaning only ; for if he grants this, a refutation will 
be achieved. 

Similar to the above are also the following argu- Examples 
ments : Has a man lost what he had and afterwards ("*'*"""*'*)• 
has not ? For he who has lost one die " only will no 
longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens 
that he has lost something which he had before but 
no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost 
the whole amount or number which he no longer 

111 



ARISTOTLE 

178 a 

epojrrjuag ovv 6 ep^et, avvayei cttI rod ocra* to, yap 

35 SeVa TTOod. el ovv rjpero i^ '^PXV^ ^^ ^^^ "^^^ f^V 

€)(ei Trporepov ex^JV, dpd ye OLTTo^e^XrjKe roaavra, 

ovhels a.v eSojKev, aAA' fj roaavra -q tovtojv tl. Kai 

ore SoLTj dv rLS o firj e)(eL. ov yap exec eva p,6vov 

aarpayaXov. iq ov SeScD/cev o ovk elxev, dAA cu? 

ovK eiX€, rov eva; ro yap jjiovov ov roSe arjp^aivei 

iTSbouSe roiovhe ovhe roaovhe, aAA co? ^X^'' ^P<^? ti, 

olov on ov /xer' aAAou. ojoTrep ovv el rjpero dp' o 

jjbij Tt? ^'x^t SoLT] dv, pLT] (f)dvros 8e epoiro el Solt] 

dv ris Tl rax€a)s /u.17 ex^ov raxeojs, <j>rj(javro's he 

av\Xoyit,OLro on Soltj dv ns o pbrj ^X^'" '^^'■ 

6 (jyavepov on ov auAAeAoy tcrrai • ro yap raxewg ov 

roSe BiSovat dAA' cSSe SiSovat eanv a»s" 8e pLrj 6;^ei 

Tt?, hoLT] dv, olov rjSews ex^v Soir] dv XvTrrjpcos. 

"OfiocoL Se Kal OL roioihe iravres. dp fi firj c^^t 

X^i'Pi' TVTTroi dv ; "^ d> P''^ ^X^'' d(j)daXpbip tSot dv ; 

10 ov yap e^et eva piovov. Xvovai p,ev ovv nveg Xe- 

yovreg /cat d)S ex^i^ ^va piovov Kal 6(f>daXp,6v /cat 
112 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxii 

has ? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with 
that which he has, in the conclusion with the total 
number ; for the number was ten. If, therefore, he 
had asked in the first place whether a man who 
formerly possessed a number of objects which he no 
longer possesses, has lost the total number of them, 
no one would have granted this, but would have said 
that he had lost either the total number or one of the 
objects. Again, it is argued that a man could give 
what he had not got ; for what he has not got is one 
die only. Is not what really happens that he has not 
given that which he has not got but has given it in a 
manner in which he has not got it, namely, as a single 
unit ? For ' single unit ' does not denote either a 
particular kind of thing or a quality or a quantity 
but a certain relation to something else, namely, 
dissociation from anything else. It is, therefore, as 
though he had asked whether a man could give what 
he has not got, and on receiving the answer ' No,' 
were to ask whether a man could give something 
quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on 
receiving the answer ' Yes,' were to infer that a man 
could give what he had not got. It is obvious that 
he has not drawn a correct inference ; for ' giving 
quickly ' does not denote giving a particular thing 
but giving in a particular manner, and a man could 
give something in a manner in which he did not get 
it ; for example, he could get it with pleasure and 
give it with pain. 

Similar also are all the following arguments : Further 
' Could a man strike with a hand that he has not got ^^^"iP'*'^- 
or see with an eye that he has not got .'' ' For he has 
not got only one eye. Some people, therefore, solve 
this by saying that the man who has more than one 

113 



ARISTOTLE 

178 b 

aAA oTLovv 6 TrXeiu} exoiv. ol Se /cat coj o ey^ei 

eAapev iSlSov yap fiiav fxovov ovros i/jrj(f>ov Kal 

ovTos y ^x^t, (ftaal, fiiav fiovrjv Trapa rovrov 

ilfri<f)ov. ol S' evdv's rrjv ipwrr^cnv dvacpovvres , ort 

15 ivhex^rai, o fxr) eXa^ev ex^iv, olov olvov Xa^ovra 

■fjSvv, Sia(f>6ap€VTos iv rij Ar^^et, ex^iv o^vv. dAA' 

ovep eXexdrj Kal Trporepov, o6tol Travres" ov Trpos 

rov Xoyov dAAo, 77pos' tov avdpojTzov Xvovatv. el 

yap '^v avrrj Xvais, hovra ro dvTLKelfxevov ovx olov 

re Xveiv, Kaddirep eVi rwv aXXixiv olov el eari p,ev 

20 6 ecTTt 8' o ov, 7] Xvais, dv aTrAai? So) Xeyeadai, 

crvfjbTTepaiveTaL' edv Se fxrj avfXTrepalvrjTai, ovk dv 

eir] Xvais' ev Se tols 7rpoeLp7]fxevoLg iravruiv 8t8o- 

fievcov ovSe <jiap.ev ylveadai avXXoyLafiov. 

' Ert 8e Acat otS' elal tovtojv rdjv Xoytov. dp* 
25 o yeypanraL, eypa(f>€ rtg ; yeypaTrrai 8e vvv otl av 
Kadrjaat, ilievSrjs Xoyos- ■^v 8' dXr]di^s, or' eypd(f)eTO' 
a/xa dpa eypd(j)eTo ijievhrjs Kal dXyjOi^s. to yap 
ipevSrj t] dXrjdrj Xoyov r) So^av elvai ov roSe dXXd 
TOLOvSe arjjjialveL- 6 yap avros Xoyos Kal eVi ttjs 
30 S6^T]s. Kal dp* o /xavdavei 6 /xavddvwv, tout* iarlv 
o /jLavddvei; /jLavdavei 8e tls to ^paSv Taxv- ov 
Toivvv o fxavdaveL dAA' (Lg {JLavdavei etpTjKev. Kal 
dp* o ^a8i^ei Tt? Traret; ^ahit^ei, 8e tt^v Tj/xepav 

" It seems probable that a new argument is dealt with here, 
cf. b 36 Kal OTL kt\. ol 8e possibly introduced a second solu- 
tion of the previous argument which has fallen out. 

* But B may already possess other pebbles, 

" 1 77 b 38. 

lU 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxii 

eye (or whatever it is) has also only one. There is 
also " the argument of some people that ' what a man 
has, he has received ' : A only gave one pebble, and 
B has, they say, only one pebble from A.** Other 
people argue by directly demolishing the question 
raised, saying that one can have what one has not 
received ; for example, one can receive wine that is 
sound but have it in a sour condition if it has gone 
bad in the process of transfer. But, as was said before," 
all these people direct their solutions not to the argu- 
ment but to the man. For if this were a real solution, 
it would be impossible to achieve a solution by grant- 
ing the opposite, as happens in all other cases ; for 
example, if ' it is partly so and partly not so ' is the 
solution, an admission that the expression is used 
without qualification makes the conclusion valid ; 
but if no conclusion is reached, there cannot be a 
solution. In the above examples, even though every- 
thing is conceded, yet we say that no proof has been 
effected. 

Moreover, the following also belong to this class 
of arguments : ' If something is written, did someone 
write it ? ' It is written that ' you are sitting ' ; this 
is a false statement, but was true at the time when 
it was written ; therefore what was written is at the 
same time false and true. No, for the falsity or truth 
of a statement or opinion does not denote a substance 
but a quality ; for the same account applies to an 
opinion as to a statement. Again, ' Is what the 
learner learns that which he learns ? ' A man learns 
a slow march quick ; it is not then what he learns 
that is meant but how he learns it. Again, ' Does a 
man trample on that through which he walks ? ' 
But he walks through the whole day. Was not what 

115 



ARISTOTLE 

178 b 

oXrjv. r) ovx o ^aSt^et aAA' ore ^aSt^et etprjKev 
ov8^ orav rrjv KvXiKa Trlveiv, o ttlvcl aAA' i^ ov. 
35 /cat dp' o Tt? oiSev 7) jxadajv rj evpwv otSev; cSv 8e 
TO iJi€v evpe TO S e/xade, ra diJt,(f)CO ovherepov . rj o 
fiev OLTTav, a 8' (ov^y airavra;^ Kal on can ris rpi- 
Tos avdpcoTTos Trap' avrov /cat tovs /ca^' eKaarov. to 
yap dvdpiVTTos Kal dnav to koivov ov roSe tl, dAAa 
TOLOvhe Tt rj Trpos tl r) ttcx)'5 rj Ttbv tolovtcov tl arj- 
i79a^atVei. ojjlolco? he /cat evrt tov KopiaKos Kal Ko- 
piaKos jjiovatKos, rroTepov TavTOV rj cTepov; to 
jiev yap rdSe tl to Se tolovSc arjjxaiveL, wot ovk 
ecTTLV avTo eKdeadaL' ov to eKTlOeadaL 8e Trotet tov 

TpLTOV dvOpCOTTOV, dAAo, TO OTTCp ToSc TL €LVaL GVy- 

5 ^(lopeLV. ov yap earat roSe tl eivat, orrep KaAAta?, 
/cat OTTep dvdpojTTog ccttlv. oj38' ei,' rts" to cKTLdd- 
fxevov jXTj orrep To8e Tt efvat XeyoL dAA' oTrep ttolov, 
oi}8ev 8totaef eaTat ydp to irapa tovs ttoAAous" €v 
Tl, otov o dvdpcoTTOs. (f)avep6v ovv otl ov Sotcov 
ToBe TL €LvaL TO KOLvfj KaTTjyopovfxevov €TtI TrdcTLV, 

10 dAA' T^TOt TTOtOV rj TTpog TL rj TTOaOV rj TCJJV TOLOVTCOV 

TL arjjialveLV. 

XXIII. "OAoj? 8' iv Tolg rrapd Trjv Ae^tv Aoyot? 
det /caTa to dvTLKeijievov eoTaL rj Xvgls rj Trap' 6 

^ Reading a 8' <ovx> anavra with Pickard-Cambridge. 
116 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxii-xxiii 

was meant not what he walks through but when he 
walks ? Just as when we talk of a man drinking a 
cup, we refer not to what he drinks but to that out 
of which he drinks. Again, ' Is it not either by 
learning or by discovery that a man knows what he 
knows ? ' But, supposing that of two things he has 
discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either 
discovered or learnt the two taken together. Is it 
not true to say that what he knows is each single 
thing, but not all the things taken together ? There 
is also the argument that there is a ' third man ' 
beside ' man ' and ' individual men.' This is not so, 
for ' man ' and every generic term denotes not an 
individual substance but a quality or relation or mode 
or something of the kind. So, too, with the question 
whether ' Coriscus ' and ' the musician Coriscus ' are 
the same thing or different. For the one term denotes 
an individual substance, the other a quality, so that 
it is impossible to isolate it ; for it is not the process 
of isolation which produces the ' third man ' but the 
admission that there is an individual substance. For 
' man ' will not be an individual substance as Callias 
is, nor will it make any difference if one were to say 
that what is isolated is not an individual substance 
but a quality ; for there will still be a one as con- 
trasted with the many, for instance ' man.' It is 
obvious, therefore, that it must not be granted that 
the term predicated universally of a class is an in- 
dividual substance, but we must say that it denotes 
either a quality or a relation or a quantity or some- 
thing of the kind. 

XXIII. To sum up, in dealing with arguments Summary of 
which turn on language the solution will always de- solution of ** 
pend on the opposite of that on which the argument fallacies 

117 



ARISTOTLE 

179 a 

eariv 6 Aoyo?. olov el irapa avvOeaiv 6 Aoyos", 17 
AvcFLg SteAovTi, el Se rrapa Staipeatv, avvBevri. ttolXlv 

15 ei TTapa Trpoacohiav o^elav, rj ^apela irpoacphia 
Xvais, el he irapa §apelav, rj o^ela. el 8e irap' 
ofjiOJVVfMLav, kari ro dvrtKretjuevov ovop^a eiTTovra 
XveLV, olov el atpvxov^ ovpb^alveL Xeyeiv, (xtto^t)- 
aavra pbT] elvai, hrjXovv cLg eariv epujjvxov el 8' 
ai/jvxov e(f)r]aev, 6 8' epultv^ov avveXoyiaaro, Xeyeiv 

20 CO? ecrriv aipv^ov. opiOLCos Se Kal eirl rrjs dp,(f)L- 
^oAta?. el Se nap' opioiorrjra Xe^eojs, to avriKei- 
p,evov earai Xvcns. ap' o p^T] ex^i, Boirj av ris ; 
r) ovx o pLTj ex^t, aAA' cos ovk e;(et, olov eva piovov 
acrrpdyaXov. ap* o tTrtCTTarai, pcadcbv 7) evpcjv 
eiTiaTaTai,; aAA ovx ^ eTnararai. /cat o paoLL,eL 

25 TrareX, dXX' ovx ore. op.oico'S Se Kal eirl rcbv 
dXXiov. 

XXIV. ripos" Se Tovs TTapd to ovpL^e^rjKog p-ia 
puev T) avTrf Xvaig TTpog aTravra?. eTrel yap dSi- 

OpiOTOV eCTTt TO TTOTe XeKTeOV eTTL TOV TTpdypbaTos, 

OTav em tov avpu^e^r^KOTog vTTapxjj, Kai err eviojv 
30 pi€V SoKet Kal <f>aaiv, ctt' evicov 8' ov (f)aaLV dvay- 
Kalov elvai, prjTeov ovv avpi^L^aadevTos^ opiOLcos 
TTpog dnavTas otl ovk dvayKalov. ^X^^^ ^^ ^^^ 
7Tpo(f>epeLV TO olov. elol Se TrdvTes ol rotoiSe tcov 
X6ya)v TTapd to avpL^e^rfKos • dp* oTSas o pieXXco 

^ Reading atpvxov with Poste for efulivxov. 

* Omitting el after Kal. 

' Reading avfi^i^aadivros with A. 

» See note on 178 a 31. » See 178 b 32-33. 

118 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiii-xxiv 

turns ; for example, if the argument turns on com- which 
bination, the solution will be by division, if on division, df^tlon.^" 
by combination. Again, if it turns on acute accentua- 
tion, grave accentuation will be the solution, and 
vice versa. If it turns on equivocation, it can be solved 
by the use of the opposite term ; for example, if it 
so happens that one says something is inanimate 
after having denied that it is so, one must show that 
it is animate ; and, if one has said that it is inanimate 
and one's opponent has argued that it is animate, 
one must assert that it is inanimate. Similarly, too, 
in the case of ambiguity ; if the argument turns on 
similarity of language, the opposite will be the solu- 
tion. ' Could one give what one has not got ? ' 
Surely not 7i-kat he has not got but he could give it in 
a 7vay in which he has not got it, for example, a single 
die " by itself. ' Does a man know the thing which 
he knows by learning or discovery ? ' Yes, but not 
' the things, which he knows.' Also a man tramples 
on the thing through which he walks, not on the time 
through which he walks. *" And similarly, too, with 
the other instances. 

XXIV. To meet arguments which turn upon acci- (ft) Solu- 
dent one and the same solution is universally appli- dependent 
cable. It is undetermined on what occasions the ^j^f x^". 
attribute should be applied to the subject where it xxx).' 
belongs to the accident, and sometimes it is generally ^gnt ^" 
held and stated to belong and sometimes it is denied <^"2^^^y ^^^ 
that it necessarily belongs. We must, therefore, when consequence 
a conclusion has been reached, assert in every case [g°^g"^t to 
ahke that it does not necessarily belong. But we must the subject. 
have an example to bring forward. All such arguments 
as the following turn on accident : ' Do you know what 
I am about to ask you ? ' 'Do you know the man 

119 



ARISTOTLE 

179 a 

ae epiorav ; dp' olSag rov TrpocnovTa 7) rov iy- 
KeKaXvixfievov ; dp' 6 avSpids aov iariv epyov, fj 

35 cros 6 KVCDV TTarrjp; dpa rd dAtya/ci? oAtya oXiya; 
(f>av€p6v yap iv aTraai. tovtols on ovk dvdyK-r] to 
Kard rod avjji^e^r] kotos /cat /cara tov 7Tpdyp,aTos 
dXrjdeveadaf (jlovols yap toIs /cara ttjv ovaiav 
dhia<j)6poLS Kal ev ovaiv dnavTa 8o/cet Tauro. virdp- 
I79b;(;eir* to) S' dyadco ov TavTov ioTiv dyaOco t efvai 
KoX fxeXXovTt, ipojTaadaL, ouSe tco TrpoaiovTi rj ey- 
K€KaXvfi[X€va) TTpoaioVTL T€ elvai Kal Kopta/coc c5ctt' 
OVK el olBa TOV ViopioKov, dyvoci) 8e tov TrpoaiovTa, 
TOV avTov otSa Kal dyvodj' ovS' el tout' eoTlv e/xov, 
5 eoTt, 8' epyov, ejjiov eoTiv epyov, dXX' rj KTr^jxa rj 
TTpdyjxa rj dXXo ti. tov avTOV Se rporrov Kal errl 
Tcbv dXXoiv. 

Avovai he Ttve? dvai,povvTes ttjv epcoTTjaiv (jyaal 
yap ivhexccrdai TavTO npayfia elhevai Kal dyvoelv, 
dXXd firj Kara TavTO' tov ovv TrpoatovTa ovk eiSoTeg, 

10 TOV Se Kopicr/cov elSores, ravTO jiev elhevat Kal 
dyvoelv <j>aaLV, dXX ov /caTct TauTo. KaiTot, rrpaiTov 
jiev, Kaddrrep rjSrj eirrofjiev. Set tcov irapd ravTO 
XoyuiV TTjv avTTjv elvai hiopdwaLV avrrj S' ovk 
eoTai, dv Tt? pirj errl tov elhevai dXX' errl tov elvai 
rj TTOJS ^x^iv TO avTO d^tcujLta Xajx^dvrj, olov el oSe 

» See 179 b 15. Cf. Plato, Euthydemus 298 e, 

* The reference here is to the question (a 33) ' Do you 

know what I am about to ask you ? ' The reply is ' no.' 

' I am going to ask you about the good ; therefore, you do 

not know about the good.' 
« 177 b 31. 

120 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 

who is coming towards us ? ' or ' the man with his 
face covered ? ' 'Is the statue your work ? ' or ' Is 
the dog your father ? ' " 'Is the result of multiplying 
a small number by another small number itself a 
small number ? ' It is obvious that in all these 
instances it does not necessarily follow that the 
attribute which is true of the accident is also true of 
the subject. For it is only to things which are in- 
distinguishable and one in essence that all the same 
attributes are generally held to belong ; but in the 
case of the good, it is not the same thing to be good 
and to be about to be the subject of a question. ** Nor 
in the case of ' the man who is coming towards us ' 
(or ' with his face covered '), is ' to be coming towards 
us ' the same thing as ' to be Coriscus ' ; so that, 
if I know Coriscus but do not know the man who is 
coming towards me, it does not follow that I know 
and do not know the same man. And again, if this 
is ' mine ' and if it is also ' a piece of work,' it is not 
therefore ' a piece of my work ' but may be my 
possession or chattel or something else. The other 
instances can be treated in the same way. 

Some people obtain a solution by demolishing the (^) By de- 
thesis of the question ; for they say that it is possible the original 
to know and not to know the same thing but not question, 
in the same respect ; when, therefore, they do not 
know the man who is coming towards them but know 
Coriscus, they say that they know and do not know 
the same thing but not in the same respect. Yet in 
the first place, as we have already said," the method 
of correcting arguments which turn on the same 
principle ought to be identical, yet this will not be so, if 
one takes the same axiom to apply not to ' knowledge ' 
but to ' existence ' or ' being in a certain state ' ; for 

121 



ARISTOTLE 

179 b 

15 ear I, Trarrjp, eari Be aos' el yap ctt' eviojv toOt' 

earlv dXrjdes Kal evSexerai ravro elSevac Kal 

ayvoeZv, aXX evravda ovBev KocvcoveZ to Xe^dev. 

ovSev Se KcoXvei tov avrov Xoyov vXeiovs yio-)(jd'i)pias 

e;^€tv. aAA' ov^ "^ Trdurjs a/xaprta? e[X(f)dvLaLS Xvols 

eariv eyxojpel ydp otl fxev iftevhos avXXeXoyiarai, 

20 Sel^ai TLva, irap* o he p,rj Bel^ai, olov tov Tiijvcovos 
Xoyov, on ovk eari Kivrjdrjvat,. cScrre /cat et tls 
eTTix^LpoLT] avvdyeiv a>? dhvvarov, afxaprdvei, kov 
el pLvpidKLS fj avXXeXoyiapLevos' ov ydp eariv avrrj 
Xvais. rjv ydp rj Averts' €[ji(f)dvi(ng ipevSovs avXXoyi- 
afxov, Trap' o i/jevS'qs' el ovv firj avXXeXoyLUTai rj 

25 Kal dXrjdes •^ tpevSos {i/'eyScD?)^ eVtp^et/jet avvdyeiv, 
rj eKeivov St^Awcti? Auo'ts' eariv. tacos 8e Kal rovr* 
67?' evicov ovSev KcoXveL avfM^alveLV' ttXtjv eTri ye 
rovrcov ovhe rovro So^eiev dv Kal ydp rov Kopt- 
aKov on Ko/DiCTKO? otSe, Kal rd Trpoatov on Trpoa- 
Lov. evSexeaOai 8e BoKel ro avro elBevai Kal fi-q, 

30 olov on fiev XevKov elSevai, on Be (XOvatKov {xt) 

yvix}pit,eiv ovra> ydp ro avro otBe Kal ovk otSev, 

dAA' ov Kard r avrov. ro Be Trpoaiov Kal K^oploKov, 

Kal on TTpoaiov Kal on KoplaKos, olBev. 

'O/Ltotcu? 8' dfjiaprdvovat Kal ol Xvovres, ori diras 

^ Reading with W. A. Pickard-Cambridge i/ievSos <ifiev8a)s>. 

" €'/. a 34 f., the false conclusion being, ' This dog is your 
father.' 
122 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 

example, ' this dog is a father, this dog is yours.' "■ 
Though it is sometimes true and it is possible to know 
and not to know the same thing, yet the suggested 
solution is quite inapplicable in the above instance. 
But there is no reason why the same argument should 
not contain several flaws, but it is not the exposure 
of every fault that forms a solution ; for it is possible 
for a man to show that a false conclusion has been 
reached without showing on what point it turns, as, 
for instance, in Zeno's argument that motion is im- 
possible. Even, therefore, if one were to attempt 
to infer the impossibility of this view, he is wrong, 
even though he has given countless proofs ; for this 
procedure does not constitute a solution, for a solu- 
tion is, as we saw, an exposure of false reasoning, 
showing on what the falsity depends. If, therefore, 
he has not proved his case or else if he attempts to 
draw an inference, whether true or false, by false 
means, the unmasking of this procedure is a solution. 
But perhaps, though in some cases there is nothing 
to prevent this happening, yet it would not be gener- 
ally admitted in the instances given above ; for he 
knows that Coriscus is Coriscus and that what is 
coming towards him is coming towards him. But 
there are cases in which it is generally held to be 
possible to know and not to know the same thing ; 
for instance, one can know that someone is white 
but be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, thus 
knowing and not knowing the same thing but not 
in the same respect ; but as to what is coming towards 
him and Coriscus, he knows both that it is coming 
towards him and that he is Coriscus. 

An error similar to that made by those whom we (Erroneous 
have mentioned is committed by those who solve ^fution." 

123 



ARISTOTLE 

179 b 

35 apiOixos oXiyos, uiairep ovs etTTOfiev el yap fXTj 
GVjXTTepaivojxevov, rovro TrapaXcTTovres , aX'qdeg avfx- 
7T€7Tepavdai, <f)acri, Trdvra yap efvat Kal ttoXvv /cat 
oXiyov, afxaprdvovaiv . 

cjVlol be Kal tco Sltto) Xvovctl rovs avXXoyiafiovs , 
oiov OTL aos ecTTt Trarrjp t] vlos ^ SovXos. KalroL 

180 a (f)avep6v COS el rrapd to 7roAAa;^aJ9 XeyeaOat (fyatverai 

6 eXeyx^os, Set rovvofjba rj rov Xoyov Kvpiios elvat 
TrXeLovojv to 8e tovS' elvai rovhe reKvov ov8els 
Xeyei Kvpiojs, ei hearroT-qs earl reKvov dXXa rrapd 
5 TO avjJb^e^r^Kos r) avvdeai? eoTiv. dp' eo-rt tovto 
aov ; vaL. eart he tovto tIkvov ; adv dpa tovto 
TeKvov OTL av/jL^e^rjKev elvai /cat aov /cat TeKvov, 
dAA' ov aov TeKvov. 

Kat TO elvai tcov /ca/coiv tl dyadov rj ydp ^povrj- 
aLS eaTiv eTnaTiqpLri tcov KaKcov. to 8e tovto tov- 
10 TCOV elvai ov Aeyerat TroAAa;^;^;?, dAAa KTrjpba. el 
8 dpa TToXXaxcog (/cat ydp tov dvdpcoTTov tcov ^cocjov 
(f)ap,ev etvaL, dAA' ov tl KTrj/jia) /cat edv tl irpds rd 
/ca/cd XeyrjTaL at? tlvos, 8td tovto twv KaKchv eoTiv, 

dAA' ov TOVTO TCOV KaKWV . TTapd TO TTTJ ovv /Cat 

aTrAcos' (jyaiveTaL. /catVot ivSex^rai ictcds" dya^op* 

15 etval TL TCOV /ca/ccDv Slttws, dAA' ovk enl tov Xoyov 

TOVTOV, aAA' et tl BovXov etrj dyadov pLo)(6r]pov, 

jLtdAAov. tacos 8' oi)8' ovTcos' ov ydp el dyadov Kal 



" When it is equivalent to our ' so-and-so's.' 
124 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 

the argument that every number is small ; for if, 
when no conclusion has been reached, they pass over 
the fact and say that a conclusion has been reached 
and is true because every number is both large and 
small, they are committing an error. 

Some people, too, solve these reasonings by the 
principle of ambiguity, saying, for example, that 
' yours ' means ' your father ' or ' your son ' or ' your 
slave.' Yet it is obvious that, if the refutation turns 
upon the possibility of several meanings, the term 
or expression ought to be used literally in several 
senses ; but no one speaks of A as B's child in the 
literal sense if B is the child's master, but the com- 
bination is due to accident. ' Is A yours ? ' ' Yes.' 
' Is A a child ? ' ' Yes.' ' Then A is your child,' for 
he happens to be both yours and a child ; but for all 
that he is not ' your child.' 

There is also the argument that ' something " of 
evils " is good ; for wisdom is a knowledge " of 
evils." ' But the statement that this is ' of so-and- 
so ' ^ is not used with several meanings but denotes 
possession. Granting, however, that the genitive has 
more than one meaning (for we say that man is ' of 
the animals,' though not a possession of theirs), and if 
the relation of so-and-so to evils is expressed by the 
genitive, it is therefore a so-and-so ' of evils,' but so- 
and-so is not one of the evils. The difference seems to 
be due to whether the genitive is used in a particular 
sense or absolutely. Yet it is perhaps possible for the 
saying ' Something of evils is good ' to be ambiguous, 
though not in the example given above, but rather in 
the phrase ' a slave is good of the wicked.' But per- 
haps this example is not to the point either ; for if 
something is ' good ' and ' of so-and-so,' it is not at 

125 



ARISTOTLE 

180 a 

TOVTov, ayaOov rovrov a/xa. ovBe ro tov avOpajnov 
(pavat. Tcov t,a)Cov elvai ov Xeyerai TToAXaxoJS' ov 
20 yap et TTore rt arip,aivop,ev d^eAovre?, rovro Xe- 
yerai TToXXaxcos' /cat yap to -q/jiicrv elirovTes tov 
eiTovs So? /xot 'lAidSa ar)fj,aivoiJiev, olov to fxijviv 
d'etSe Bed. 

XXV. Tovs 8e TTapa to Kvpiois Tohe r) Trfj -^ 
TTOV 7] TTOJS 7] 77/309 TL Xiyeodai Kal fir] anXajg, 

25 XvTeov (TKOTTOVVTI TO avfiTTepaofjia irpos Tr]v dvTt- 
(pacnv, el evhe^^TaL tovtojv tl rreTTOvdevai. to. yap 
evavTia Kal to. dvTLKelfieva Kal cf)daLv Kal d7T6(f)aaLV 
aTrAcij? iJiev dBvvaTov vTrdp^eiv tw avTw, ttjj fxevToc 
CKdrepov ^ rrpos ri rj ttws, r] to p,ev tttj to 8' 
aTrAcD?, ovSev KOiXvei. oiOT el Tohe p.ev dTrAd)? 

30 ToSe Se rcf], ovtto) eXeyxos. tovto S' ev to) avfx- 
TTepaapiaTt decoprjTeov npos ttjv dvTi<f)a(jiv. 

Etcrt oe TTavTes ol toiovtol Xoyoi toOt' e)(ovTes, 
dp' evSe;^^''"^^'^ '''o P''^ ov elvai; dXXd p,r)v eoTi ye 
TL p,'q ov. opbOLOJS 8e Kal to ov ovk eoTai- ov yap 

35 eoTai Tl Tcx)v ovTojv. dp' ivSex^Tai tov avrov d/xa 

evopKeZv Kal eTnopKelv; dp' eyxojpel tov avTov 

afj,a TU) avTO) Treideadai Kal dneideiv; rj ovTe 

TO elvai tl Kal elvat TavTov; to Se firj ov, ovk el 

eoTL TL, Kal eoTLv dTvAdis'- ovt' el evopKel Tohe -q 
126 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv-xxv 

the same time ' so and-so's good.' Nor is the state- 
ment that ' man is of the animals ' used with several 
meanings ; for a phrase does not acquire several 
senses every time we express its meaning in an ellip- 
tical form ; for we express, ' Give me the Iliad ' by 
quoting the half line ' Sing, goddess, the wrath.' 

XXV. Arguments which turn upon the use of an (2) The use 
expression not in its proper sense but with validity °vu^*^or* 
in respect only of a particular thing or in a particular without 
respect or place or degree or relation and not ab- tlon.' 
solutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion 
in the light of its contradictory, to see if it can possibly 
have been affected in any of these ways. For it is 
impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirma- 
tive and a negative to belong absolutely to the same 
subject ; on the other hand, there is no reason why 
each should not belong in a particular respect or 
relation or manner, or one in a particular respect and 
the other absolutely. Thus if one belongs absolutely 
and the other in a particular respect, no refutation has 
yet been reached. This point must be examined in the 
conclusion by comparison with its contradictory. 

All the following arguments are of this kind : Is Examples, 
it possible for what is-not to be ? But surely it is 
something which is not. Similarly, too. Being will 
not be ; for it will not be any particular thing which 
is. — Is it possible for the same man at the same time 
to keep and to break his oath ? — Is it possible for the 
same man at the same time to obey and disobey the 
same order ? Is it not true, in the first place, that 
being something and Being are not the same thing ? 
On the other hand, Not-being, even if it is something, 
has not absolute being as well. Secondly, if a man 
keeps his oath on a particular occasion or in a par- 

127 



ARISTOTLE 

180 a 

TrjSe, dvdyKrj /cat evopKelv, 6 8' o/xocra? eTnopK-qaeLV 

180 b €vopK€L emopKaJv rovro fiovov, evopKel Se ov' ou8' 
o a7T6ida)V TTeiderai, dXXd n neWerai. ofjioios S' 
o Aoyo? /cat Trept tou i/jevSeadat rov avrov djxa /cat 
aXrjdeveiv dXXd hid to fxr] elvai evdecopr^Tov, tto- 
Tepojg av tls drTohoirj ro aTrAa)? dXrjdeveLv ■^ ifjevSe- 
5 adai, hvuKoXov ^atVerat. /ccoAuet 8' rov avrov^ ovhev 
aTrXcJs p^ev elvac ipevSrj, tttj 8' dXrjOrj, rj tlvos /cat 
etvat dXiqdrj rivd, dXrjdrj 8e (^avTOvy jLti^.* . o/Ltota>s" Se 

/cat CTTt TCtJV' 77/30? Tt /Cat 7TOV /Cat TTOTC " TTClVTeS" ya/> 

ot TOLOVTOi XoyoL TTapd rovro avpi^aivovaiv . dp* 
rj vyieia rj 6 rrXovros dyadov; dXXd ro) dcftpovi 

10 /cat p,rj dpddJs XP^H-^^V ^^'^ dyadov dyaOov dpa 
/cat ovK dyadov. dpa ro i5y tatVetv rj Bvvaadai ev 
TToAet dyadov; dAA' eariv ore ov ^eXriov r avrov 
dpa rw avTcp dyadov /cat ovk dyadov. rj ovSev 
KOjXvei, aTrXdjs ov dyadov rcpSe [xr] elvai dyadov, r] 
rcohe pbkv dyadov, dAA' ov vvv t} ovk evravd* dyadov ; 

15 dp' o p^T] ^ovXoir^ av 6 (f)p6vLpiO£, /ca/cov; diro- 

jSaAetr 8' ov jSouAerat rdya^ov /ca/cov dpa rdya^dv. 

ou ydp ravrov etTreiv rdya^ov efvat /ca/cov /cat to 

dTrojSaAetv r dyadov. 6pL0i(x)S 8e /cat d tou KXerrrov 

^ Reading toi' auror or roCrov for auroi'. 
128 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv 

ticular respect, it does not necessarily follow that 
he is a keeper of oaths, but he who he has sworn that 
he will break his oath keeps his oath on this particular 
occasion only by foreswearing himself, but is not a 
keeper of oaths ; nor is he who disobeys obedient, 
except to a particular order. The argument is 
similar which deals with the question whether the 
same man can say what is at the same time both true 
and false ; but it presents apparent difficulties be- 
cause it is not easy to see whether the qualification 
* absolutely ' should be applied to ' true ' or to ' false.' 
But there is no reason why the same man should not 
be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects, 
or that some of a man's words should be true but he 
himself not be truthful. Similarly, too, if there are 
qualifications of relation or place or time. All the 
following arguments turn upon a point of this kind. 
Is health (or wealth) a good thing ? But to the 
fool who misuses it, it is not a good thing ; it is, 
therefore, a good thing and not a good thing. — Is 
health (or political power) a good thing ? But there 
are times when it is not better than other things ; 
therefore the same thing is both good and not good 
for the same man. Or is there no reason why a thing 
should not be absolutely good but not good for a 
particular person, or good for a particular person, but 
not good at the present moment or here ? — Is that 
M'hich the wise man would not wish, an evil ? But he 
does not wish for the rejection of the good ; therefore, 
the good is an evil. This is not true ; for it is not the 
same thing to say that the good is an evil and that 
the rejection of the good is an evil. So likewise with 
the argument about the thief ; it does not follow, 

* Reading dXridrj 8e <.avT6v> fir). 

F 129 



ARISTOTLE 

180 b 

Aoyo?. ov yap el KaKov icrrtv 6 KXevTrjg, Kal ro 

20 Xa^elv earl KaKov ovkovv to KaKov ^ovXerat, dXXa 
rayadov to yap Xa^elv dyaOov dyadov. Kal r^ 
voaos KaKov cotlv, aAA ov to diro^aXelv voaov. 
dpa TO StKacov tov dSiKov Kal to St/cat'cos' tov 
aSi/coj? alpeTcoTCpov ; dAA' dTroOavelv aStVco? alpe- 
TCxiTepov. dpa hiKaiov iaTtv Ta avTov e^eLV eKaoTov ; 

25 a S' dv TLS Kptvrj /cara So^av ttjv avTov, Kav fj 
ipevBrj, Kvpid eoTLV €k tov v6p,ov to avTO dpa 
hiKaiov Kal ov hiKaiov. Kal noTepa Set Kpcvetv tov 
Ta StVaia Aeyoyra ■^ tov Ta aSt/ca; oAAo. fX7]v Kal 
TOV dSLKovp,evov hiKaLOV eoTiv iKavdJs Xeyetv a 
evadev raura S' rjv dSiKa. ov yap el TraOeZv ti 
dSiKCos alpeTov, to aStVo)? alpcTajTepov tov St- 

30 Kaioi)S' aAA' dTrAcD? p,€V to SiKaiojs, toSI fxevTot 
ovSev Ka)XveL dStVojS" rj StKatO)?. Kal to e^^iv rd 
avTov St/catov, to Se rdAAdrpia ov SiKatov Kpiaiv 
p,evTOi TavT'qv hiKaiav elvai ovhev /ccuAuet, olov dv 
fj /card Bo^av tov KpcvavTos' ov yap el SiKaiov 
ToSl 7) coSi, Kal dTrXdjg SiKaiov. opLoiois 8e Kal 

35 dSi/ca ovTa ovhev KcjXvei XeyeLV ye avTa hiKaiov 
elvaf ov yap el Xeyeiv St/caiov, dvayKt] StVaia 
elvaL, (LoTTep ouS' el (h^eXip^ov Xeyetv, cu^e'At/Lta. 

O/JiOlCOS 

130 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv 

if the thief is an evil, that to acquire things is also an 
evil. The thief, therefore, does not v^^ish for what is 
evil but for what is good ; for to acquire something 
good is good. Also disease is an evil, but to get rid 
of disease is not an evil. — Is what is just preferable 
to what is unjust and are just circumstances prefer- 
able to unjust ? But it is preferable to be put to 
death unjustly. — Is it just that each man should 
have his own ? But judgements which a man passes 
in accordance with his personal opinion, even if they 
are false, are valid in the eyes of the law ; the same 
thing, therefore, is just and not just. — Again, should 
judgement be given in favour of him who says what 
is just or of him who says what is unjust ? But 
it is just for the victim of injustice to state in full 
the things which he has suffered, and these things 
were unjust. For if to suffer something unjustly is an 
object of choice, it does not follow that unjust cir- 
cumstances are preferable to just, but, absolutely, 
justice is preferable ; but this does not prevent unjust 
circumstances being preferable to just in a particular 
case. Again, it is just that a man should have his 
own, and it is not just that he should have what 
belongs to another ; but there is no reason why any 
judgement which is given in accordance with the 
judge's opinion should not be just ; for, if it is just 
in a particular case and in particular circumstances, 
it is not also absolutely just. Similarly, too, there is 
no reason why, though things are unjust, merely 
saying them should not be just. For if to say things 
is just, it does not follow that they are just, any more 
than, if it is expedient to say things, it follows that 
those things are expedient. Similarly , too , with things 
that are just. So that if what is said is unjust, 

131 



ARISTOTLE 

180 b 

ra Aeyo/xeva dSiKa, 6 Xeyojv d'Si/ca vlko.- Xeyei, 

yap d Xeyeiv earl StVata, aTrAois' 8e kul Tradelv 

d'St/ca. 

181a XXVI. Tots' Se irapa tov opiaixov ytro/xeVois' rov 

eXeyxou, Kaddrrep VTreypdcJir] rrporepov, dTravTrjreov 

GKOTTovaL TO avp.TT€paap,a Trpos ttjv dvTL(f)aaLV, ottco? 

earat to avro koI Kara to avTO /cat Tvpos to avTO 

5 Kal d>aavT(X)'5 /cat eV to) avTco ■)(^p6vcp. idv S' ev 

o-pxjj TTpoGeprjraL, ovx ofioXoyrjTeov (Ls dSvvaTOV 

TO avTO etvat StTrAdcrtor /cat [xrj StTrAdcrtov, dAAd 

(f>aT€ov, puTj fjbevTOL ojSl, (x)s ttot' ■^v to eXeyx^adai 

hioj puoXoyrjixevov , elal Se Trdrre? oiS' ol Adyot 

TTapa TO tolovto. dp 6 etSco? e/cacrTov otl eKaoTov, 

10 otSe TO TTpdyjjia; /cat d dyt'odir (LaavTcos ; eiScu? 
Se Tt? Tor Kopio'/cov' drt Kopia/cos", dyvooif] dv otl 
fiovaiKog, ware TavTO eTrioTarat /cat dyvoet. dyoa 
TO TeTpdrriqxy tov TpiTTTj^eos pbeZl,ov ; yevoiTO S' 
dv e'/c TpLTTiqxpvs TerpdTT7]-)(V Kara to fxrJKOs- to 8e 
/xet^ov eAaTTovos" jLtet^ov auTO ct/aa auTou pbelS^ov 
/cat eAaTToi'. 

15 XXVII. Toy? Se rrapd to alreZaOat Kal Xap,- 
^dveLv TO iv dp^fj Trvvdavofievco /xeV, dv rj SrjXov, 
ov 8oT€ov, ouS' dv evSo^ov fj, XeyovTa TdXrjdes. 
dv 8e Xddrj, ttjv dyvoiav Std ttjv iJio)(6rjpLav tcov 

" 167 a 23. 
132 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv-xxvii 

it does not follow that it is a case of the man who 
uses unjust pleas winning his cause ; for he is saying 
things which it is just for him to say but which are, 
absolutely, unjust for anyone to suffer. 

XXVL Refutations which are connected with the migrwratio 
definition of the refutation must, as suggested above," ^'^"''*^- 
be met by examining the conclusion in the light of 
its contradictory and seeing how the same term shall 
be present in the same respect and in the same 
relation, manner and time. In putting this additional 
question at the beginning, you must not admit that 
it is impossible for the same thing to be both double 
and not double but must admit the possibility but 
not in the way that was once admitted to fulfil the 
conditions of a refutation. All the following argu- 
ments depend upon a point of this kind. ' Does he 
who knows that A is A, know the thing A ? ' And, 
similarly, ' Does he who does not know that A is A, 
not know the thing A ? ' But one who knows that 
Coriscus is Coriscus, might not know that he is 
musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of 
the same thing. — Again, ' Is an object which is four 
cubits long greater than an object which is three 
cubits long ? ' But an object three cubits long might 
become four cubits long. Now the greater is greater 
than the less ; therefore the object is itself greater 
and less than itself. 

XXVII. In refutations which are connected with (4) Petitio 
the begging and assuming of the original point at p^'^'^P'^^- 
issue, it should not be granted to a questioner, if his 
procedure is obvious, even though his view is gener- 
ally accepted, but you should state the truth. If, 
on the other hand, his procedure is not detected, you 
should, owing to the badness of such arguments, 

133 



ARISTOTLE 

181 a 

TOLOVTCOV Xoycjov eiV rov ipcorcovra ixeraarpeTrreov 

<1)S ov SteiAeyjueVov o yap eXey^os avev tov e^ 

20 apx^js. et^' on ehodrj ovx cos" tovtw XRV^ofJuevov , 

dAA' cl>s" vrpos" TovTo avXKoyiovfxevov rovvavTiov rj 

eiTL TOJv TTape^eXey^cov . 

XXVIII. Kat TOWS' Sta rov TrapeTTOfJuevov avjx- 
^i^dl^ovras ctt' avrov rov Xoyov SeiKreov. eari Se 
StTTT^ 7] Tcov €7Tofji€va)v aKoXovOiqais . ri yap co? ro) 

25 Iv fxepei TO KadoXov, olov dvOpcoTTW ^a)ov' d^iovTai 
yap, el ToSe ixeTa rovSe, Kal toS' elvai pberd rovhe. 
Tj Kara rds avTt^eo'ei9 ' et yap ToSe rcoSe aKoXovdel, 
ra> avrLKCLfxevo) ro dvriKeLfievov. Trap* 6 Kal 6 rov 
MeAiCTCTou Adyos" €t yap ro yeyovos ^X^'' ^PXV^> '''^ 
dyevrjrov d^iol pirj ex^iv, c5ctt' el dyevqros 6 ovpa- 

30 vos, Kal aTTeipo^. ro 8' ovk eariv dvaTraXcv yap 
7] dKoXovdrjaig . 

XXIX. "Oaoi re 77apa ro Trpoaridevai ri avXXo- 
yit,ovrai, OKOTTelv el d^aipovpiivov avfi^alvei /xTjSev 
rjrrov ro dbvvarov. KaTreira rovro epL(j>aviariov , 
Kal XeKreov ojs ehcoKev ovx co? Sokovv dAA' chs 

35 TTpos rov Xoyov, 6 Se Ke^p'^^aL ovhev Trpog rov 
Xoyov. 

XXX. Ylpos Se rovs rd TrXeio) ipcor'^fxara ev 
TTOiovvras evdiig ev dpxfj Stopiareov. epwrriats 
yap jxla Trpo's tjv /xta diroKpLai^ eanv, coctt' ovre 
134 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxvii-xxx 

make your ignorance recoil on the head of the ques- 
tioner, on the ground that he has not argued properly ; 
for refutation must proceed without any assumption 
of the original point. Next, you must argue that the 
point was granted with the idea that he was going 
to use it not as a premiss but in order to argue the 
opposite view to it or for the purpose of refutations 
on side issues. 

XXVIII. Again, those refutations which draw (5) The 
their conclusions through the consequent must be consequent. 
exposed in the argument itself. There are two ways 

in which consequences follow : Either as the universal 
follows from the particular, as ' animal ' follows from 
' man ' ; for it is claimed that, if A accompanies B, 
then B also accompanies A. Or else the process goes 
by opposites ; for if A follows B, A's opposite will 
follow B's opposite. It is on this, too, that the argu- 
ment of Melissus depends ; for he claims that, if 
that which has come to be has a beginning, that 
which has not come to be has no beginning, and so, 
if the heaven has not come to be, it is also eternal. 
But this is not true ; for the sequence is the reverse. 

XXIX. In refutations which are argued by means (6) inser- 
of some addition, you must examine whether the irrelevant 
impossibility occurs none the less when the addition matter. 
has been withdrawn. If so, then the answerer should 
make this fact clear and should state that he granted 

the addition not because he believed in it but for 
the sake of the argument, but that his opponent has 
made no use of it at all for his argument. 

XXX. In dealing with those who make several (7) Multi- 
questions into one, you should draw a distinction questions, 
immediately at the beginning. For a question is 
single to which there is only one answer, so that one 

135 



ARISTOTLE 

181 a 

TrAetco Kad^ ero? ovre eV Kara ttoXXwv, aAA' ev Kad 

181b eVo? (j>aT€ov t) aTro(f)areov . woTTcp Se €7rt roiv o/xco- 
vvfjicuv ore fiev ajJicfyoLV ore 8 ovSerepoj VTrap^ei, 
ware fXTj airXov ovros tov ipcoriqpLaro^ aTrAco? a770- 
KpivopLevoL'S ovhkv avpi^aivei Traa^^eiv, opiOLW^ /cai 
irrl rovroiv. orav iiev ovv ra TrAetco ro) evL 7] to 
5 €V rols TToAAois' vnapxHy tco aTrAcD? Soi'Tt Krat apuap- 
rovTL ravTrjv rrjv apLapriav ovhev vrrevavrnopLa 
avfx^aiveL- orav Se ro) puev tco he pur^, rj TrXeiOi Kara 
■nXeiovoiV, /cat eariv ais" vrrdp-)(et. apb<j>6repa a/x^ore- 
pois, ecTTt 8' cl»? ou;^ VTrdpx^i ttolXlv, ware rovr 
evXa^r]T€ov . olov iv rolaSe toI<5 Aoyoi?. et ro pbev 

10 icrrtv dyadov ro 8e KaKov, ore ravra dXrjde? enrelv 
dyadov Kal KaKov /cat TraAtv /ui^r' aya^ov ju-Tyre 
KaKov {ovK ecrrt yap eKdrepov eKdrepov), ioare 
ravro dyadov /cat /ca/cor /cat out' dyadov ovre /ca/cdv. 
/cat et cKaarov auro avro) ravrov, /cat aAAoy erepov, 
€TT€tSr]^ OVK a'AAotS' raura dAA' avrols, /cat krepa 

15 avroiv, ravrd iavrots erepa /cat rayra. ert et to 
/u-ev dyadov KaKov yiverai, ro 8e KaKov dyadov 
iariv, hvo yevoir^ dv. Suotv re /cat aviaaiv eKare- 
pov avro avno laov, ujare \aa /cat avtaa auTa 
auTo t? . 

'E/LtTTtTTTOuat p.kv OVV ovroL Kal ets" dAAa? Xvcreis' 

20 Kal yap ro dp,(f>a> Kal ro drravra TrXeico ar^fxatvei' 
ovKovv ravrov, TrXrjv ovojxa, au/x/SatVet (f)TJaat /cat 

^ Reading eneiBrj for eVel 8' with Poste. 
1S6 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx 

must not affirm or deny several things of one thing 
nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one 
thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a 
predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and 
sometimes of neither, and so, though the question 
is not simple, no detriment results if people give a 
simple answer, so too with these double questions. 
When, therefore, the several predicates are true of one 
subject, or one predicate of several subjects, no con- 
tradiction is involved in giving a simple answer, though 
he has made this mistake. But when the predicate 
is true of one subject but not of the other, or several 
predicates are true of several subjects, then there is 
a sense in which both are true of both but another 
sense, on the other hand, in which they are not ; so 
one must be on one's guard against this. The follow- 
ing arguments illustrate this : (1) Supposing A is 
good and B evil, it is true to say that they are good 
and evil and, on the other hand, that they are neither 
good nor evil (for A is not evil and B is not good), so 
that the same thing is good and evil and neither good 
nor evil ; (2) If everything is the same as itself and 
different from anything else, since things are not the 
same as other things but the same as themselves, 
and also different from themselves, the same things 
are both different from themselves and the same as 
themselves ; (3) Moreover, if that which is good 
becomes evil and that which is evil is good, they 
would become two ; and of two unequal things each 
is equal to itself, so that they are both equal and 
unequal to themselves. 

These refutations also fall under other solutions ; 
for the terms ' both ' and ' all ' have several meanings, 
so that to affirm or deny the same thing is verbal only, 

137 



ARISTOTLE 

181b 

a7TO(f)rjaaL- tovto 8' ovk rjv eXeyxos. dXXa <f>av€p6v 

on 1X7] /jbidg epoiTTJaecos rGiv nX^iovinv yivo\iivr]s ^ 
oXk ev Kad^ ivos ^dvros rj d7TO(f>dvTO? , ovk earai 
TO aSvvarov. 
25 XXXI. Hepl 8e tcov aTrayovrajv et? to' TavTO 

TToAAa/CtS" €L7T€LV, (f)aV€p6v COS OV BoT€OV Tcbv VpoS 

TL XeyojjievcjDv a-qfjuaivcLV ti ;^a>/3t^o/xeVas' Kad^ auras' 
ras" KaT'qyopias , olov SiTrXdaLov dvev tov SiTrAaatov 
rjpnaeoSy otl eja^aiVerai . Kal yap Ta SeVa iv toIs 

30 evos" beovGL Se/ca Kal to Troirjaat ev to) pLTj TToirjaai, 
/cat oAcu? iv TTJ d7TO<f)da€L r] <j)dais' dXX ofxojs ovk 
et TtS" Xeyoi toSl pirj elvai XevKov, Ae'yei avTo XevKov 
etvai. TO 8e SiTrXdacov ovSe crqixatvei ovBev tacos, 
MGTTep ovSe TO iv TO) rj[j,La€L' el S' dpa Kal arjixaivei, 
aAA' OV TavTO Kal avvrjprjfxevov. ouS' r] imaT'qfX'q 

35 ev TO) etSei, olov el eoTiv rj laTpiKrj e7naTT]fir], ovep 

TO KOLVov eKeivo 8' Tjv eTnaTrjpt,7] eTTiaTrjTov. ev 

he Tols 8t' cSv hr^XovTai KaTrjyopovfjievois tovto 

XeKTCov, COS OV TO avTO x^pf'S '<^'' ^v '^dj Xoyo) to 

Sr^Xovfievov . to yap kolXov Koivfj /xev to avTO 

SrjXol €7tI TOV aipLov Kal tov poiKov, TrpoaTi6ep.evov 

182 a 8e ovhev KcoXvet dXXa, to p.ev Trj ptvl to 8e to* 

GKeXei, arjjxaiveiv^ • evda fxev yap to cnfiov, evda Se 

^ Reading yivonemjs for yico/itVcov. 

* Inserting to before ravTO. 

* Reading arjfxaivuv (oij/xatVei ABD). 

138 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx-xxxi 

and this, as we saw, is not a refutation. But clearly, 

if one of the several questions is not asked but the 

answerer affirms or denies a single predicate of a 

single subject, the reduction to an impossibility will 

not occur. 

XXXI. As regards those who lead one on to repeat (B) Solu- 

the same thing several times over, it is clear that arguments 

one must not allow that predications of relative tending to 
, r • •/? i- • .1 1 i_ Babbling. 

terms nave any signincation in themselves when 

separated frorri their correlatives ; for example, 
that ' double ' apart from the expression ' double of 
half ' is significant, just because it appears in that 
expression. For ' ten ' appears in the expression 
' ten minus one ' and ' do ' in the expression ' not 
do,' and affirmations in general in negations ; but, 
all the same, if one were to say ' this is not white,' 
one is not saying that it is white. ' Double ' has 
possibly no signification at all, just as ' the ' in ' the 
half ' too signifies nothing. If it has any signification, 
it is not the same as in the combined expression. 
Nor is ' knowledge ' of a specific kind, such as ' medi- 
cal knowledge,' the same as ' knowledge ' as a 
general term ; for the latter has always meant 
' knowledge of the knowable.' When dealing with 
terms which are predicated of the terms by means 
of which they are defined, you must say that the 
term defined is not the same when taken separately 
as it is in the combined expression. For ' concave ' 
has the same general meaning when used of the 
snub-nosed and of the bandy-legged, but when it is 
combined in the one case with the nose and in the 
other with the leg, there is no reason why it should 
not signify different things, for in the first case it 
signifies ' snub,' in the other ' bandy,' and it makes 

139 



ARISTOTLE 

182 a 

TO pai^ov arjualvei- koL ovhev hia^epei elireZv pis 
aifXTj rj pis kolXt]. ert ov Soreov rrjv Xe^tv Kar 
evdv ipevSos yap iariv. ov yap iari to aifjiov pis 
5 kolXt] dXXa pivos ToSt, olov rrddos, war' ovhkv 
aroTTOv, et r] pis rj utp,r] pis iariv exovaa KOiXor-qra 
pivos. 

XXXII. Y\epl he TCJv aoXoLKtafMcov, Trap" o tl 
fiev (j>aivovraL avix^aivecv, elrropbev Trporepov, cos 
oe Xvreov, evr' avrcbv rwv Xoywv ecrrat <f)av€p6v. 

10 diravres yap ol TOLoihe tovto ^ovXovrai Kara- 
GKevd^cLV. dp* o Xeyeis dXrjdcos, Kal eari tovto 
dXr)dd)s ; (f)fjs S' elvai tl XiOov eoTiv dpa tl Xidov. 
rj TO XeycLV Xidov ovk eoTL XeyeLV o dAA' ov, ovSe 
tovto dXXd TOVTOV €L ovv epoLTO TLS, dp* ov dXrjddJs 
XeycLS, eoTL tovtov, ovk dv hoKoirj iXXrjvi^CLV, 

15 cocTTTep ovS* el epoLTo, dp* rjv XeyeLS elvaL, cutlv 
ovTos ; ^vXov 8' elnelv ovtms,^ rj daa jxrjTe drjXv 
p.rjT dppev arjjiaiveL, ovhev hLa(f)epeL. hLO Kal ov 
yLveTaL aoXoLKL(yp,6s, el o XeyeLs elvaL, eoTL tovto; 
^vXov Se XeyeLS elvaL- eoTLV dpa ^vXov. 6 Be Xidos 
KaL TO OVTOS dppevos exeL KXijaLV. el Se* tls epoLTO, 
dp OVTOS CGTLV avTrj ; etra TraAtv, ti 8'; ov^ 

20 OVTOS eoTL Y^opioKos ; elT* eLTreLev, eoTLv dpa ovtos 
avTrj, ov crvXXeXoyLGTaL tov aoXoiKiapLov , ov8* el 

^ Reading etTretv ovtcds for dnev ovtos. 
* Reading 8e for Sij. 

« 165 b 20 f. 

* The argument is clear in the original, because Greek is 
an inflected language, whereas English does not distinguish 

140 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxi-xxxii 

no difference whether you say ' a snub nose ' or ' a 
concave nose.' Further, the expression must not 
be allowed to pass without qualification ; for it is 
a falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but 
something, namely a condition, appertaining to a 
nose ; so there is nothing absurd in supposing that 
a snub nose is one which possesses nasal concavity. 

XXXII. As regards solecisms, we have already (C) Solu- 
stated " the apparent cause of their occurrence ; arguments 
how they should be solved will be clear in the actual tending to 
arguments. All the following arguments aim at 
producing this result : ' Is a thing truly that which 
you truly affirm it to be ? ' You affirm something 
to be a stone (accusative masculine) ^ ; therefore 
something (nominative neuter) is a stone (accusative 
masculine). Or does speaking of a stone (a masculine 
word) involve the use of the relative ' whom ' rather 
than ' which ' and the pronoun ' him ' rather than ' it ' ? 
If, then, one were to ask, ' Is a stone him whom you 
truly state him to be ?,' he would not be considered 
to be talking good Greek any more than if he were 
to ask, ' Is he whom you state her to be ? ' But the 
use of the word ' stick,' or any other neuter word, 
in this way, involves no difference between the 
nominative and accusative ; therefore no solecism 
is committed if you say, ' Is this what you affirm it 
to be ? ' You affirm it to be a stick ; therefore it is 
a stick, ' Stone,' however, and ' he ' have the mascu- 
line gender. Now if one were to ask, ' Can " he " 
be a " she " ?,' and then again, ' Why ? Is he not 
Coriscus ? ' and then were to say, ' Then he is a she,' 
he has not proved the solecism even if Coriscus 

between the nominative and accusative except in the personal 
pronouns and the relative. 

141 



ARISTOTLE 

182 a 

TO KoptCT/co? arjfMaLvei oTTcp avrt], fjurj StScuai 8e 

o aTTOKpivojxevos , aAAa Set rouro TTpoaepcjrrjOrjvai. 

€t 8e /xryr' eWii^ jx-^re SlScdgiv, ov avXXeXoyLGTai 

OVT€ TO) OVTL OVT€ TTpO'S TOV rjpCOTrjfJbeVOV. OflOliOS 

25 ovv Set KOLKel tov Xidov arjfMatveLV ovrog. el 8e 
fjLTjTe koTL p/qre hihorai, ov XeKreov to avpiTrepaapba- 
^atVerat he Trapa to tt^v dvofioLov tttwglv tov 
ovopLaTos opLoiav (^aLveadai. ap' aXrjdes euTtv et- 
TTeZv OTL ecFTLv avTT] , oTTep elvai (f)fi's avTrjv ; etvai 
oe (pr^s doTTtSa' eoTtv dpa avTrj daTriSa. r) ovk 

30 dvayKYj, el fxrj to avTTj darriha arjpiaivet dAA' danig, 
TO 8 duTTiSa TavTTjv; ovS^ el o (f>'r]s etvat, tovtov, 
eaTLV ovTos, (f>'r}? 8' etvat KXeojva, eoTLv dpa ovtos 
KAecova* ov yap eoTiv ovtos KAeajva* etp'qTat yap 
OTL 6 (f)rjixt, etvai tovtov, eoTiv ovtos, ov tovtov 
ov8e yap dv eXXrjVLt,oL ovtcds to epd)T7)p,a Xe-)(6ev. 

35 dp eTTLOTaaaL tovto ; tovto 8' eoTi Xldos' erri- 
OTaaai dpa Xidos. t) ov TavTO ar]fxaiv€t to tovto 
€v TO) ap eTTLOTaaaL tovto Kal iv tw tovto 8e 

XlBoS, dAA' iv p,€V TO) TTpcOTCp TOVTOV, iv Sc TW 

vaTepcp ovtos; dp* ov eTTLcrTT^pLrjv ^x^ls, eTTLOTaaaL 

tovto; eTTLaTTJixrjv 8' e^ei? Xidov eTTLOTaaaL dpa 

182 b Xidov. 7] TO fjiev tovtov Xidov XeyeLS, to 8e tovtov 

' ButCleon. 
142 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxii 

signifies a ' she,' though the answerer refuses to 
concede this ; but this must be the subject of a 
further question. But if neither this is so nor does 
he concede it, then the solecism has not been proved 
either in fact or relatively to the person to whom the 
question was put. Similarly, therefore, in the first 
example also, ' he ' must signify the stone. If, how- 
ever, this is neither true nor is conceded, the con- 
clusion must not be stated, though it is apparently 
true, because the case which is used of the word, 
which is unlike, appears to be like. — ' Is it true to 
say that this object is what you affirm it to be ? ' 
You affirm it to be a shield (accusative), therefore 
it is a shield (accusative). Or is this not necessarily 
so, if ' this object ' (nominative) signifies not shield 
(accusative) but shield (nominative), while ' this 
object ' (accusative) signifies shield (accusative). — 
Nor again if he is what you affirm him to be, and you 
affirm him to be Cleona (accusative of Cleon), is he 
therefore Cleona ? for he is not Cleona " ; for the 
statement was that he not him is what I affirm him 
to be. For the question if asked in this form ^ would 
not be Greek either. — ' Do you know this ? ' But 
this is a stone (nominative) ; therefore you know a 
stone (nominative). Has not ' this ' a different force 
in the question ' Do you know this ? ' and in ' This 
is a stone,' in the first case standing for an accusative 
and in the second for a nominative ? — When you 
exercise recognition of an object, do you not recognize 
it ? You exercise recognition of a stone ; therefore 
you recognize ' of a stone.' Do you not in the one 
case put the object in the genitive and say ' of the 
stone,' and in the other case in the accusative and 

** i.e. with the subject in the accusative. 

143 



ARISTOTLE 

182 b 

Xldov iSodr) 8', ov iTnar-^fjLrjv e;^ets", eTTiaTaadai, ov 
TOVTOV, dXXa TOVTO, wot' ov Xidov aAAa rov Xidov. 
"On ixev ovv ol tolovtoi roJv Xoycov ov avXXoyi- 
l^ovrat GoXoLKiajjiov dXXa ^aivovrai, /cat hid rl re 
5 (^aivovrat /cai ttcos dTravTrjreov Trpos avrovs, 
(jiavepdv eV rcov elp-qfjievojv. 

XXXIII. Aet 8e Kal Karavoelv ore iravrcDV rcov 
Xoycov ol jJLev elai, pdovs KaTiSelv ol Se x'^XeTTiL- 
repoi, napa tl /cat ev rivi TTapaXoyil,ovrai rov 
aKovovra, TroAAa/cts" ol avrol ^Keivois ovres. rov av- 

10 rov yap Xoyov Set KaXelv rov Trapd ravro yivo- 
/Jbevov 6 avro^ Se Xoyos rolg p,ev rrapd rrjv Xe^iv 
rots Se Trapd ro avpi^e^rjKos rots 8e Trap' erepov 
So^eiev dv elvat Sid ro piera(f)ep6p.€vov eKaarov p,rj 
ofioiios elvau SrjXov. aiOTTep ovv ev rols Trapd rrjv 
ofJLajvviXLav, oaTrep So/cet rpoTTOs evrjdeararo^ etvac 

15 rdJv TTapaXoyLGjjidJv , rd [xev /cat rots" rv)(ovaiv ean 
SrjXa (/cat ydp ol Xoyot axeSdv ol yeXoloi, Trdvres elal 
Trapd rrjv Ae^tv), olov dvrjp e(f>ep€ro /caret /cAt/xa/co? 
8i<f)pov, /cat OTTov areXXeade; Trpos rrjv Kepaiav. 
Kal TTorepa rcov ^owv ejXTrpoadev re^erai; ovSerepa, 
aAA' oTTLodev dp,cf)co. /cat Kadapds 6 jSopea?; ov 

20 Srjra- aTreKrovrjKe yap rov TTra)-)(ov Kal rov d)vov- 
pevov. dp* Yjvap^os ; ovhrjraydXX ' AttoXXcovlSt)? . 

" The two meanings of the phrase are uncertain ; the 
Oxford translation suggests (1) 'a man got the body of the 
car taken off its chassis,' and (2) ' he came a " sitter " {Bl(f>pos) 
down from the ladder.' 

'' The reply takes the word in the sense of ' To what do you 
fasten the sail when you furl it ? ' 

" The answer understands the question to mean ' which 
cow will calve forwards ? ' 

144. 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxii-xxxiii 

say ' a stone ' ? But it was granted that, when 
you exercise recognition of a thing, you recognize 
' it ' not ' of it,' so that you recognize not ' of a stone ' 
but ' a stone.' 

That arguments of this kind, then, do not prove 
solecism but only appear to do so, and why they 
appear to do so and how you must face them, is clear 
from what has been said. 

XXXIII. It must be noted about arguments in Note on the 
general that in some it is easier and in some more degrees^of^*^ 
difficult to see why and where they mislead the cUHicuity in 
listener, though often the latter are identical with the tion of 
former. For an argument must be called identical ^^i'*''"^- 
when it depends on the same principle, but the same 
argument might be held by some people to depend on 
diction, by others on accident and by others on some- 
thing else, because each, when applied in different 
contexts, is not equally clear. So, just as fallacies due 
to equivocation, which are generally regarded as the 
stupidest form of fallacy, some are obvious even to 
ordinary minds (for almost all the most laughable 
remarks depend upon diction). For example, ' A man 
was carried over the standing board of the framework 
of the chariot ' " ; and ' Whither are you bound ? ' 
' To the yard-arm ' *" ; ' Which of the two cows will 
calve in front ? ' ' Neither, but both behind.' " ' Is 
the north wind ** clear ? ' ' No, certainly not ; for he 
has killed the beggar and the purchaser.'* ' Is he 
Evarchus ? ' ' Certainly not ; he is Apollonides.' •'^ 

•* The answerer takes Boreas as a proper name. 

' Kal Tov covovnevov is almost certainly corrupt ; Poste 
suggests Kttt Tt? o wvovfievos ; 

f The literal meaning of these names might be rendered 
' good-manager ' and ' squanderson.' 

145 



ARISTOTLE 

182 b 

Tov avTov 8e rpoTvov /cat rwv aXXiov a-)(eh6v ot ttXcl- 

OTOi, ra Se Kal rovs €^7T€Lpordrovs (f>aiv€rai \av- 
ddveLV arjix€iov he tovtojv otl fiaxovTat ttoXXolkls 
TrepL Tcov ovofjuarcov, olov TTorepov ravrov arjjxai- 

25 vei Kara rrdvrcov to ov Kal to eu 7] eTepov. toTs 
puev yap SoKel TavTov CTTj/xatVeiv to ov Kal to ev 
OL 8e TOV TjtJvcovos Xoyov Kal HapiMeviSov Xvovai 
Sta TO 7ToXXax(Ji>s (f)dvai to ev Xeyeadat Kal to ov. 
o/xotcos' Se Kal tcov Trapd to avpL^e^rjKos Kal Trapa} 
TCtJV dXXcov eKaoTov ol [xev eaovTat pdovs I8etv ol 

30 8e ^(aXeTTchTepoL tcov Xoycov Kal Xa^elv iv tIvl yevei, 
/cat TTOTcpov eXey)(os rj ovk eAey;)^os", ov paSiov 

OfXOLCOS TTepl TTaVTOJV. 

"EcTTt 8e SpLjxvs Xoyos ooTig diTopelv Trotet fxd- 
XiUTa' haKvei yap ovtos jjudXcaTa. aTTopia 8' eart 
StTTTy, 7] jxkv iv rot? avXXeXoyiafievocs , o tl dveXrj 

35 Tt? TCOV epCOTTJ/JbaTCOV, T^ 8' ev rot? epiGTLKols , TTOJS 

eLTTTj Tis TO TTpoTadev. StOTTep ev Tot? cryAAoytCTTi- 
Kols ol SpifxvTepoL Xoyot S^rjTelv fjbdXXov ttolovolv. 
eoTL he avXXoyiaTiKo^ pev Xoyog hptpiVTaTOS, dv e^ 
OTt /xaAiara hoKovvTcov otl /xaAtcrra evho^ov dvai,pfj. 
els yap cov 6 Xoyos iJieTaTLdefjievrjs ttjs dvTL(f>daeu)s 

183 a ttTravras" op^olovs e^ei tovs avXXoyLap,ovs' del yap 

e^ evho^cov o/xolcos evho^ov dvaipyjaei. r) KaTaoKevd- 

aei, hiOTTep diropelv dvayKaZov . /xaAiara p.ev ovv 

6 TOiovTos hpijJLVs, 6 e^ 'laov to avpmepaapa ttolcov 

6 Tols epojT'qp.aaL, hevTepos 8' o e^ dndvTOJV opLoiojv 

^ Reading with Poste twv Trapa to avfi^e^TjKos Kal napa for 
Tu>v TTfpl TOV avuPep-qKOTOS Kal irepl. 

146 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiii 

And so on with almost all the rest of the ambiguities, 
but some even the most expert seem to fail to dis- 
cern. A proof of this is that people often dispute 
about the terms used, for example, whether ' Being ' 
and ' Unity ' always mean the same thing or some 
thing different ; for some people hold that ' Being ' 
and ' Unity ' are identical in meaning, while others 
solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying 
that ' Unity ' and ' Being ' are used in several senses. 
Similarly, too, of the arguments which are dependent 
on accident and each of the other classes, some will 
be easier to detect and others more difficult, and it 
is not always equally easy to grasp into which class 
they fall and whether refutation takes place or not. 

A shrewd argument is one which causes most Shrewdness 
embarrassment ; for it bites deepest. Embarrass- men\^" 
ment is of two kinds. In a reasoned discussion one 
is in doubt which of the questions one should subvert, 
whereas in contentious arguments it is about the way 
in which one is to express the proposition. Hence it is 
in reasoned discussions that shrewder arguments are 
more stimulative of inquiry. Now a reasoned argu- 
ment is shrewdest when from the most generally 
accepted premisses possible it subverts the most 
generally accepted thesis possible. For the single 
argument, if the contradictory is changed about, 
will result in all the syllogisms being alike ; for from 
generally accepted premisses it will subvert or estab- 
lish an equally generally accepted conclusion ; there- 
fore embarrassment must necessarily arise. Such, 
then, is the shrewdest argument which puts the con- 
clusion on an equality with the premisses. The next 
shrewdest is that which argues from premisses which 
are all on an equality ; for this will cause an equal 

147 



ARISTOTLE 

183 a 

ovros yap ofMoicos TTOLTjaei aTTopelv ottoIov twv 
epuiTrjlxarajv avaepereov . tovto 8e ;\;aAe7Tov dvai- 
pereov jjuev yap, 6 tl S' dvaipereov, dSrjXov. tcov 8' 
eptcrrtKcbv Spi/JiVTaros [xev 6 Trpcorov evdvs dSrjXog 
TTorepov CTuAAtAoytCTTtti rj ov, /cat TTorepov vapd 
ifjevSog Tj hiaipeaiv iartv 7] Xvats, Sevrepos Se rdJv 
10 dAAojv 6 SrjXos fxev on Trapd SiatpeorLV r] dvalpcGiv 
CCTTi, jjiT] (f)avep6s S' coy hid rlvos tojv rjpcorrjfxevojv 
avaipeoLV 'q Statpecrtr Xvreo? eariv, dXX rf rrorepov 
avTTj TTapa to avpLTrepaafJia r) Trapd tl tcov €pa)T'q- 

fJidTCOV ioTLV. 

Evtore jLtev ovv 6 jjltj avXXoyLaOels Adyo? €vrj67]s 

15 ecrrtV, idv fj Xiav dSo^a rj iJjevSij Ta XrjixpiaTa- 

evioT€ 8' ovK d^Los KaTa(f)pov€LadaL . OTav pikv yap 

iXXeLTTJ) Tl TCOV TOLOVTCOV epCOTTJfxdTCDV , 7T€pl OV 6 

Xoyos Kal St' o, Kal pcrj rrpoaXa^cbv tovto kol 
pLTj crvXXoyLadjxevog €m]dr]s 6 avXXoyicrpiO'S , otov 

20 8e Td)V e^cxiOev, ovk €VKaTa(f>p6vr]Tos ovSafMcos, dAA' 
o jxev Xoyos eTTtet/cT^?, o 8' epcoTojv rjpcoTrjKev ov 
KaXcbg. 

"Eart T€, wcTTTep Xv€.lv oTe fiev Trpos tov Xoyov otc 
8c TTpos TOV ipcoTOJVTa Kal TTjv ipu)T7jat,v OTe he 
Trpos ovhcTepov tovtojv, ofMoicos Kal ipcJTav cctti 
/cat avXXoyil^ecrdai Kal Trpo'S tt^v deaiv Kal Trpds tov 

25 aTTOKpLvofxevov Kai Trpo'S tov -)(p6vov, OTav fj TrXei- 
ovos xpovov Seofxevq rj Aycrts" r] tov napovTos 
Kaipov.^ 

XXXIV. E/c TTOGOJV jxev ovv Kal TTOLCov ytvovTai 
Tot? 8iaAeyo/ieVot9 ot TrapaXoytafxoi, Kal TTCog 8et- 
^o/LteV T€ i/jevBofievov Kal irapaSo^a Xeyeiv ttoltJ- 

^ Reading dAA' -q with W'allies. 
' Omitting with Waitz to SiaXex^V^"^'' ^rpoj rr/v Xvmv as a gloss. 
148 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiii-xxxiv 

embarrassment as to which kind of question ought to 
be subverted. The difficulty lies in this, that some- 
thing must be subverted but it is not clear what. The 
shrewdest of contentious arguments is that which, 
in the first place, immediately makes it uncertain 
whether the reasoning is conclusive or not, and also 
whether the solution is due to a false premiss or a 
distinction. Of the rest, that comes next which 
clearly depends on a distinction or a subversion, but 
it is not clear which of the premisses it is on the 
subversion or distinction of which the solution de- 
pends, but only whether this process depends upon 
the conclusion or one of the premisses. 

Now sometimes an inadequately reasoned argu- stupid 
ment is stupid if the premisses assumed are too para- ^''^uments. 
doxical or false ; but sometimes it is not deserving 
of contempt. For when some question is wanting 
such as concerns the argument or the means of 
carrying it on, the reasoning which has failed to 
supply this and is not properly argued is stupid ; but 
when something which is merely extraneous has been 
omitted, the reasoning is by no means to be lightly 
condemned but is respectable, though the questioner 
has not asked his questions well. 

As it is possible to address the solution sometimes 
to the argument, sometimes to the questioner and 
his mode of questioning and sometimes to neither 
of these, so likewise also it is possible to address one's 
questions and reasonings both to the thesis and to 
the answerer and to the time, when the solution needs 
more time than the present occasion supplies. 

XXXIV. The number, then, and the nature of the EPI- 

sources from which fallacies arise in discussion, and (i) sum- 

how we are to show up a pretender and make him mary of 
■^ -^ results. 

149 



ARISTOTLE 

183 a 

30 (JOfiev, krt S' eV tlvwv (yvfx^acvei 6 ooXolklgixos,^ 
/cat TTws ipcoTTjreov koI tls t) tol^ls rwv ipcurr]- 
fiarwv, €TL vpog ri xp'']cnfJiOL Trdvres elalv ol tolovtol 
XoyoL, /cat 7T€pl OLTTOKpLaecos aTrAco? re Trao-rj? /cat 
TTcos Xvreov tovs Xoyovs /cat tovs aoXoLKtapLovs,^ 
eLprjaOoj Tvepl aTrdvrcov rjjjuv ravra. Xolttov 8e Trepl 

35 T'^S" €^ '^PXV^ TTpoOcaecos dvafivqcraatv etVetv tl 
Ppo-x^ TTepl avTTJs /cat reAo? eTndeLvai rols elpr]- 

IlpoetAo/xe^a pev ovv evpelv Svvap,i.v rtva avX- 

XoyLOTLKrjv Trepl rov Trpo^XrjdevTos e/c rcov inrap- 

XovTOJV (x)s evho^ordriov tovto yap epyov iurl rijs 

183 b StaAe/CTt/c^? /ca^' avrrjv /cat Tr\s TTeipaarLKrjg. eVet 

Se TrpoaKaTauKevdt,€raL TTpos avrrjv 8ta rrjv Trjg 

ao(f)LaTLKrjs yeirviaaiv, ws ov povov Tret/aav Swarat 

Aa^eiv StaAe/CTt/cois" dAAo. /cat co? elScog, 8ta tovto 

ov p,6vov TO Xexdev epyov vrreOepeda ttjs 7Tpayp,a- 

5 reta?, to Xoyov SvvaaOai Xa^elv, dXXd /cat ottcos 

Xoyov vnexovreg (f)vXd^op€v ttjv deatv co? St' evho^o- 

Tarojv opoTpoTTws. TTjv 8' aiTiav elprJKap^ev tovtov, 

€7ret /cat 8ta tovto ^oiKpdTTjs rjpcoTa, dAA' oi}/c 

aneKptveTO' (opioXoyei yap ovk etSeVat. SeSTyAcorat 

8' cv Tot? TrpoTepov /cat irpo? rrocra /cat e/c 77dcra>v 

10 TOVTO ecrrat, /cat o^ev eviroprjcropiev tovtcjv, ert 8e 

TrcDj epiOTTjTeov iq ra/CTeov T171/ ipcoTTjaiv rrdaav, /cat 

^ Reading with Pacius aoXoiKia/ios for auAAoyia/ids. 
150 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 

utter paradoxes, and, further, in what circumstances 
a solecism occurs, and how to ask questions, and 
what is the right arrangement of questions, and, 
moreover, what is the use of all such arguments, 
and also about all answering of questions in general 
and in particular how to solve arguments and sole- 
cisms, on all these subjects let the treatment we have 
given suffice. There remains to call to mind our 
original purpose and say a few words about it and 
then bring our treatise to an end. 

Our purpose, then, was to discover a faculty which (2) Con- 
could reason on the problem set before us from the reimarks on 
most generally accepted premisses that exist ; for dialectic, 
this is the function of dialectic in itself and of the 
art of examination. But, since there is further added 
to it, on account of its close affinity with the art of 
sophistry, that it can undertake an examination not 
only dialectically but also with a pretence of know- 
ledge, we therefore proposed as the purpose of our 
treatise not only the above-mentioned task of being 
able to conduct an argument but also the discovery 
how, when supporting an argument, we are to defend 
our thesis by means of the most generally accepted 
premisses in a consistent manner. Of this we have 
given the reason ; for this was why Socrates used to 
ask questions but never answered them, because he 
confessed ignorance. An indication has been given, 
in what has been said above, of the number of cases 
in which this will apply and of the various kinds of 
material which can be used for this and the various 
sources from which we may obtain an abundance 
of them ; moreover also how questions must be 
asked and about the arrangement of questions in 

' Reading with Pacius aoXoiKiafiovs for avWoyiafiovs. 

151 



ARISTOTLE 

183 b 

Trepi re anoKpLaeajv /cat Aucrecur rajv rrpos Tom 
avAXoyiafxovs . SeSTyAcorat 8e /cat Trept tcov dXXcov, 
oaa rrj's avrrjg fxedohov rcbv Adycuv iariv. Trpos 
oe Tovrois irepl twv -rrapaXoyiaiJioJv SieXrjXvdafxev, 

15 axjTTep eLprjKajJbev rjSrj rrporepov. on /xev ovv e;^et 
riXo? LKavaJs a rrpoeLXofjieda, <l)av€p6v Set 8' T^/ia? 
/XT^ XeXrjdevat ro avfx^e^riKos rrepl Tavrrjv ttjv 
TTpaypLareiav. tcov yap evpLaKOfxevajv aTTOVTcov to. 
fj,€v Trap erepiov Ai^^^eVra Trporepov TreTTovrjpbiva 
Kara fiepos imSeScoKev vtto roJv TTapaXa^ovTOJV 

20 varepov ra 8 e^ VTrapxrjs evpioKopbeva pbiKpav to 
Tvpcbrov eTTiSocTLv Xafjb^dveiv e'iujde, )(prjaip,a}T€pav 
fxevTOi TToXXoi TTJs voTepov e/c TOVTOJV av^-qaecos. 
fieyLciTOV yap locos apx^] TravTO'S, ^OTrep Aeyerat- 8to 
/cat yaX(.TnxiTaTov ooco yap KpaTiOTov ttj Swafxei, 

25 ToaovTip pbLKpoTaTov ov TO) fjueyeOei -)(^aXeTTojTaT6v 
eaTiv 6(j>drivaL. TauTTjs 8' evprjfjievrjs paov to Tvpoa- 
TiOevaL /cat ovvav^eiv to Xoittov eartv orrep /cat 
TTcpl rovg prjTopLKovs Xoyovs avp,^€^r]K€, o)(eS6v 8e 
/cat 7T€pl ras" ctAAa? Trdaas Texvas- ol p,ev yap tols 
apxcLS evpovTeg TravreAaJS' inl fXLKpov tl Trporiyayov 

30 OL 8e vvv evhoKLp^ovvTes TrapaXa^ovTes Trapd ttoXXojv 
oiov e/c SLa8oxT]^ /cara fiepo? TrpoayayovTCOV ovtco? 
rjv^-qKaaL, Ttatas fMev fxeTO. tovs TrpwTovs, Qpaav- 
fxaxos 8e jxeTo. TiatW, 0eo8cupo? 8e jLtera tovtov, 
/cat TToAAot TToAAa avvevqvoxo-fyf- f^^P'O' StoTrep ouSev 
davfiacrrov ex^tv tl 7rXi]dos ttjv Texvqv. TavT-qs he 
152 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 

general, and about answers and solutions applicable 
to the reasonings employed. All the other points 
have also been set forth which belong to the same 
system of argument. In addition to these we have 
also explained about fallacies, as we have already 
remarked above. That what we purposed has been 
satisfactorily carried through to the end is plain ; 
but we must not fail to observe what has happened 
regarding this inquiry. In all discoveries, either the 
results of other people's work have been taken over 
and after having been first elaborated have been 
subsequently advanced step by step by those who 
took them over, or else they are original inventions 
which usually make progress which at first is small 
but of much greater utility than the later develop- 
ment which results from them. It is perhaps a true 
proverb which says that the beginning of anything is 
the most important ; hence it is also the most difficult. 
For, as it is very powerful in its effects, so it is very 
small in size and therefore very difficult to see. When, 
however, the first beginning has been discovered, it 
is easier to add to it and develop the rest. This has 
happened, too, with rhetorical composition, and also 
with practically all the other arts. Those who dis- 
covered the beginnings of rhetoric carried them 
forward quite a little way, whereas the famous 
modern professors of the art, entering into the heri- 
tage, so to speak, of a long series of predecessors who 
had gradually advanced it, have brought it to its 
present perfection — Tisias following the first in- 
ventors, Thrasymachus following Tisias, Theodorus 
following Thrasymachus, while numerous others have 
made numerous contributions ; hence it is no wonder 

that the art possesses a certain amplitude. Of our (3) Origin- 
^ ^ ality of the 

153 



ARISTOTLE 

188 b 

35 rrjs TTpayfiareias ou ro /xev '^v to S' ovk ■^v Trpoe^eip- 
yaafxevov, aAA' ovSev TravreXcos V7Trjp)(€v. Kal yap 

TCOV 776/31 rOVS epLUTLKOV^ XoyOVS jJLiadapVOVVTCOV 

ofioia ris rjv r) TralSevacs rfj Fopyiov TTpaypLareia. 
Xoyovs yap ol puev prjropiKovs ol Se epotr-qriKovs 
eStSocrav cKnavdaveiv, els ovg TrAeicrra/ci? eju-TriTTTetv 

IM a (pT^drjaav eKarepoL tovs dXX'^Xcvv Xoyovg. StoTrep 
Ta;;^eta jxev arexvos S' rjv rj SiSac/caAta rots fiav- 
davovai Trap* avrcov ov yap r€)(vrjv dXXa rd dno 
TTJs r€)(vr]s SiSovres" TTaiSeveLV VTreXdpL^avov , wortep 
5 dv el TLs eTTLGTTJiJirjv (f)daKa>v Trapahojaeiv eirl ro 
firjSev TTOvelv rovs TToSas, elra crKvroropiiKrjv fiev 
pLT] 3tSaa/<:ot, p,r]h odev hwrjaerat TTopil,eadaL rd 
roiavra, Soltj 8e TToXXd yevn) TravrohairaJv VTToSrj- 
/xdrcov ovTOS ydp ^e^ot^drjKe jxev irpos rrfv ;^peiav, 
Te)(yr]v 8' ov TrapehcoKev . /cat irepl fj,ev twv prj- 

184 b TopcKcbv v7Tijp)(e TToXXd Kal TTaXaid rd Xeyojxeva, 
TTepl he rod avXXoyit,ead ai navreXw^ ovSev eixo/Jiev 
TTporepov dXXo Xeyetv, aAA' r) rpi^fj l,rjrovvres ttoXvv 
Xpdvov €7Tovovp,ev. el 8e ^aiverai deaaafxevoLS 
v[XLV COS" eK roLOvroiv e^ dpxrjs v7Tap)(6vrcov ex^i-v rj 
5 jxeOohos cKavdJs Trapd rds dXXas TTpayixareias ras 
€/c TTapahoaeoiS r]v^rjp,evas, Xoittov dv elr) ttovtcjv 
vp,(x)V ri rcbv rjKpoapievojv epyov rols p-ev napaXe- 
XetfXfxevoLg rrjs p^edoSov avyyvd)p,r]v rois 8 evpy]- 
fxevotg TToXXrjv ex^t-v x^P''^- 



154 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 

present inquiry, however, it is not true to say that present 
it had already been partly elaborated and partly 
not ; nay, it did not exist at all. For the training 
given by the paid teachers of contentious argument 
resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them 
gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which 
were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and 
answers, in which both sides thought that the rival 
arguments were for the most part included. Hence 
the teaching which they gave to their pupils was 
rapid but unsystematic ; for they conceived that they 
could train their pupils by imparting to them not an 
art but the results of an art, just as if one should 
claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the 
prevention of pain in the feet and then were not to 
teach the cobbler's art and the means of providing 
suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of 
various kinds of shoes ; for he has helped to supply 
his need but has not imparted an art to him. Also, 
on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much 
material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding 
reasoning we had absolutely no earlier work to 
quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative 
researches. If, therefore, on consideration, it appears (4) Appeal 
to you that, in view of such original conditions, our ^ader. 
system is adequate when compared with the other 
methods which have been built up in the course of 
tradition, then the only thing which would remain 
for all of you, or those who follow our instruction, 
is that you should pardon the lack of complete- 
ness of our system and be heartily grateful for our 
discoveries. 



155 



DE GENERATIONE ET 
CORRUPTIONE 



INTRODUCTION 

That the De Generatione et Corruptione is a genuine 
work of Aristotle has never been disputed. It belongs 
to the group of physical treatises which also includes 
the Physics, the De Caelo and the Meteorologica. Its 
composition has been generally ascribed to the period 
covered by Aristotle's residence in the Troad, in 
Mitylene and in Macedonia, that is, circa 347 to 
335 B.C. 

Professor H. H. Joachim, to whose work I am deeply 
indebted, tells us that during the preparation of his 
version for the Oxford Translation of Aristotle he 
realized that something more was called for. " It 
soon became evident," he writes, " that a mere 
translation would be of little or no value, since the 
intrinsic philosophical interest of the original depends, 
to a large extent, upon what it implies and presup- 
poses. In short, Aristotle's fascinating and masterly 
little treatise calls for a commentary in almost every 
sentence. It is full of allusions to the speculations 
of his predecessors and contemporaries, and inex- 
tricably interwoven with the theories elaborated in 
his other works, particularly in the Physics, De Caelo 
and Meteorologica, of which no modern English edi- 
tions exist." Anyone who attempts to translate theDe 
Generatione et Corruptione must feel that a translation 
by itself is unsatisfactory, but the present translator 

159 



ARISTOTLE 

has found it impossible, within the scope of a Loeb 
version, to do more than provide brief explanatory 
notes on some of the major obscurities and to give 
the references where Aristotle is obviously referring 
to passages in his other treatises, and to recommend 
those who require something more to consult Pro- 
fessor Joachim's masterly commentary (Aristotle on 
Coming-to-be and Passing-away , Oxford, 1922). 

Amongst the other works which have been con- 
sulted most u^has been made of the Latin Version 
of Franciscus Vatablus in vol. iii of the Berlin Aristotle 
and of Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away : 
Some Comments by Dr. W. T. Verdenius and Dr. T. H. 
Waszink (Leiden, 1946), which was kindly sent to me 
by a friend, Dr. H. J. Drossaart Lulof. The summary 
of the treatise given by Sir W. D. Ross in his Aristotle 
(PP- 99-108) has also been very useful. 

The text which has been used is that of L Bekker 
in the Berlin Aristotle, any divergences from which, 
except for obvious misprints, have been noted. 

The De Generatione et Corruptione discusses the ttuOij 
to which the natural bodies in the sublunary sphere 
are liable, namely, " coming-to-be " (yei/eo-6s) and 
" passing-away " {^dopa). In Book I these processes 
are explained and distinguished from alteration 
(aAAotwfris) and from " growth and diminution " 
(ail^T/crts KuX (pBiafi) ; incidentally the views of Anaxa- 
goras and Empedocles are examined and shown to be 
inconsistent. In the second half of the book it is 
shown that what comes-to-be is formed by combina- 
tion (/xt^ts) of certain natural constituents, a process 
which implies " action and passion " (iroieh' Kal 
Tracrxetv), which in their turn imply contact {<J-<fii'i). 
Book II proves that the material constituents of 

160 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 

all that comes-to-be are the elements or " simple 
bodies," Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, and shows the 
manner in which they are transformed into one 
another and how they combine. Aristotle then 
briefly discusses the material, formal and final causes 
of" coming-to-be " and " passing-away," in particular 
criticizing the theory of Socrates in the Phaedo. He 
further states that the efficient cause of the double 
process is the sun's annual movement, and, in con- 
clusion, shows that what " comes-to-be " is necessary, 
since absolute necessity is characteristic of a sequence 
of events which is cyclical, that is to say, continuous 
and returning upon itself. 



Manuscripts 

J = Vindobonensis, phil. Grace. 100 (10th century) 

E = Parisiensis Regius 1853 (10th century) 

F = Laurentianus 87. 7 (12th century) 

H = Vaticanus 1027 (12th century) 

L = Vaticanus 253 (lith or 15th century) 

Diels = Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, by Hermann 
Diels (rec. W. Kranz, 5th edition, Berlin, 
1934.) 



161 



APISTOTEAOTS HEPI 
TENESEOS KAI 4>eOPA2 



314 a 1 1. Ilepl Se yevcarecos Kal (f)6opdg rojv (f)va€L yivo- 
fievojv Kal (f)6€LpofJi€va)V, ofxoicos Kara navrcov, ra? 
T€ acTLas Statpereov /cat rovs Xoyovs avruiv, eVi 
Se TTepl av^-qaeojs /cat aAAotcoCTeojS", rt eKarepov, 
5 /cat TTorepov rrjv avT7]v VTToXrjTTreov (/)vaiv efrat 
dAAoicocreco? /cat yeveaecos, r] ;^a»pi?, (Lanep St- 
copicTTat /cat toi? ov6fiaai,v. 

Tcov /Lter ow apxaicov ol p-kv rrjv KaXovpevrjv 
aTrXrjv yeveaiv aAAotoiaiv etrai ^acrtv, ot 8' erepov 
dXXoLioaiv /cat yeVeaiv. oaot /xev ya/a ei^ rt to ttov 
Xeyovaiv elvac /cat TrdvTa i^ ivos yevvaJaiv, tovtols 
10 fxev dvayKT] ttjv yeveaiv aXXoicoatv (f>dvaL Kal to 
Kvpiojs ytvopevov dXXoiovadai' ocrot 8e TrXeico rrjv 
vXrjv ivos Ttdeacriv, olov 'E/ATreSo/cA'jjs' /cat 'Ava^a- 
yopa^ Kal AevKLmros, tovtols Se erepov. /caiVot 
* Ava^ayopa? ye rrjv ot/cetav <j>u)vr^v "qyvorjcrev Ae'yet 
162 



ARISTOTLE ON 
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 

BOOK I 

1 . In discussing coming-to-be and passing-away of Chs. 1-5. 
things which by nature come-to-be and pass-away, be^nd'pas- 
as exhibited uniformly wherever they occur, we must sing-away 
distinguish their causes and definitions ; further, we ^■^aUera- 
must deal with " ofrowth " and " alteration," and <*'"*'' «<>»■ 

(ITC ttlBU 

inquire what each of these terms means, and whether growth and 
we are to suppose that the nature of " alteration " '^*'"*'*«''^<>"- 
and coming-to-be is the same, or whether each is of 
a separate nature corresponding to the names by 
which they are distinguished. 

Of the ancient philosophers some assert that what views of 
is called " simple " coming-to-be is " alteration," th^Momsts 
while others hold that " alteration " and coming-to- Piuralists 
be are different processes. Those who hold that the '''"*^'"'" 
universe is a simple entity and who generate all 
things from a single thing, must necessarily maintain 
that coming-to-be is " alteration," and that what 
comes-to-be in the proper sense of the term under- 
goes " alteration." Those, on the other hand, who 
hold that the matter of things is more than one, must 
regard the two processes as different — -Empedocles, 
for example, and Anaxagoras and Leucippus. Anaxa- 
goras, however, misunderstood his own statement ; 

163 



ARISTOTLE 

314 a 

yovv CO? TO yLvecrdai /cat aTToXXvadai ravrov 

15 KaOearrjKe ra> aXKoiovadat. ttoAAo, Se Aeyet ra 
aToi)(e.La, KadaTrep /cat erepoi. 'E^TreSo/cATj? /xev 
yap ra [xev acofjuariKa rerrapa, ra Se Trdvra fxera 
Tcbv Kivovvrojv e^ rov apidp,6v, ^ Ava^ayopag 8e 
dneipa /cat AevKiTTTTos /cat IS.rjpbOKpiro's . 6 jxev yap 
TO. oixoLOjxepi] crroLX^la TidrjaLV, olov ocrrovv /cat 

20 adpKa /cat /xueAdv, /cat rcoi^ ctAAcov a>v e/cacrrou 
avvcovvixov to jxepos eartv ^iqp.oKpLTos 8e /cat 
Aeu/ctTTTTos' e/c acofiaTcov aStatpeVcor TdAAa oyy- 
Kelcrdai (^aai, ravra S' arretpa /cat to ttXtjOo^ clvai 
/cat TO.? piop(f)ds, avTO. he npos avra hia(j>epeLv rov- 
TOLS e^ cSv etCTt /cat ^e'o-et /cat rd^ei rovrajv. evav- 

25 Ttoj? Se (f)aLvovTai Xeyovreg ol irepi ^ Ava^ayopav 
Tolg TTepl 'E/LtTreSo/cAea* o jxev yap (firjoi rrvp /cat 
vSojp /cat de'/aa /cat y^v aroiX'^^o- reaaapa /cat aTrAa 
etv-at [xdXXov r) crdpKa /cat ootow /cat to, Toiavra 
TCtJV ofjuotofJiepcov, ol Se ravra /jiev dnXd /cat aroi- 
;^eta, yryv 8e /cat 7ru/3 /cat vScop /cat aepa avvdera- 
314 b TTavanepfJLcav yap etvai rovrcov. 

Tot? /X€V owv e^ ei'o? Trdvra KaraaKeval^ovaiv 
dvayKaiov Xeyeiv rrjv yeveaiv Kal rrjv (f)6opdv dX- 
Xoioiaiv del yap fxevecv ro VTroKeipuevov ravro /cat 
ev [ro Se roiovrov dXXoLovaOai ^a/xev)" Tot? Se Ta 

5 yevrj irXeioj Ttotovai. Sta(f)epeiv rrjv aXXoicnaiv rrjs 

" Diels, fr. 17. 

' i.e. compounds (though, it may be, in different propor- 
tions) of the same four simple bodies — Earth, Air, Fire and 
Water — such as wood, the metals, and blood, flesh and 
marrow in animals. Such compounds, when divided, still 
retain the same constituents. 

164 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1 

for example, he says that coming-to-be and destruc- 
tion constitute the same process as " being altered," * 
though, like others, he says that the elements are 
many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal 
elements are four, but that all the elements, including 
those which create motion, are six in number, while 
Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus hold that 
their number is infinite. For Anaxagoras puts down 
as elements things which have like parts,* for example 
bone, flesh and marrow, and anything else of which 
the part bears the same name as the whole ; whereas 
Democritus and Leucippus say that all other things 
are composed of indivisible bodies, and that these 
are infinite both in number and in the forms which 
they take, while the compounds differ from one 
another in their constituents and the position and 
arrangement of these. Anaxagoras and his school 
obviously take a view directly opposite to that of 
Empedocles and his school ; for Empedocles says 
that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements 
and are " simple " rather than flesh and bone and 
similar things which have like parts, whereas Anaxa- 
goras and his school assert that the things which have 
like parts are " simple " and are elements, but that 
Earth, Fire, Water and Air are composite, for each 
of them is, they say, a " general seed-ground " for 
things which have like parts. 

Those, therefore, who construct everything out of 
a single element must necessarily say that coming- 
to-be and passing-away are " alteration," for their 
substratum remains the same and one (and it is such 
a substratum which we say undergoes " alteration ") ; 
but those who make the kinds of things more than 
one must hold that " alteration " differs from coming- 

165 



ARISTOTLE 

314 b 

yeveaeojs' avviovrcov yap koL SiaXvofievojv rj yeveais 

avfi^aLvei /cat rj (l)dopd. 8l6 Xeyei tovtov tov 
rpoTTov KOL ^EifiTTeSoKXrjs, ore " (f)vcns ovSevos 
ear IV ^ aXXa jxovov /xl^ls re StaAAa^i? re jxiyevrayv." 
on [xev ovv oiKelos 6 Xoyos avroJv rfj virodeaei 

10 ovrcx) (f)dvaL, SrjXov, Kal on Xeyovoi rov rpoTTov 
rovrov dvayKoiov 8e /cat rovrois rrjv aXXolcuaiv 
elvai [xev n (j>avaL rrapd rrjv yeveutv, dSvvarov 
fievroL Kara rd vtt* eKeivcov Xeyofxeva. rovro 8' 
on Xeyofxev opdws, pdhcov avvihelv. oioirep yap 
6pG)[iev ■qpejxova'qs rrjs ovaias ev avrij fxera^oXrjV 

15 Kara fieyedos, rrjv KaXovfxevrjv av^rjaiv Kal ^Qlaiv, 
ourco Kal dXXoLiOGLV. ov firjv aAA' e^ cov Xeyovaiv 
ol TrXetovs dpxdg notovvres [xcdg dhvvarov aAAoi- 
ovadai. rd ydp nddrj, Kad* a (f)ap,€V rovro avp.- 
^aiveiv, Stac^opat ra)v aroL^eicov elaiv, Xeycu 8' 
olov depfjiov ijjvxpdv, XevKov fxeXav, ^rjpdv vypov, 

20 fiaXaKov (TKXrjpov Kal rcbv dXXoiv eKaarov, axnrep 
Kal cf)rjcrlv 'EyLt77e8o/cArjs" " rjeXtov /xev XevKov opdv 
Kal OepjJLOv dndyrr], o/ji^pov 8' ev Tracrtv 8vo(f)6evrd 
re piyaXeov re," o/jlolcos Se 8topt^ei /cat ctti rdJv 
XoLTTcov. war et pirj 8uvaTov e/c TTvpos yeveadai, 
vSojp /X178' e^ vSaros yrjv, 01)8' e/c XevKov /xe'Aav 

25 earai ovSev ov8' eK [xaXaKov aKXrjpov 6 8' avrd? 
Xoyos Kal TTepl rcov dXXcov. rovro 8' rjv dXXoicoaig. 
fl Kal (f>avep6v on yiLav del rols evavriois vtto- 

» Diels, fr. 8. » Diels, fr. 21 lines 3 and 5. 

166 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1 

to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when 
things come together and are dissolved. This is the 
reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect, 
when he says that " there is no origin of anything, 
but only a mingling and separation of things which 
have been mingled." " It is clear then, that their 
description of coming-to-be and passing-away in this 
way accords with their assumption and that they 
actually describe them in this way ; they also must, 
however, admit that " alteration " is something 
different from coming-to-be, though they cannot 
possibly do so consistently with the views which they 
express. It is easy to see that we are correct in 
saying this ; for just as we see changes in magnitude 
taking place in a thing while its substance remains 
unchanged (what we call " increase " and " diminu- 
tion "), so also we see " alteration " occurring. Never- 
theless, the statements of those who suppose the 
existence of more than one first principle make it 
impossible for " alteration " to take place. For the 
qualities, in respect of which we say that " altera- 
tion " occurs (for example, hot and cold, white and 
black, dry and moist, soft and hard, etc.) are differ- 
ences affecting the elements. As Empedocles says, 

The sun is white to look upon and hot 
In every part, the rain is dark and chill * ; 

and he likewise characterizes also the other elements. 
Hence, as it is impossible for Water to come-into- 
being from Fire, or Earth from Water, neither will 
black come into existence out of white, nor hard out 
of soft ; and the same argument applies also to the 
other qualities. Now this is what " alteration " has 
always meant. From this it is also clear that it must 
be assumed that a single matter belongs to the " con- 

167 



ARISTOTLE 

314 b 

deriov vXrjv, av re jjbera^dXXrj Kara tottov, av re 
/car' av^r)aLV Kal (fidiaLV, av re /car' dXXoiojaLV. 
eVt 8' ofjLOLOJS dvayKalov elvai rovro Kal dXXoLOxnv 

315 a e'ire yap dXXolioats iari, Kal to vTroKeifxevov ev 

aroix^iov Kal /xta rj TrdvTCov vXrj tcov e)(6vTajv ets" 
dXXrjXa fiera^oXijv , Kav el ro VTTOKeijJievov ev, ecrrtv 
dAAotcocris". 

^KfjLTreSoKXrjs fJicv ovv eoiKev evavria Xeyetv Kat 
rrpos rd (^aivofieva Kal npo'S avrov avros. ajxa 
5 fxev yap ov ^tjctiv erepov i^ irepov yiveadai rojv 
aTOLX^^(^v ovhev, dXXd rdXXa rravra €K rovrojVy 
dfxa S' orav els ev uvvaydyrj rrjv diraaav (f>vaLV 
ttXtjv rov veLKovs, eK rod evos yiveadai irdXiv 
eKaarov. atar e^ evds" tlvos SrjXov ore Sia^opat? 
TLul ;^ to/at ^Ojuevcor /cat Trddecriv eyevero to puev vhwp 

10 rd Se rrvp, KaQdirep Xeyei rov piev rjXiov XevKov Kal 
dep/xov, rrjV 8e yriv ^apv Kal OKXrjpov. dcf)atpov- 
pbivoiv ovv rovrwv rcov Sia(f)opa)v [etal yap d(f>ai- 
peral yevop^evai ye) hrjXov (Ls dvdyKT) yiveadai Kal 
yrjv i^ vharos Kal vScjp €K yrjs, opcoLCOs Se Kal 
rcov dXXcov eKaarov, ov rdre piovov dAAo. Kal vvv, 

15 piera^dXXovrd ye rol<s rrddeaiv. eari 8' ef c5v 
e'lprjKe hvvdpieva Trpoaylveadai Kal ;(CD/3t^eCT0at Tra- 
Xlv, dAAco? re Kal pcaxopievcov dXX-qXoig en rov 
vetKovs Kal rrjs ^tAta?. hionep Kal rore e^ evos 
iyevvTJdr]aav ov yap Brj rrvp ye Kal yrj Kal vhcop 

" i.e. when the elements originally came-to be. 
168 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, I. 1 

trary poles," whether they change in respect of place, 
or of " growth " and " diminution," or of " altera- 
tion " ; furthermore, that the existence of a single 
matter and that of" alteration " are each as necessary 
as the other, for, if " alteration " takes place, then 
the substratum is a single element, and so all things 
which change into one another have a single matter, 
and, conversely, if the substratum is one, " altera- 
tion " takes place. 

Empedocles, then, seems to contradict the observed 
facts and himself as well. For he denies that any one 
of his elements comes-to-be from any other element, 
but declares that all other things eome-to-be from 
these elements, and at the same time, after collecting 
all nature, except Strife, together into one, he declares 
that each thing again comes-to-be out of the One. 
Hence it is clear that out of a One, when separation 
took place owing to certain differences and qualities, 
one thing came-to-be Water and another Fire, as is 
shown by his calling the sun " white and hot " and 
the earth " heavy and hard." If, therefore, these 
differences are taken away (and it is possible to take 
them away, since they came-to-be), it is clear that 
Earth must necessarily come-to-be out of Water, and 
Water out of Earth, and similarly with each of the 
other elements, not only then " but also now,** when 
they undergo a change in their qualities. According 
to his statements, the qualities can be attached and 
can be separated again, especially as Strife and Love 
are still fighting against one another. This is also the 
reason why the elements were originally generated 
from the One ; for, I suppose. Fire, Earth and Water 

^ i.e. when according to Empedocles " Strife " is gaining 
the upper hand. 

169 



ARISTOTLE 

315 a 

ert ovra ev 7]v ro rrdv. aSrjXov 8e Kal noTepov 

20 a.px'TjV avrojv dereov ro ev rj ra ttoXXol, Ae'yco Se TTvp 
Kai yrjv /cat ra avaroi.-)(a tovtcov. fj fiev yap cos 
vXr] VTTOKeLTai, i^ ov (xera^aXXovra Sta rrjv Kivrjaiv 
yivovrai yrj Kat TTVp, to ev crroix^^ov fj Be rovro 
pcev e/c avvdeaeoj's ytverat avvLovroiv eKewiDV, 
eKelva 8' €K StaAuaeco?, aTotxeLcoSearepa eKelva 

25 Kal TT pore pa rrjv (f)vaLV. 

2. "OAw? re St] irepl yeveaecos Kal (jydopds rrjg 
aTrXrjs XeKreov, TTorepov eariv r] ovk ecrri Kal ttcos 
eartv, /cat irepi rcov dXXcov arrXaJv KLvqaeojv, olov 
TTepl av^rjaeco'S Kal dXXoicoaecos . YlXdrcov /xev ovv 

30 jxovov TTepl yeveaecos eaKeiparo Kal (f>6opd9, onajg 
v7Tdp)(€L Tot? TTpdyfxaGL, Kal TTepl yeveaecos ov 
rrdarjs dXXd rrjs rcov aroixeicov ttcos Se crdpKes r] 
ocjrd 7] rcov dXXcov rt rcbv rotovrcov, ovSev en 
ovre TTepl dXXoicoaecos ovre vepl av^-^crecos , riva 
rpoTTov vTrdpxovcTi rots TTpdyfiaaLV. oXcos 8e Trapd 
ra eTTiTToXrjs TTepl ovhevos ovhels eTTearrjuev e^co 

35 A-qfioKpirov. ovros 8' eoiKe /xev TTepl aTrdvrcov 

315 b (jypovriaaL, rjSr) Se ev rco ttcos Sia^epei. ovre yap 

TTepl av^Tjoecos ovBels ovhev hicopiaev, cooTTep Xe- 

yofjiev, 6 Tt fjirj kolv 6 rvxcov eiTTeiev, art, TTpocriovros 

av^dvovrai rov op-oiov^ rco opioico [ttojs he rovro, 

^ rov ofioiov add id i. 

° i.e. Water and Air. 

* Namely, that set up by Strife. 

* Timaeus 52 v ff. 

170 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1-2 

did not exist separately at all while they were still 
one. Now it is also not clear whether we must ascribe 
to him the One as his starting-point, or the Many — 
by which I mean Fire and Earth and their co- 
ordinates." For the One, in as much as it forms, as 
its matter, the substratum from which Earth and 
Fire come-to-be through the change due to motion,'' 
is an element ; on the other hand, in as much as the 
One comes-to-be through a process of composition, 
due to the coming together of the Many, whereas 
the Many are the result of dissolution, the Many are 
more " elementary " than the One and by nature 
prior to it. 

2. We must, therefore, deal in general with the 
subject of unqualified coming-to-be and passing- 
away, and discuss whether they exist or not, and how 
they exist, and with the other simple motions, such 
as " growth " and " alteration." Plato," it is true, Plato's 
investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only "^^®^ '^ *°° 
as to the manner in which passing-away is inherent in 
things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal 
with it in general but only that of the elements ; he 
never inquired how flesh or bones or any other similar 
things came-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss 
how " alteration " and " growth " are present in 
things. In fact no one at all has applied himself to 
any of these subjects, except in a superficial manner, 
with the single exception of Democritus. He seems views of 
to have thought about them all, and from first to last Draiocritus 
he excels in his manner of treatment. For, as we Leucippus. 
assert, no one else made any definite pronouncement 
about " growth," except such as any man-in-the- 
street might make, namely, that things grow by the 
coming together of like with like (without a word as 

171 



ARISTOTLE 

315 b 

ou/ceri), ovSe Trepl jat^ecus", ovSe vrepi tcov dXXiov 

5 CO? eiTTelv ovSevos, olov rod iroieZv koL tov 7Tda)(€LV, 
Tiva rpoTTOv ro [xev TTotei to 8e irdax'^L ras ^vaLKO.'S 
TTOLTjaeLS. /^rjixoKptrog 8e /cai AevKiTTvos ttoltj- 
aavreg rd G-)(iqixara tt^v dXXoicoaLV /cat rrjv yeveoLV 
€K rovTtov TToiovGL, hiaKpia€i p,kv /cat avyKpiaei 
yeveaiv /cat (f)dopdv, rd^eL 8e /cat Secret aAAotaxrtv. 

10 ivel 8' ojovTo rdXrjOes ev rep (jiaiveaOai, evavria 8e 
/cat aTTecpa ra (f)aLVopLeva, rd a-)(rjixara aTreipa 
eTToirjaav , ware raZs fxera^oXals tov avyKeipiivov 
TO avrd evavriov hoKeZv dXXo) /cat aAAoj, /cat fiera- 
KLveZadai puKpov epLfxiyvvpuevov , /cat oAco? ercpov 
(jyaiveaOat ivos pberaKivrjdevros' €k rcov avrcjv ydp 

15 rpaycphia /cat KcofxcpSia ytVerai ypafxpidriDV. 

'Eyret Se 8o/cet CT;(e86v Traatv erepov etvat y4veui<; 
/cat aAAoio/crts', /cat yiveadai p.kv /cat ^deipeadai 
avyKpivofJLeva /cat 8iaKpt,v6p,€va, dXXoiovadai 8e 
piera^aXXcvrtov rcov TTadrjpidroJV , irepl rovrojv eVt- 
OTT^craCTt deoip-qriov. aTTopta? yap e;;^et ravra /cat 

20 TToAAa? /cat euAdyou?. et juei^ yap eart cruyKpiaL^ 

7] yeveai'5, TToXXa a8waTa avfi^aLvei' elal 8' ai5 

Adyot erepoL dray/cacrTt/cot /cat oi5/c evnopoi SiaXv^LV 

cl»? oi)/c evSex^TaL dXXcog e^^etv. et 8e^ p.?^ eVrt ady- 

KpioLS 7) yeveoLS, r} dXcos ovk eari, yeveais rj oA- 
172 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

to how this happens), and they tell us nothing about 
" mixing " and practically nothing about the other 
terms, such as " action " and " passion," that is, how 
one thing acts upon and another is aiFected by physical 
action. Democritus, however, and Leucippus postu- 
late the " figures " and make " alteration " and 
coming-to-be result from these, attributing coming- 
to-be and passing-away to their dissociation and 
association, and " alteration " to their arrangement 
and position ; and, since they held that the truth 
consisted in appearance, and appearances are con- 
trary to one another and infinite in number, they 
made the " figures " infinite in number, so that, owing 
to changes in the compound, the same thing seems 
to be contrary to different people and to be " trans- 
posed " by the mixing in of a small ingredient and 
to appear quite different owing to " transposition " 
of one constituent. For a tragedy and a comedy are 
composed of the same letters. 

Since almost all philosophers think (a) that coming- 
to-be and " alteration " are different processes and 
(b) that things come-to-be and pass-away by " associa- 
tion " and " dissociation," whereas they undergo 
" alteration " by a change of their qualities, we must 
fix our attention on these views and examine them ; 
for they present many arguable questions for dis- 
cussion. For if coming-to-be is " association," many 
impossible situations arise ; and, on the other hand, 
there are other compelling arguments, not easy to 
disentangle, to prove that coming-to-be cannot be 
anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be 
is not " association," either coming-to-be does not 

* €t Se scripsi : eire codd. 

173 



ARISTOTLE 

315 b 

Aotojcrts', 7]^ Kai TOVTO StaAucrat ;)^aAe7rov ov rretpa- 

T€OV. 

25 ^Apx^ S^ TOVTCOV TTavTcov, TTOTepov ovTco ytVerat 
Kal aXXoLovrai /cat av^dverai to, ovra /cat ravavria 
TOVTOLS TTciax^t, Tcbv TTpcoTiov VTTap-)(6vro}v /xeyedcov 
ahiaipiroiv , r^ ovhev iari fxeyedos dSiaiperov Sta- 
(f)€p€i yap TOVTO TrAetCTTov. /cat TraAiv et fxeyedr], 
TTOTepov, COS" ^rjixoKpLTog /cat AevKLTnrog, CTca/xara 

30 raur' eaTLV, r) wanep iv tco Tiixaito, CTTtTreSa. 
TOVTO [M€V ovv avTO, KadaTTep /cat ev ctAAotS" ttpT^- 
Kapuev, aXoyov f^^xpt iTrnreScov StaAucrat. Sto 
fxaXXov evXoyov CTco/xara etvat dStaipera. aAAa 
/cat raura TroXXrjv €)(ei dXoy tav. opiOis Se Tourot? 
aAAoia)(Ttv /cat yevecrtv iv8e)(€TaL TToielv, Kaddirep 

35 eiprjTai, TpoTrij Kal SLaOiyfj pbCTaKtvovvTa to avTo 

316 a /cat rat? tcov a)(rnxdTCi}v Sia^opat?, oTrep TTottt 

AiqixoKpLTOS (8to /cat xpoi-dv ov (f)rjai,v etvat* TpoTrfj 
yap p^pwjaaTi^eff^at), rotS" 8' et? €77t7re8a StaipouCTtr 
ovK€Tf ovSevydp ytVerat ttXtjv OTCped avvTide- 
pbdvoiv TTados yap ouS' iyx^ipovcri. yevvdv ovSev i^ 
avTOJv. 
5 AtTtov 8e Tou 67r' eXaTTOV Svvaadai Ta ofioXoyov- 
jxeva avvopdv rj diTeipia. Sto oaot evcpKrjKaai /xdX- 
Xov iv TOt? (j>vaiKols, fxdXXov SvvavTat, VTroTideadai 
TOLavTas dpxds at CTTt ttoAi) Swarrat avveip€LV 

^ el post ^ omisi cum EH. 

" Plato, Timaeus 53 c fF. 

* De Caelo 299 a 6 ff. 

<^ These terms are explained in Met. 985 b 15 flF. 

174 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

exist at all or it is " alteration " ; or else we must try 
to unravel this problem too, difficult as it is. 

The starting-point for dealing with all these pro- There are 
blems is the question, " Do things which exist come- dh-lsible 
to-be and ' alter ' and ' grow,' and undergo the magnitudes. 
contrary changes, because the primary existences 
are indivisible magnitudes ? Or is no magnitude in- 
divisible ? " For it makes a great difference which 
view we take. Again, if primary existences are in- 
divisible magnitudes, are they bodies, as Democritus 
and Leucippus assert ? Or are they planes, as is the 
view expressed in the Timaeus ? " To resolve them 
into planes and to stop at that point is, as we have 
said elsewhere,'' in itself contrary to reason. Hence 
it is more reasonable to hold that they are indivisible 
bodies, though this view also involves considerable 
irrationality. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is 
possible with these bodies to bring about " altera- 
tion " and coming-to-be if one " transposes " the 
same thing by " turning " and " intercontact " '^ and 
by variations of the " figures," as Democritus does 
(hence he denies that colour exists, for coloration, 
he says is due to the " turning " of the " figures ") ; 
but it is impossible for those who divide bodies into 
planes to bring about " alteration " and coming-to 
be ; for, when planes are put together, nothing can 
result except solids ; for they never even try to 
generate any quality from them. 

The reason why we have not the power to compre- 
hend the admitted facts is our lack of experience. 
Hence those who have lived in a more intimate com- 
munion with the phenomena of nature are better able 
to lay down such principles as can be connected to- 
gether and cover a wide field ; those, on the other 

175 



ARISTOTLE 

316 a 

ot 8' eK TU)v TToX\a)v Xoyojv dd€a)pr]roi, rcbv vrrap- 

10 X'^VTCov ovTeg, irpos oXlya ^XeipavTCS dTTO^aiVovrat 
paov. tSoi S' av ri? /cat e/c tovtcov oaov Sia(f)€povaLV 
OL (f)vaiKa)s Kai XoyLKCos aKoirovvres' Trepl yap 
Tov aropca elvai fieyedr] oi p^ev ^acrtv ori, ro avro- 
rplycovov iroXXa carat, Arjp^oKpiTog 8' av 0avet7y 
otKeiot? Kal (jivaLKols Xoyois TreTrelcrdac. SrjXov 8' 
ecrrat o Aeyo/xev TTpotovuiv. 

15 ' Ep^et yap aTTopiav, el ti? ^et'»y aajpid tl etvai Kal 
p.eyedos TTavrrj Statperdv, /cat rovro hwarov. ri 
yap earai OTvep ttjv Siatpecriv 8ia^euyei; el yap 
TTavrrj Siaiperov, Kal rovro Svvarov, Kav dp,a etr] 
rovro iravrr) Scrjp'qp.evov, Kal el fir) a/xa SijjprjraL- 
Kav et rovro yevocro, ovBev dv e'lrj dSvvarov. 

20 ovKovv Kal Kara ro p.ecrov d>aavrcog, Kal oAat? 8e, 
et TTavrrj TTe<j>VKe Siaiperov, kov SiaLpedfj, ovSev 
earai dSvvarov yeyovos, eTrel ovh* dv els p,vpla 
p.vpiaKi's hirjprjpueva fj, ovhev dhvvarov /catVot taiog 
ovhels dv SieXot. evel rolvvv irdvrrj roiovrov can 
ro (Tco/xa, Sirjptjadoj . rl ovv earai Xolttov ; fxe- 

25 yedos ; ov yap olov re- ecrrat yap rt ov hirjprjpievov , 
rjv he TTavrrj hiaiperov . dXXd purjv el pirjBev earai 

" i.e. the Platonists. 
* See De Lin. Insec. 968 a 9 If . 
176 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

hand, who indulge in long discussions without taking 
the facts into account are more easily detected as 
men of narrow views. One can see, too, from this 
the great difference which exists between those whose 
researches are based on the phenomenon of nature 
and those who inquire by a dialectical method. For 
on the subject of atomic magnitudes one school ^ 
maintains their existence on the ground that other- 
wise the " ideal triangle " will be many,** while 
Democritus would appear to have been convinced by 
arguments germane to the subject and founded on 
the study of nature. What we mean will be clear as 
we proceed. 

If one postulates that a body, that is, a magnitude, Difficulty 
is divisible throughout and that such a division is the^assump- 
possible, a difficulty arises, namely, what will the tion that 
body be which escapes division ? If it is divisible divisible 
throughout and this procedure is possible, it might througiiout. 
be simultaneously divided throughout, even though 
the divisions have not been made simultaneously, 
and, if this were to result, no impossibility would be 
involved. Therefore, supposing it is of a nature to 
be divisible throughout, by a series of similar bisec- 
tions or on any other principle, nothing impossible 
will have been achieved if it has actually been 
divided, since, even if it has been divided into in- 
numerable parts innumerable times, there is no 
impossibility, though perhaps no one would carry 
out this division. Since, therefore, the body is divi- 
sible throughout, let us suppose that it has been 
divided. What then will be left ? A magnitude ? 
No : that is impossible, since then there will be some- 
thing which has not been divided, and it was divisible 
throughout. But if no body or magnitude is to be left 

177 



ARISTOTLE 

316 a 

aaj/xa firjSe fxeyedos, Staipecns 8' earai, rj e/c 
OTLy/jicbv ecrrai, /cat d^eyedr] i^ wv avyKeirai, ^ 
ovoev TTavraTTaaiv , ware Kciv yivoLTo ck yLrjhevos 
Kav e'irj ovyKeifxevov, /cat to tto-v 8r] ovSev aXX* •^ 
30 (j)aLv6^evov. ofxoLCos Se Kav fj e/c aTLy/xcov, ovk 
earaL ttooov. ottotc yap rjTTTovTO /cat ev rjv fjLeyedos 
/cat d/xa rjaav, ovSev eTTolovv ixelt,ov to Trdv. Siat- 
pedevTos yap els Svo Kal TrXeico, ovBev eXarrov ovhk 
fiel^ov TO Trdv rov rrporepov, (Lare Kav Trdcrai avv- 
redcoGiv, ovSev TToi-qaovcFL jxeyeOog. dXXa fxrjv Kal 

316 b et Tt hiaipovpiivov olov eKTrptapba ytVerat rov ao)- 
jxaros, Kal ovtojs e'/c rov peyedovs awp^d tl dnep- 
■)(eTaL, 6 avTOs Xoyos, eKetvo ttcos Biatperov; ei 
oe prj acopa dAA' etSos tl ;)(a)ptCTTdi' rj Trddog o 
aTTTjXdev, Kal eoTi to puiyedos OTtypial rj d<f>al rohl 
5 TTadovaai, drorrov e/c purj payedibv pueyedos etvat. 
en oe ttov ecrovrai Kal dKLvqroi •^ Kivovpevai, at 
ariypiai; dcfyi] re del /xta Svolv rivibv, cos ovros 
TLVOS TTapa rrjv dcfnjv Kal rrjv Staipeatv Kal rrjv 
artypLrjv. ei Sij ris dtjaerac oriovv rj otttjXikovovv 
croj/Lta efv'at rrdvrrj hiaiperov, rrdvra ravra avp- 
10 ^aivei. en edv hieXwv avvdco ro ^vXov rj n dXXo, 
TTaXiv laov re Kal ev. ovkovv ovrcos ex^i SrjXovon 
Kav repno ro ^vXov /ca^' OTtow arjpelov. Travrr) 
dpa SiT^prjrai hvvdpeL. ri ovv eon irapd r-fjv Stat- 



" i.e. the sum of the separated parts. 
178 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

and yet division is to take place, the body either will 
consist of points, and its constituents will be things 
of no magnitude, or else it will be absolutely nothing ; 
and so it would come-to-be and be compounded of 
nothing, and the whole would be nothing but an 
illusory appearance. Similarly, if it consists of points, 
it will not be a magnitude ; for when the points were 
in contact and formed a single magnitude and were 
together, they did not make the whole any larger. 
For when it was divided into two or more parts, the 
whole " was no smaller or larger than before ; so that, 
if all the points were to be put together, they will 
not make any magnitude. Further, if, when the body 
is being divided, a minute portion of it, like a piece 
of saw-dust, is formed and in this way a body is 
detached from the magnitude, the same argument 
holds good, and the question arises : " In what sense 
is this portion divisible ? " If it was not a body which 
was detached but a separable form or quality, and 
if the magnitude is points or contacts thus qualified, 
it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed 
of things which are not magnitudes. Furthermore, 
where will the points be ? And, are they motionless 
or do they move ? Also a contact is always a contact 
of two things, since there is always something as well 
as the contact or the division or the point. All this 
results, if one is going to posit that any body of any 
size whatever is divisible throughout. Furthermore, 
if, after having divided a piece of wood or some other 
object, I put it together again, it is again both equal 
to what it was and a unity. Obviously this is so at 
whatever point I cut the wood. The wood has, there- 
fore, been divided potentially throughout. What 
then, is there in the wood besides the division ? For 

179 



ARISTOTLE 

316 b 

peaiv; et yap Kal ecm tl irados, dAAa ttcS? €t? 
ravra SiaXverat Kal ylverai eK tovtcov; rj ttcos 

15 ;j^copi^eTat ravra; war^ e'lTrep ahvvarov i^ d(f>cov 
7] a-Tiyficov elvai ra jjieyidrj, dvdyKTj elvai crco/iara 
dhiaipeTa Kal fjueyedrj. ov fjLTjv dAAa Kal ravra 
dep,evois ovx '^rrov avfi^aivei dSvvarov. ecrKCTrrai 
oe TTepl avrcov ev iripois- dAAd ravra 7T€t,par€ov 
Xvetv Sio TrdXtv e^ dpxy]S rrjv diropiav XcKreov. 

20 To fiev ovv dtrav croi/xa aladrjrov elvai Staiperov 
Kad oriovv arjjxelov Kal dhtaiperov ovhev droTTov 
ro pikv yap Bvvdp,ei Siaiperov, ro S' ivreXex^^o. 
vrrdp^et. ro S' elvat, djia Travrj) Siaiperov Bwd/jLei 
dSvvarov So^etev dv elvai,. et yap Svvarov, Kav 
yevoiro, ov)( ware elvac d/xa d/x(^6o evreAep^eta 

25 dhiaiperov Kal Sifiprjixevov, dAAd Sirjprjfjievov Kad^ 
oriovv arjpbeZov. ovhkv dpa ear at Xolttov, Kal els 
dacofjcarov e(f>dapjxevov ro adjjjia, Kal yevoiro 8' dv 
TToXiv Tjroi eK ariyixdjv rj oXcos e^ ovSevo^. Kal 
rovro TTcos Svvarov ; 

'AAAd [X'qv on ye SiaipelraL el? ^^oi/jtCTTa /cat del 
els eXdrroi fxeyedr] /cat ei? dTTe-)(pvra /cat Kexmpi- 

30 ofxeva, ^avepov. ovre hrj Kara piepos Siaipovvri elrj 
dv dneipos f] dpvipis, ovre ajxa olov re Staipedfjvai, 
Kara ndv arjp.elov {ov yap Svvarov) dAAd p-^xpi rov. 
dvayKYj dpa drop.a evvTrapx^tv /xeyedr] dopara, 
dXXcos re Kal etirep earai yeveois Kal <j>dopd 'q 

" i.e. points of division and quality. 
* Phys. 231 a 21 if. ' i.e. iincuttable. 

180 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

even if there is some quality, how is it dissolved into 
these constituents " and how does it come-to-be out 
of them ? And how are these constituents separated ? 
Therefore, since it is impossible for magnitudes to 
consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible 
bodies and magnitudes. However, if we posit these, 
an equally impossible consequence arises, which has 
been the subject of discussion elsewhere.^ But we 
must try to solve these difficulties, and so the problem 
must be stated again from the beginning. 

It is, then, in no wise absurd that every perceptible 
body should be divisible at any point whatsoever and 
also indivisible ; for it will be potentially divisible and 
actually indivisible. But it would seem impossible 
that it should be, even potentially, divisible through- 
out at the same time ; for, if that were possible, it 
would actually happen, with the result, not that it 
would actually be simultaneously both things — in- 
divisible and divided — but that it would be divided 
simultaneously at any and every point. Nothing will, 
therefore, be left, and the body will have passed-away 
into a state of incorporeity, and so it also might come- 
to-be again either from points or absolutely from 
nothing. And how is this possible ? 

It is clear, however, that a body is divided into 
magnitudes which are separable and grow smaller 
and smaller and come apart from one another and 
are separated. If you divide a body piece by piece, 
the process of breaking it up would not be infinite, 
nor can it be divided simultaneously at every point 
(for this is not possible), but the process can only be 
carried on within a certain limit. There must, then, 
exist in a body atomic *= magnitudes which are in- 
visible, especially if coming-to-be and passing-away 

181 



ARISTOTLE 

316 b 

/xev hiaKpicret r) Se avyKpiaet. 6 [xev ovv avayKdl,eiv 

317 a hoKoyv Xoyos elvai [Meyedr] drofxa ovrog eariv on 

he Xavddvei TrapaXoyL^ofievos , Kal fj XavOdvei, Ae- 
ycofjiev. 

'E77et yap ovk eart ariyjxrj urLyixrjg cxofxevrj, to 
TrdvTr) elvai Siaiperov e'crn fjiev co? V7Tdp)^€i toZs 
jxeyedeaiv, eart 8' cos" ov. hoKel 8' orav tovto 
5 reOfj, Kal oirrjovv /cat TTdvTT] (myp,rjv efvat, war^ 
dvayKalov etvai hiaipedrjvai ro /xeyedos et? p.'qhiv 
TTavrr) yap etvai (TTLyfxrjv cScrre ^ i^ dcf>a)v rj eV 
OTiyficov eivaL. to 8' cotlv d)s virdp^ei TrdvTrj, 
OTL jxia oTTTjovv iori, /cat Trdaai ct»? iKdarrj, TrXeiovg 
Se ^la? OVK elaiv {i(f)€^rjg yap ovk elaiv), cocrr^ ov 

10 TrdvTr). €L yap Kara /xeaov 8tatpeToi', /cat /car' 
€)(ofJi€vr]v aTiyfxrjv ecrrat Statperov oi5;^t 8e^- oi) 
yap iaTLV ixofxevov Grjfxetov (Trj[X€Lov rj ariyfxr} 
artyjjirjs. tovto 8' iarl 8tatpeCTts" /cat* crvvdeaig. 

"Qctt' eart /cat BidKpiaLg Kal ovyKpiais, dAA' our' 
€t? drofxa /cat e^ dropniiv [noXXd yap rd a8waTa) 

15 ovre. ovTO)9 (Zare Trdvrr) Siatpecriv yeveaOai (et 
yap -qv ixo/xevr) aTiyfxr) cmyjjirjs , toiJt' dv -^v), dXX* 
els fitKpd Kal eXdrroj eart, Kal avyKpiais e^ 
iXaTTOVCOv. aAA' ov^ 'f] aTrXrj Kal reXeia yeveais 
avyKpiaei Kal hiaKpicreL wpiarai, cos rives (^aaiv, 
TTjv 8' ev TO) avvex^Z fxeTa^oXrjv dXXoiiOGLV. dXXd 

^ ovxi Sc J : oni. cet. codd. 
" Kal H : 7J. 

182 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 

are going to take place by association and dissocia- 
tion respectively. This, then, is the argument which 
is thought to necessitate the existence of atomic 
magnitudes, but let us now show that it conceals a 
false inference, and where this false inference lies. 

Since no point is contiguous to another point, the 
divisibility throughout of a body is possible in one 
sense, but not in another sense. When such divisi- 
bility is postulated, it is generally held that there is 
a point both anywhere and everywhere in it, so that 
it follows that the magnitudes must be divided until 
nothing is left. For, it is urged, there is a point every- 
where in it, so that it consists either of contacts or 
of points. But divisibility-throughout is possible only 
in the sense that there is one point anywhere within 
it and that all its points taken separately are within 
it ; but there are not more points than one anywhere 
in it (for the points are not " consecutive "), so that 
it is not divisible throughout ; for then, if it was 
divisible at its centre, it will also be divisible at a 
contiguous point. But it is not ; for one moment 
in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point 
to another. So much for division and composition. 

Hence both association and dissociation occur but Coming-to- 
neither into atomic magnitudes and out of them (for duetto" 
the impossibilities involved are numerous), nor in association 
such a way that division-throughout occurs (for this particles 
would be possible only if point were contiguous to "wayTo'"^' 
point) ; but dissociation occurs into small, or relatively their dis- 
small, parts, while association occurs out of relatively *'°^ ^ ^^^' 
small parts. But unqualified and complete coming- 
to-be is not defined as due to association and dis- 
sociation, as some people assert, while they say that 
change in what is continuous is " alteration." In fact, 

183 



ARISTOTLE 

317 a 
20 TOVT CGTiv €v cL a(f)aXXerai Travra. can yap 

yevecTLS aTrXrj /cat (f)dopa ov avyKpiaei /cat 8ta/cptaet, 

aAA' orav jxeTa^dWr^ e/c Tovhe els roSe oXov. ol 

he o'lovrai aAAotcocrtv Trdaav elvac rrjv roLavrrjv 

[xera^oX-qv to Se hia(f)4pei. iv yap tw UTro/cet/xeVoj 

TO fxev eoTL /caret, tov Xoyov, to 8e /cara Tr]v vXrjv. 

25 oTav jxev ovv ev tovtol? fj rj fxeTa^oX-r], yevecris 

ecrrat rj (f)dopd, OTav S' eV rot? irddecn /cat /caret 

avfi^e^rjKos, dAAotcDorts". Sta/cptvo/zera Se /cat avy- 

KpLvojxeva ev^OapTa ytVerat. idv /xev yap etV 

eXaTTco i38arta Siaipedfj, OaTTov drjp ytVerat, eav 

80 8e avyKpidfj, ^pahvTepov . fidXXov 8' earat St^Aoi' 

•^ ^€v rot? vaTepov. vvv 8e roaourov htoipiadco, ort 

dSuvarov efvat ri^v yeveaiv avyKpiuiv, oiav 8^^ rtre? 

^aCTtr. 

3. Aicoptop^dviov 8e rourcot', rrpcoTov decoprjTeov 

TTOTepov eari rt yLvofx-evov dirXcos /cat <f)detp6pi€vov, 

7] Kvpiojs fMev ovSev, del 8' e/c rtvo? /cat rt, Ae'yco 8' 

35 olov e/c KdjjivovTos vyialvov /cat Kdfxvov i^ vyial- 

317 b vovro?, •^ puKpov e/c pieydXov /cat /xe'ya e'/c puKpov, 

/cat rdAAa rrdvTa tovtov tov Tponov. el yap aTrAcDs' 

ecrrat yeVecris", ctTrAa)? ctp yivocTO e'/c /xi^ ovro?, toar' 

dXrjdes dv elt] Xeyeiv otl vrrdp^ei Tial to p.r] ov. 



' 328 a 23-b 22. 
184 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2-3 

this is where the whole mistake occurs ; for unqualified 
coming-to-be and passing-away are not due to associa- 
tion and dissociation, but take place when something 
as a whole changes from " this " to " that." But 
some philosophers hold that all such change is " altera- 
tion," whereas there is a difference. For in that 
which underlies the change there is a factor corre- 
sponding to the definition and a material factor ; 
when, therefore, the change takes place in these, 
coming-to-be or passing-away will occur, but, when 
the change is in the qualities (that is to say, there 
is an accidental change), " alteration " will result. 
Things which are associated and dissociated become 
liable to pass-away ; for if drops of water are divided 
into still smaller drops, air comes-to-be from them 
more quickly, whereas, if they are associated together, 
air comes-to-be more slowly. This, however, will 
be clearer in what follows "■ ; for the moment let us 
assume this much as established, namely, that 
coming-into-being cannot be association of the kind 
which some people assert it to be. 

3. Having made the above distinctions, we must Do unquali- 
first inquire whether there is anything which comes- to-be°an(f^' 

to-be and passes-awav in an unqualified sense, or passing- 

,1 1 . •',.,. , away actu- 

whether nothing comes-to-be in the strict sense, but ally occur? 

everything comes-to-be something, and out of some- 
thing — for example, comes-to-be healthy out of being 
ill, and ill out of being healthy, or small out of being 
large, and large out of being small, and so on in the 
other instances which one might give. For, if there 
is to be coming-to-be without qualification, something 
must come-to-be out of not-being without qualifica- 
tion, so that it would be true to say that there are 
things of which " not-being " can be predicated ; for 

185 



ARISTOTLE 

317 b 

TLS fJikv yap yiveais €K [mtj ovros tlvos, olov €K 

5 [XT) XevKov rj fxr) KaXov, r) 8e (XttAtj i^ ciTrAais' /xi7 

OVTOS. 

To S' aTrXcbs yjroL to Trpwrov arjixatvei Kad^ 
eKaaTqv Karriyopiav rod ovros, rj to KadoXov Kal 
TO TTovTa 7TepLe)(ov. €t [xev ovv TO 7Tpa)Tov, ovacag 
cCTTat yeVcCTts" €K p/rj ovaias. to Se p,r] vTrdpx^i ovaia 
pr]Se ToSe, SrjXov cos" ouSe tcov dXXojv ovSepta KaTt)- 

10 yopicbv, olov OVT€ TTOLOV OVT€ TTOCTOV OVT€ TO TTOV' 

■)(OipLaTa yap dv e'irj rd irddrj tcov ovgcwv. el 8e 
TO p/Tj ov oAcos", aTTo^acng earai KadoXov TrdvTiov, 
ctJCTe €K p,rjS€v6g avdyKT] ylveadai to ycvopevov. 
Uepl pi€v ovv TOVTCOV iv dXXotg re StrjTToprjTai Kal 

15 SicopiaTaL TOLS Xoyois evrt TrAetov avvTopcos Se Kal 
vvv XeKTeov, otl TpoTTov p,€V Tiva Ik prj ovtos aTrXcos 
yivcTai, Tpoirov Se aAAoy e^ ovtos dei' to yap 
bvvdp,€L ov ivTeXex^ia Se prj ov dvdyK-q TrpovTrdp^^eiv 
Xeyopicvov dp.<f>oT€pcos. o Se Kal tovtcov hiojpi- 
apevcov e;^ei davp,aaTrjv drropiav, ttoXiv irravaTTO- 

20 hioTeov, Tru)s eoTiv dTrXi] yiveais, etr' e/c Svvdpei 
OVTOS ovaa etre /cat ttcos dXXcos. dTroprjcjete yap dv 
Tt? ap' ecTTiv ovaias yeveais Kal tov tovSc, dXXd 
pr) TOV Toiovhe Kal ToaovSe Kal nov [tov avTov Se 

» Phys. i. 6-9. 
* i.e. as " being " and as " not-being," 

186 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some kind 
of not-being, for example, from " not-white " and 
" not-beautiful," but unqualified coming-to-be pro- 
ceeds from unqualified not-being. 

Now " unqualified " signifies either (a) that which The mean- 
is primary in each category, or (b) that which is ^unqualified. 
universal and universally comprehensive. If, then, 
it signifies that which is primary, there will be a 
coming-to-be of substance out of not-substance ; but 
that which has not a substance or a " this " obviously 
cannot have any predicate from the other categories, 
either, for example, quality, quantity or position, 
for then the properties would exist apart from the 
substances. If, on the other hand, " unqualified not- 
being " signifies that which does not exist at all, this 
will be a general negation of all being, and, there- 
fore, what comes-to-be must come-to-be out of 
nothing. 

This problem has been discussed and settled at 
greater length elsewhere ** ; but a short restatement 
of it is called for here : In one way things come-to-be 
out of that which has no unqualified being, in another 
way they always come-to-be out of what is ; for there 
must be a pre-existence of that which potentially is, 
but actually is not, in being, and this is described in 
both ways.** This having been established, a ques- 
tion involving extraordinary difficulty must be re- 
examined, namely, how can there be " unqualified 
coming-to-be," whether it comes from what exists 
potentially or in some other way ? For one might Are coming- 
raise the question whether there is a coming-to-be passfng- 
of substance (that is, of the " this ") at all, and not ^^^^j'"?!,^ 
rather of a " such " or a " so-great " or a " some- substance 
where"; and the same question might be asked ^^^jj^y ^ 

187 



ARISTOTLE 

317 b 

rpoTTOv Koi TTcpl (f)6opds). el yap ri yiverai, SrjXov 

(hs earai SwdfieL tls ovaia, ivreXexeia 8' ov, e^ 
25 rjs 7] yeveats earai koi els tjv avdyKT] /xerajSaAAetv 
TO <j>deip6pLevov. TTorepov ovv vTrdp^ei rt tovtu) 
Tcov dXX(x)v evTcXexeta; Xeyco 8' olov a/a' earai 
TToaov r) TToiov ri ttov to hwapbei pbovov rohe koL 6v, 
ctTrAais' he pirj roSe jLfjyS' 6v; el yap [xrjSev dXXd 
ndvTa Suva/net, ;^ajpio'TOV re avpL^aivei ro {jlt] ovtcos 
30 6v, Kal en, o p^dXtara ^o^ovpevoi SiereXeaav ol 
TTpwroL <f)LXoao(f)'qaavres , to ck p,r]Sev6s yiveadai 
TTpovTrdpxovTos' el Se to p.ev elvai ToSe tl t} ovaiav 
ovx vrrdp^ei, t&v 8' dXXoyv tl tojv elprjp,€va}v, eoTat, 
Kaddrrep eLTTOfiev, p^coptCTTo. to, nddrj tojv ovaicov. 
TTepi Te TOVTOiv ovv oaov evhe^eTai Trpayp,aTevT€ov, 
35 Kal TLS aiTta tou yeveaiv del elvai, Kal ttjv dTTXrjv 
Kal TTjv KaTa p^epos. 

318 a Ovarjs 8' aiVta? /xtas" pev o6ev ttjv apx^jv elvai 

(f>api€V TTJs Kivrjaeios, p-cds 8e ttjs vXtjs, ttjv ToiavT7]v 
atTiav XcKTeov. irepl p,ev yap eKeivrjs eipr^Tat npo- 
Tepov iv Tot? TTepl Kivrjaeois XoyoLS, otl cgtI to 

5 p,€V dKLVT]TOV TOV aTTOVTa XPOVOV , TO 8e Kivovpevov 

del. TOVTOiv 8c TTcpl p,€V TTJs dKLv^Tov dpx^js Trjs 
CTepas Kal TrpoTepas hieXelv cgtI (fjiXoao^ias epyov 



"In lines 10, 1 1 above. 

* i.e. qualified, that is, changing in respect of quality, 
quantity or position. 
« Phj/s. 258 b 10 ff. 

188 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

about passing-away also. For, if something comes- 
to-be, it is clear that there will be substance, not 
actually but potentially, from which the coming-to-be 
will proceed and into which that which is passing- 
away must change. Will any other attribute then 
belong actually to this supposed substance ? For 
example, I mean, will that which is only potentially 
a " this " (and only potentially exists), and which is 
not a " this " and does not exist without qualification, 
possess size or quality or position ? For, (1) if it 
actually possessed none of these determinations but 
possesses them all potentially, the result is (a) that 
a being which is not a determined being can possess 
a separate existence, and (b) that coming-to-be arises 
out of nothing pre-existent — a view which inspired 
great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early 
philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it 
is not to be a " this " or a substance, it is to possess 
some of the other attributes which we have men- 
tioned, then, as we said," the qualities will be separ- 
able from the substance. We must, therefore, deal 
with these matters to the best of our ability, and also 
with the causes of continuous coming-to-be, both 
the unqualified and the partial.'' 

Now there are two meanings of" cause," one being 
that which, as we say, results in the beginning of 
motion, and the other: the material cause. It is the 
latter kind with which we have to deal here ; for with 
cause in the former sense we have dealt in our dis- 
cussion of Motion," when we said that there is some- 
thing which remains immovable through all time and 
something which is always in motion. To come to 
a decision about the first of these, the immovable 
original source, is the task of the other and prior 

189 



ARISTOTLE 

318 a 

TTcpl Se Tov Std TO avvexoJs Kiveladai, raAAa kivovv- 

Tos varepov OLTTo^oTeov, ri roioxhov tcDv Kad^ 

eKaara Xeyoixdvcov air tov eariv. vvv Se rr^v cos iv 

10 vXrjs etSei TiOefxevrjv alriav etTTCo/xev, hi -^v ael 
<j)Oopa /cat yiveais ovx inroXeiTTeL rr)v (f)vcnv' dfxa 
yap av taiog rovro yevoiro SrjXov, Kal Trepl tov 
vvv aTToprjdevTos, TraJs ttotc Set Xeyetv Kal Trepl Trjs 
dTrXrjs (f)dopdg Kal yeveaecos. 

*'E;^et 8' diTopLav CKavqv Kal tl to alriov tov 
avveipeiv rrjv yeveauv, etvrep to cfjOeipofjievov els to 

15 [XT] ov OLTTepx^Tai, TO 8e fir) ov fjirjSev ioTiv ovt€ 
yap tI ovt€ ttolov oirre rroaov ovt€ ttov to p,rj ov. 
eiTTcp ovv dei tl tcov ovtojv drrepxcTai, Std tl ttot' 
ovK dvrjXwTaL TrdXai Kal <j)povhov to rtdv, et ye 
TTeTTepaapiivov rjv i^ ov yiveraL tojv yLVopLevwv 
eKaoTov ; ov yap Srj 8ta to dneLpov elvai i^ ov 

20 yLVCTai, ovx VTroXeiireL- tovto yap dhvvaTov. /car' 
ivepyeiav p,€v yap ovSev ioTiv aTreipov, SwdfieL 
8' eVt TTjv hiaipeaLV, wot cSei TavTTjv cTvaL pLOvrjv 
Trjv fxr] VTToXetTTovaav tw yiveadai tl del eXaTTov 
vvv 8e TOVTO ovx dpdjfxev. 
*Ap' ovv 8ia TO TTjv TovBe <f>dopdv dXXov ctvai 

25 yiveoLV Kal ttjv Tovhe ycveaLV dXXov etvai <f)dopdv 



" Usually called npcoTr) (j>iXoao<f>ia. 
* See 336 a 13 ff. 

" Or " specific " causes, as opposed to causes in the 
universal sense : cf. Phys. 1 95 a 37 fF. 

190 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

branch of philosophy,* while, regarding that which 
moves all other things by its own continuous motion, 
we shall have to explain later ^ which of the individual '^ 
causes is of this Idnd. For the moment let us deal 
with the cause which is placed in the class of matter, 
owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never 
fail to occur in nature ; for perhaps this may be 
cleared up and it may become evident at the same 
time what we ought to say about the problem which 
arose just now, namely, about unqualified passing- 
away and coming-to-be. 

What is the cause of the continuous process of What is the 
coming-to-be is a perplexing enough problem, if it comfng-to- 
is really true that what passes-away vanishes into be and 
" what is not " and " what is not " is nothing ; for away"f 
" what is not " is not anything and possesses neither 
quality nor quantity nor position. If, therefore, some 
one of the " things-which-are " is constantly vanishing, 
how is it that the whole of being has not long ago 
been used up and has not disappeared, provided, of 
course, that the source of each of the things which 
come-to-be was limited ? For, I suppose, the fact 
that coming-to-be never fails is not because the 
source from which it comes is infinite ; for this is 
impossible, since nothing is actually infinite but only 
potentially so for the purpose of division, so that 
there would have to be only one kind of coming- 
to-be, namely, one which never fails, because some- 
thing which comes-to-be is successively smaller and 
smaller. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see this 
happening. 

Is it, then, because the passing-away of one thing Why is the 
is the coming-to-be of another thing, and the coming- ^hang^l ^^ 
to-be of one thing the passing-away of another thing, unceasing ? 

191 



ARISTOTLE 

318 a 

airavarov avayKolov elvat rrjv jLterajSoAr^v; Trepl 
fjL€V ovv rod yiveaiv etvai /cat <j)dopav ofjiOLCos Trepl 
CKaarov tcov ovtcov, ravrrjv olrjreov etvat Trdaiv 
LKavrjv air Lav. Sto. rl Se TTore ra p,ev aTrAois" yi- 
veaOac Aeyerat /cat (fidelpeaOai ra 8' oi3j( aTrActJ?, 
30 TTctAtv OKeTTreov, e'lTrep ro avro eari yeveais )U,ev 
TouSt (f)6opa Se rovhi, /cat (f)dopa pikv rovhl yeveoL? 
Se TouSt- ^rjrel yap riva rovro Xoyov. Xeyopiev 
yap on (fidelperai vvv aTrAcos", /cat ov [jlovov roSf 
/cat auTT] fxev yeVeai? aTrAco?, auVrj 8e (f>dopd. roSl 
Se yiverai jxev rt, yiverai 8' ctTrAois' ou* <f>ap.ev yap 
35 Tov fJiavOdvovra yiveadai {xev iTnarrjfjiova, yiveadai 
8' aTrAa)? ou. 
318 b Ka^ctTTep ow TToXXaKLS 8LopLt,ofJi€v Xeyovres on rd 
fjiev To8e n arjjxaLveL rd 8' ov, Bed rovro cru/x^atVei 
TO ^r]rovfX€vov hia^epei ydp els d /Ltera^aAAet to 
fiera^dXXov' olov tcrcos r} /xev et? "TTup 080? yiveai's 
5 /Ltev ciTrAT^, (f>dopd Be nvos iariv, olov yfjs, r) 8e yrjs 
yeveais rls yeveais, yevecns 8' ovx dirXajs, <f)9opd 
8' aTrAco?, otov TTvpos, ajarrep Ylapp,evLBr]s Xeyei Bvo 
ro ou /cat ro /xr] ov elvac <j)daK(x}V, irvp /cat yryr. to 
817 ravra rj roiavd^ erepa VTTorideadai SLa<f>epei 
ovBev rov ydp rpoirov ^rjrovixev, aAA' ov ro vtto- 



" Fr. 8 lines 53 fF. (Diels), but Parmenides mentions this 
theory as being wrong. 

192 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- AW AY, I. 3 

that the process of change is necessarily unceasing ? 
As regards the occurrence of coming-to-be and 
passing-away in everything which exists ahke, the 
above must be regarded by all as an adequate cause ; 
but why some things are said to come-to-be and to The dis- 
pass-away without qualification and others tvitk quali- between 
Jication, must be examined once more, if it is true " qualified 
that the same process is a coming-to-be of " this," qualified." 
but a passing-away of " that," and a passing-away 
of " this " but a coming-to-be of " that " ; for the 
question calls for discussion. For we say " It is now 
passing-away " without qualification, and not merely 
This is passing-away " ; and we call this a " coming- 
to-be," and that a " passing-away," without qualifica- 
tion. But this " comes-to-be-something," but does 
not do so without qualification ; for we say that the 
student " comes-to-be learned," not " comes-to-be " 
without qualification. 

Now we often make a distinction, saying that some 
things signify a " this," and others do not ; and it is 
because of this that the point which we are examining 
arises, for it makes a difference into what that which 
is changing changes. For example, perhaps the 
passage into Fire is " coming-to-be " without quali- 
fication but " passing-away-of-something " (for in- 
stance, of Earth), while the coming-to-be of Earth 
is qualified (not unquaHfied) coming-to-be, but un- 
qualified passing-away (for example, of Fire). This 
agrees with Parmenides' theory ,« for he says that the 
things into which change takes place are two and 
asserts that these two things, what is and what is not, 
are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these or 
other things of a like kind makes no difference ; for 
we are seeking not what underhes these changes, but 

H 193 



ARISTOTLE 

318 b 

10 Ketfxevov. r^ fxev ovv et? to [xtj ov aTrXaJg oSos 

(fydopa aTrXij, rj S' et? to ctTrAcos" ov yeVeCTi? aTrA'^. 

of? ovv SiwpiaTaL etre rrvpl koI yfj eire aXXois Tiai, 

TOVTCOV earai to p-ev ov to Se p,r] ov. eva [xev ovv 

TpoTTOv TOVTO) SioiCTet TO ttTrAcij? Tt yLvecrdai /cat 

(l>d€tp€adai Tov fXTj aTrAais", aAAov 8e ttj vXr] oiroia 

15 Ti? ai' 27* rj's jxev yap /jloXXov at 8ia(f)opal rdSe ti 
arjixaivovoi, /xaAAov ovaia, rjg Se OTeprjaLV, fir] ov, 
olov TO fxkv deppiov KaTrjyopia ti? /cat efSoj, rj Se 
ifivxpoTTj^ aTeprjais' Si,a(f)epovaL Be yrj /cat Trup /cat 
TavTat? Tat? Sta^opat?. 

Ao/cet 8e fidXXov Tot? ttoAAois" to) aladr)Ta) /cat 

20 p-T^ aladrjTCx) Sia^epetv oVar /aev yap et? aladrjTrjv 
IxeTa^dXXrj vXrjv, yiveadai <f>aaiv, otov S' ets" a<f)avr\, 
(f)6€ip€crdaL' TO yap ov /cat to [mtj ov tw aladdveadai 
/cat TO) [XT] alarddveadai, Siopll^ovaiv, (Larrep to p.€V 
iTTiaTTjTov ov, TO 8' ayvcuoToi' fXTj ov 7] ydp atadrjais 
iTTiaTT^fjirjS ex^t Srivapuv. Kaddnep ovv avTol tw 

26 alaOdveadai r] tw Swaa^at /cat l^rjv /cat efrat 

vopLi^ovaLV, ovTW /cat Ta TrpayjxaTa, Tponov Ttva 
194 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

the manner in which they take place. The passage, 
then, into that which " is not " without quaUfication 
is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into 
that which " is " without qualification is unqualified 
coming-to-be. Hence, whatever it is by which the 
things which change are distinguished from one 
another — whether it be Fire and Earth or some other 
pair — one will be " a being," the other " a not-being." 
One way, then, in which unqualified will differ from 
qualified coming-to-be and passing-away is obtained 
by this method. Another way of distinguishing them 
is by the special nature of the material of that which 
changes ; for the more the differences of material 
signify " a this," the more is it a real being, whereas 
the more they signify a privation, the more unreal 
it is. For example, " hot " is a positive predication 
and a " form," while " cold " is a privation, and Earth 
and Fire are distinguished from one another by these 
differences. 

In the opinion of most people the difference be- A note on 
tween qualified and unqualified depends rather on p^pi^°*^ 
perceptibility and imperceptibility ; for when there identify the 
is a change to perceptible material, they say that the percept- 
coming-to-be takes place, but, when they change to ^^^^ ^f^lth 
invisible material, they say that passing-away occurs : the imper- 
for they distinguish between " that which is " and ^^p**^'®- 
" that which is not " by their perception and non- 
perception, just as what is knowable is and what is 
unknowable is not (for to them perception has the 
force of knowledge). As, therefore, they themselves 
think that they live and have their being in virtue of 
perceiving or having the power to perceive, so, too, 
they consider that things exist because they perceive 
them — and, in a way, they are on the right road to 

195 



ARISTOTLE 

318 b 

hiwKovTe^ TaXrjdeg, avro 8e Aeyovre? ovk dXrjdes. 
avfx^aivei Sr] Kara So^av /cat /car' dXijOeiav dXXcos 
TO yiveadai re ctTrAo)? koL to ^deipeodaL- TTvew/xa 
yap /cat dr]p /cara jxev ttjv aiadrjaiv -^ttov eartv (8to 

30 /cat ra ^^etpo/xeva ctTrAoj? ttj els ravra pbera^oXfj 
(jideipeaOaL Xeyovaiv, yiveaOat 8' orav els cltttov /cat 
eis yrjv fiera^dXXr]) , Kara 8' aAi^^eiar [xdXXov roSe 
Ti /cat efSo? TavTa Trjs yrjs. 

Tov jxev ovv elvac rrjv [xev dTrXrjv yeveaiv ^dopdv 
ovaav Tivos, ttjv he (j>dopdv rrjv aTrXrjv yevecriv ovadv 

35 Ttvos, eLprjrai to aiTiov [Sid yap to ttjv vXtjv 8ta- 
319 a (f)ep€LV t) TO) ovaiav etvai rj tco pnq, rj tco ttjv fxev 
fidXXov T-Tjv 8e fXTJ, •^ TO) Trjv fiev {jloXXov aladrjTrjv 
etvai, T-qv vXrjv i^ ■^s /cat els 17V, Trjv 8e ^ttov elvat) • 
tov he TO, /Ltev dirXois ytveaOai XeyeoOai, Ta he ti 
ixovov, fxr] TTJ e^ dXXrjXcov yeveaei, Ka6' ov etTTo/xev 
5 vvv rpoTTov [vvv fxev yap ToaovTov huopicnai, tl h-^ 
TTOTe Trdcrrjs yeveaeois ova'qs (f)9opds aAAou, /cat 
TTaarjs <j)6opds ovarjs erepov tlvos yeveaecos, ov^ 
opiOLCOs dnohlhopLev to yiveadai /cat to (f>deipea9ai 
TOLS eis dXXrjXa [xeTa^dXXovaiv . to 8' varepov elprj- 
fxevov ov TOVTO htaTTopel dXXd tl ttotc to jxavddvov 

10 piev ov XeyeTai ctTrAo;? yiveadai dXXd yiveadai eVt- 
aTTJpiov, TO he (f)v6pievov yiveadai), raura 8e 8t- 
wpiOTai rat? KaTrjyoplais' ra piev yap Tohe ti 



" TOV fiev (318 b 33) is answered by rov Se (319 a 3), and the 
construction is broken by the parenthesis. 
* i.e. in 318 a 33 flF. 
' i.e. to the question raised in lines 3-5 above. 

196 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

the truth, though what they actually say is not true. 
Indeed, the popular opinion about the way in which 
unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away occur, 
differs from the truth ; for Wind and Air have less 
reality according to our perception of them (hence, 
too, things which pass-away are said to do so in an un- 
qualified sense by changing into Wind and Air, and to 
come-to-be when they change into what is tangible, 
namely, into Earth), whereas in truth they are more 
a definite something and a " form " than Earth. 

We have now stated the reason why " there is un- Summary 
qualified coming-to-be, which is the passing-away of argument, 
something, and unqualified passing-away, which is Coming-to- 
the coming-to-be of something (for it depends on ing-awa^^*^' 
the difference of the material, from which and into of a^ringle^^ 
which the change takes place, and on its being sub- transforma- 
stance or not, or on its having more or less of the stanoj into 
nature of substance, or on its being more or less substance. 
perceptible) ; but why are some things said to come- 
to-be without qualification, while others come-to-be 
some particular thing only and not by coming-to-be 
reciprocally out of one another in the manner which 
we described just now ? (For up to the present we 
have only determined this much, namely, why, 
although all coming-to-be is a passing-away of some- 
thing else and all passing-away is a coming-to-be of 
some other thing, we do not attribute coming-to-be 
and passing-away uniformly to things which change 
into one another ; but the problem afterwards raised .* 
does not discuss this difficulty, but why that which 
learns is said to come-to-be learned and not to come- 
to-be without qualification, yet that which grows is 
said to come-to-be). The answer '' is that this is 
determined by the differences of the categories ; for 

197 



ARISTOTLE 

319 a 

arjfiaLveL, ra Be rotovSe, ra 8e ttooov oaa ovv fjirj 

ovaiav aiqixaivei, ov Aeyerat anXcbs, dXXa rl yi- 

veadai. ov ixrjv dAA' o/xoicos' ev Trdai yeveaus jxev 

15 Kara rd ev rfj irepa avarotx^a Xeyerat, olov ev /xev 
ovcna edv TTvp dAA' ovk idv yrj, ev he to) ttoico edv 
eTnaTrjjjiov dAA' ovx orav dvemcrTrjfxov. 

YlepL jJLev ovv tov rd fxev drrXays yiveadai rd 8e 
IXT), Koi oXcos Kal ev rat? ovatais avrals, e'ip7]rai, 
Kal Scon TOV yeveaiv etvai uvvexo^S atria o)? vXt] 

20 TO viroKeipuevov, on ixera^XrjTiKov els rdvavria, 
Kol eanv t] Oarepov yeveats del errl rdJv ovaiwv 
dXXov <f)dopd Kal T) dXXov (f)dopd dXXov yeveats. 
dXXd [jiTjv ou8' dTTopijaai Set Sid ri yiverai del 
aTToXXvfievcov' cocerrep ydp Kal to <j)6eipeadai dTrAcu? 
(f>aaLv, orav els dvaiadrjTov eXdrj Kal to [jltj ov, 

25 ofioLCos Kal yiveadai €K ^t] dvros ^aaiv, orav e^ 
dvaiadiqrov . e'lr^ ovv dvros rivds rod VTTOKeifievov 
e'lre jx-q, ylverai ck fi.r] ovros. a)are oju-olajs Kal 
yiverai €k firj ovros Kal ^Oelperai, els rd fxr) ov. 
eiKorojs OVV ovx vTroXeliref rj ydp yeveais (f>6opd 
TOV jxr) dvros, r] Be <f>dopd yeveats rov fxrj ovros. 

30 'AAAd rovro ro p-rj ov aTrXcos drroprjaeiev dv rt? 

° i.e. the two parallel columns containing co-ordinate 
pairs ; see W. D. Ross on Met. 1054 b 35, 

198 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 

some things signify a " this," others a " such-and- 
such," others a " so-much." Those things, therefore, 
which do not signify substance are not said to come- 
to-be without quahfication, but to come-to-be some- 
thing. However, coming-to-be is said to take place 
in all things alike when a thing comes-to-be some- 
thing in one of the two columns " : in substance if it 
comes-to-be Fire, but not if it comes-to-be Earth ; 
in quality, if it comes-to-be learned, but not if it 
comes-to-be ignorant. 

It has already been stated how some things come- 
to-be without qualification and others do not, both 
generally and in the substances themselves, and that 
the substratum is the material cause why coming-to- 
be is a continuous process because it is subject to 
change into the contraries, and, in the case of sub- 
stances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a 
passing-away of another, and the passing-away of 
one thing another's coming-to-be. It is, however, 
not necessary even to raise the question why coming- 
to-be goes on when things are being destroyed ; for, 
just as people use the term passing-away without 
qualification when a thing has passed into the im- 
perceptible and into apparent non-existence, so like- 
wise also they talk of coming-to-be from non-exist- 
ence, when a thing appears out of imperceptibility. 
Whether, therefore, the substratum is something or 
is not, what comes-to-be does so from not-being ; 
and so it comes-to-be from not-being and passes- 
away into not-being in the same manner. Therefore 
it is probable that coming-to-be never fails ; for it 
is a passing-away of that which is not, and passing- 
away is a coming-to-be of that which is not. 

But about that which " is not," unless you qualify 

199 



ARISTOTLE 

319 a 

TTorepov TO erepov ra)v evavricov iariv, otov yrj 

Kai TO ^apv jj,-?) 6v, TTvp Se /cat to kov^ov^ 6v, •?) 
oVy aAA' ecrrt /cat yi] to 6v, to he purj ov vXt] rj ttjs 
yrj?, /cat TTvpos (haavTCJS- xal apd ye eVepa e/ca- 
319 b Tepov rj vXrj, ■^ ovk av yivoiTO i^ aXX'qXcov ovB^ ef 
evavTLWv; tovtols yap VTrdp)(€i TavavTia, TTvpi, yij, 
vSaTt, depi. rj eart jxev chs rj avTrj, ecrrt 8' cu? rj 
erepa* o piev yap ttotc 6V VTTOKeiTai to avTo, to 
8 elvai ov TO avTO. vepl /xev ouv tovtojv cttI 
5 ToaovTOV elp-qadco. 

4. Ilept 8e yeveaeiog /cat dAAotcocrect)? Xeycopbev tL 
hia<j)ipovaLV' 0a/xev yap erepa? etvai TavTas tols 
pieTa^oXds aAATyAoiv, iTreiSrj ovv ioTi. ti to vrroKei- 
pbevov /cat eTepov to rrados o /caTO, tou VTroKetpievov 
10 XeyeaOai 7T€(f>VK€V, /cat CCTTt pueTa^oXrj cKaTepov 
TOVTCDV, dAAotajots" /xeV eoTiv, otov vrropuevovTos tov 

V7TOK€Lp,€VOV, alodrjTOV OVTOS , pi€Ta^dXXrj iv TOIS 

avTov rrdOeatv, t) ivavTioLs ovaiv rj p,€Ta^v, otov 
TO aojfxa vyiaiveL /cat vrctAtv Kapivec VTTopievov ye 
TavTO, /cat o ;^aA/cos" CTT/Doyyi^Aos, OTe 8e ya)vtoet8i7? 
15 o auTOS" ye wv. OTav 8' oAov fxeTa^dXXrj purj vrro- 
fxevovTos aladrjTov tlvos cl»? viroKcifMcvov tov avTov, 
dAA' otov e/c Tr^? yovTy? atjLta irdarjs rj e^ vhaTOs 
drjp rj i^ depos rravTos vScop, yeveai^ rjBrj to tolov- 
Tov, tov 8e (f)6opd, pidXiGTa 8e, dv rj p,eTa^oXrj 

^ post Kov<f>ov add. TO EL. 
200 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3-4 

it, one might well be puzzled. Is it one of the two 
contraries ? For example, is Earth, and that which 
is heavy, " not-being," but Fire, and that which is 
light, " being " ? Or is this not so, but is Earth also 
" what is," while " what is not " is matter — the 
matter of Earth and of Fire alike ? And is the matter 
of each different, or else they would not come-to-be 
out of one another, that is, contraries out of con- 
traries ? For the contraries exist in these things, 
namely, in Fire, Earth, Water and Air. Or is the 
matter the same in one sense, but different in another ? 
For their substratum at any particular moment is the 
same, but their being is not the same. So much, then, 
on these subjects. 

4. Let us now deal with coming-to-be and " altera- Alteration 
tion " and discuss the difference between them ; for quality*^;^ ° 
we say these forms of change differ from one another, conung-to- 
Since, then, the substratum is one thing and the passing- 
property which is of such a nature as to be predicated c^^nggg of 
of the substratum is another thing, and since change substance, 
takes place in each of these, " alteration " occurs 
when the substratum, which is perceptible, persists, 
but there is change in its properties, which are either 
directly or intermediately contrary to one another : 
for example, the body is healthy and then again sick, 
though it persists in being the same body, and the 
bronze is spherical and then again angular, remaining 
the same bronze. But when the thing as a whole 
changes, nothing perceptible persisting as identical 
substratum (for example, when the seed as a whole 
is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a 
whole into water), such a process is a coming-to-be — 
and a passing-away of the other substance — particu- 
larly if the change proceeds from something imper- 

201 



ARISTOTLE 

319 b 

yiv-qrai i^ dvaiadyjTov €19 alad-qrov -^ a<f)fi rj ndaais 

20 Tai? aLad-qaeacv , oiov orav vhcop yevqrai rj (jydapfj 
ei? aepa' 6 yap drjp ivLeiKcog dvaiadrjTov. iv 8e 
TOVTOL? dv ri VTTOjJievrj irddos ro avTO ivavricoaeajg 
ev TO) yevop.evcx> kol tco (fydapevri {otov orav i^ 
aepo'5 vhcop, cl a/x^cu SLa(f>avrj rj ijjvxpd), ov Set 
rovrov Odrepov Trddos elvai els o jU-era^aAAei. ei 

25 oe jxr], earai dXkoiayais . olov 6 fxovaiKos dvdpcoTTos 
€(f)ddpri, dv9pcD7Tos 8' dfxovaos iyevero, 6 8' dvdpco- 

TTO? V7TOpi€V€l TO aVTO . €1 [xkv OVU TOVTOV fXT) TTadoS 

7]v Kad^ avTo 7] jjuovGLKT] Kal T] dfMovala, rod fiev 
yeveuLs rjv dv, rod Se (f)dopd- Bio dvdpojTTov fjiev 
ravra Tradrj, dvdpcorrov Be fjbovcnKov /cat dvdpioTTov 
30 dfxovaov yiveais kol cjydopd- vvv Be TrdOos rovro 
rod VTTOjJLevovros . Blo dXXoLcoais rd roiavra. 

"Orav jxev ovv Kara ro ttooov fj rj fiera^oXr} rrjs 
evavriwaecos , av^t] /cat ^dicris, orav Be Kara roTTOv, 
<f>opd, orav Be Kard nados Kal ro ttolov, dXXoicoais , 
320 a orav Be jxrjBev inrofxevrj ov ddrepov irddos r^ avfx- 
^e^TjKos oXws, yevecrig, ro Be (f>dopd. earn Be vXt) 
fxaXiara fiev Kal Kvpicos ro vTTOKeifxevov yeveaeuos Kal 
(f)dopds BeKriKov, rpoirov Be riva Kal ro rat? aAAat? 
5 fxerapoXals, on Trdvra 8e/CTt/ca rd vrroKeipieva evav- 
202 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 4 

ceptible to something perceptible (either to touch 
or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out 
of, or passes-away into, air ; for air is pretty well 
imperceptible. But if, in these circumstances, any 
property belonging to a pair of contraries persists 
in being the same in the thing which has come-to-be 
as it was in the thing which has passed-away — if, for 
instance, when water comes-to-be out of air, both 
are transparent or cold — that into which it changes 
is not necessarily another property of this thing ; 
otherwise the change will be " alteration." For 
example, the musical man passed-away and an un- 
musical man came-to-be, but the man persists as 
identically the same. Now if musicality (and un- 
musicality) were not in itself a property of man, 
there would be a coming-to-be of the one and passing- 
away of the other ; therefore, these are qualities of 
a man, but the coming-to-be and the passing-away 
of a musical man and of an unmusical man ; but, 
in fact, musicality (and unmusicality) are a quality 
of the persistent identity. Consequently such changes 
are " alteration." 

When, therefore, the change from one contrary 
to another is quantitative, it is " growth and diminu- 
tion " ; when it is a change of place, it is " motion "; 
when it is a change of property (or quality), it is 

alteration " ; but when nothing persists of which 
the resulting state is a property or an accident of any 
kind, it is a case of coming-to-be, and the contrary 
change is passing-away. Matter, in the chief and 
strictest sense of the word, is the substratum which 
admits of coming-to-be and passing-away ; but the 
substratum of the other kind of change is also in 
a sense matter, because all the substrata admit of 

203 



ARISTOTLE 

320 a 

riwaedov tlvcov. 7T€pl fxev ovv yevecreaJS"/ etre eariv 

€tre 1X7], /cat tto)? eari, /cat Trepi aXXoicoaetos St- 

iopiaooi rovTov rov Tporrov. 

5. Hept Bk av^Tjoeajs Xoirrov elTrelv, ri re Sta- 

(pepei yeveaecos /cat dXXoitocrecog , /cat rrojs av^dverai 

10 roJv av^avojjievcov eKaarov /cat (jidivei otiovv rcov 

(pUlVOVTCOV. aK€7TT€0V St] TTpOiTOV TTOTepOV /XOVCt)? 

ev TO) TTept 6 ioTLV avTcov rj irpos dXXrjXa hia<f)opd, 
olov oTt -f] fxev e/c rovSe et? roSe pLera^oXr], olov e/c 
hvvdpuGL ovaias els ivTeXexeta ovoiav, yeveais iariv, 
r) §e vepl puiyedos av^rjaig, rj Se vrept irddos dX- 
15 Xoicoats' dp,(f)6T€pa Se e/c 8vvdp,et, ovtcov elg evre- 
Xe-)(^eiav p^era^oXri raJv elprjpieviDV eariv, rj /cat o 
TpoTTos hLa<f>epet rrjg ixera^oXrjs' ^atVerat yap to 
fxev dXXoLovp.evov ovk e^ dvdyKrjs pbera^dXXov Kara 
T07T0V, ovSe TO yiv6p,evov, to S' av^avopievov /cat 

20 TO (f)&LV0V, dXXoV he TpOTTOV TOV (f)e po pLCVOV . TO pLev 

yap (f)ep6pievov oXov aAAarret tottov, to 8' ai3^a- 
vopLevov axTTTep to eXavvopcevov tovtov yap pLevov- 
T09 ra pLopia pLeTa^dXXei /caro, tottov, ov)( (Lanep 
Ttt TT^s" a(f)aipa'S' Ta pcev yap iv tu) taco tottco pceTa- 
jSaAAei TOV oXov pievovTos, to. he tov av^avopLe- 
25 vov aei eTTi TtXeioi tottov, ctt' eAarra) Se to. tov 
<l)divovTos. 

^ KoX <f>6opas post yiviaicos add. Bekker. 
204 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 4-5 

certain kinds of contrariety. Let this, then, be our 
decision on the question about coming-to-be, whether 
it exists or not, and how it exists, and about " altera- 
tion." 

5. It remains, therefore, for us to deal with The nature 
" growth " and to discuss (a) how it differs from com- °*^8rowt . 
ing-to-be and from " alteration," and (b) how 
" growth " takes place in each thing that grows and 
how " diminution " occurs in each thing that dimin- 
ishes. First we must consider whether the difference 
between them lies only in the sphere of each. For 
example, is it because the change from one thing 
to another (for instance, from potential to actual 
substance) is coming-to be, while the change in re- 
spect of magnitude is " growth " ; and the change 
in respect of property is " alteration," and both the 
last two involve a change from what is-actually to 
what is-potentially ? Or does the difference also lie 
in the manner of the change ? For it is manifest that, 
whereas neither that which is altering nor that which 
is coming-to-be necessarily changes in respect of 
position, that which is growing and that which is 
diminishing do change in this respect but in a manner 
different from that in which that which is moving 
changes. For that which is moving changes its place Growth is 
as a whole, but that which is growing changes its respect of 
position like a metal which is being beaten out ; for, size. 
while it retains its place, its parts undergo local 
change, but not in the same manner as the parts of 
a revolving globe. For the latter change their places 
while the whole remains in an equal space, whereas the 
parts of that which is growing change so as to occupy 
an ever larger space, and the parts of that which is 
diminishing contract into an ever smaller space. 

205 



ARISTOTLE 

320 a 

"On jjLev ovv rf fxera^oXrj Stat^epet ov /xovov vrept 

o aAAa Kal co? rov re yivofxevov /cat dAAoiou/xevou 
/cat av^avofxevov, SrjXov. nepl 8e o eartv tJ fiera- 
^oXrj 7) rrjg av^-qaeo)'; /cat 17 rrjs (jidiaews {-Trepl 
jxeyedos 8e 80/cet etvai to av^dveaOai /cat (j)diveiv), 

30 TTorepois viroXrjTTTeov , Trorepov e/c Suvct/xet /xev 
fxeyeOovg /cat acofxaros, evreXey^eia 8' a.aojfj.a.Tov 
Kal djxeyeOovs yiveadai, acopia /cat pieyedos, /cat 
TOUTOU St;^;^? ivhe^opievov Xeyeiv, TTorepajs rj 
av^rjOL^ yiverai; Trorepov e/c Kcxcopi'CrpLevr)? avrrjs 
/ca^' avrrjv rrjg vXrjg, •^ ivvTTap)(^ovcrr]g iv dXXco 
320 b awpiaTL ; r] dhvvaTov dpLcfyorepu)^ ; )(a)pi(Trr) piev 
yap ovaa iq ovbeva KaOe^ei tottov, [r^] olov ariypni] 
Tt?, '^ /cevov earai r^ aiopia ovk atadrjTOV. rovrcov 
8e TO /Ltev ou/c evSex^raL, to 8e avay/catov eV Tivt 
etvaf del yap ttov earai ro ytvopievov e^ avrov, 
5 coCTTe /caKctvo, tj /ca^' awTo •^ Kara ovpL^e^rjKo^. 
dXXd pLTjv el y' ev tlvi vTrdp^ei, el p,ev Ke')((J^pi'Opievov 
ovrcos oiore per) eKeivov Kad* avTO rj Kara avp.- 
^e^rjKos Tt ett'at, avp-^-qaerat ttoAAo, /cat dSuvaTa. 
Aeya» 8' oiof et ytVeTat drjp e^ vSaros, ov rov 
vharos earai puera^aXXovros , dXXd Std ro cooTrep 

10 ev dyyeicp rw vSarL evelvai rrjv vXtjv avrov, 
direipovg yap ovhev KcoXvet vXas elvat, ware Kal 
yiveadat, ivreXe^eia. en 8' ovh^ ovrco (fiaiverai 

" i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or contained in 
something else. 

206 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

It is clear, then, that the changes both of that 
which comes-to-be and of that which " alters " and 
of that which " grows," differ not only in sphere but 
also in manner. But how are we to conceive the 
sphere of the change which is growth and diminu- 
tion ? Growth and diminution are generally re- 
garded as taking place in the sphere of magnitude. 
Are we, then, to suppose that body and magnitude 
oome-to-be out of what is potentially body and magni- 
tude but is actually incorporeal and without magni- 
tude ? And since this can be meant in two diiferent 
senses, in which of these senses does growth take 
place ? Does it come from matter which exists 
separately by itself or matter previously existing in 
another body ? Or is it impossible for growth to take 
place under either of these conditions ? For, since 
the matter is separate, either it will take up no space, 
like a point, or else it will be void or, in other words, 
an imperceptible body. Of these alterations the 
first is impossible, and in the second the matter must 
be in something. For, in the first case, what comes- 
to-be from it will always be somewhere, so that the 
matter too must exist somewhere, either directly or 
indirectly " ; in the second case, supposing it is to 
be in something else, if it is so separated as not to 
lielong to that something, either directly or indirectly, 
many impossibilities will arise. For example, if Air 
comes-to-be from Water, it will not be due to any 
change in the Water but owing to the presence of 
the matter of the Air in the Water, as in a vessel. 
For there is nothing to prevent there being an 
infinite number of matters contained in the Water, 
so that they might actually come -to -be ; and, 
furthermore, the Air cannot be seen coming-to-be 

207 



ARISTOTLE 

320 b 

yivoixevos drjp e^ vSaros, otov i^icbv VTrofxivov- 
ro9. 

BeArtov TOLVVV Trotetv Trdaiv aj(^u)pLarov rrjv vXr)v 
d)S ovaav rrjV avrrjv /cat /xtW tco dpi.6[xa), to) Xoyo) 

15 Se jjirj jxiav. dXKd fxrjv ovhk ariyfxds dereov ovSe 
ypajjLfiag ttjv tov crcu/xaTOS" vXr)v Std ra? avrds 
alrias. eKelvo Se ov ravra ecrxara, rj vXt], rjv 
ovBeTTOT* dvev Trddovs otov re etvat oi38' dvev fjiop<f)7Js. 
yiverat fxev ovv aTrAct)? erepov e^ irepov, (Zarrep 
Kal iv aAAoi? hicopiarat, kol vtto tlvos 8e evTeAe;^eia 

20 ovros rj o^otoetSou? rj o/xoyevous", otov rrvp vtto 
TTVpos rj dvdpwTTOs vrt* dvdpcoTTov, r) vrr* evreXeX'^ias' 
okXtjpov yap ovx vtto OKXrjpov yiverai. iml S' 
ecTt /cat ouCTtas" vXrj acujjLarLKrjs, aa)[xaTOS S rjSrj 
TOtouSt {acbfjua yap kolvov ovSev), rj avrrj /cat /ue- 
yidovs Kal rrdOovs iari, rco fxev Xoyco p^wptCTri^, 

25 roTTCp S' ov ^cuptoTTy, 61 p,rj Kal rd nddrj ;)^coptaTa. 
^avepov Srj e/c tcov hirjTToprjyLevcov on ovk eartv 
rj av^rjOLS fJbera^oXrj e/c Suvajitet pLcyedovg, ivreXc- 
X^^^ 8^ /LtTjSev exovros jxeyedos' x^P'-^'''^^ Y^P ^^ 
eirj TO /cevdv, tovto S' oti dSwarov, eiprjrai ev 
irepoL^ TTporepov. ert S' 17 ye roiavrrj fjLera^oXrj 

30 oi)/c au^Tyaecus' tSto? aAAa yevdaecjg- rj yap av^rjais 
ioTL TOV ivvTrdpxovTog jjieyedovs eTrtSooi?, rj Se 
^diais /xetojCTts" (8to 87) e;^eiv rt 8et fieyedos to 

<• See J/eif. 1033 a 12 ff. 

* Or " form " ; see Met. I.e. '25 ff. 

' In 320 a 27-b 12. 

' Phys. iv, 6-9. 

208 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

in this manner out of Water, namely, issuing forth 
while the Water is left as it was. 

It is better, therefore, to suppose that the matter 
in anything is inseparable, being the same and 
numerically one, though not one by definition. 
Further, for the same reasons also, we ought not to 
regard the matter of the body as points or lines ; 
matter is that which has points and lines as its limits 
and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and 
without form. Now one thing comes-to-be, in the 
unqualified sense, out of another, as has been deter- 
mined elsewhere " and by the agency of something 
which is actually either of the same species or of 
the same genus — for example, Fire comes-to-be 
through the agency of Fire and Man through that 
of Man — or through an actuality ^ (for that which 
is hard does not come-to-be through that which is 
hard). But since there is also a matter out of which 
corporeal substance comes-to-be, but already be- 
longing to a body of such-and-such a kind (for there 
is no such being as body in general), this same matter 
is also the matter of magnitude and quality, being 
separable by definition but not in place, unless the 
properties are also separable. 

Now it is clear from the difficulties which we have 
discussed,^ that growth is not a change from a 
potential magnitude which actually has no magni- 
tude ; for then, " the void " would be separable, and 
that is impossible, as has already been stated else- 
where.'* Moreover, such a change is not peculiar 
to growth but characteristic of coming-to-be ; for 
growth is an increase, just as diminution is a reduc- 
tion, of the already existing magnitude (hence that 
which grows must already possess a certain magni- 

209 



ARISTOTLE 

320 b 

av^avofievov) , oiar ovk i^ afxeyedovs vXrjs Set efvat 
Tr]v av^TjOLV els evreXex^Lav fxeyedovs' yeveoLS yap 
av €17] Gco/xaros jJLoiXXov, ovk av^rjats. XrjTneov Srj 

321 a [xdXXov olov aiTToyLevovs rrjg 1,'qr'qaecos i^ dpx'rjs, 

TTOLOV TLVOS OVTOS TOV aV^dvecdaL 7] TOV (jydlveLV TO. 

air La ^'qTovfiev. 

OatVerat Brj rov av^avofxivov onovv fxepos rjv- 
^yjcrdai, op-oicos Be /cat iv rw (j)Qivetv eXarrov ye- 
yovevai, en 8e Trpoaiovros rivos av^dveadat /cat 
5 dinovTos ^diveiv. dvayKaZov Brj -iq daojixdro) av- 
^dveadat rj aiojJLari. et fxev ovv dcjoip,dro), earai 
Xioptarov TO Kevov dBvvarov Se [xeyeOovs vXrjv 
elvai ;)^a>piaT7yv, wanep etprjTaL Trporepov el be 
adypLart, Suo ev rip avro) crcvpLara tottco ear at, to 
Te av^6p,evov /cat to av^ov eoTL he /cat tovto 

10 aSwarov. dXXd pir]v ovS* ovruis evSexeTaL Xeyeiv 
yiveadai Trjv av^rjaiv /cat t-tjv (f)diatv, uiairep OTav 
€^ vSaTOS drip- TOTe yap peil,oiv 6 oyKos yeyovev 
ov yap av^rjOLS tovto dXXd yeveais p,ev rov els o 
p,eTe^aXev eo-rai, (f)dopd Se rov evavTiov av^rjais 
Se ovSeTepov, aAA' rj ovSevos rj et ri kolvov dp,(f)olv 

15 VTrdpx^i, TO) yivop,evcp /cat rw (jidapevri, olov el 
awfjia. TO 8' vScop ovk rjv^-qraL ou8' o d-qp, dXXd 
TO /xev drroXcoXe ro 8e yeyovev ro acopia Se, elirep, 
7)v^r)rai. dXXd /cat tout' dSvvarov. Set yap aw- 

" In 320 a 27 flF. " i.e. steam. 

210 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

tude), so that growth must not be from matter 
Avithout magnitude to an actuaUty of magnitude ; 
for that would be rather a coming-to-be of a body 
and not a growth. We must, therefore, lay hold 
more closely and, as it were, get to grips with our 
inquiry from the beginning as to the nature of growth 
and diminution, the causes of which we are seeking. 

It appears that eveiy part of that which grows What is 
has increased, and likewise in diminution every part growth^ ^" 
has become smaller, and, further, that growth occurs takes place? 
when something is added and diminution when 
something departs. Growth, then, must be due to 
the addition of something incorporeal or of a body. 
If it is due to something incorporeal, there will be 
a void existing separately ; but, as has been stated 
before," it is impossible for matter of magnitude to 
exist separately ; whereas, if it grows by the addition 
of a body, there will be two bodies in the same place, 
one which grows and the other which causes the 
growth, and this also is impossible. But neither is 
it admissible for us to say that growth or diminution 
occurs in the manner in which it occurs when air ^ 
is produced from water. For then, the volume has 
become greater ; for it will not be a case of growth 
but of a coming-to-be of that into which the change 
has taken place, and a passing-away of its contrary. 
It is a growth of neither, but either of nothing or 
of something (for example, " body ") which belongs 
in common both to that which is coming-to-be and 
to that which has passed-away. The water has not 
grown nor has the air, but the former has perished 
and the latter has come-to-be ; and the " body," if 
anything, has grown. But this is also impossible ; 
for in our account we must preserve the character- 

211 



ARISTOTLE 

321a 

t,eLV Tcp Xoycp ra inrdpxovTa rw av^avofxevo) /cat 
(jiBivovTi. ravra Se rpia earlv, c5v ev jxev iart to 

20 OTiovv fxepos jLtei^ov yiyveodai rod av^avofxcvov 
ixeyldovs, olov el aap$ rrjs aapKos, koL TrpoaLovros 
TLVos, Koi rpirov acot^oixivov rov av^avofidvov /cat 
V7Top,€VovTos' iv jU-cv yap rw yiveaOai n arrXcog 
7] <j)deipeadaL ovy^ VTrofievei, iv Se rco aXXoLovaOai 
r) av^dveadai r] ^diveiv VTTOjxevei, ro avro ro av- 

25 ^avopievov rj dXXoiovpievov' d-AA' evda fxev ro rrdQog 
6VC7a 06 ro pieyeUog ro avro ov pLevei. et oij earai 
rj elprjpLevT] av^rjaig, evSe^otT' av pLrjBevos y€ Trpoa- 
Lovros pLTjSe vrropLevovros av^dveaOat, /cat pbrjBevos 
aTTiovros (f)6LV€LV /cat pLrj vTrofxeveLV ro av^avofievov . 
dXXd Set rovro aco^etv zJTTo/cetrat yap rj av^rjais 
roiovrov. 

30 ^Avop'qaeLe 8' av rts" /cat rt can ro av^av6p,€- 
vov, TTorepov d) Trpoariderai rt, otov et rrjv Kvrjp.'qv 
av^dvei, avrf) ju-et^oiv, a) 8e au^avet, r] rpo(j>'q, ov. 
hid ri Brj ovv ovk dp,cf)OJ rjv^rjrac; pcel^ov yap /cat 
o /cat <L, atarrep orav pii^rjs oivov y'Sarf ofMoiios 
yap ttXclov cKdrepov. •>} ort rov fiev fievci rj ovaLa, 

35 rov 8' ov, olov rrjg rpo(f)rjs, iirei /cat evravOa ro 

321 b emKparovv Aeyerat ev rfj /it'^et, otor ort otv-os" 

TTOtei yap ro rov olvov epyov dXX ov ro rov vharos 

ro avvoXov plyfxa. opioiws 8e /cat eV dAAotcucreots', 

et jLteVet adp^ ovaa Kal ro ri iari, irddos 8e' rt 



" i.e. the generation of air from water. 

* i.e. the persistence of that which grows. 

" In line 22 above. 

'' With Aeyeroi understand TrXilov. 

212 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

istics which belong to what is growing and diminish- 
ing. These characteristics are three : (a) that every 
part of the growing magnitude is greater (for example, 
if flesh grows, every part of it grows) ; (b) that it 
grows by the accession of something ; and (c) that 
it grows because that which grows is preserved and 
persists. For while a thing does not persist in un- 
qualified coming-to-be or passing-away, in alteration 
and growth or diminution that which grows or alters 
persists in its identity, but, in the case of alteration 
the quality, and, in the case of growth, the magnitude 
does not remain the same. Now if the change men- 
tioned above " is to be gi'owth, it would be possible 
for something to grow without anything being added 
to it or persisting and to diminish without anything 
going away, and for that which grows not to persist. 
But this quality '' must be preserved ; for it has been 
assumed '^ that growth has this characteristic. 

One might also raise this difficulty : What is it What is it 
which grows ? Is it that to which something is * K^^^^ 
added ? For example, if a man grows in his leg, is 
it his leg which is greater, while that which makes 
him grow, namely, his food, is not greater ? Why 
have not both grown ? For both that which is added 
and that to which the addition was made are greater, 
just as when you mix wine with water ; for each 
ingredient is similarly increased. Or is it because 
the substance of the leg remains unchanged, but that 
of the other (i.e. the food) does not ? For in the 
mixture of the wine and water it is the prevailing 
ingredient which is said to increase,** namely the 
wine ; for the mixture as a whole performs the 
function of wine and not of water. Similarly, too, 
in the process of " alteration," flesh is " altered," if 

213 



ARISTOTLE 

321 b 

VTTap-)(€i Tcov Kad^ avTO, o TTporepov ovx VTrrjpx^v, 

5 rjXKoicoraL tovto' co S' ■f])(Xoicorai, ore [xev ovSev 

7T€7Tov6ev, ore 8e kolkcIvo. dXXa to aXXoiovv koI 

rj apx^] TT^S" KLvrjaeajs iv rco av^avofxevo) Kal tco 

aXXoLovpiiva)- ev tovtols yap ro klvovv, eTret koI 

TO eiaeXOov yevoiT* av ttotc /xet^ov, Kal to oltto- 

Xavaav avTov croj/xa, olov el elaeXOov ylvono 

10 TTvevjJia. aAA' e(j>dapTai ye tovto vadov, Kal to 

KiVOVV OVK iv TOVTCp. 

Ettci 8e hiriTToprjTai irepl avTCJV LKavoJs, Set Kal 
TTJs OLTTopias TTetpdadai, Xvatv evpelv, acot,ovTas to 
VTTOjJievovTos T€ Tov av^avofxcvov Kal TTpoaiOVTOS 
TLVos av^dveadai, aTTiovTO? Se ^diveiv, eVt 8e to 
oTiovv a7}iJi€Lov aloOrjTov rj fiet^ov r) eXaTTOv yeyo- 

15 vevai, Kal jLti^re kcvov elvai to acop,a jx-qTC Bvo iv 
TO) avTix) TOTTO) [leyddrj /xT^re daoifxaTcp av^dveadai. 
XrjTrTeov he to avriov hiopiaapLevoig rrpcoTov ev [xev 
OTL Ta dvopiOLOixeprj av^dvcTaL tw ra oixoLopiepi] 
av^dveadai {avyKeiTai yap eK tovtojv eKaoTOv), 

20 eTTeid* OTL adp^ Kal ootovv Kal eKaoTov tcov tolov- 

TOJV [XOpLiOV IotI StTTOV, COOTTep Kal TCOV dXXoiV TOiV 

iv vXrj etSos ixdvTcov Kal yap rj vXrj XeyeTai Kal 
TO efSo? adp^ t] ootovv. to ovv otiovv pLepos 
av^dveadai /cat TrpoatovTos tivos KaTa p-ev to ethos 
ioTtv ivhe^dpLevov , KaTa he ttjv vXrjv ovk cotiv. 

" i.e. the organic parts. * i.e. the tissue. 

214 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

it remains flesh and its substance remains the same, 
but some inherent quality now belongs to it which 
did not belong before ; but that by which it has been 
altered sometimes has not been affected but some- 
times has also been affected. But that which causes 
alteration and the source of movement reside in that 
which grows and in that which is altered (for the 
motive agent is within them) ; for that which has 
entered might sometimes become greater as well as 
the body which benefits by it (for example, if, after 
entering in, it were to become wind), but after having 
undergone this process, it has passed- away and the 
motive agent is not in it. 

Now that the difficulties have been adequately Conclusions 
discussed, we must try to find a solution of the |^owth. 
problem. In doing so we must maintain the doctrine 
that growth occurs, when that which grows persists 
and grows by the accession of something (and 
diminishes by the departure of something), and that 
every perceptible particle has become greater (or 
less), and that the body is not void, and that there 
are not two magnitudes in the same place, and that 
growth does not take place by the addition of anything 
incorporeal. We must grasp the cause of growth 
by making the distinctions (i) that the parts which 
are not uniform " grow by the growth of the parts 
which are uniform '' — for each part is composed of 
these — and (ii) that flesh and bone and every such 
part, like all other things which have their form in 
matter, are of a double nature ; for the form as well 
as the matter is called flesh or bone. It is quite 
possible, then, that any part can grow in respect of 
form by the additiorLof something, but not in respect 
of matter ; for we must regard the process as like that 

215 



ARISTOTLE 

321 b 

Set yap vorjaai oiOTrep et rt? fxeTpotrj rep avrcp 
25 jxerpcp vScop- del yap dXXo /cat dXXo to yivop^evov. 
ovTO) 8' ai'^dvcrai rj vXt] rrjs aapKos, /cat ovx 
OTCpovv TTavTL 7TpoayLV€Tat, dXXd TO [xev VTreKpel 
TO Be TTpoaep-)(€TaL, tov 8e ayrjp^aTos /cat tov etSous" 

OTCpovv JJiOpiCp. €771 8e Tcbv dvOflOLOpiepCOV TOVTO 

fiaXXov BrjXov, otov x^^'Pos, ort dvdXoyov rjv^rjTaf 
30 rj yap vXrj irepa ovaa SijXrj /xaAAov tov etSous" 
evTavda rj cttI aapKos /cat tcov 6fJioiop,epa>v 8to 
/cat TcdvewTog p,dXXov dv So^cLev elvai €tl adp^ 
/cat OGTOvv rj x^lp /cat ^paxiojv. amre eoTi, fxev 
ws OTLOvv T-fjs oapKos rjv^rjTai, eoTL 8' oi? ov. 
Kara fxev yap to elSos otwovv mpooeXrjXvdev, Kara 
35 8e TTjv vXrjv ov. p,€lt,ov [xevTOL TO oXov yeyove 

322 a TTpoaeXdovros fjcev tlvos, o /caAetrai Tpo(f)rj /cat 

evavriov, jxeTa^dXXovTos 8e els to avTO elhos, otov 
ei ^yjp<p TTpoaioL vypov, rrpooeXOov 8e fieTa^dXoi, 
/cat yevoLTo ^rjpov ean p.ev yap d>s to o/xoiov 
ofioLtp av^dveTaij ecTL 8' ws ro dvopLoiov^ dvo- 

flOLCp. 

5 ^ A.TToprjaeie 8' dv tls ttolov tl 8et efi^at to (L 
av^dveTai. <j>avep6v hrj OTt Swdfjuei €K€lvo, otov 
el adp^, 8vvdp,ei adpKa. evTeXexeia dpa dXXo' 
(f>dapev Srj tovto adp^ yeyovev. ovkovv ovk avTO 
Kad* avTO {yeveais yap dv rjv, ovk av^-rjais)' dXXd 

^ TO avofjioiov addidi. 
216 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

Avhich happens when a man measures water uith 
the same measure, for there is first one portion and 
then another in constant succession. It is in this way 
that the matter of the flesh grows ; something flows 
out and something flows in, but there is not an addi- 
tion made to every particle of it, but to every part 
of its figure and " form." That the growth has taken 
place proportionally is more obvious in the parts 
which are not uniform, for instance, in the hand ; 
for there the matter, being distinct from the form, 
is more noticeable than in the flesh and the parts 
which are uniform ; for this reason one is more likely 
to think of a corpse as still possessing flesh and bone 
than that it has a hand and an arm. Therefore, in 
one sense it is true that every part of the flesh has 
grown, but in another sense it is untrue ; for in 
respect to its form there has been an accession to 
every part, but not in respect to its matter ; the 
whole, however, has become greater (a) by the acces- 
sion of something which is called food, the " con- 
trary " of flesh, and (6) by the change of this food 
into the same form as that of the flesh, just as if moist 
were to be added to dry, and, after having been 
added, were to change and become dry ; for, it is 
possible that " like grows by like " and also that 
" unlike grows by unlike." 

One might raise the question what must be the 
nature of that by which a thing grows. It is clear 
that it must be potentially that which is growing, for 
example, potentially flesh, if it is flesh which is 
growing ; actually, then, it is something different. 
This, therefore, has passed- away and come-to-be 
flesh — not alone by itself (for that would have been 
a coming-to-be and not growth) ; but it is that which 

217 



ARISTOTLE 

322 a 

TO av^avofxevov tovtco. tl ovv Tradov vtto tovtov 

['fjv^TJdrjY ; rj fxix^ev, warrep olvto et tis" imx^oi 

10 vBcop, 6 Be BvvaiTo otvov 7tol€lv to iiix^ev ; koI 
cooTTep TO TTvp aijjdpLevov tov KavoTov, ovrcos iv 
Tcp av^avofievo) Kal ovtl €VTeXe\eia crap/ct to Ivov 
av^rjTLKov TTpoaeXdovTOS SvvdfxeL aapKos iTTotrjaev 
•cvTeXcx^la adpKa. ovkovv a/xa ovtos' el yap ;^a>pts', 
yeveois. ecm fxev yap ovto) nvp noirjaai, cttI to 

15 VTTapxov imdevTa ^vXa. aAA' ovtoj pcev av^rjaig, 
OTav be avTO. to. ^vXa d(f)9fj, yeveais. 

Xiooov he TO ixev KadoXov ov yiveTai, ojarrep 
ovhe t,cpov o p/r]T^ avdpcoTTOs fi-qTe tcov Kad^ e/cacrra* 
aAA' CO? evTavOa to KaOoXov, KaKel to Trorrov. 
adp^ he r] ootovv t} X^^P '^^^ tovtwv to. ofjioiopieprj, 

20 irpoaeXdovTO? fiev 8i^ tcvos ttooov, dAA' ov aapKog 
TToarjs. fj piev ovv hvvdpieL to avvaficfyoTepov, olov 
TToar] adp^, TavTT) p,€v au^ef Kal yap TToarjv hel 
yeveadai Kal adpKa' fj he piovov adp^, Tpe(l>eL' 
Tavrrj yap Sia^e'pet Tpo(f)rj Kal av^rjaLS to) Xoyu). 
hio Tpe^eTai piev ecos av acot,r)Tai Kal (f>dtvov,* 

25 av^dveTaL he ovk del. Kal r) Tpo<j>r] ttj av^rjoei to 

avTO piev, TO 8' elvai dXXo' ■?} piev ydp eoTi to 

^ rjv^rjdTj seclusit Joachim. 
« ^^vov I. : <l>0iv€i F : <f>dlvr} H. 

" And not a growth of already existent tissue. 
218 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 

grows which now comes-to-be flesh owing to the food. 
How has the food been affected by the growing 
thing ? Is it by admixture, as if one were to pour 
water into wine, and the latter were able to convert 
the mixture into wine ? And like fire when it takes 
hold of inflammable material, so the principle of 
growth present in that which grows (i.e. in what is 
actually flesh) lays hold of the added food which is 
potentially flesh, and turns it into actual flesh. The 
added food must, therefore, be together with that 
which grows ; for, if it is separate, it would be a case 
of coming-to-be." For it is possible to produce fire 
by placing logs on the fire which is already in exist- 
ence ; in this case there is growth, but, when the 
logs themselves are set on fire, there is a coming- 
to-be of fire. 

" Quantum-in-general " does not come-to-be, just 
as " animal," which is neither man nor any other 
particular animal, does not come-to-be ; but what 

animal-in-general " is in coming-to-be, that " quan- 
tum-in-general " is in growth. But what comes-to-be 
in growth is flesh or bone or hand and the uniform 
parts of these, by the accession of such-and-such a 
quantity of something, but not of such-and-such a 
quantity of flesh. In so far, then, as the combination 
of the two, e.g., so much flesh, is a potentiality, it 
produces growth ; for both quantity and flesh must 
come-to-be, but in so far as it is potentially flesh only, 
it nourishes ; for it is here that nutrition and growth 
differ in their definition. Therefore the body is 
nourished as long as it is kept alive, even when it is 
diminishing, but it is not always growing ; and 
nutrition, though it is the same as growth, is different 
in its being ; for, in so far as that which is added is 

219 



ARISTOTLE 

322 a 

npooLov Svvafxei TTocrrj odp^, ravrr) /xev av^rjriKov 
aapKos, fj Se /xovov Syva/zet oap^, rpocf)-^. 

TovTo be TO elSog \avev uAt^?]/ olov auAos"/ hvvafxi^ 
Tis iv vXrj iariv. iav Be rts TTpoaiT] vXrj, ovaa 

30 Svvdfiet, avXos,^ e^ovcra Kal to ttouov Suva/u-ei, ovtol 
eaovTai p,eit,ovs avXoi^ edv he [xrjKeTi rroLetv 
Svv7]TaL, aAA' olov vhcop o'lvco del TrXelov pnyvvpievov 
TeXos vbaprj TToiel koL vScop, TOTe f^diaiv TToietTai 
Tov TToaov, TO S' etSos [xevei. 
322 b 6. 'Evret 8e TrpwTov Set Trepl ttjs vXtjs Kal tojv 
KaXov[xeviov gtolx^lcov eiTrelv, etV eoTLV eire p,rj, 
Kal TTOTepov dthiov eKaoTov r] yiveTai ttojs, Kal 
el yiveTai, TTOTepov e^ dXX'qXcov yiveTai Travra tov 
5 avTOV TpoTTOv 7] TL TTpoJTOv ev aVTWV ioTLV, dvdyKT) 
St] TTpoTepov eLTTelv rrepl (Lv dScopiaTcos XeyeTat 
vvv, iravTes yap oi re Ta aToi)(^la yewcovTes Kal 
OL TO. eK Tcbv aToi-)(eio)v hiaKpiaet ■)(pa)VTai Kal 
avyKpiaei /cat roi TTOieZv Kal Trdcrx^iv. ecrrt 8' 
•q avyKpicTLS /xt^t?* ttcos" Se piiyvvaOai Xeyop,ev, 
ov hicopiaTai o-a^cos". aAAa pLT^v ouS' oXXoiovadaL 

10 hvvaTov, ovhe hiaKpiveadai Kal avyKpiveadai, jxr]- 
Bevos 7TOLOVVTOS firjBe TrdaxovTos' Kal yap ol TrXeioi 
TO. aTOf)(ela TToiovvTes yewoJat, tco TTOielv Kal 
7Tda)(€LV VTT^ dAAr^Aojv, /cat rot? e^ evo? dvdyKXj 

^ avev vXris seclusit Joachim. 

* avXos . . . avXos . . . avXol Joachim : avXos . . . auAoj . . . 
dvXoi codd : tibia . . . tibia . . . tibiae vertit Vatablus. 

" In 821 b '22 ff. 

* i.e. the Pluralists, like Anaxagoras, Democritus and 
Plato, who ref^ard Earth, Air, P'ire and Water as composed 
of some prior constituents. 

" i.e. other Pluralists, like Empedocles, who regard them 
as actual elements. 

220 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5-6 

potentially so much flesh, it is productive of the 
growth of flesh, but, in so far as it is only potentially 
flesh, it is nutriment. 

This " form " of which we spoke " is a kind of power 
present in matter, as it were a channel. If, therefore, 
matter is added which is potentially a channel and 
also potentially possesses such-and-such a quantity, 
these channels will become bigger. But if the 
" form " is no longer able to function, but, as water 
mixed with wine in ever-increasing quantities eventu- 
ally makes the wine waterish and converts it into 
water, it will cause a diminution of the quantity, 
though the " form " still persists. 

6. We must first deal with the matter and the Chs. 6-10. 
so-called " elements " and determine whether they comes^to^be 
exist or not, and whether each is eternal, or whether is formed of 
there is a sense in which they come-to-be, and, if so, congtUuents 
whether they all come-to-be in the same manner c^n^^^^oM 
out of one another, or whether one among them is Combina- 
something primary. We must, therefore, first deal " aVio^"^** 
with matters about which people at present speak f^^^ "pas- 
only vaguely. For all those who generate the ele- involve 
ments '' and those who generate the bodies composed " ''intact." 
of the elements," apply the terms " dissociation " 
and " association " and " action " and " passion." 
Now " association " is a process of mixing ; but 
what we mean by mixing has not yet been clearly 
defined. But there cannot be " alteration " any 
more than there can be " dissociation " and " associa- 
tion " without an " agent " and a " patient." For 
those who suppose the elements to be several in 
number ascribe the generation of composite bodies 
to the reciprocal " action " and " passion " of these 
elements, whereas those who derive them from a 

221 



ARISTOTLE 

322 b 

Xeyciv rrjv TToirjaiv, Kal tout' opdcos Xeyei Ato- 
y€V7]s, on €L fjiT) €^ eVos" '^v anavra, ovk av rjv to 

15 TToielv Kal TO Trdaxetv vn^ aXXriXcov, olov to Oepfxov 
ipvxeadaL /cat tovto depfxatveodai. ttolXlv ov yap 
7] OepixoTTjs jLtera^aAAei /cat 7] ipvxpoT-qs eiV aAAi^Aa, 
aAAa orjAov otl to VTroKeLfxevov. cSare iv of? to 
TTotetv eaTi /cat to Trdax^tv, dvdyKr] tovtcdv pt-iav 
eivat Tiqv VTTOKeLfjLevqv <^vaiv. to fiev ovv rrdvT^ 

20 etvat Totaura (f)d(TK€iv ovk dXrjdeg, dAA' eV ocrot? 
TO V7t' dXX-qXcov loTLV. 

AAAa /X7JV et Trept tov ttolclv Kal Trdax^iv Kal 
rrepL /u.ig-ecos' d€a>p7]Teov, dvdyKTj /cat irepl d(f}rjs' 
ome yap TToielv raura /cat vdax^i'V Swarai Kvpitog 
a fXT) OLOV T€ dipaaO at dXX-^Xcov, ovt€ [xtj dilidjievd 

25 TTCos evBexeTai fXLxdrjvai TrpcoTov. (Lotc rrepl Tpicov 
TOVTCov hiopKjTeov, TL d(f)r) Kal tl fxi^i^ /cat tl 

TTOirjGlS. 

Kpx'TjV 8e Xd^copcev TijvSe. dvdyKr] yap tcDp' 
ovTOiv oaoLS ioTL fxi^tg, efvat raur' aAAi^Acov dnriKd' 
Kav 61 Tt TTotet, TO 8e Trdax^L Kvpicu?, Kal tovtols 
coaavTOj's . 8to irpcoTov XeKTeov nepl d(f)rjg. ax^Bov 
30 /Ltev ovv, coaTTep Kal tcov dXXcov ovofxaTOJV CKaoTov 
AeyeTttt 7roAAa;^aj?, /cat Ta /xev opLcovvpico? Ta Se 
uaTepa airo tcop' CTepcov Kal Tojv TrpoTepcov, ovtcos 
e;^et /cat Trept d(f)rjs. op.cos 8e to Kvpiojs Xeyofxevov 
323 a vvapx^i. Tols exovai deaiv. diais 8' olarrep Kal 



« Fr. 2 (Diels). 
222 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6 

single element must necessarily hold that there is 
" action " ; and Diogenes " is right in saying that 
there could not be reciprocal action and passion, 
unless all things were derived from one. For example, 
what is hot would not become cold, and the cold 
become hot again ; for it is not heat and cold which 
change into one another, but it is obviously the 
substratum which changes ; so that, where action 
and passion exist, their underlying nature must be 
one. It is not, however, true to say that all things 
are of this kind ; but it is true of all things between 
which there is reciprocal action and passion. 

But if we must go into the question of " action " What Is 
and " passion " and of" commingling," we must also *'°°**°*^ 
investigate " contact." For action and passion ought 
properly to be possible only for such things as can 
touch one another ; nor can things be mixed with 
one another in the first instance without coming in 
some kind of contact. Hence we must decide about 
these three things, namely, what is " contact," what 
is " mixture," and what is " action." 

Let us take this as our starting-point. All existing 
things which can undergo mixture must be able to 
come into contact with one another, and this must 
also be true of any pair of things, one of which acts 
and the other is acted upon in the proper sense of 
the word. Therefore we must first speak about 
" contact." Practically speaking, just as every other 
term which is used in several senses is so used owing 
to verbal coincidence or because the different senses 
are derived from different prior meanings, so it is 
also with " contact." Nevertheless, " contact " in 
its proper sense belongs only to things which have 
" position," and " position " belongs to those things 

223 



ARISTOTLE 

323 a 

T0770S" Kol yap toi? ixaOrjiJiaTLKolg oju-oicus" (xttoSo- 

reov d<f)r]v /cat tottov, evr' earl Kexcopcaiievov e/ca- 

GTOV avTcbv etr' dXXov rpoTTov. el ovv iartv, oiOTrep 

hiuiplaQr] TTpoTcpov, ro aTrreadai to rd ea^o-ra 

5 e)(€tv a/xa, ravra dv aTnoLTo aXXrjXcov oaa Sicopi- 

afieva [xeyedrj Kal deaiv eyovra a/xa ex^i rd eaxo-ra. 

inel 8e deais p-ev oaoig Kal tottos VTrdp-)(€i, tottov 

8e Si,a(f)opa TrpojTrj to avco /cat /carco /cat to. Totaura 

TO)V dvTLKeipevojv, aTravTa Td dXKrjXtov diTTopieva 

^dpos dv e)(OL rj KovcfyoTrjTa, rj dp(f)io ■^ daTcpov. 

10 TO, 8e TOtaura TradrjTiKd /cat rrot,7]TLKd' (Lgtc (f)av€p6v 

OTt TavTa aTTTeadai 7T€cf}VK€V dXX-^Xojv, a>v SLrjpr]- 

pilvixjv p,eyed(x}v dp.a ra ea^^aTa ioTLV, ovtojv Kivrj- 

TLKcov /cat KLvrjTwv VTT oXX-qXcov . inel 8e to klvovv 

ovx opoLios Kivel TO KLvovpievov, dXXd to jLtev avdyKt] 

Kivovp,€VOV /cat avTO Ktvelv, to S' a/ctVrjTOV oi/, 8r^- 

15 XoV OTL /cat eTTl TOU TTOtOWTOS" €pOVp€V djOaVTOJS' 

/cat yap to /ctrouv Trotetv rt ^aat /cat to ttolovv 
KLvetv. ov prjv dXXd hia^ipei ye /cat 8et Scopil,eiv 
ov ydp olov T€ Trdv to klvovv noLelv, einep to 
TTOiovv avTidriaopuev t<2> Trda-x^ovTi, tovto 8' of? rj 
KivrjaLS TrdOos, irddos he /ca^' oaov aXXoiovTai 

' Phys. 226 b 21-23. 
224 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6 

which have also a " place " ; for " place," just as much 
as " contact," must be attributed to mathematical 
objects, whether each exists in separation or in some 
other manner. If, therefore, as has been defined in 
a previous work," for things to be in " contact " they 
must have their extremities together, only those 
things would be in contact with one another, which, 
possessing definite magnitudes and a definite posi- 
tion, have their extremities together. Now, since 
position belongs to such things as also have a " place," 
and the primary differentiation of" place " is " above" 
and " below " and other such pairs of opposites, all 
things which are in contact with one another would 
have " weight " and " lightness," either both of these 
qualities or one or other of them. Now such things 
are capable of " acting " and " being acted upon " ; 
so that it is clear that those things are of a nature 
to be in contact with one another, the extremities 
of whose separate magnitudes are " together " and 
which are capable of moving one another and being 
moved by one another. But, since that which moves 
does not always move that which is moved in the 
same way, but one mover must move by being it- 
self moved, and another while itself remaining un- 
moved, it is clear that we must speak in the same 
terms about that which " acts " ; for the " moving 
thing " is said to " act " (in a sense) and the " acting 
thing " to " move." There is, however, a difference, 
and a distinction must be made ; for not every 
" mover " can " act," if we are going to employ the 
term " agent " in contrast to the term " patient," 
and the term " patient " is applied only to those 
things for which the movement is an " affection " * 

* See Met. x, 1022 b 15 ff. 

I 225 



ARISTOTLE 

323 a 

20 ixovov, OLov TO XevKov Kal TO depixov dXXa to KLvelv 

€7TL TTAeOV TOV TTOielv e(JTiV . €K€iVO 8' OVV (f)aV€p6v, 
OTl koTL fJieV (X)S TO, KtVOVVTa TWV KlVrjTU)V drTTOLT^ 

dv, eoTL S' CO? ov. aAA' o Stoptajuo? tov aTTTeadat. 
KadoXov jxev 6 tcov deaiv €)(6vt(i>v Kal tov fxev 

KLVrjTLKOV tov §€ KlVTjTOV, TTpOg dXXrjXa 8e, KLVTj- 
25 TIKOV Kai KLVTJTOV €V Ol? VTrdp-)(€l TO TTOielv Kal TO 

TTaax^tv. eaTt, [xev ovv co? errt to ttoXv to ctTTTo- 
fxevov aTTTopbivov dinopLevov /cat yap KiveZ klvov- 
p,€va TTOVTa a^ehov ra ep^noSayv, oaois dvdyKr] Kal 
(j>aiveTai. to ctTZTOju-evov dTTTcadai dnTop-ivov eari 
8', (hs ivLOTe (f)ap,€V, to klvovv diTTeadai p,6vov tov 
Kivovfievov, TO 8' aTTTOfjievov per] drrTeadaL diTTo- 
30 jxevov aAAa 8ia to Kiveiv Ktvovp,eva to, opioyevrj, 
dvdyKTj SoK€i elvai aTTTopuevov dTTTeaOai. cuare et 

Tt KLVel dKLVrjTOV 6v, €K€LVO pi€V dv aTTTOLTO TOV 

Kiv7]Tov, CKeivov 8e ouSeV* (f)ap.€v yap €vlot€ tov 
XvTTovvTa drTTeadai -qpLcov, dAA' ovk avTol eKeivov. 
7T€pl pL€V OVV d(f>rjs TTJs €v Tot? <f)V(nKOis Siojpiadco 

TOVTOV TOV TpOTTOV, 

323 b 7. Ylepl 8e TOV TToielv Kal Trdaxei-v XeKTeov i(f)- 
e^fjs, TTap€LXrj<j>apLev 8e Trapd tcov rrpoTCpov virevav- 
226 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6-7 

(an " affection," that is, such as whiteness and heat, 
in virtue of which they only undergo " alteration "), 
whereas to " move " is a wider term than to " act." 
But this, at any rate, is clear, that there is a sense in 
which the things which move can come into contact 
with the things which are capable of being moved, 
and a sense in which they cannot do so. But the 
distinction between contact in the most general sense 
and " reciprocal contact " is that, in the first sense, 
two objects should have position and that one should 
be capable of moving and the other of being moved ; 
in the second sense, that there should be one thing 
capable of moving and another of being moved, 
possessing, respectively, the qualities of " agent " 
and " patient." Generally, no doubt, if one thing 
touches another, the latter also touches the former ; 
for almost all things, when they move, cause motion 
in the things which stand in their way, and in these 
cases that which touches must, and obviously does, 
touch that which touches it. But it is possible, as 
we say sometimes, for that which causes motion 
merely to touch that which is moved, and that which 
touches need not touch something which touches it ; 
but because things of the same kind impart motion 
by being moved, it seems to follow necessarily that 
they touch that which touches them. Hence, if any- 
thing causes motion without being itself moved, it 
might touch that which is moved, though not itself 
touched by anything ; for we say sometimes that 
a man who grieves us " touches " us, though we 
ourselves do not " touch " him. So much for our 
definition of contact in the realm of Nature. 

7. Next we must deal with " action " and " pas- "Action' 
sion." We have inherited conflicting accounts from "Passion' 

227 



ARISTOTLE 

323 b 

TLOvs aAAi^Aot? Xoyovs. ol fxev yap TrXeiaroi, tovto 

ye ojxovo'qriKa)? Xeyovaiv , tos" to fxev ofiotov vtto 

5 rod ofxOLov irdv arrade? ecrrt 8ia to ixrjBev jjidX- 

Xov TTOLrjTiKov T] TTaOrjTiKov etvac ddrepov darepov 

{TTOLvra yap ofioicos V7rap)(eLv ravra rols opuoLOis), 

TO. 8' dvopuoia Kal rd hid<^opa ttoi^Zv Kat Traa)(eiv 

els dXXrjXa 7Te<f>VK€v. /cat yap orav to eXarrov 

TTvp VTTO Tov TtXeLovos (jiSeiprjTai, hid rrjv evavrccocnv 

10 TOVTO (f)aGL Trdax^LV evavT iov yap etvai to ttoXv 
TO) oXiycp. ArjfjioKpLTOS Se napd tovs dXXov? IBlcos 
e'Ae^e juovos" cf)r]ol ydp to avTO Kai opioiov etvat 
TO re 7TOLOVV Kal to Trda-)(ov ov ydp iyxfJ^p^'iv rd 
€T€pa Kal hia^epovTa irdax^iv vtt^ dXXrjXcov, dXXa 
Kov €T€pa ovTa TTOLTJ Tt et? dXXrjXa, ov)( fj erepa 

15 dAA' fj TavTov Tt VTTdpx€L, TavTrj TOVTO avpi^aiviiv 
avTois. 

Ta puev ovv Xeyofieva Taur' ioTiv, eot/caat 8e 
ol TOVTOV TOV TpoTTov XeyovTes VTTevavTta ^ai- 
veadat Xeyeiv. atrtov 8e Trjs ivavrioXoyiag otl 
Beov oXov TL decoprjaai p^epos tl Tvyxdvovai Ae- 
yovT€s eKaTepof to re ydp op,oLov Kal to Travrr] 

20 TTamais dhid(f)opov evXoyov prj Traax^tv vtto tov 
OjJLOLOV puribev {ri ydp fidXXov ddrepov earai ttoit]- 
TLKOV r] Odrepov; et re^ vtto tov opuoiov tl Traax^cv 
Bvvarov, Kal avrd v<f)* avrov' Kairoi rovrcov ovroi'S 
ixovrcov ovBev dv e'irj ovre d^daprov ovre aKivr]- 
rov, eiTTep rd ojxolov fj op.oiov TToirjTLKov, avro yap 

^ ft re Bonitz : etre Bekker. 
228 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 

our predecessors. For most of them agree in de- view of 
daring that (i) Uke is always unaffected by Uke be- phiio- 
cause, of two things which are hke, neither is, they gophers, 
argue, at all more liable than the other to act or to be 
acted upon (for all the same properties belong in a 
like degree to things which are like), and (ii) things 
which are unlike and different are naturally disposed 
to reciprocal action and passion ; for, when the lesser 
fire is destroyed by the greater, it is said to be thus 
affected owing to its contrariety, the great being 
the contrary of the small. Democritus, however, in 
disagreement with all other philosophers, held a view 
peculiar to himself ; for he says that the agent and 
the patient are the same and alike, for (he declares) 
it is not possible for things which are " other " and 
different to be affected by one another, but even if 
two things which are " other " do act in any way upon 
one another, this occurs to them not in as much as 
they are " other," but because some identical pro- 
perty belongs to them both. 

These, then, are the views expressed, and it appears 
that those who so expressed them were obviously 
in opposition to one another. But the reason of this 
opposition is that each school, when they ought to 
have viewed the problem as a whole, in fact only 
stated part of the truth. For, firstly, it is reasonable 
to hold that that which is like another thing, that is, 
in every respect absolutely without difference from 
it, cannot be in any way affected by the other thing 
which is like it. (For why should one be more likely 
to act than the other ? And if like can be affected 
by like, it can also be affected by itself ; yet, if that 
were so — if like were liable to act qua like — nothing 
would be indestructible or immovable, for everything 

229 



ARISTOTLE 

323 b 

25 avTO Ktvqaei Trdv) • to re TravreXcog crepov Kai 

TO [Jiyjhafjifj ravrov wcravrajg. ovSev yap av Trddoi 
XevKorrjg vvo ypafjbfxrjs rj ypayLfxr] vtto XevKorrjros, 
7tX7)v el pLTj TTov Kara avfx^e^'qKo?, olov el avjx- 
^e^rjKe XevKrjv -r) fxeXaivav etvai ttjv ypap,fn]V ovk 
i^iorrjat yap aXXrjXa rrjg (jyvaecvg oaa p,'r]T evavTia 
30 ju-t^t' e^ evavriojv eariv. aXX eirel ov to tv^ov 
7Te<f)VKe TTaaxeiv /cat Troteiv, aAA' oaa rj evavria 
iarlv rj evavricoaiv exei, dvdyKrj Kai to ttolovv Kai 
TO Trda-)(ov tco yevei fiev ofxoiov elvai /cat TavTo, 
TO) 8' etSet dvojuoiov /cat ivavTcov (jrecfiVKe yap 
aajjjia jiev vtto aiofxaTOS, x^t^^^ ^' ^'^^ X^H-^^> 

324 a ;^/>a»ju.a 8' vtto ;^pc(j/xaTOS' TTaaxecv, oAco? he to 

ofxoyeves vtto tov opioyevovs . tovtov S' atTtor oti 
TavavTia iv TauTo) yevei TTovTa, 77otet he /cat Tra- 
CT;(et TOLvavTia vtt* aAA-r^Acoy), coot' dvdyKrj rrajg piev 
elvai TavTa to tc ttolovv /cat to rrdaxov, ttcos h 
5 eTepa /cat dvopcoia dAArjAot?. eTTel he Kai to rra- 
a^ov Kai to ttolovv tw piev yeveL TavTa Kai o/zota 
TO) 8' etSet dvopLOLa, TOiavTa he TdvavTca, <j>avep6v 
OTL vadrjTLKa Kai TTOirjTLKa dXXtjXwv ioTL Td t' 
ivavTLa Kai to. pieTa^v' Kai yap oXcog ^^opa /cat 
yeveoLS ev tovtols. 
10 Aio /cat evXoyov rjhrj to tc vvp deppiaiveLV Kai 

TO IpVXpOV ifjVXeLV, Kai oAcO? to TTOLTjTLKOV OpiOLOVV 

eavTU) TO TTdaxov to tc yap ttolovv KaL to Traaxov 
evavria eoTL, Kai rj yeveoLg els TovvavTLOV. wot 
230 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 

will move itself.) And, secondly, the same thing 
happens if there is complete difference and no kind 
of identity. For whiteness could not be affected in 
any degree by line, or line by whiteness, except per- 
haps incidentally, if, for example, it happened that 
the line was white or black ; for unless the two things 
are contraries or made up of contraries, one cannot 
displace the other from its natural condition. But, 
since only such things as possess contrariety or are 
themselves actual contraries — and not any chance 
things — are naturally adapted to be acted upon and 
to act, both " agent " and " patient " must be alike 
and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in 
species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be 
affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, 
and in general that which is of the same kind by 
something else of the same kind ; and the reason of 
this is that contraries are always within the same kind, 
and it is contraries which act and are acted upon 
reciprocally. Hence " agent " and " patient " are Aristotle's 
necessarily in one sense the same, and in another "^f^nt"" °^ 
sense " other " and unlike one another ; and since fnd 
" agent " and " patient " are identical in kind and ^* ^^ ' 
like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which 
have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries 
and their " intermediates " are capable of being 
affected and of acting reciprocally — indeed it is 
entirely these processes which constitute passing- 
away and coming-to-be. 

It is, then, now reasonable to hold both that fire 
hefits and that what is cold cools and, in general, 
that what is active assimilates that which is passive 
to itself ; for the agent and patient are contrary to 
one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the 

231 



ARISTOTLE 

324 a 

avayKi) to rrdaxov els to volovv fxera^dWeLV 

ovTOJ yap earai et? rovvavriov rj yeveaig. /cat 
15 Kara Xoyov br] to [xr] ravTa Aeyovras" dfji(f)OT€povs 
Ofxajs diTTecrdai rrjs (f>v(T€cos. XeyopLCV yap Trdcrxeiv 
6t€ [lev TO VTTOKeifjievov {olov vytdt,€a6aL rov dvdpo)- 
TTov Kal depfiaLveadac Kal ipux^adai Kal rdXXa rov 
avTov TpoTTOv), OTC 8e deppbalveadai fiev to ipv^pov, 
vyid^eaOaL 8e to KdpLvov dfji(f)6T€pa 8' ioTLV dXrjdrj 
20 (rov avrov 8e Tponov Kal evri tov ttolovvtos' ore 
jxkv yap rov dvOpcjonov ^a/xev Oepfxaiveiv, 6t€ 8e 
TO Oepfxov eoTi jxev yap cos rj vXrj irdax^i, can 8' 
(Ls TovvavTiov). ol fiev ovv els €K€lvo ^XeipavTes 
TavTOV Ti 8etv cpT]drjaav to ttoiovv ex^i-v Kal to 
Trdaxov, ol 8' ets" ddrepa TovvavTiov. 
25 Tov avTov he Xoyov VTToXrjTTTeov elvai rrepl tov 
TToieZv Kal Trdaxetv ovirep Kal irepl tov KiveZv Kal 
Kiveladat. 8t;;^cD? yap Xeyerai Kal to klvovv ev 
o) Te yap rj dpx^j Trjs Kivqaecvs, 80/cet tovto KLvetu 
{rj yap dpx^j TrpcoTrj tcov atTicuv), /cat TrdXiv to 
eaxo-Tov TTpos to KLvovjievov /cat ttjv yeveatv. 
ojioiois 8e /cat Ttepi tov ttoiovvtos' Kal yap rov 
30 laTpov (fiajxev vytd^eiv /cat tov olvov. to fiev ovv 
TTpwTOV KLVOVV ovhkv KO}XveL ev jiev KLvqaei aKivrj- 
Tov etvai (ctt' evicov 8e /cat dvayKalov), to S' 
ecrxO'Tov del Kivelv Kivovjxevov , errl he TTOi-qaecos 



" i.e. immediately next to that which is moved. 
232 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 

contrary, so that the patient must change into the 
agent, since only thus will coming-to-be be a process 
into the contrary. And it is reasonable to suppose 
that both schools, though they do not express the 
same views, are yet in touch with the nature of things. 
For we sometimes say that it is the substratum which 
is acted upon (for example, we talk of a man as being 
restored to health and warmed and chilled and so 
on), and sometimes we say that what is cold is being 
warmed and what is ill is being restored to health. 
Both these ways of putting the case are true (and 
similarly with the agent : for at one time we say that 
it is the man that causes heat, and at another time 
that it is that which is hot ; for in one sense it is the 
matter which is acted upon and in another sense it 
is the " contrary "). One school, therefore, directed 
its attention to the substratum and thought that the 
agent and patient must possess something identical, 
the other school, with its attention on the contraries, 
held the opposite view. 

We must suppose that the same account holds 
good of " action " and " passion " as about moving 
and being moved. For " move " is also used in two 
senses ; for that in which the original source of 
motion resides is generally held to cause motion (for 
the original source is the first of causes), and so also 
is that which is last in relation to that which is moved " 
and to the process of coming-to-be. Similarly, too, 
in the case of the agent ; for we speak of the doctor, 
and also of wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there 
is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved 
(in fact in some cases it is actually necessary), but 
the last mover always causes motion by itself being 
moved ; and in action, there is nothing to prevent 

233 



ARISTOTLE 

324 a 

TO fJL€V TTpOJTOV aTTadis , TO 8' €(TXO.TOV /Cttt aVTO 

TTaaxov oaa yap jjir] e^ei ttjv aurrjv vXrjv, Trotet 

35 oLTTadrj ovTa {olov rj laTpiKrj, avTT) yap rroLovaa 

324 b vyieiav ouSev rraax^i vtto tov vyial,ofX€vov), to 

he aiTiov 7TOLOVV /cat avTO TTaa-)(ei tl' •^ yap Oepfxal- 

veTai 7] ifjvx^Tai r] aXXo tl vracrp^et d/xa ttoiovv. 

€(jtl Be 7] piev laTpiKT] ws o.pXVi "^^ ^^ aiTiov to 

eaxaTov /cat drrTopievov . 

5 "Oaa piev ovv pirj ev vXrj e;\;et ttjv piop(f>'qv, ravra 

piev dvadfj tcov ttoltjtlkwv, oaa 8' ev ^^T}> '^c-^V 

Tt/ca. TTJV piev yap vXtjv Xeyopev opioicDS cLg eiTTeTv 

Tr)v avTTjv elvai TOiv avTiKeip^evoiv oTTOTepovovv, 

wGTTep yevos ov, to 8e hvvdpievov depp.6v elvai 

TtapovTos TOV deppiavTiKov /cat TrX-qcrid^ovTos dvdyKrj 

10 deppLatveadai' 8td, KaddTrep etprjTai, Ta piev tcjv 

TToirjTiKwv drradrj Ta 8e TradrjTLKa. Kat axjTrep 

errl KivrjaeoiS, tov avTOV e^ei TpoTTOv /cat cttI tcov 

TTOirjTiKCJv CKel Te yap to TrpajrcD? Kivovv dKLvqTov, 

/cat €7tI TCx)V TTOLTjTLKcbv TO TTpdJTOV TTOIOVV aTTade?. 

ecTL 8e TO TToirjTLKov acTiov COS" oOev r] ap^f] Tjjg 
15 Ktvqaecos. to 8' oi) eVe/ca ov ttoltjtlkov (8to rj 
vyieia ov ttoitjtlkov, el pA] /caro. pLeTa<j>opdv)- /cat 
yap TOV piev ttolovvtos otov vrrdp^J], ytveTat tl 
TO Trdaxov, tcov 8' e^ecov TrapovadJv ovk€tl ytVerat, 
dAA' eoTtv 17817 • TO. 8' €1817 Kol Ta TeXrj e^ei? Ttvis. 



" Of which the two opposites are species. 
* Such as " health " or " disease." 



234 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 

the» first agent being unaffected, but the last agent 
is itself also affected. P'or those things which have 
not the same matter act without being themselves 
affected (for example, the art of the physician which, 
while it causes health, is not itself acted upon by 
that which is being healed), but food, while it acts, 
is itself all somehow acted upon, for, while it acts, 
it is at the same time being heated or cooled or 
affected in some other way. Now the art of the 
physician is, as it were, an original source, while the 
food is, as it were, the final mover and in contact with 
that which is moved. 

Of the things, then, which are capable of acting, 
those of which the form does not consist in matter 
are not affected, but those of which the form consists 
in matter are liable to be affected ; for we say that 
the matter of either of the two opposed things alike 
is the same, so to speak, being, as it were, a kind "' ; 
and that which is capable of being hot must become 
hot, if that which is capable of heating is present and 
near to it. Therefore, as has been said, some of the 
active agencies are unaffected, while others are liable 
to be acted upon ; and what holds good of motion 
is also true of the active agencies ; for as in motion 
the first mover is unmoved, so among active agencies 
the first agent is unaffected. The active agency is 
a cause, as being the source from which the origin 
of the movement comes, but the end in view is not 
" active " (hence health is not active, except meta- 
phorically) ; for, when the agent is present, the 
patient becomes something, but when " states " * 
are present, the patient no longer " becomes " but 
already " is," and the " forms," that is the " ends," 
are a kind of " state," but the matter, qua matter, 

g35 



ARISTOTLE 

324 b 

Tj 8' vXr) fj vXrj TTadrjTiKov. to fxev ovv rrvp e^^ iv 

20 vXrj TO depfxov el 8e tl etrj depfxov ;^a)ptCTTOP', tovto 
ovoev av Traap^ot. tovto [xev ovv tocos' dSvvaTOV 
€Lvai p^copiCTTOv et 8' iaTLv eVta ToiavTa, irr^ eK€L- 
vajv av e'lT] to Xeyofxevov dXiqdes. tl fxkv ovv to 
TToielv /cat TTaax^i'V eoTL /cat tlglv V7rdp)(€i /cat 8ta 
Tl /cat TTca?, huxipiaOd) tovtov tov TpoTTov. 

25 8. ricii? 8e ivSex^Tai tovto avfx^aLvetv, rrdXiv 
Xeycjofxev. tols p^ev ovv 8o/cet irdax^iv e/caoTov 8ta 

TLVCDV TTOpOJV eLGLOVTO? TOV TTOLOVVTOS ia)(^dTOV /Cat 

KvpiiOTaTov, kal tovtov tov TpoTTov /cat opdv /cat 
a/covetv i^/xa? ^aot /cat to.? ctAAa? oladrjaeLS aladd- 
veadat ndcras, €tl 8e opdadai 8ta tc depog Kal i38a- 

30 TO? /cat Tcov' hta(l>avcov, Sta to TTopovs e^etv dopdTovs 
p,ev 8ta piLKpoTrjTa, ttvkvovs 8e /cat /caTO, gtoIxov, 
/cat /LtaAAov ^X^^^ '^^ 8ta^av7y p.dXXov. 

Ot jLtev ofv CTTt TtvoJi/ ovTO) SicopLGav, waTTep 
/cat 'E/x77e8o/cArj?, ou p,6vov €7tI tcov ttolovvtojv 
/cat TTaaxovTcov, aAAa /cat p.iyvvadai (f)aai,v ouiov 

35 ot TTopoL avp.p.€Tpoi, TTpos aXX'qXovs elaiv o8ai 
325 a 8e pbdXioTa /cat 776/31 ndvTWV evl Xoycp huopi- 
/caoi Aef/ctTTTTos' /cat ^'qp.oKpiTO's, dpx'fjv TToir^ad- 
fJLCVoi /caTO. (f)vaLv rjirep ioTiv. evlois yap tojv 
dpxaicov eSo^e to w e^ avay/cTj? ev efvat /cat 
dKivrjTov TO p,€v yap k€v6v ovk ov, KtvqdrjvaL 8' 
5 ovk av SvvaaOai p,rj ovTog kcvov Kex^jpt^ofievov, 
ovh* av TToXXd elvat pL7) ovtos tov hieipyovTos. 

« Namely, Parmenides and Melissus. 
236 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, I. 7-^8 

is passive. Now fire holds the heat embodied in 
matter : but, if there were such a thing as " the hot " 
apart from matter, it could not be acted upon at all. 
Heat, therefore, perhaps cannot exist separately ; 
but, if there are any such separate existences, what 
we are saying would be true of them also. Let this, 
then, be our explanation of" action " and " passion," 
and when they exist, and why and how. 

8. Let us now go back and discuss how it is possible How do 
for action and passion to occur. Some people hold aiu^'"" 
that each patient is acted upon when the last agent " passion " 
— the agent in the strictest sense — enters in through 
certain pores, and they say that it is in this way that 
we also see and hear and emiploy our other senses. 
Furthermore, they say that things are seen through 
air and water and the other transparent bodies, 
because they have pores, which, owing to their 
minuteness, are invisible, but are set close together 
and in rows, and are more transparent the closer 
together and in more serried array they are. 

Some philosophers (including Empedocles) held The 
this theory as regards certain bodies, not confining j,heory^of 
it to those which act and are acted upon ; but mixture Empedocles. 
also, they assert, takes place only between bodies 
whose pores are symmetrical with one another. The 
most methodical theory, however, and the one of 
most general application has been that enunciated 
by Leucippus and Democritus, taking what is the 
natural starting-point. For some of the ancient 
thinkers ^ held that " what is " must necessarily be 
one and immovable ; for they argued that the void 
does not exist, but that, if there is not a void existing 
separately, " what is " could not be moved ; nor, 
again, could there be a multiplicity of things, since 

237 



ARISTOTLE 

325 a 

TOVTO 8' ovSev bta(f>€p€Lv, et tls oierai jxtj avvex^s 
etvai TO TTov aAA' aTrreadai SLrjprjixevov, tov ^dvai 
TToAAa Koi firj ev elvai Kai Kevov. el fxev yap iravrr^ 
hiaiperov, ovSev elvai ev, Mare ouSe TroAAa, dAAa 

10 Kcvov TO oAov el Se rrj fiev rfj Se pur], TreTrXaapievu) 
TLvl TOVT eoLKevaf p,expi ttooov yap /cat 8ia ri 
TO fiev ovTwg ^X^^ "^^^ oXov /cat TrXijpes eari, to 
Se hiir]prjp,evov ; CTt opLoioi'S (f>avai auayKalov p^rj 
elvat Kivqcriv. e/c piev ovv tovtcov tcov Xoywv, 
VTrep^dvTes ttjv a'iadr^aiv /cat TraptSovTe? avTTjv ojs 

15 Tip Xoycp heov aKoXovdelv, ev /cat aKtvrjTov to rrdv 
elvai (f>aaL, /cat direipov evLOf to yap vepas Trep- 
atvetv av Trpos" to Kevov. ol piev ovv ovtcos /cat 
8ta TauTa? to.? atTta? a.Trecfy'qvavTO Tie pi Trjg dXr]- 
deias' eTL he €7tI piev tcov Xoyoiv 8o/cet TauTa avp,- 
^aiveiv, cttl be tojv irpaypLaTOiv pLavla TrapanXriaLov 

20 elvai TO So^a^eiv ouVcos"* o!38eVa yap tiov piaivo- 
pcevcov i^eoTavaL tooovtov cocttc to TTvp ev elvat 
8o/cetv /cat tov KpvoTaXXov, dXXd piovov to, /caAa 
/cat Ta (f)aiv6p,eva Bid owqdeiav, TavT* evicts' 8ta. 
Tr)v pbaviav ovhev 8o/cet 8ta^epetv. 

AevKLTTTTOs 8' e^'^iv (hr^df] Xoyovs otTtve? Trpos ttjv 
atadrjaLV opioXoyovpieva XeyovTes ovk dvaip'qaovcnv 

25 ouVe yeveaiv ovt€ (f)dopdv oirre Kivqaiv /cat to ttXtjOos 
ToJv ovTixJV. opioXoyqaas 8e TavTa p,ev tols <j)aivo- 
p,evois, ToZs 8e TO ev KaTaaKevdt,ovaiv (Ls ovk^ av 

^ OVK E : otJre FHJL. 

" i.e. the Monists. 
238 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

there is nothing which keeps them apart ; and they 
declare that, if one holds that the universe is not 
continuous but maintains contact in separation, this 
does not differ from saying that things are " many " 
(and not " one ") and that there is a void. For if 
the universe is divisible throughout, there is no " one," 
and therefore no " many," but the whole is void ; but 
to suppose that it is divisible at one point but not 
at another seems like a baseless invention. For hoM- 
far is it divisible ? And why is part of the whole in- 
divisible and a plenum, and part divided ? Moreover, 
they say that it is equally necessary to deny the 
existence of motion. As a result, then, of these 
arguments, going beyond and disregarding sense- 
perception, on the plea that they ought to follow 
reason, they assert that the universe is one and 
immovable ; some add that it is infinite as well, for 
the limit would be a limit against the void. Some 
philosophers, then, set forth their views about the 
truth in this manner and based them on these grounds. 
Furthermore, though these opinions seem to follow 
logically from the arguments, yet, in view of the facts, 
to hold them seems almost madness ; for no madman 
is so out of his senses as to hold that fire and ice are 
" one " ; it is only between things which are good 
and things which, through habit, seem to be good, 
that some people, in their madness, see no difference. 

Leucippus, however, thought that he had argu- The 
ments, which, while agreeing with sense-perception, ^0^^°?)^*°*^ 
would not do away with coming-to-be and passing- theory of 
away, or motion, or the multiplicity of things which and'^Demo- 
are. While making these concessions to things as <^"tus. 
they appear, and conceding to those who postulate 
the oneness of things « that there could not be motion 

239 



ARISTOTLE 

325 a 

KLvrjaLV ovaav dv€V Kevov to t€ k€v6v firj ov, /cat rov 
ovTog ouSev [xtj 6v <f)r]cnv etvai. to yap Kvpicog ov 
TTajjiTrX-qOes ov aAA' eti^at to tolovtov ovx €V, aAA' 

30 aTTeipa to ttAt^^os" Kal dopara Sta afxiKpoTTjTa tcov 
oyK(x)v. Tavra 8' ev to) Kevco <j)epead ai [Kevov yap 
eivat), Kai avviOTafieva fxev yeveaiv TTOLelv, Bia~ 
XvofJLCva Se (f)6opdv. ttolclv Be Kal Trdax^iv fj Tvy- 
xdvovoLV aTTTopieva [TavTrj yap ovx ^^ elvat), Kal 

35 avvTidepeva he Kal TrepLTrXeKOfxeva yevvdv €K Se 
rov Kar* dXi^Oeiav ivos ovk dv yeveaOai irXrjdos, oi)S' 
eK Tii}v dXrjdcos ttoXXwv ev, dXX etvai rovr* dSvva- 
325 b Tov, aAA' woTTep 'Eju.77-e8o/<Ar^? Kal tu)v dXXcov rive? 
<f>aai Trdax^tv Sid vopajv, ovtch Trdaav dXXoLOjaiv 
Kal irdv TO Trdax^tv tovtov yiveadai tov Tportov, Sia 
TOV Kevov yLVop,€vrjs Trjg BiaXvoecus Kal ttj? (f)do- 
5 pas", ofjLOLCJS Be Kal Trjs av^ijaecos, VTreta-BvofievoiV 
OTepedjv. 

2;\;eSov Be Kal 'EjUTreSo/cAet dvayKalov Xeyeiv, 
oiOTvep Kal AevKiTTTTos <l>rjGLV elvai ydp arra are pea, 
dBiaipeTa Be, el p.r] Trdvrrj iropoi avvex'^'ts elaiv. 
TOVTO 8' dBvvaTov ovBev ydp earai erepov arepeov 
irapd Tovs TTopovs, aXXd ttov Kevov. dvdyK-rj dpa 

10 Td {xev diTTopieva elvai dBiaipeTa, ra Be /xera^u 
avTiov Kevd, ovs eKctvos Xeyei nopovs. ovTOjg Be 
Kal AevKLTTTTos Xeyei irepl tov TToieZv Kal Trdax^iv. 
01 fiev ovv TpoTTOL Kad^ ovs Td fxev TTOiel to. Be 
rrdcrx^L, ax^Bov o^roi Xeyovrai' Kal Trepl fiev tov- 
240 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

without a void, he declares that the void is " not 
being," and nothing of " what is " is " not being " ; 
for " what is " in the strictest sense is a complete 
plenum. " But this ' plenum,' " he says, " is not one 
but many things of infinite number, and invisible 
owing to the minuteness of their bulk. These are 
carried along in the void (for there is a void) and, 
when they come together, they cause coming-to-be 
and, when they dissolve, they cause passing-away. 
They act and are acted upon where they happen to 
come into contact (for there they are not one), and 
they generate when they are placed together and 
intertwined. But from that which is truly one, a 
multiplicity could never come-into-being, nor a one 
from the truly many ; but this is impossible. But " 
(just as Empedocles and some of the other philo- 
sophers say that things are acted upon through their 
pores) "all ' alteration ' and all ' passion ' occur in 
this way, dissolution and passing-away taking place 
by means of the void, and likewise also growth, when 
solids creep into the voids." 

Empedocles, too, is almost compelled to take the 
same view as Leucippus ; for he says that there are 
certain solids, but they are indivisible, unless there 
are continuous pores throughout. But this is im- 
possible ; for then there will be nothing solid except 
the pores, but the whole will be void. It necessarily 
follows, therefore, that those things which are in 
contact are indivisible, but the spaces between them, 
which he calls pores, must be void. This is also 
Leucippus' view about " action " and " passion." 

These, then, are, roughly speaking, the accounts 
given of the way in which some things " act " and 
other things are " acted upon." As regards this 

241 



ARISTOTLE 

325 b 

TOiV, /cat TTchs Xeyovai, SrjXov, Kal Trpos ras avrcjjv 

15 deacis at? ;)^pa>VTat ax^Sov ofxoXoyovfievcos (j)aive- 
rai avfi^alvov. rot? S' aXXoLS ■^ttov, olov 'E^77e- 
So/cAet TtVa rpoTTov earat yeveaig Kal (f)6opa Kal 
aXXoLCoai^, ov SrjXov. rot? /xev yap iariv ahiaipera 
ra TTpaJra rcbv Ga)p,dra)v, ax'^p-o-Ti Sta^epovra 
fMovov, €^ cLv TTpcoTiov avyK€LTaL Kal els a €cr)(aTa 

20 SiaXverai' 'E/ATreSo/cAet 8e ra pcev aAAa <f}avep6v 
OTL p-expi' Tcov aroix^icov ex^i rrjv yeveatv Kal ttjv 
(f)dopdv, avTcov 8e tovtojv ttws yiverai Kal <f>deL- 
peraL ro aix)pev6p.evov pueyedos, ovre SrjXov ovre 
evSex^rai Xeyeiv avrw pi/r] Xeyovri /cat rov TTvpos 
etvai (TTOLxelov, o/Ltoto)? 8e Kal roJv aAAcov dnavrajv, 

25 coairep ev rw Tt^Ltatoi yeypa<j>e YYXdrojv tooovtov 
yap Sia^epei rov p,rj rov avrov rporrov AevKiTnTcp 
Xeyeiv, on 6 jxev areped 6 8' eTrtTreSa Aeyet ra 
dSiaipera, Kal 6 /xev direipoL^ d>piadai cr;^7yjLtaat 
\rix)v dSiaipdrcov orcpeaJv e/cacrrov], o 8e (l)piap,evois, 
CTret ahiaiperd ye dp,<j)6repoL Xiyovai Kal wpiapLcva 

30 ax'Tip-aaiv . e/c hrj rovrcov at yeveaeig Kal at 8ia- 
KpiacLs AevKLTTTTO} jxkv \hvo rpoiroi dv cUv,] 8ia re 
rov Kevov Kal Bid rrjg dcfiijg {ravrrj ydp Siaiperov 
eKaarov), YlXdrcavi he Kard rrjv dcf)rjv p,6vov Kevov 
ydp ovK elvai <fyr]aiv. 

Kat TTepl p,ev rdJv dSiaiperwv eTrnreSajv eipr)- 
Kapiev ev rois rrporepov Xoyois' irepl he rcbv aot- 

35 aipercov crrepeoJv ro pcev €ttI ttXcov deioprjaai ro 



" i.e. r,eucippus and the other Atomists. 
* i.e. the vVtoniists. 



242 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

school," it is obvious what their views are and how they 
state them, and they are clearly more or less consistent 
with the suppositions which they adopt. This is less 
clearly the case with the other school ; for example, 
it is not clear how, in the view of Empedocles, there 
are to be coming-to-be and passing-away and " altera- 
tion." For to the other school ** the primary bodies, 
from which originally bodies are composed and into 
which ultimately they are dissolved, are indivisible, 
differing only in structure ; but to Empedocles, it 
is clear that all the other bodies, down to the elements, 
have their coming-to-be and passing-away, but it 
is not evident how the accumulated mass of the ele- 
ments themselves comes-to-be and passes-away ; nor 
is it possible for him to give an explanation without 
asserting that there is also an element of fire and like- 
wise of all the other kinds, as Plato has stated in the 
Timaeus." For Plato is so far from giving the same Plato's 
account as Leucippus that, while both of them declare pared'^with 
that the elementary constituents are indivisible and \^^^ 9^ 
determined of figures, (a) Leucippus holds that the 
indivisibles are solid, Plato that they are planes, and 
(h) Leucippus declares that they are determined by 
an infinite number of figures, Plato by a defi- 
nite number. It is from these indivisibles that the 
comings-to-be and dissolutions result : according to 
Leucippus, through the void and through the con- 
tact (for it is at the point of contact that each body 
is divisible) ; according to Plato, as a result of contact 
only, for he denies that a void exists. 

Now we have dealt -with indivisible planes in Neither the 

earlier discussions ** ; but with regard to indivisible i?^°'^^*'^, 
Tiii 1 /-i n ^ T Empedocles 

solids, let us leave tor the moment further discussion nor that 
« 53 A flF. <' De Caelo 298 b 33 ff. 

243 



ARISTOTLE 

325 b 

avfjL^atvov a^eiaOco ro vvv, ws 8e [XiKpov TrapcK- 

326 a ^daiv elrreLV, avayKoiov aTraQis re eKacrrov Xeyetv 

Tcov aStatpercov {ov yap otov re iraaj^eiv aXX r\ 
Ota Tov Kevov) koI fxrjSevos 7tol7]tlk6v nddovs' ovre 
yap ipvxpov ovre CKX'qpov otov t' elvat. /caiVot 
Tovro ye droTTov, to [jlovov dnoSovvaL rco Trepi- 
5 (pepel a-)(rjp,aTL ro deppiov dvayKiq yap Kal rovvav- 
nov ro ipvxpov dXXco ri,vl TvpoaiqKeiv rwv axyj/J-drcov. 
aroTTov he kolv el ravra fxev VTrdpyet, Aeyco he 
oeppLorrjs Kal ipvxpdrrjg, ^apvTrjs Be /cat Kov^ort]? 
Kal oKXrjporrjs Kal ixaXaKorrjs fxr) virdp^er Kairoi 
papvrepov ye Kara rrjv vrrepox'^v (f>7jaLV etvai 

10 i^rjfxoKpLros eKaarov rcov dhiaiperoyv, oiore hrjXov 
on Kai depfjLorepov. roiavra 8' ovra jxtj rrdaxeiv 
VTT aj0^r^(jiv aSwarov, otov vtto tov ttoXv virep- 
^dXXovrog deppLOV ro rjpep.a depjiov. dXXd /xt)v 
et oKXrjpov, Kal /xaXaKov. ro he jxaXaKov rjhr] rw 
TTaaxeiv ri Xeyerai- ro yap vTreiKriKov /xaXaKov. 

15 dAAa p.r)v droTTov Kal el firjhev VTrdpxei dXX rj 
fjLovov axrjpia- Kal el virdpxei, ev he pLOvov, olov ro 
/xev i/jvxpov ro he deppLov ovhe yap dv fila ris eX-q 
7] (pvais avrwv. opbOLOis he dhvvarov Kal el TrXeioi 
rw evL' ahialperov yap ov ev rw avrcp e^ct rd Trddrj, 

20 ware Kal edv Trdaxj) etnep ifjvxerai, ravrrj tl^ 
Kai dXXo TToi'qaeL rj Txeiaerai. tov avrov he Tponov 
Kat eTTL rcov dXXoiv 7Tadr]p,drujv tovto yap Kal 

^ TavTj) Ti J : Tavrri rt EL : ravn] rot, F : ravro Tt H. 

" I.e. of the Atomists, 
244 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

of what they involve and deal with them in a short of the 
digression. It is a necessary part of the theory <* that ^^™^o»int 
each " indivisible " is incapable of being acted upon for"actioii- 
(for it cannot be acted upon except through the void) passion." 
and incapable of producing an effect on anything 
else ; for it cannot be either cold or hard. Yet it 
is certainly strange that heat can only be attributed 
to the spherical figure ; for then it necessarily 
follows that its contrary, cold, must belong to another 
of the figures. It is also strange if these properties, 
I mean heat and cold, belong to the indivisibles, 
while heaviness and lightness and hardness and soft- 
ness are not going to belong. Yet Democritus says 
that the more each of the indivisibles exceeds, the 
heavier it is, so that clearly it is also hotter. Being 
of this kind, it is impossible that the indivisibles should 
not be acted upon by one another, for example, the 
slightly hot should be acted upon by what far sur- 
passes it in heat. Again, if an indivisible can be 
hard, it can also be soft ; and the soft is always 
so-called because it can be acted upon ; for that 
which yields to pressure is soft. But, further, it is 
strange that no property except figure should attach 
to the indivisible ; and that, if properties do attach 
to them, only one should attach to each, e.g. that one 
" indivisible " should be cold and another hot ; for, 
then, neither would their substance be uniform. It 
is equally impossible, too, that more than one pro- 
perty should belong to one indivisible, for, being 
indivisible, it will possess these properties in the 
same place ; so that if it is acted upon by being 
chilled, it will also, in this way, act or be acted upon 
in some other way. And similarly with the other 
properties also ; for this problem also confronts in 

245 



ARISTOTLE 

326 a 

rots' crrepea Kal rots" eTrtVeSa Xiyovaiv dSiaipera 
avfi^aLvei, tov avrov rpoTrov ovre yap fiavorepa 
ovT€ TTVKVorepa olov re yiveadai Kevov firj ovros 

25 €V TOLS dSiaipeTOLS . ert 8' arorrov /cat to p,LKpd 
jxkv dhiaipera etvat, jxeydXa 8e fxi]' vvv p,€v yap 
evXoycos rd fxeil^co dpaverai /xaAAov tojv jJiLKpwv rd 
[xev ydp StaAuerat pabiojg, otov rd ^leydXa' TTpoa- 
KOTTrei ydp TroAAots" rd Se dhiaiperov dXiOS 8ta 
Ti fjidXXov VTrapx^L tojv fieydXiov roZs puKpols ; en 

30 8e TTorepov fxla irdvroiv rj (f>vat,s cKetvcov rcov 
arepecov, ■^ hia(j)epei ddrepa rwv erepcov, coaTrep 
dv €1 rd fxev etr] Ttvpiva, rd he yq'Cva rov oyKov; 
el fjiev ydp fjiia <f>VG(.s iarlv diravruyv, ri rd X^P^' 
aav ; ■»} 8ta ri ov yiver at di/jdp,eva ev, (LaTrep 
vSojp vSaros drav dtyrj; ovhev ydp hia<j>epei rd va- 

35 repov rov rrporepov. el 8' erepa, TTota ravra; Kal 

326 b S'^Aov o)? ravra dereov dpxds Kal atrta? rcov avfi- 

^aivovrojv fxdXXov rj rd ax'qP'O-ra. eVt Se Sta^e- 

povra ryjv (j)vaiv, kov ttoijj kov Trdaxf) dtyydvovra 

dXX-^Xcjv. en 8e rt rd klvovv ; el fiev ydp erepov, 

TTadrjriKa^' el 8' avrd avrd eKaarov, rj hiaiperdv 

5 earaL, /car' aAAo puev klvovv Kar^ dXXo he klvov- 

fievov, r) Kard ravrd rdvavria vnap^ei, Kal rj vXrj 

ov jxovov dpiOfxa) ear ai pLia dXXd Kal hvvdfxei. 

"OaoL p,ev oSv hid rrjs rcov TTopwv Kivqaecj? <j>aai, 

^ naOTjTiKa. EHL : -ov F. 

<• See Phys. 190 b 24, 192 a 1 ff. 
246 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

the same way both those who assert that " indi- 
visibles " are solid and those who say they are planes, 
for they cannot become either rarer or denser, because 
there can be no void in the " indivisibles." Further, 
it is strange that there should be small " indivisibles " 
but not large ones ; for it is natural to suppose at 
this stage that the larger bodies are more liable to 
be shattered than the small, for the former, like 
large things in general, are easily dissolved, since 
they come into collision with many other bodies. 
But why should indivisibility in general attach to 
small things rather than large ? Furthermore, is the 
substance of all these solids uniform or does it differ 
in different groups, as if, for example, some were 
fiery and some earthy in their bulk ? For if they are 
all of one substance, what has separated them from 
one another ? Or why do they not become one when 
they come into contact, just as water does when it 
touches water ? For there is no difference between 
the two cases. But if they belong to different classes, 
what are their different qualities ? Indeed it is clear 
that we ought to postulate that these classes rather 
than the " figures " are the origins and causes of 
the resulting phenomena. Moreover, if they were 
different in substance they would act and be acted 
upon reciprocally if they touched one another. Again, 
what sets these in motion ? For if it is something 
other than themselves, they must be liable to be 
acted upon ; but, if each is its own mover either it 
will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part 
being moved, or contraries will belong to it in the 
same respect, and the matter of it will be not only 
arithmetically but also potentially one." 

As for those who say that the processes of being 

247 



ARISTOTLE 

326 b 

ra TTadrj avfi^aiveiv, el fxev /cat TreTTX-qpoifJievcov 
r(x>v TTopojv, TTepiepyov ol iropof el yap ravTrj n 

10 TTaaxei to ttolv, kolv fxrj TTopovs ^xov aAA' avro 
crvvex^s 6v iraaxoi tov avrov rponov. ert Se ttojs 
evSex^rat irepl rod Siopdv avfM^aLvetv cu? Xeyovaiv; 
ovre yap Kara to,? a^a? ivbex^rai SiteVat 8td tcov 
Sta^avcDv, ovre Slo. riov TTopojv, el TrX-qprj^ eKaoTos' 
TL yap hLoiaei tov fXTj e;j^eiv TTopovs ; ttov yap 

15 ojXOLOJS earai TTXrjpes. aAAa pirjv el Kal Keva fxev 
TavTa [avayKT] Se aco^ara ev avToZs ex^Lv), rayro 
avpL^-qaeTat TraAtv, el 8e TrjXiKavTa to /xeyedos 
(xiOTe fiT] Bex^adai CTcD/xa pLrfhev, yeXoZov to jjucKpov 
[xev o'Uadai Kevov elvai, fxeya Se /jlt] )U.7jS' oTrrjXi- 
Kovovv, ri TO Kevov dXXo tl o'iead ai Xeyeiv ttXtjv 

20 x^P^^ acofiaTog, ojOTe hrjXov otc rravTi ocofiaTi tov 
oyKov laov earai Kevov. 

"OAco? 8e TO TTopovs TTOietv TTepiepyov el fiev yap 
lx7]Sev TToieZ Kara ttjv d(f)7]v, ovSe Sia rdtv Troptov 
7TOL7]aet Suov el Be tco aTTTeadai, Kal [xrj nopCDV 
ovTcov ra jxev neiaeTaL to, Se TToirjaei tcov Trpos 

25 dXXrjXa TOVTOV tov TpOTTOV 7Te(f)VK6TWV. OTl fiev 

ovv ovTCos Xeyeiv rovg TTopovg ws rii^es" vnoXafx- 
Pdvovaiv, 7] ipevSos rj juaratov, (f)avep6v eK tovtojv 
eoTiv BiaipeTibv 8' ovtcov TrdvTT) tcov acofxaTcov 
TTopovs TToielv yeXolov fj yap Siatpera, BvvaTai 
Xiopi^eadai. 

" i.e. the body is none the less impenetrable, even if it is 
held that the pores, though they contain bodies, are them- 
selves, qua pores, empty channels. 

* i.e. the very fact that a body is everywhere divisible 
makes it possible to open up a channel in it. 

248 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 

acted upon occur through movement in the pores, 
if this happens although the pores are filled, the pores 
are an unnecessary supposition ; for if the whole 
body is acted upon at all in this way, it would be 
acted upon in the same way even if it had no pores, 
in its own continuous self. Again, how is it possible 
to carry out the process of seeing through a medium 
as they describe it ? P'or it is not possible to pene- 
trate through the transparent bodies either at the 
points of contact or through the pores, if each pore 
is full. For how will this condition differ from the 
possession of no pores at all ? For the whole will 
be equally full throughout. Furthermore, if these 
channels, though they must contain bodies, are void, 
the same result will occur again " ; but if they are 
of such a size that they cannot admit any body, it 
is absurd to suppose that there is a small void but 
not a big one, of whatever size it be, or to think that 
" a void " means anything except a space for a body ; 
so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in 
cubic capacity to every body. 

In general, then, it is superfluous to postulate the 
existence of pores ; for if the agent effects nothing 
by contact, neither will it effect anything by passing 
through pores. If, however, it effects anything by 
contact, then, even without there being any pores, 
some of those things which are by nature adapted 
for reciprocal effect of this kind will be acted upon, 
while others will act. It is clear, therefore, from what 
we have said that it is either false or useless to talk 
of pores of the kind which some people suppose to 
exist, and, since bodies are everywhere divisible, it 
is ridiculous to postulate pores at all ; for since bodies 
are divisible, they can be separated into parts. ** 

249 



ARISTOTLE 

326 b 

9. Tiva o€ rpoTTov V7Tdp)(^6i rot? ovai yevvdv Kal 

30 TTOieZv Kal Trdaxeiv, Xeycofxev Xa^ovres Oipxr)V rrjv 
TToXXoLKLg elpriyievT)v . el yap eari ro fxev SwdfjieL 
TO S' ivreXexeia roiovrov, ire^vKev ov rfj pckv rfj 
8' ov TTaaxciv, dXXd Travrr] Kad^ oaov iarl roiovrov, 
rjrrov 8e /cat /xaAAov fj roiovrov /xoAAov iari /cat 
rjrrov /cat ravrj] TTopovs av rt? Xeyoi fiaiXXov, 

35 KaOaTTep iv roZs jLteraAAeyo/xeVots" StaTetvoycri rov 

327 a rraOrjriKov (f>X€^€s crvvex^ls- avpL(f)V€S fiev ovv e/ca- 

(Trov /cat ev ov drradi^. 6yLoio)S 8e /cat /xi^ diyyd- 
vovra pirire avrcov pnqr^ dXXoav, a TToielv Tre(f}VK€ 
/cat Traax^iv- Xeycx) S' olov ov pLovov drrropLevov 
depixaivGi ro TTvp, dXXa Kav aTTodev fj' rov piev yap 
5 aepa ro TTvp, o 8' dr^p to acopia deppLaivei,, Tre^u/ca/s" 
TToteiv /cat Trdaxetv. ro 8e rfj p,ev o'Uadai ndaxeiv 
rfj 8e pLTj, Sioptaavra^ iv dpxfj rovro XeKreov. el 
fiev yap pirj Trdvrrj Siaiperov ro pueyeOos, dAA' ecrrt 
atbpia ahiaiperov r^ nXdros, ovk av eir] Trdvrrj 
10 TTadrjriKov, dAA' ovbe avvex^s ovSdv el 8e rovro 
ipevBos Kal irdv aajpia Staiperov, ovbev hia(f)epei 
htr^prjaOai p-ev aTrreadai 8e, 7) 8tatpeTov etvat* el 
yap hiaKpiveadai Svvarat Kara rd? d(j>ds, aiairep 
(/)aai rives, Kav pn/jnco fj SirjpTjpievov, earai hirjpr^- 

" It is difficult to extract any meaning from this sentence 
as it stands. Joachim supposes a lacuna after rrj Se fi^. 
250 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 9 

9. Let us now deal with the question about the Aristotle's 
way in which existences have the power of generating of^'*°cUon° 
and of acting and being acted upon, starting from and-pas- 
the principle which we have often enunciated. For 
if there exists that which is potentially of a certain 
kind as well as that which is actually so, it is of a 
nature, in so far as it is what it is, to be acted upon 
in every part, and not in some part but not in another, 
and to a more or a less extent according as it is more 
or less of that particular nature ; and one might 
speak of pores as having a particular nature in a 
greater degree, just as there are veins of substance 
which can be acted upon which stretch continuously 
in metals which are being mined. Every body, then, 
which is coherent and one is not acted upon ; and 
this is equally true of bodies which do not touch 
either each other or other bodies which are of a 
nature to act or be acted upon. Fire is an example 
of what I mean : it heats not only when it is in con- 
tact with something, but also if it is at a distance ; 
for it heats the air, and the air heats the body, being 
of a nature both to act and to be acted upon. But 
having enunciated the theory that a body is acted 
upon in one part but not in another, we must first 
make the following declaration ** : if the magnitude 
is not everywhere divisible, but there is a divisible 
body or plane, no body would be liable to be acted 
upon throughout, but neither would any body be 
continuous ; but, if this is not true and every body 
is divisible, there is no difference between " having 
been divided but being in contact " and " being 
divisible " ; for if it is possible for a body to be " sepa- 
rated at the points of contact " — a phrase which some 
people use — then, even if it has not yet been divided, 

251 



ARISTOTLE 

327 a 

jxevov hvvarov yap hiaipedrjvaf yiverai yap ovhkv 

15 aovvarov . oAcos" 8e ro tovtov yiveadai tov rporrov 
axi'^op'^viov ru)v awfjiariov droTTOv dvatpel yap ov- 
Tog 6 Adyo? dXXoLaxytv, opcofiev Se to avro acofxa 
ovvex^s ov ore [xev vypov ore Se Treirriyos, ov Stai- 
peaei Kai avvdeaet tovto Tradov, ouSe rpoTTTJ /cat 
hiadiyfj, KaOdnep Aeyet ArjixoKpLTos' ovre yap 

20 fxeraredev ovre fxera^aXov rrjv ^vaiv TreTrrjyos i^ 
vypov yeyovev ovS' ivvvapx^t rd aKX-qpd /cat ne- 
TTTjyoTa dhiaipera rovs oyKovs' aAA' ofxoicos dnav 
vypov, oTe 3e OKXrjpov /cat TreTrrjyos iariv. en 
S' ovS^ av^TjOLV olov t' etvai /cat (^diaw ov yap 
OTLOvv ecrrat yeyovog jxelt^ov, etnep earai Ttpoadeai^, 

25 /cat jXT] TTOV /uerajSe/SArj/cos', rj fxixdevTog rivds ^ 
KaO^ avTo [xera^aXovros . 

"On fjiev ovv eari to yewdv /cat to ttouiv /cat to 
yiveadai re /cat Trdaxeiv v'n dXKr\Xoiv, koX riva 
TpoTTOv ivSex^Tai, /cat rtVa cfiaarl jxev Tives ovk 
evSex^Tai Se, SicopLadco tovtov tov TpoTTov. 

30 10. AotTTOv 8e decoprjaai nepl fxt^ecos Kara tov 

aVTOV TpOTTOV TTJ? [JieOoBoV TOVTO ydp rjv TpiTOV 

tG)v TTpoTedevTOJV i^ dpxrjs. OKeiTTeov Se tl t' 

eOTLV Tj /Ltt^t? /cat Tl TO flLKTOV, /Cat TtCTtJ/ VndpXiL 
Tcbv 6vT(X)V /cat TTWg, €TL 8e TTOTepOV eCTTl /it'^t? T] 

TOVTO ipevSog- aSwaTor ydp ioTL fxixBrjvai tl ctc- 

35 pov €T€pcp, Kaddnep Xiyovai TLves' ovrcov fiev ydp 

327 b CTt rajv [Xix^evTWV /cat fxr) rjXXoLcofievojv ovSev fxaX- 

" The other two being ac^if (ch. 6) and ttouZv koL naavnv 
(chs. 7-9). 

252 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 9-10 

it will be in a condition of having been divided ; for 
since it can be divided, nothing impossible results. 
And, in general, it is strange that it should happen 
in this way only, namely, if the bodies are being 
split ; for this theory does away with " alteration," 
whereas we see the same body remaining in a state 
of continuity, though it is at one time liquid and at 
another solid, and it has not undergone this change by 
" division "or" composition, "nor yet by " turning "and 
" mutual contact," as Democritus declares ; for it has 
not become solid instead of liquid through any change 
of arrangement or alteration of its substance, nor do 
there exist in it those hard and congealed particles 
which are indivisible in their bulk, but it is liquid and at 
another time hard and congealed uniformly through- 
out. Furthermore, it is also impossible for there to 
be growth and diminution ; for if there shall be any 
addition — as opposed to a change in the whole, either 
by the admixture of something or by a change in the 
body itself — no part of it will have become greater. 

Let this, then, be our explanation of the way in 
which things generate and act and come into being 
and are acted upon by one another, and the manner 
in which these processes can occur and the impossible 
theories which some philosophers enunciate. 

10. It now remains to consider " mixture " by the The nature 
same kind of method ; for this is the third of the °urg 1^'^j 
subjects originally proposed.* We must consider " combina- 
what " mixture " is and what it is that can be mixed how it 
and of what things mixture is a property and how ; ^^^^^ p'*'*'^- 
and, further, whether there is such a thing as mixture, 
or is it a fiction. For, according to some people, it is 
impossible for one thing to be mixed with another ; 
for (a) if the ingredients still exist and are not altered 

253 



ARISTOTLE 

327 b 

Xov vvv fx€[jux0ai ^aaiv rj nporepov, aAA' o/xotoj? 
e;^eiv, darepov Be cfjOapevros ov pLefilxdoLi', dXXa to 
pLev etvai to S' ovk elvai,, ttjv Se pbi^iv o/xoioJS' 
5 exovTCov elvaf tov avTov Se TpoTTov koI el dpu- 
^OTepcov avveXOovTCOv e^dapTai tcov payvvpievuiv 
eKOLTepov ov yap eivaL piep^typteva to. ye oXojs ovk 
ovTa. 

OvTOS piev ovv 6 Xoyos eoiKe ^rjTeXv BiopiaaL tl 
Sia(f)epeL pilots yeveaeats Kal (fyOopds, Kal tl to pn- 
KTOV TOV yewTjTov Kal (f)9apTov' SrjXov yap to? Set 

10 Sta^epetv, e'nrep cotlv. coare toutcuv ovtcov <f)ave- 
pcjv TO. 8ia7Topr)9evTa Xvolvt^ av. 

'AAAa pur^v ovhe Trjv vXrjv tw TTvpl piepu-)(6ai 
(f)apL.ev ov8e pLtyvvaOaL Kaiopievrjv, ovt* avTr)v avTrjg 
T0L9 piopLois ovTe Tcp TTvpt, dXXd TO pL€V TTVp ytveodai, 
TTjv he ^deipeaBai. tov avTov he Tpoirov ovTe to) 

15 CTajjuari Tiqv Tpocfyrjv ovTe to 0)(^rjpLa tw Krjpcp pnyvv- 
puevov ox'^P'CLTtleiv tov oyKov ovhe to oajpia Kal to 
XevKov oi)8' oXcos TO, TTadr] Kal Tas e^etg olov Te 
pbiyvvaOai tols TTpdypLaaiv cra)l,6pi€va yap oparrai,. 
dXXd pirjv ovbe to XevKov ye Kal ttjv imaT'qpi'qv 
evhex^Tat pnx^'^vaL, oyS' aAAo tiov pirj p^copiCTTcDv 

20 ovSev. dXXd tovto XeyovoLV ov KaXws ol Trai'Ta 
TTore opiov ^dcKovres etvai Kal piepblxdcLf ov yap 

" i.e. "white" and "knowledge" cannot exist by them- 
254 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 

at all, they are no more mixed than they were before, 
but are in a similar state ; and (b) if one ingredient 
is destroyed, they have not been mixed, but one 
ingredient exists while the other does not, whereas 
mixture is composed of ingredients which remain 
what they were before ; and in the same way (c) even 
if, both the ingredients having come together, each 
of them has been destroyed, there is no mixture ; for 
things which have no existence at all cannot have 
been mixed. 

This argument, then, seems to seek to define in 
what respect " mixing " differs from coming-to-be and 
passing-away, and how that which is " mixed " differs 
from that which comes-to-be and passes-away ; for 
obviously " mixture," if there is such a thing, must 
be something different. When, therefore, these ques- 
tions have been cleared up, our difficulties would be 
solved. 

Now we do not say that wood has mixed with fire 
nor that it mixes, when it is burning, either with its 
own particles or with the fire, but we say that the 
fire comes-to-be and the wood passes-away. Similarly 
we do not say that the food mixes with the body or 
that the shape mixes with the wax and so forms the 
lump. Nor can " body " and " white " be " mixed " 
together, nor, in general, can " properties " and 
" states " be mixed Avith " things " ; for we see them 
persisting unchanged. Again, " white " and " know- 
ledge " cannot be mixed together, nor any of the 
terms which cannot be used separately." This is 
what is wrong in the theory of those who hold that 
formerly all things were together and mixed ; for 

selves ; a man can be " white " and " learned," but these attri- 
butes can only exist as properties of someone. 

255 



ARISTOTLE 

327 b 

aTTav aTTOVTi [xiktov, dAA' vrrapx^iv Set ■)(copiar6v 
eKarepov twv paxdevTCov rcov Se rraOaJv ovBev 
Xojptarov. errel 8' earl ra /xev Swdfiei to. 8' 
evepyeia twv ovrcov, evhey^eraL to. fiL)(d€VTa elvai 

25 TTO}s /cat jLti] eivat, ivepyeia fxev irepov ovros rod 
yeyovoTog e^ avrtov, 8uva/xet 8' ert eKarepov arrep 
Tjaav TTplv pnx^rjvai , /cat ovk (XTroAcoAdra • rovro 
yap 6 Xoyos StrjTrdpet rrporepov ^aiverat 8e to, 
jjLLyvvixeva rrporepov re eK Kexcopioixevcov avviovra 
Kal Swd/xeva xa)pL^eadaL ttolXlv. ovre Siafxevovatv 

80 ovv evepyeia warrep ro acojxa /cat ro XevKov, ovre 
(j)deipovraL, ovre ddrepov ovr^ dp^co- ad)iC,erai yap 
7) 8wa/xis" avrd)V. 8to ravra pev d(f>eLadcx)' ro 
oe avve^eg rovrois aTToprjpa hiaipereov , norepov 'q 
/xt^t? Trpos rrjv aladrjaiv ri eariv. 

"Orav yap ovrcos et? piKpd SiaLpedfj ra pnyvv- 

35 fjieva, Kal reOfj Trap' dXXrjXa roCrov rov rpoirov 
ware p.r] SrjXov eKaarov etvai rfj aladrjaei, rore 

328 a pepLKrat 7] ov, dAA' eariv ware oriovv Trap* dri- 

ovv etvat pbopiov rwv pnxQ^vrcov ; Xeyerai pev ovv 

eKeivcog, olov KpcOds peplxdai rrvpols, orav rjnaovv 

Trap ovrivovv redfj. el 8' ecrrt Trdv crcD/xa SiaLperov, 

eiTTep Kai eon ad)p,a crcup,arL puKrov opotopepes, 

5 oriovv dv Se'ot pepos yiveadai irap* oriovv. eirel 
256 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 

everything cannot be mixed with everything, but 
each of the ingredients which are mixed must origi- 
nally exist separately, and no property can have a se- 
parate existence. Since, however, some things have 
a potential, and other things an actual, existence, it 
is possible for things which combine in a mixture 
to " be " in one sense and " not-be " in another, the 
resulting compound formed from them being actually 
something different but each ingredient being still 
potentially what it was before they were mixed and 
not destroyed. (This is the difficulty which arose in 
our earlier argument, and it is clear that the ingredi- 
ents of a mixture first come together after having 
been separate and can be separated again.) They 
do not actually persist as " body " and " white," nor 
are they destroyed (either one or both of them), for 
their potentiality is preserved. Let us, therefore, 
dismiss these questions, but the problem closely con- 
nected with them must be discussed, namely, whether 
mixture is something relative to perception. 

When the ingredients of the mixture have been 
divided into such small particles and so set side by 
side with one another that each is not apparent to 
the sense-perception, have they then been mixed ? 
Or is this not so, and is mixture of such a nature that 
every particle of one ingredient is side by side with 
a particle of the other ingredient ? The term cer- 
tainly is used in the former sense ; for instance, we 
say that barley is mixed with wheat when each grain 
of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat. 
But if every body is divisible, then since body mixed 
with body is made up of like parts, every part of each 
ingredient ought to be side by side with a part of the 
other. But since it is not possible for a body to be 

K 257 



ARISTOTLE 

328 a 

8' ovK ear IV et? raXd'^iaTa Siatpedrjvai, ovre avv- 

deoLS ravTO /cat [Jll^is aAA' erepov, hrjXov o)? ovre 
Kara jxiKpa aojt,6fi€va Set ra ixtyvvfjieva (f)dvaL 
[xefilx^oLi' [avvdeais yap earai /cat ov Kpdats ovhe 

10 jut^i?, oi)S' efet Tov avrov Xoyov rep oXcp ro [xopiov. 
(f)aix€v Be Setv/ e'lTrep jiefiLKrai,^ ro fXLxdev opoco- 
pepes etvai, /cat wanep rov vSarog ro puepo'S vScop, 
ovroj Kal rov Kpadevrog. dv 8' fj Kara piKpd 
avvdeais rj pt^is, ovdev avpL^-^aerat rovrcov, dXXd 
povov pepiypeva irpos rrjv aLad-qaiv Kal ro avro 

15 TO) pev p,ep,t,yp,€vov, edv prj ^Xerrr) o^v, rat Auy- 
/cet 8' ovSev piepi'/pLevov) ovre rfj hiatpeaei ware 
orLovv Trap' oriovv pepos' dhvvarov yap ovrco 8tat- 
pedrjvaL. ^ ovv ovk eari pt^is, rj XeKreov rovro 
TTOJS evhey^erai yiveaO ai ttoXlv. 

"Eart hrj, (hs e^apev, rcov ovrcvv rd pev TToirjriKd, 
rd 8' VTTo rovrojv TradrjriKa. ra p.ev ovv avri- 

20 arpe(j)eL, oacov rj avrrj vXrj eari, Kal TTOLrjriKd dX- 

XrjXixiv /cat TTaOrjriKd vtt* dAAr^Aon^* rd 8e TTOiel 

drraOrj ovra, oacov prj rj avrrj vXrj. rovrojv pev 

ovv OVK eart pLi^iS' Sio oj38' tj larptKrj Troiet vyceiav 

jK oj38' 'q vyieia piyvvpevrj rots acop,aaiv. rcov be 



>l%' 



1 8' EL. 



" One of the Argonauts, famous for his keen sight 
(Apollonius Rhodius i. 153 ff.). 

258 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 

divided into its smallest parts and " composition " 
and mixture are not the same thing but different, it 
is clear (a) that we must not say that the ingredients, 
if they are preserved in small particles, are mixed 
(for this will be " composition " and not " blending " 
or " mixing," nor will the part show the same ratio 
between its constituents as the whole ; but we say 
that, if mixing has taken place, the mixtui-e ought 
to be uniform throughout, and, just as any part of 
water is water, so any part of what is blended should 
be the same as the whole. But if mixing is a com- 
position of small particles, none of these things will 
happen, but the ingredients will only be mixed 
according to the standard of sense-perception, and 
the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he 
has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lynceus " 
will not be mixed) ; it is also clear (b) that we must 
not say that things are mixed by means of a division 
whereby every part of one ingredient is set by the 
side of a part of the other ; for it is impossible for 
them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no 
mixing, or another explanation must be given of the 
way in which it occurs. 

Now, as we maintained, some of those things which 
exist are capable of action and others capable of 
being acted upon by them. Some things, then, 
namely, those whose matter is the same, " recipro- 
cate," that is, are capable of acting and being acted 
upon by one another, while other things, namely, 
those which have not the same matter, act but are 
not liable to be acted upon. Of the latter, then, no 
mixing is possible ; hence, neither the art of healing 
nor health mixing with the patients' bodies can pro- 
duce health. But of things which are capable of 

259 



ARISTOTLE 

828 a 

TTOL'qTiKcov Kol TTadrjTiKcJov OCTtt evhiaipeTa, TroAAa 

25 jLtev oAtyot? KOi jxeydXa fXLKpols avvrtdepbeva ov 
TToiel /xt^tv, aAA' av^rjaiv rod Kparovvtros' fiera- 
^dXXet yap ddrepov els to Kparovv, olov araXayjxos 
o'lvov fjLvpiOiS )(o€vaLV vSaros ov [xiyvvTaf XveraL 
yap TO etSo? /cat /xera^aAAet els to irdv vScop. 
OTav 8e rat? hvvdfjieaiv Icrd^rj ttws, roTe [xeTa- 

30 jSaAAei jLtev eKdrepov els to Kparovv €k rrjs avrov 
(f)va€a)s, ov yiverai he ddrepov, dXXd pbera^v /cat 

KOIVOV. 

^avepov ovv on ravr^ eart fJUKra oaa evavriojatv 

e;^et rwv ttolovvtcdv ravra yap St] utt' dXXr]Xa>v 

earl TTadrjriKd. /cat p.LKpd Se fiiKpols Trapandeixeva 

jjilyvvrai jxaXXov paov yap /cat ddrrov dXXr^Xa 

35 fJLeOLOT'qaiV. to 8e ttoXv /cat vno ttoXXov j^poviuys 

328 b rovTO 8 pa. Sto rd evopiara roJv Siaipercov /cat 

TradrjTiKcov jjLLKrd (Siatpetrat yap els puKpd ravra 

pahioiS' rovro yap rjv ro evoptarcp elvai), olov ra 

vypd fiLKra pudXiara rGiv acofxdrcov evopicrrov yap 

pcdXiara ro vypdv rwv hiaiperwv , edv /jlt) yXiaxpov 

6 7}* ravra yap Sr) vXelco /cat /Ltet^co povov vrotet 

rev oyKov. orav S' fj ddrepov pcovov rradrfriKov r] 

a<f)6Spa, ro 8e TrdpLrrav rjpepa, rj ovSev TrXelov ro 

260 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 

action and capable of being acted upon, those which 
are easily divisible, when many of one of them are 
compounded with few of another or a large bulk with 
a small, do not produce a mixture but an increase of 
the predominant ingredient, for there is a change 
of the other ingredient into the predominant. (For 
example, a drop of wine does not mix with ten thou- 
sand measures of water, for its form is dissolved and 
it changes so as to become part of the total volume 
of water.) But when there is some sort of balance 
between the " active powers," then each changes from 
its own nature into the predominant ingredient, 
without, however, becoming the other but something 
between the two with common properties. 

It is clear, therefore, that those agents are capable Aristotle's 
of admixture which show contrariety, for these can "mixture.' 
be acted upon by one another ; and they mix all the 
better if small particles of the one ingredient are 
set side by side with small particles of the other, for 
then they more easily and more quickly cause a 
change in one another, whereas a large quantity of 
one takes a long time to be affected in this way by 
a large quantity of the other. Hence, those of the 
divisible and susceptible materials whose form is 
easily modified are capable of mixture ; for they are 
easily divided into small particles (for that is what 
" to be easily modified in form " means) ; for example, 
the liquids are the most " mixable " of bodies, since 
of " divisibles " liquid is the most easily modified in 
form, provided it is not viscous (for viscous liquids 
merely increase the volume and bulk). But when 
one only of the ingredients is susceptible to action — 
or is excessively susceptible, while the other in- 
gredient is only slightly so — the result of the mixture 

261 



ARISTOTLE 

328 b 

fjLLX^^v ^^ ayi(j)olv rj fxiKpov, orrep cru^jSaiVei TTCpl 

Tov Karrirepov /cat rov jj^aA/cdv. evta yap ifjeXXt- 

10 t,€rai TTpos aXXrjXa twv ovtcov /cat eTTaix^OTepil,eL' 

<f)aLV€Tai yap ttcos Kal fiiKra rjpefjia, /cat cog 

darepov jxev heKTiKov ddrepov S' etSo?. OTrep cttI 

Tovrwv CTfjLtjSatVet • d yap Karrirepos (vs tradog rt 

a)V av€V vXrjg rod ;)^aA/coi' ax^Sov a<j>avi^erai, /cat 

^lydels ctTTetat y^pcjixariaas fxovov. ravro 8e tovto 

avfx^aivei /cat e^' erepojv. 

15 C[)aye/3dv roivvv e/c tcSi/ elprjixevcov Kal drt ecrrt 

/xi^t? /cat Tt ecTTt /cat Sia rt, /cat Trota puKra tojv 

ovriov, €7T€i7T€p ioTiv €vt,a Toiavra ola TTadrjTLKa. 

re utt' aAAi^Acov /cat evopiara /cat evSiaipera' ravra 

yap ovT^ €(f)ddpdai aray/cr^ fxefnypidva ovt* €tl 

ravra glttXcos clvai, ovre avvdeaiv etrat Tr]v fil^tv 

20 avTcbv, ovre rrpos rrjv atadrjatv dXX* ecrrt, fiiKTOv 

jxev o dv evopiarov ov iradrfTLKov r] /cat ttoit^tckov 

/cat roiovrcp {jllktov [irpog ofjuovvixov yap ro puKrov), 

Tj §€ flints rdJV fJiLKTCOV dXXoLcoOivTOJv eVOiOLS. 



262 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 

of the two is no greater in volume or very little 
greater, as happens when tin and copper are mixed. 
For some things adopt a hesitant and wavering atti- 
tude towards one another, for they appear somehow 
to be only slightly " mixable," one, as it were, acting 
in a " receptive " manner, the other as a " form." This 
is what happens with these metals ; the tin almost 
disappears as though it were a property of the copper 
without any material of its own and, after being 
mixed, almost vanishes, having only given its colour 
to the copper. And the same thing happens in other 
instances too. 

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there 
is such a process as mixing, and what it is, and how 
it occurs, and what kind of existing things are " mix- 
able," seeing that some things are of such a nature 
as to be acted upon by one another and easily modi- 
fied in shape and easily divisible. For it does not 
necessarily follow either that they are destroyed by 
having been mixed, or that they simply remain 
still the same, or that their " mixture " is composi- 
tion, or only dependent on perception ; but any- 
thing is " mixable " which, being easily modified in 
shape, is capable of acting or being acted upon, and 
is " mixable " with something of the same kind as 
itself (for the term " mixable " is used in relation to 
something else which is also called " mixable "), and 
mixture is the union of " mixables," when they have 
undergone alteration. 



263 



B 

328 b 26 1. YlepL fxev ovv fjii^ews Kal d(f)rjs Kal rov Troielv 
Kal TTaax^iv eiprjrai ttcos vnapx^i- rots /xera^aA- 
Xovai Kara (ftvaiv, eVt 8e Trepl yeveaecos Kal (f)do- 
pds Trjs aTrXrjg, TTcvg Kal tlvo<s^ earl Kal hid riv^ 
30 alriav. o/xotcus' 8e Kal Trepl dXXoicoaew^ et/aT^rai, ti 
TO aXXoLovaOaL Kal riv* e^^i hia^opdv avrihv. Xolttov 
8e Oeojprjaai Trepl rd KaXovfxeva GTOL)(€xa rcov crco- 
pbdroiv. 

VeveoLS pi€v ydp Kal (f)6opd Trdaais rats cf)vaei 

(TVveaTcoaais ovcriaig ovk dvev rojv aLadrjTcov aco- 

[xdrcov TOVTWV 8e rrjv VTTOKeLpievrjV vXr)v ol fiev 

35 (f)aai,v etvai fxiav, otov depa riOevre^ •^ TTvp -^ ri 

329 a fxcTa^v rovTcov, aa>{xd re ov Kal ;!^co/9icrTW, ol 8e 

TrXeicD rov dpidfxov ivos, ol fxev rrvp Kal yrjv, ol 

Se ravrd re /cat depa rpirov, ol Se /cat v^ojp tovtiov 

reraprov, ciiaTrep 'E|u.7re8o/cA';^S" e^ &v avyKptvo- 

fxevcDV Kal hiaKpivopievojv r) dAAotou/xeVoJV au/u,- 

5 ^aivetv rrjv yeveaiv /cat tt^v <j)dopdv rols Trpdyixaaiv. 

"Otl fjiev ovv rd Trpwra dp^ds /cat aTOt;^eta /ca- 

X(x)s e^et Xeyeiv, earoj avvopLoXoyovjxevov , ef d)v 

Ixera^aXXovTOJV rj Kard avyKpiaw /cat BiaKpLOLV t) 

^ TTOJS KOL TLVOS .J^D'': TIVOS KoX TTcDs E.I*: Koi TIVOS KOI. 
TTUiS HL. 

264 



BOOK II 

1. We have now dealt with the way in which mixture, Chapters 
contact and action-and-passion are attributable to wkatcomes- 

thinffs which undergo natural change ; we have, to-be and 

^ 1-11 i-r-i • ^ \_ passes-away 

moreover, explained how unqualified coming-to-be consists of 

and passing-away exist, and with what they are fJI^-^"' 

concerned and owing to what cause they occur, simple 

Similarly, we have dealt with " alteration " and ex- whMare 

plained how it differs from coming-to-be and passing- ^My and 
^ how do they 

away. It remains to consider the so-called elements combine? 

of bodies. 

Coming-to-be and passing-away occur in all natu- views held 
rally constituted substances, if we presuppose the s^oob.°"^ 
existence of perceptible bodies. Some people assert 
that the matter underlying these bodies is one ; for 
example, they suppose it to be Air or P'ire, or an 
intermediate between these two, but still a single 
separate body. Others hold that there are more than 
one material, some thinking that they are Fire and 
Earth, others adding Air as a third, others (like 
Empedocles) adding Water as a fourth ; and it is, 
they say, from the association and separation or 
alteration of these that coming-to-be and passing- 
away of things comes about. 

Let us, then, be agreed that the primary materials 
from the changes of which, either by association or 
by separation or by some other Idnd of change, 

265 



ARISTOTLE 

329 a 

Acar' dXXrjv fjLera^oXrjv cru/x^atVet yeveaiv etvai /cat 
(fiOopdv. dAA' OL fM€v TToiovvreg ^xiav vXrjv Trapd 

10 TO. elprjfieva, ravr'qv 8e aoypLarLKrjv kol xoipLonqv , 
apLapravovGLV ahvvarov yap dvev €vavTta)oeoJS ef- 
vat TO awfJLa tovto aladrjTrjs^ • rj yap Kov(f)ov "^ 
^apv rj i/jvxpov t) deppiov dvdyKT] elvai to d-neipov 
TOVTO, o XeyovGL Ttve? elvai Trjv dpx'^v. cos" S' ev 
TO) Tiju-aia> yeypaiTTat, ovSeva e;)^ei hLopiafxov ov 

15 yap etprjKe aa(f)cos to iravSex^s, el p^copi'^erat tcDv 
aTOLX€La>v. ovSe XPV'^^'' ovSev, (^T^cra? etvai utto- 
Keifxevov tl toIs KaXovfievots OTOLX^iois irpoTepov, 
olov ;)(puor6v Tols epyoLS rots xpuo-ots". (/catVot /cat 
TOVTO ov KaXcos Aeyerat tovtov tov TpoTTOv Xeyo- 
fxevov, dAA' c5v /x.ei' dAAoicocrt?, ecrnv ovtojs, cSv 

20 Se yeVeatS" /cat (j>Oopd, dhvvaTov €K€lvo npocrayo- 
peveadai e^ ov yeyovev. KaiToi yi (f>r)aL [xaKpcp 
dXr^deoTaTOV elvai ;(puCTov Xeyeiv eKacTTov elvai.) 
dXXd TUiv aTOLX^LWV ovtcov OTepecbv P'^XP^ eVtTreScor 
Troietrat ttjv dvaXvaiv dSwaror Se t7]v Tid-qvqv 
/cat TTjV vXrjv ttjv TrpcoTTjv ret eniTreha etvai. rjpiels 

25 Se (f)afX€v fxev elvai TLva vXtjv tcjjv acofxaTcov tcov 
ala6r)Tcov , dXXd TavTrjv ov x^P^^'^'h^ dAA' det /Lter' 
ivavTLwcreojs, e^ t^? ytVerai ret KaXovp.€va gtolx^m. 
StcopicTTai Se Trept avTwv iv eTcpoL^ dKpL^eaTepov. 
ov pLrjv dAA' €7T€ihr) /cat rov TpOTTOv tovtov ioTiv 
e/c rr^? vXr)9 rd acofiaTa Ta irpoiTa, SiopiOTeov /cat 

30 Trept TOVTOJV, dpx'^v pckv /cat TrpwTfjv olop^evois etvai 

^ ataBrjTTJs MJ : alaOrjTOV E : to aladtfTov F : aiadrjTov ov L. 

» Plato, Timaeus 51 a. * /6irf. 49 d — 50 c. 

Ibid. 53 c fF. <* Ibid. 49 a. 

* P/ty«. i. 6 and 7. 

266 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1 

coming-to-be and passing-away occur, are rightly 
described as " sources " and " elements." But (a) those 
who postulate that there is a single matter, besides 
the bodies which we have mentioned, and that this 
is corporeal and separable, are mistaken ; for it is 
impossible that this body can exist without " per- 
ceptible contrariety," for this " infinite," which some 
say must be the source of reality, must be either 
light or heavy, or hot or cold. And (b) what is written 
in the Timaeus " is not accurately defined ; for Plato 
has not clearly stated whether his " omnirecipient " 
has any existence apart from the elements, nor does 
he make any use of it, after saying that it is a ^m^- 
stratum prior to the so-called elements, just as gold 
is the substratum of objects made of gold. (Yet put 
in this way the statement is not a happy one. Things 
of which there is coming-to-be and passing-away 
cannot be called after that out of which they have 
come-to-be, though it is possible for things which are 
altered to keep the name of that of which they are 
alterations. However, what he actually says * is 
that by far the truest account is to say that each of 
the objects is " gold.") However, he carries the ana- 
lysis of the elements,^ though they are solids, back 
to " planes," and it is impossible for the " Nurse," ^ 
that is the primary matter, to consist of planes. Our 
theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible 
bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always Aristotle's 
accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that thTele^** 
the so-called elements come into being ; but a more ments are 
accurate account of these things has been given else- matter 

where.* However, since the primary bodies are also ^P^ certain 
1.1-1. /• 1. *'°^" 

derived in this way rrom matter, we must explain trarieties." 

about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary 

267 



ARISTOTLE 

329 a 

Tr]v vXrjv TTjv a')(wpLarov fxev, vTTOKeifievrjv 8e toi? 

evavTiois' ovre yap to depfjiov vXrj tm i/jvxp<^ ovre 

TOVTo TO) depfio), dXXa ro viroKeipievov ap,^olv. 

a)aT€ TrpoJTOv puev to SuvctjLiet aw pea aladrjTOV apx^j 

Seyre/aov 8' at ivavTiwaeis, Aeyco 8' olov depp.OTrjs 

35 Kal ijjvxpoTrjs , TpiTOv 8' rfhrj TTvp Kal vhcop Kai ra 

32dbTOLavTa' TavTa piev yap jLterajSaAAet et? ctAATjAa, 

Kal ovx <^S 'EjU,7re8o/cA'f5? Kal erepot Xeyovaiv [ovhe 

yap av rjv aXXotojais) , at 8' ivavTiwaeig ov pLCTa- 

^dXXovatv. aAA' ovhev rJTTOV Kal co? croJ/xaTOS" 

TTota? Kal TToaas XcKTeov dpxds' ol pev yap dX- 

5 Aot V7ro6ep,€voL p^pciivTat, /cat oj}8ev Xeyovcn 8ta rt 

avTai 7] ToaavTai. 

2. 'E77et ow ^7]Tovpi€v alodrjTOV acopLaTos dpxds, 
TOVTO 8' cotIv aTTTOV, aTTTOv 8' ou 1^ atod'qais acprj, 
cfyavepov otl ov Trdoai at evavrtcucrets' acopiaTog 
10 61817 Kat dpp^a? TTOLovaiv, dXXd pLovov at Kara ttji' 
dcfi'qv /car' evavTicooLV re yap Siacfjepovat, Kai Kara 
diTTrjv evavTLOjaiv. 8to ouVe XevKOTrj? /cat pieXavia 

OVT€ yXvKVTT]? Kal TTLKpOTrjS , OpiOLCOS 8 Ol)Se TCOP' 

aAAa)v roil' aladrjTCbv ivavTuoaecav ovSev Trotet 
crToi;(€tov. /catVot rrpoTepov oif/is d(f)rjg, wotc /cat 
15 TO vTTOKeipLevov TTpoTepov. dXX* ovK eoTi awpiaTog 
aTTTOV irddos 'fj dTTTov, dXXd /ca^' CTepov, /cat 6t 
€TVX^ TJ) <f>va€i TTpoTepov. 

KvT<Iiv Se TTpcjTOV Tojv aTTTiov SiatpeTcoi/ TTOtat 
TTpcoTai 8ta0opat /cat iuavTicoaeis . eial 8 cv'at'Tt- 
waeis Kara tt^v at^iyi' atSe, deppLov ipvxpdv, ^rjpov 
268 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1-2 

the matter which is inseparable from, but underUes, 
the contrarieties ; for " the hot " is not matter for 
" the cold," nor "the cold" for "the hot," but the sub- 
stratum is matter for them both. Therefore, firstly, 
the potentially perceptible body, secondly, the con- 
trarieties (for example, heat and cold), and thirdly. 
Fire and Water and the like are " sources." For the 
bodies in this third class change into one another 
and are not as Empedocles and others describe them " 
(otherwise alteration could not have taken place), 
whereas the contrarieties do not change. Neverthe- 
less, even so the question must be decided what kinds 
of contrariety and how many of them there are which 
are sources of body ; for all other philosophers assume 
and make use of them without stating why they are 
these and why they are of a particular number. 

2. Since, therefore, we are seeking the sources of The " con- 
perceptible bodies, and this means tangible, and are"*' hot 
tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it ^^i"! po'*^ '' 
is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute and moist.' 
" forms " and " sources " of body, but only those con- 
nected with touch ; for it is in the matter of con- 
trariety that they differ, that is, tangible contrariety. 
Therefore neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweet- 
ness and bitterness, nor any of the other perceptible 
contrarieties constitute an element. Yet sight is 
prior to touch, so that its subject is also prior ; but 
it is a quality of tangible body not in virtue of its 
tangibility but because of something else, even though 
it happens to be naturally prior. 

Of the tangible differences and contrarieties them- 
selves we must distinguish which are primary. The 
following are contrarieties according to touch : hot 

" i.e. as immutable. 

269 



ARISTOTLE 

329 b 

20 vypov, jSapy Kov(f)ov, aKXrjpov fxaXaKov, yXioxpov 

Kpavpov, Tpaxv Xelov, 7ra;^u Xctttov. tovtojv he 
^apv pbkv Kol Kov(j)ov ov TTOirjriKa ovhk TradrjTLKa.' 
OX) yap rw TToielv ti erepov tj Trda^^eiv vcf)* irepov 
Xeyovrat. Set he TToirjriKa etvat dXXrjXojv /cat 
TTad'qrLKOL rd aroix^la' p^iyvvrai yap /cat p-era- 

25 jSaAAet ei? aAAr^Aa. depp.6v he /cat ipvxpov /cat 
vypov /cat ^rjpov rd p.ev rep TTOLrjTLKa elvai rd he 
ra> TTadrjTiKd Xeyerat' 9epp,6v yap ian to avy- 
KpZvov rd 6p.oyev7J {rd ydp hiaKpiveiv, oTrep (j>aal 
TTOielv rd TTvp, avyKpiveiv earl rd 6pi6(j)vXa- avp- 
jSatvet ydp e^aipelv rd dXXorpia), ipvxpdv he ro 

30 avvdyov /cat avyKplvov o/Ltoio)? rd re avyyevrj /cat 
rd fXT] 6p6<f)vXa, vypov he rd dopcarov oi/ceta> opto 
evopiarov 6v, irjpdv he rd evopiarov p,ev ot/ceto) 
opo), hvaopiarov he. rd he Xerrrdv /cat 7ra;(u /cat 
yXiaxpov /cat Kpavpov /cat GKXrjpdv /cat fiaXaKov 
/cat at aAAai hiacf>opaL e/c rovra)v enei yap ro 

35 dvaTTXrjariKov eort rov vypov hid rd prj (Lpladai 

330 a pev evopiarov 8' elvat /cat aKoXovdelv rd) dirro- 

p,evu), rd he Xeirrdv dvaTrXriariKov [XeTrrofxepeg 

ydp, Kal rd fxiKpopiepes dvaTrXtjariKOV' oXov ydp 
270 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2 

and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, hard and 
soft, viscous and brittle, rough and smooth, coarse 
and fine. Of these heavy and light are not active nor 
yet passive ; for they do not get their names because 
they act on something else or are acted upon by some- 
thing else ; elements, on the other hand, must be 
mutually active and passive, for they mix and change 
into one another. But hot and cold, and dry and 
moist are terms of which the first pair get their names 
because they are active, the second pair because they 
are passive ; for " hot " is that which associates things 
of the same kind (for to " dissociate," which, they say, 
is an action of Fire, is to associate things of the same 
class, since the result is to destroy things which are 
foreign), but cold is that which brings together and 
associates alike both things which are of the same 
kind and things which are not of the same class. 
Moist" is that which, though easily adaptable to form, 
cannot be confined within limits of its own, while dry 
is that which is easily confined within its own limits 
but is not easily adaptable in form. From the moist 
and the dry are derived the fine and the coarse, the 
viscous and the brittle, the hard and the soft and the 
other contrasted pairs. For since " capacity for filling 
up something " is characteristic of the moist, because 
it is not confined within bounds but is adaptable in 
form and follows the shape of that which comes into 
contact with it,** and that which is " fine " is " capable 
of filling up something " (for it consists of small par- 
ticles, and that which consists of small particles is 
capable of filling up something, for the whole is in 

" Aristotle means liquid. 

'' e.g., water conforms with the shape of the vessel into 
which it is poured. 

271 



ARISTOTLE 

330 a 

oXov aTTreraf to 8e Actttov jLtaAtcrra tolovtov), 
(j>avepov on ro [xev Xenrov earat rov vypov, to 8e 
5 rraxv tov ^iqpov. ttolXlv §e to [xev yXia-)(^pov tov 
vypov {to yap yXiaxpov vypov tt€7tov6os tl eaTtv, 
olov TO eXaiov), to 8e Kpavpov tov ^rjpov' Kpavpov 
yap TO TcXecos ^r^pov, wo-tc /cat TreTrr^yevai 8i' 
eXXeiifjLV vypoTTjTos. eVi to pikv [xaXaKov tov vypov 
[fjLaXaKov yap to vttcIkov et? eavTO /cat /xr^ /xe^tara- 

10 fxevov, oTtep rroLel to vypov 8to /cat ovk cotl to 
vypov puaXaKov, aAAa to fxaXaKov tov vypov), to 
Se okXyjpov tov ^rjpov' GKXrjpov yap can to 7T€- 
nrjyos, to 8e TreTrrjyos ^Tjpov. XeyeTai 8e irjpov 
/cat vypov TrXeovaxoJS' avTiKeLTai yap tw ^i^poi /cat 
TO vypov /cat to 8tepov, /cat TraAtv to) vypcp kul to 

15 ^Tjpov /cat TO TTerriqyo^- (XTravTa 8e Ta£5T eo"Tt tou 
^rjpov /cat TOV vypov tcov TrpwTiov Xexd^VTOJV . inel 
yap av'Tt/ceiTat tw 8iepa) to ^rjpov, /cat Siepov jxev 
eoTL TO €xov aXXoTplav vypoT'qTa iTTLTToXrj?, j8e- 
^peyjxevov 8e to els ^ddos, irjpov 8e to euTiprjfjLevov 
TavT7]s, (f)av€p6v oTt TO jxev Siepov eWat tov vypov, 

20 TO 8' aVTLK€tfX€VOV ^'qpOV TOV TTpCOTOV ^TjpOV. TToXlV 

8e TO vypov /cat to TreTrrjyog waavTCos' vypov [xev 
yap eoTi to e^ov oLKclav vypoTtjTa, ^e^peyjjievov 
he TO e)(ov aXXoTplav vypoTiqTa ev tco ^ddei, ire- 
TT7)y6s 8e TO eaTeprjfjievov TavTiqs. oooTe /cat tov- 
Tojv eoTai to /xev i^jpov to 8e vypov. SijXov tolvvv 
25 OTt irdaai at aAAat Sia(f>opaL dvdyovTai els tols 

« See 329 b 30 ff. 
272 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2 

contact with the whole, and that which is fine consists 
of the smallest possible particles), it is clear that the 
fine is derived from the moist and the coarse derived 
from the dry. Again, the viscous is derived from the 
moist (for that which is viscous is moisture which 
has undergone a certain treatment, as in the case of 
oil), and the brittle is derived from the dry ; for the 
completely dry is brittle, so that it has become solid 
through lack of moisture. Further, the soft is derived 
from the moist (for the soft is that which gives way 
and sinks into itself but does not change its position, 
as does the moist ; hence, too, the moist is not soft, 
but the soft is derived from the moist). The hard, 
on the other hand, is derived from the dry ; for that 
which has solidified is hard, and the solid is dry. 
Now " dry " and " moist " are used in several senses ; 
for both moist and damp are opposed to dry, and, 
again, solid as well as dry is opposed to moist. 
But all these qualities are derived from the dry and 
the moist which we mentioned originally." For the 
dry is opposed to the damp, and the damp is that 
which has foreign moisture on its surface, soaked 
being that which is damp to its innermost depth, 
while dry is that which is deprived of foreign moisture. 
Therefore, clearly the damp will be derived from 
the moist, and the dry, which is opposed to it, will 
be derived from the primary dry. So likewise, on 
the other hand, with the moist and the solidified ; 
for moist is that which contains its own moisture in 
its depth, while soaked is that which contains foreign 
moisture there, and solidified is that which has lost 
its foreign moisture ; so that of these the latter 
derives from the dry, the former from the moist. It 
is clear, then, that all the other differences are re- 

273 



ARISTOTLE 

330 a 

TTpcoras rerrapas. avrai Se ovKeri et? iXdrTovs' 
ovre yap to deppcov onep vypov rj oTrep ^rjpov, ovre 
TO vypov oTrep deppiov rj onep ipvxpov, ovre ro 
ifjvxpov Kal TO ^rjpov ovd^ utt' aAAT^A' ovd vtto ro 
dep/jLov Kal ro vypov elaiv war avayKiq rerrapas 
elvai ravras. 

30 3. 'Ettci 8e rerrapa ra aroLX^^c-> ^^^ ^^ tct- 
rdpcov e^ at avt,ev^eig, rd 8' ivavrla ov 7T€(f)VK€ 
avv8vdt,eadaL [Qeppcov yap Kal i/jvxpov elvai, ro avro 
Kal TrdXiv ^rjpov Kal vypov dhvvarov), (f)avep6v 
orL rerrapes eaovrai at rwv aroLX^icov avt,ev^€ig, 
330 b Qepyiov Kal ^rjpov, Kal depjjLov Kal vypov, Kal rrdXiv 
ijjvxpov Kal vypov, Kal ipvxpov Kal ^-qpov. Kal 
rjKoXovd7]K€ Kara Xoyov Tot? aTrAot? ^aivop-evoLS 
awpLaai, TTvpl Kal depc Kal vSari Kal yfj' ro jxev 
yap TTvp depfxov Kal ^rjpov, 6 S' drjp dep/xov Kal 
5 vypov (otov drpus ydp 6 drip), ro S' vSojp ifjvxpov 
Kal vypov, rj 8e yrj i/jvxpov Kal ^rjpov, oior^ evXoyoj^ 
SiavepLeadaL rds Sta^opa? Tots" Trpcorots acofxaai, 
Kal ro rrXfjQos avrwv elvai Kara Xoyov. aTravres 
ydp ol rd drrXd awpiara aroiX'^la rroiovvres ot /nev 
ev, ot he hvo, ol he rpia, ol he rerrapa ttolovoiv. 

10 ooot [xev ovv ev jjlovov Xeyovoiv, elra TrvKvcoaei 
Kal fxavcocreL rdXXa yevvwai, rovrots avpL^alvei hvo 
TTOielv TO,? dpxd^, ro re jxavdv /cat ro ttvkvov rj 
rd deppLOV Kal ro ifjvxpov ravra ydp rd hrjpnovp- 
yovvra, ro 8' ev yrroKretTat Kaddrrep vXrj. ol 8' 
evdvs hvo TTOiovvres, warrep Ilapp.€VLhr)s TTvp Kal 

15 yrjv, rd pLera^v pLiypiara ttolovol rovroiv, olov 
depa Kal vhojp. waavrojs he koI ol rpla Xeyovres, 

" I.e. are mathematically possible. 

274 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, II. 2-3 

duced to the first four, and these cannot be further 
reduced to a lesser number ; for the hot is not that 
which is essentially moist or essentially dry, nor is the 
moist essentially hot or essentially cold, nor do the 
cold and the dry fall in the category of one another 
nor in that of the hot and moist ; hence these must 
necessarily be four of these elementary qualities. 

3. Now since the elementary qualities are four in The four 
number and of these four six couples can be formed," qulmief "^^ 
but contraries are not of a nature which permits of 0>ot. cold, 
their being coupled— for the same thing cannot be by being 
hot and cold, or again, moist and dry — it is clear that toaetlher in 
the pairs of elementary qualities will be four in diflferent 
number, hot and dry, hot and moist, and, again, ^ftute^fo'iir 
cold and moist, and cold and dry. And, according ^''HP'*: 
to theory, they have attached themselves to the Earth,' Air, 
apparently simple bodies, Fire, Air, Water and water"'^ 
Earth ; for Fire is hot and dry, Air is hot and moist 
(Air, for example, is vapour). Water is cold and moist, 
and Earth is cold and dry. Thus the variations are 
reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, 
and the number of these is according to theory. 
For all those who make out that the simple bodies 
are elements make them either one or two or three 
or four. Therefore (a) those who hold that there is 
only one and then generate everything else by con- 
densation and rarefaction, as a result make the sources 
two in number, the rare and the dense or the hot 
and the cold ; for these are the creative forces, and 
" the one " underlies them as matter. But (b) those 
who hold that there are ttvo from the beginning — 
as Parmenides held that there were Fire and Earth 
— make the intermediates. Air and Water, mixtures 
of these ; and (c) the same thing is done also by 

275 



ARISTOTLE 

330 b 

KadaTTep IlAaTWv ev rats Siaipeaeaiv to yap fxeaov 
puypLa TToiet. /cat cr^eSov ravra XeyovaLv 61 re 
Svo /cat ot rpla TroiovvTeg' ttXtjv ol pbkv Tepivovaiv 
els 8vo TO fjLeaov, ol 8' ev fiovov TTOiovaiv. evioi 

20 8' evdvs Terrapa Xiyovaiv, olov 'E/xttcSo/cA'^S". avv- 
dyei Be /cat ovrog els ra Svo' ro) yap rrvpl rdXXa 
iravra avrniOrjULv. 

OvK eoTi 8e TO TTvp /cat o drjp /cat eKaoTOV 
Ta)V elprjixevoiv drrXovv, dXXd [xlktov. to, S' ciTrAa 
Totaura fiev eaTiv, ov puevTOi. TavTO., olov el tl to* 
TTvpl opiOLov, TTVpoeiSes, ov TTvp, /cat TO TO) ae'pi 

25 depoeiSes' opcolcos 8e kolttl tcov aAAojv. to 8e nvp 
eoTiv VTrep^oXrj deppLorrjros, wairep /cat /cpuCTTaAAo? 
iJjvxp6t7]tos' rj yap Trrj^ts /cat tj ^eais inrep^oXai 
TLves elaiv, r) pLev ijjvxpoTrjTOS , rj Se deppiOT'qTOS. 
el ovv 6 KpvoTaXXos ecTi tttj^ls vypov ijjv)(pov, /cat 
TO TTvp ecTTat treats ^rjpov deppiov. 8t6 /cat ovhev 

30 ovT^ €K KpvaToXXov ytVcTat oyV e/c TTvpos. 

"OvTCJV 8c TeTTapcov TCJV (xttAcop' actipLarcov, eKo.- 
Tepov Tolv hvolv eKarepov tcov tottojv ecTTtv TTvp 
pLev yap /cat dr}p rod irpos tov opov ^epopuevov, yi) 
he /cat vScop tov Trpos ro pLeaov. /cat a/cpa juev 
/cat elXiKpLveoTaTa irvp /cat yrj, p,eaa he /cat p,e- 

331 a pLiypieva pLaXXov vha>p /cat di^/j. /cat eKorrepa e/ca- 

repois evavria- TTvpl p.ev yap evavTtov vhcop, depi 
he yrj' Tavra yap e/c tcov evavTicov TTadrjpidTcov 

" It is doubtful what is meant here. The commentator 
Philoponos suggests that it was a collection of otherwise 
jinpublished doctrines of Plato and thinks that Aristotle is 
referring to a theory of Plato that there was " the great " and 
" the small " and a third dpx'q, which was a mixture of these 
and served as matter ; but there is nothing to support this 
theory. H. H. Joachim takes " the Divisions " to mean the 

276 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- AW AY, II. 3 

those who hold that there are three, as Plato does in 
the " Divisions," " for he makes " the middle " a 
mixture. Those who hold that there are two and 
those who postulate three say practically the same 
things, except that the former divide the middle 
into two, while the latter treat it as one. But (c?) 
some declare that there are four from the start, for 
instance Empedocles, though he also reduces these 
to two, for he too opposes all the others to Fire. 

Fire, however, and Air and each of the other bodies 
which we have mentioned are not simple but mixed, 
while the simple forms of them are similar to them 
but not the same as they are ; for example, that 
which is like fire is " fiery," not fire, and that which 
is like air is " air-like," and similarly with the rest. 
But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of 
cold ; for freezing and boiling are excesses, the former 
of cold, the latter of heat. If, therefore, ice is a 
freezing of moist and cold, so fire will be a boiling 
of dry and hot ; and that is why nothing comes to 
be from ice or from fire. 

The simple bodies, then, being four in number, 
make up two pairs belonging to two regions ; for 
Fire and Air form the body which is carried along 
towards the " limit," while Earth and Water form the 
body which is carried along towards the centre ^ ; 
and Fire and Earth are extremes and very pure, 
while Water and Air are intermediates and more 
mixed. Further, the members of each pair are con- 
trary to the members of the other pair, Water being 
the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are 

sections in the Timaeus (35 a ff.), where Plato makes the 
middle of his three kinds of substance a blend of the other 
two. * Cf. De Caelo 308 a 14 ff. 

277 



ARISTOTLE 

331a 

avvearrjKev. ov fjirjv dAA' aTrXcog ye rerrapa ovra 

ivos €Kaar6v iari, yrj [xev ^r)pov [xdXXov rj ijjvxpov ^ 
5 vho)p he ifjvxpov [xdXXov r) vypov, drjp 8' vypov 
[jLoiXXov ■^ depjxov, TTvp Se depjxov fxaiXXov rj ^rjpov. 
4. 'E77et 8e hiajpiarai Trporepov otl toZs ctTrAots' 
acofiacnv i^ aXX-qXcov rj yeveoLs, a/u-a 8e /cat /cara 
rrjv atadrjaiv (fyaiverai yivofieva [ov yap av -^v dX- 

10 AoicoCTis" Kara yap rd tcov ctTrTcDv TrdOrj rj dXXoioioig 
eariv), XcKreov res 6 rpoTTos rrjs elg dXXrjXa fxera- 
^oXrjs, Kal TTorepov dirav i^ aTravro'S yiveadai 
hvvarov ?} rd fiev Svvarov rd 8' dSvvarov . on fxev 
ovv dnavra 7T€<f)VK€V els dXXrjXa pLera^dXXeiv , (f>ave- 
pov 7] ydp yeveais els evavria Kal e^ evavricov, rd 

15 8e CTTOi;)^era Trdvra exei ivavrlojaLV npos dXXrjXa 
Sid ro rds 8ta<^opas" evavrias elvai' rots piev ydp 
d[Ji(f)6repai evavriai, olov nvpl Kai vBari {ro piev 
ydp ^rjpov Kal depfiov, ro 8' vypov Kal ipv^pov), 
rols 8' 7) erepa piovov, olov depi Kal vSari {ro pi,ev 

20 ydp vypov Kal deppLov, ro 8e vypov Kal if/vxpov). 
ware KaOoXov pcev (f>avep6v on ttom €k iravros yi- 
veadai 7Te(f)VKev, TJSr] Se Kad^ eKaarov ov ;^aAe7Tov 
Ihelv TTCus" diravra p,ev ydp e^ drravruiv earat, 
Sioicrei 8c rep ddrrov Kal ^paSvrepov Kai ra> paov 
Kal ;(aAe7rajTepov. ocra pikv ydp e^et avpu^oXa 

25 TTpos dXXrjXa, ra^ela rovrcov rj pierd^aais, oaa 8e 

• De Caelo 304 b 23 fF. 
278 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 3-1 

made up of different qualities. However, since they 
are four, each is described simply as possessing a single 
quality. Earth a dry rather than a cold quality. Water 
a cold rather than a moist. Air a moist rather than 
a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry. 

4. Since it has been determined in a former dis- The four 
cussion " that the coming-to-be of simple bodies is bod?es 
out of one another, and at the same time, too, change into 
it is evident from sense-perception that they do in various 
come-to-be (for otherwise there would have been no '"*n°er8. 
alteration — for alteration is concerned with the 
qualities of tangible things), we must state (a) what 
is the manner of their reciprocal change, and (6) 
whether any one of them can come-to-be out of any 
other one of them, or some can do so and others 
cannot. Now it is manifest that all of them are of 
such a nature as to change into one another ; for 
coming-to-be is a process into contraries and out of 
contraries, and all the elements are characterized 
by contrarieties one to another, because their dis- 
tinguishing qualities are contrary. In some of them 
both qualities are contrary, for example, in Fire and 
Water (for the former is dry and hot, the latter is 
moist and cold), in others only one, for example, in 
Air and Water (for the former is moist and hot, the 
latter is moist and cold). Hence, it is clear, if we 
take a general view, that every one of them naturally 
comes-to-be out of every one of them and, if we take 
them separately, it is not difficult now to see how 
this happens ; for all •will be the product of all, but 
there will be a difference owing to the greater and 
less speed and the greater and less difficulty of the 
process. For the change will be quick in those things 
which have qualities which correspond with one 

279 



ARISTOTLE 

331 a 

fjLT) ex^L, ^paBela, Sia to paov clvat to ev ^ to. 
TToAAa jLterajSaAAetv, olov Ik TTvpog jjuev eWat drjp 
daTepov juerajSaAAovTO? (to /xev yap -^v depfxov /cat 
^fjpov, TO he depfJLOv Kal vypov, cocttc av KpaTT^dij 
TO ^Tjpov V7t6 tov vypov, drjp eoTai). ttoXlv 8e e^ 

30 depos vScop, idv KpaTrjdfj to Oepfxov vtto tov i/jvxpov 
[to jxkv yap 'qv OepjjLov /cat vypov, to 8e ipvxpov /cat 
vypov, a)aT€ fxeTa^dAXovTos tov deppuov vScop eoTat) . 
TOV avTov Be Tpoirov /cat e^ iihaTos yrj Kai e/c yfjg 
TTvp' €X€L yap d[Ji(f)Co irpos djjicfxo avfx^oXa' to jxev 

35 yap vScop vypov /cat i/jvxpov, rj 8e yrj ifjvxpov /cat 

^rjpov, coCTTe KpaT7]6evTog tov vypov yrj eWat. /cat 

331 b TraAtv 67761 TO [X€V TTvp ^rjpov Kal dep^ov, r] Se yrj 

ifjvxpov Kal ^r]p6v, idv ^daprj to ijjvxpdv, nvp eo-Tat 

e/c yrj9. 

"D.crT€ (f)av€p6v OTt kvkXco t€ eWat r) yeveais 
TOLS arrXols awpiaai, /cat paoTos ovtos o Tporrog 
Trjs p.eTa^oXrj'S hid to avpL^oXa ivvTrapx^iv Tot? 
5 i<f)€^rjs. CK TTvpds he vhcop Kal e^ depos yrjv /cat 
TTctAtv ef j^'SttTOS" Kal yrjg depa Kal TTvp evhex^rat 
fiev yiveadai, ;;^aAe7r66Tepot' Se Sto, to TrAetoi'ajj^ 
efvat Tr]v /xeTa^oAr^v dvdyKTj yap, el eoTai e^ 
vhaTOS TTvp, (fydaprjvai Kal to ijjvxpov Kal to vypov, 
Kal TTaXiv el e/c yfjs drjp, (f>daprjvai Kal to ifjvxpdv 

10 /cat TO ^r)p6v. (haavTCog he Kal el e/c TTvpds Kal 
depos vhcop Kal yrj, dvdyKrj dix(f)6Tepa fxeTa^aXXew. 
avrri fiev oSv ;^/3ovtaiTepa rj yeveais' edv h* e/ca- 

" avfi^oXa was originally used of two pieces of wood or 
bone broken away from one another and kept by the two 
parties to a contract as a means of identification. 

280 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- AW AY, II. 4 

another," but slow when these do not exist, because 
it is easier for one thing to change than for many ; 
for example. Air will result from Fire by the change 
of one quality ; for Fire, as we said, is hot and dry, 
while Air is hot and moist, so that Air will result if 
the dry is overpowered by the moist. Again, Water 
Avill result from Air, if the hot is overpowered by the 
cold ; for Air, as we said, is hot and moist, while 
Water is cold and moist, so that Water will result if 
the hot undergoes a change. In the same way, too, 
Earth will result from Water, and Fire from Earth ; 
for both members of each pair have qualities which 
correspond to one another, since Water is moist and 
cold, and Earth is cold and dry, and so, when the 
moist is overpowered, Earth will result. Again, since 
Fire is dry and hot, and Earth is cold and dry, if 
the cold were to pass away. Fire will result from 
Earth. 

It is clear, therefore, that the coming-to-be of 
simple bodies will be cyclical ; and this manner of 
change will be very easy, because the corresponding 
qualities are already present in the elements which 
are next to one another. The change, however, from 
Fire to Water and from Air to Earth, and again from 
Water and Earth to Air and Fire can take place, but 
is more difficult, because the change involves more 
stages. For if Fire is to be produced from Water, 
both the cold and the moist must be made to pass- 
away ; and, again, if Air is to be produced from 
Earth, both the cold and the dry must be made to 
pass-away. In like manner, too, if Water and Earth 
are to be produced from Fire and Air, there must 
be a change of both qualities. This method of coming- 
to-be is, therefore, a lengthier process ; but if one 

281 



ARISTOTLE 

331 b 

repov (j>dapfj ddrepov, paojv pciv, ovk els dXXrjXa 

8e rj ixerd^acTLS , aAA' ck rrvpog [xev /cat vSaros 

earai yrj /cat ar]p, i^ depos 8e /cat yrjs "nvp /cat 

15 vScop. orav pikv yap tov vSaros (f>dapfj to iljv)(p6v 
Tov 8e TTvpos TO ^ripov, drjp earat (AetTrerat yap 
TOV fxev TO OeppLOV tov 8e to vypov), otov 8e tov 
jxev TTvpos TO depfiov tov 8' vSaTos ro vypov, yrj 
8ta TO Xeitreadai tov fxev to ^rjpov tov 8e to 
iffvxpov. (hcravTOiS 8e /cat e^ depos /cat yrjg rrvp 

20 Kat vBojp' OTav /xev yap tov depos (f)6apfj to depfiov 
TTJs 8e yrjs to ^rjpov, vSiop earat (AeiTrerat yap 
TOV fxev TO vypov Trjs 8e to i/jvxpdv), OTav 8e tov 
fxev depos ro vypov Trjs Be yrjs to ipvxpdv, nvp 
8ta TO XeiTTeaOai tov puev to depfxov ttjs Se to ^rjpov, 
aTTep rjv rrvpos. opboXoyovpievrj 8e /cat tjj alaOrjaeL 

25 1^ TOV TTvpos yeveais' fidXtcrra pcev yap irvp rj <I>X6(, 
avTrj 8' eart KaTTVos KaLOfievos, 6 8e Karrvos e^ 
depos /cat yrjs. 

'Ev 8e Tols i(f>€^rjs ovk ivSex^Tat (f)9apevTos ev 
cKaTepo) darepov twv aTOLX^ccuv yeveadai /xeTd- 
jSaCTtv els ovSev twv auypLaTCov 8ta to XeiTreadat ev 
dpi^olv 7} rauTct •^ rdvavTia. e^ ovSeTcptov be 

30 eyx^ipel yiveadai acopia, olov el tov p.ev irvpos 
<j>dapeir] to ^rjpov, tov 8' depos ro vypov AetTrerat 
ydp ev dfxcfiolv to depfMov edv 8' e^ e/carepou to 
depjxov, AetTrerat ravavrta, ^rfpov Kat vypov. 

" i.e. those which pass into one another by the "cyclical " 
process described in 331 b 2 IF. 

282 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II, 4 

quality of each element were to be made to pass away, 
the change will be easier but not reciprocal ; but 
from Fire and Water will come Earth and (alterna- 
tively) Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and (alter- 
natively) Water ; for when the cold of the Water 
and the dryness of the Fire have passed-away, there 
will be Air (for the heat of the Fire and the moisture 
of the Water are left), but, when the heat of the Fire 
and the moisture of the Water have passed-away, 
there will be Earth, because the dryness of the Fire 
and the cold of the Water are left. In the same 
manner also Fire and Water will result from Air and 
Earth ; for when the heat of the Air and the dryness 
of the Earth pass-away, there will be Water (for the 
moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth are 
left), but when the moisture of the Air and the cold 
of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, 
because the heat of the Air and the dryness of the 
Earth, which are, as we saw, the constituents of 
Fire, are left. Now the manner in which Fire comes- 
to-be is confirmed by our sense-perception ; for 
flame is the most evident form of Fire, and flame is 
burning smoke, and smoke is composed of Air and 
Earth. 

No change, however, into any of the bodies can 
take place from the passing-away of one of the 
elements in each of them taken in their consecutive 
order," because either the same or the contrary 
qualities are left in the pair, and a body cannot come- 
to-be out of identical or contrary qualities ; for 
example, it would not result if the dryness of Fire 
and the moisture of the Air were to pass-away (for 
the heat is left in both), but, if the heat passes-away 
from both, the contraries, dryness and moisture, are 

283 



ARISTOTLE 

331b 

ofioLOiS 8e /cat iv rots d'AAois" iv aTracri yap rols 

it^e^rjs evvTTOLpy^ei ro fiev ravro to 8' ivavriov. 

35 coCT^' ajxa BfjXov otl to, fxkv i^ €v6s eis" €V fxera- 

^aivovra ivo? (f)dapevTos yLverai,, to. S' ck Svolv 

332 a et? €V TrXeLovcov. on fiev ovv aTravra €K TravTOS 

yiverai, Kal riva rporrov et? aAAryAa /xera^aais" 

ytverat, e'lp-qraL. 

5. Ov ixTjv aAA' ert /cat cuSe Oeoipiqaoiyiev rrepl 
avTwv. el yap ecrri tcDv (f>vai,KCov orajfiaTcov vXrj, 
5 caaTTep Kal SoKet evtot?, vScop Kal arjp Kal to. 
Toiavra, avdyKT] yjroi ev ^ Svo etvai ravra ■^ 7rAeta». 
€v [ji€V Srj TTOvra ov\ olov re, olov depa Travra rj 
vScop rj TTvp Tj yrjv, etTrep -q neTa^oXrj et? rdvavTia. 
el yap e'lrj drjp, el fxev imopieveL, aXXoLwaig earai 
dXX ov yeveais. dp.a 8' ovh^ ovrco SoKel, ware 

10 vhoip etvai dpba Kal depa ri aAA' otiovv. earai 817 
ns evavrioiOLS Kal hia^opd rjg e^ei tl ddrepov 
pLopiov TO TTvp olov deppLOTTira. dXXd fxrjv ovk 
earai ro ye irvp drjp depp.6<5' aXXoicoois re yap to 
TOLOVTOV, Kal ov ^alverai. afxa 8e rrdXiv el ear ai 

15 e/c TTvpos d-qp, rod depfiov els rovvavriov fiera- 
^dXXovros ear at. VTrdp^ei dpa ra> depi rovro, 
Kal earai 6 drjp ifjvxpdv ri. ojare dhvvarov ro 
TTvp depa Oepfjiov etvai' dfxa yap ro avro depfiov 

« See Phys. 224 a 21 fF. 
284 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 4-5 

left. So likewise with the others too ; for in all the 
consecutive elements there exists one identical and 
one contrary quality. It is, therefore, at the same 
time clear that some elements come-to-be by being 
transformed from one into one by the passing-away 
of one quality, but others come-to-be by being trans- 
formed from two into one by the passing-away of 
more than one quality. We have now stated that 
all the elements come-to-be from any one of them, 
and how their change into one another takes 
place. 

5. Let us, however, proceed to discuss the following Restate- 
points about them. If Water, Air and the like are, dxfcteine o/ 
as some people hold, matter for the natural bodies, chapter 4, 
there must be either one or two or more than two of tional 
them. Now they cannot all of them be one (for evidence. 
example, they cannot all be Air or Water or Fire or 
Earth), because change is into contraries." For if 
they were all Air, then, if Air continues to exist, 
" alteration " will take place and not coming-to-be. 
Furthermore, no one holds that Water is at the same 
time also Air or any other element. There will, then, 
be a contrariety (or difference),^ and the other member 
of this contrariety will belong to some other element, 
for example, heat will belong to Fire. Fire, however, 
will certainly not be " hot air " ; for such a change is 
an " alteration " and also is not observed to happen. 
Another reason, too, is that, if Air is to be produced 
from Fire, it will be due to the changing of heat into 
its contrary. This contrary, therefore, will belong 
to Air, and Air will be something cold ; hence it is 
impossible for Fire to be " hot air," for, in that case, 

'' e.g., if Air is to alter into Fire, we must assign one of a 
pair of contrary qualities to Air and the other to Fire. 

285 



ARISTOTLE 

332.a 

Kal ifjvxpov earai. aXXo tl ap' afKJyoTepa to avro 
earai, Kal dXXr] ns vXr] KOLvrj. 

'0 8' avros Aoyos" Trept aTravroiv, on ovk eariv 

20 ev rovTiov i^ ov to, TTavra. ov [X'qv ovS dXXo tl 
ye TTapd TavTa, olov [xeaov ri depos Kai v8aros t] 
dipos Kal TTvpos, depos p-ev TvaxvTepov Kal TTvpos, 
Twv he XeTTTOTepov eoTat, yap drjp Kal TTvp eKelvo 
jxeT* evavTLOTrjTO'S' dXXd aTep'qais to eTepov tcjv ev- 
avTiCDV u)aT ovk evSex^Tai fiovovadaL eKelvo ovSe- 

25 TTOTe, <x)(J7Tep (f>aai. TLves to dTreipov Kal to Trepie^ov. 
ojxoLOJS dpa OTLovv TOVTCOV rj ovSev. 

Et ovv p.rj8€v alaOrjTov ye rrpoTepov tovtcdv, Tav- 
Ta dv e'lrj TTavra. dvdyKrj toIvvv tj del p.evovTa Kal 
dfxeTa^XrjTa els dXX7]Xa, rj jLterajSaAAovTa, Kal rj 
dnavTa, t] Ta jxev Ta 8' ov, (Zanep ev tco TijLtaio) 

30 HXaTwv eypaipev. otl fxev tolvvv pceTa^aXXeiv 
dvdyKT] els dXXrjXa, SeSet/crat irpoTepov otl 8 ov^ 
opioicxis Tax^ojs dXXo e^ dXXov, eLpr^Tai TrpoTepov, 
OTL Ta /x€V exovTa avpu^oXov daTTov yiveTaL e^ 
dX}<rjjXoiv, TO. 8' OVK exovTa ^pahvTepov. et jLter 
TOLVVV rj evavTLOT'qs /xta eort Kad^ rjv p,eTa^dX- 

35 XovaLV, dvdyKrj Svo elvaL- rj yap vXr) to p-eaov 

" Aristotle's npcoTrj vXr). 

* i.e. without having; some quality attached to it. 
' This was the doctrine of Anaximander. 

'' The " boundless " cannot exist without being qualified 
by a contrary ; if it is qualified by a contrary, it is one of the 
elements. 

« i.e. there can be no simple bodies but Earth, Air, F"ire 
and Water. ' Timaeus 54 b-d. » 331 a 12 flF. 

* See 331 a 23 ff, and note. 

286 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5 

the same thing will be hot and cold. Both Fire and 
Air 'wdll, therefore, be something else which is the 
same, that is, there will be some other " matter " * 
which is common to both. 

The same argument holds good of all the elements 
and shows that there is no single one of them from 
which all are derived. Yet neither is there anything 
other than these from which they come, for example, 
an intermediate between air and water (coarser than 
Air, but finer than Water) or between Air and Fire 
(coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the 
intermediate will be Air and Fire with the addition 
of a pair of contraries ; but one of the contraries will 
be a privation, so that it is impossible for the inter- 
mediate to exist by itself, '' as some people " declare 
that the " boundless " or " all-embracing " exists ; it 
is, therefore, one of the elements (it does not matter 
which), or nothing.** 

If, therefore, there is nothing — nothing perceptible 
at any rate — prior to the four elements, these must 
be all that there are * ; it follows, therefore, neces- 
sarily, that they must either persist and be unable 
to change into one another, or they must undergo 
change, either all of them or some of them only, as 
Plato wrote in the Timaeus/ Now it has been shown 
above ^ that they must change into one another ; 
and it has previously been stated that they do not 
come-to-be equally quickly from one another, because 
elements which have a corresponding quality '' come- 
to-be more quickly out of one another, while those 
which have not this do so more slowly. If, therefore, 
the contrariety, in virtue of which they change, is 
one, the elements must be two ; for the matter, which 
is imperceptible and inseparable, is the intermediate 

287 



ARISTOTLE 

332 b avatadrjTog ovaa Kal dxcopLcrrog . CTret 8e TrXeio) 
opdrat ovra, Svo av etev at i\d)(LaraL. hvo 8' 
ovTiov ovx olov re rpia elvat, dAAa reaaapa, oio- 
7T€p (f)aLV€Tai' roaavrai yap at ovt,vyiaL- e^ yap 
ovacjv rds hvo aSuvarov yeveadai hid ro evavrias 
5 ett'at dXX'qXai?. 

riept [xev ovv tovtojv e'iprjrac rrporepov otl 8' 
i7T€tSr] pcera^dXXovaLV els dXXrjXa, dSvvarov dpx'>^v 
TLva elvai avrwv rj inl rep aKpcp t] jxeao), ck TwvBe 
brjXov. CTTL pL€V OVV Tot? aKpoiS ovK earai, otl 
TTvp ear at r) yr] rrdvra' Kal 6 avros Xoyos rep (jidvai 

10 e/c TTvpos rj yrjs etvat Trdvra- on 8' oi)8e p.eaov, 
a)(T7T€p SoK€i rialv drjp pckv /cat et? "nvp /xerajSctAAetv 
/cat els vhciip, vbcop 8e /cat els depa /cat et? yi]v, 
rd 8' ea-)(ara ovKeri els dXXrjXa e/c rdJvSe SrjXov^' 
SeX fxev ydp arrjvaL /cat /xt) els aTreipov rovro levai 
eiT* evdelas e^' eKarepa' aTreipot ydp at evavrio- 

15 r7)res em rov evos eaovrai. yrj e<j>^ <5 V , vScop 
€(f>' o) Y, drjp e^' a> A, Trvp e^' oi H. et 817 to A 
fxera^aXXei els ro 11 /cat T, evavnorrjs ecrrat tcDv 
An. earixi ravra XevKorr^s /cat jxeXavla. TrdXiv 
et et? TO 1 TO A, earai aAAr)- ov yap ravro ro 1 
/cat n. earo) 8e ^rjporrjs /cat vyporrjs, ro fxev 

20 H ^r]p6rr]s, ro he T vyporrjs. ovkovv el puev p,evet 
ro XevKov, virdp^et ro vha>p vypov /cat XevKov, el 
he fji-q, p,eXav earai ro vhcDp' els rdvavria ydp rj 
piera^oXrj. dvayK-q dpa -^ XevKov rj peXav etvat 

^ €K TcDi'Se BrjXov add. Joachim, 

« Bk. II. chs. 2 and 3. 
288 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5 

between them. But since the elements are seen 
to be more than two, the contrarieties would be at 
least two ; but if the latter are two, the elements 
cannot be three but must be four, as is evidently the 
case ; for the couples are of that number, since, 
though six are possible, two of these cannot occur 
because they are contrary to one another. 

These matters have been dealt with before,** but 
that, when the elements change into one another, 
it is impossible for any one of them, whether at the 
end or in the middle of the series, to be a " source " 
is clear from the following considerations. There 
will be no " source " at the ends, since they will all 
be Fire or Earth ; and this is the same as arguing 
that all things are derived from Fire or Earth. That 
the " source " cannot be in the middle either — as some 
people hold that Air changes both into Fire and into 
Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while 
the end-elements are not further changed into one 
another — is clear from these considerations. There 
must be a halt, and the process cannot continue in 
either direction in a straight line to infinity ; for, 
otherwise, the number of contrarieties belonging to 
a single element will be infinite. Let E stand for 
Earth, W for Water, A for Air and F for Fire. Then 
(a), if A changes into F and W, there will be a con- 
trariety attaching to AF. Let this contrariety be 
whiteness and blackness. Again (b), if A changes 
into W, there will be another contrariety ; for W is 
not the same as F. Let this contrariety be dryness (D) 
and moisture (M). If, then, the whiteness persists, 
Water will be moist and white ; if not. Water will be 
black, for change is into contraries. Water, therefore, 
must be either white or black. Let it, then, be the 

L 289 



ARISTOTLE 

332 b 

TO vScop. CGTU) Srj TO TTpWTOV. OfXOLCJg TOLVVV 

Kol Tcp n TO S V7rdp^€L Tj ^rjpoTr]?. earai apa 
25 Kal TO) n TO) TTvpl fxera^oXrj elg to vScop' evavTia 
yap VTroLpx^i' to fiev yap vvp to TxpcJTOv [xeXav rjv, 
eTreiTtt 8e ^rjpov, to S' v8a>p vypov, eneiTa Be 
XevKov. (f)avep6v hr] otl Trdotv e^ dXXt^Xcjjv eoTai 
■fj ixeTa^oXiq, Kal Ittl ye tovtcdv, otl Kal iv tco T 
TTJ yfj vTTap^et to. Xoltto. Kal Svo crvfi^oXa, to 
30 pLcXav Kal TO vypov TavTa yap ov avvBehvaaTat 
TTiog. 

"Otl S' els direLpov ovx olov t' levaL, OTrep fieX- 
XrjaavTes Bel^eLV e-nl tovto epurpoadev TJXdofjiev, brj- 
Xov e/c TCovSe. et yap ttolXlv to TTvp, e0' (L H, €ls 
dXXo jjieTa^aXel Kal p-r] dvaKdpujjeL, olov els to W, 
ivavTLOT'qs tls tw nvpl kol to) ^ aXXr] vrrdp^ei 
35 Tciyv elprip.eva)v ovhevL yap to avTO vnoKeLTai tojv 

333 a r T A n TO ^. eoTOJ Br] Tip p,ev R to K, tw Be 

^ TO O. TO St^ K TTaoLV vTrdp^ei tols F T A FI- 
p.eTa^dXXovaL yap els dXXrjXa. dXXd yap tovto 
pcev eoTOi /litjttcu BeBeLyp.evov dAA' CKelvo BrjXov, 

5 OTL el TTaXiv TO ^ els dXXo, aXXr] ivavTLOTtjs Kal 
tG) ^ inrdp^eL Kal tco Trvpl toj O . o/xoicu? 8' 
aet /leTct tov TrpoaTLdepievov evavTLOTTjS tls vrrdp^eL 
TOLS ep.7Tpoadev, oktt* el aTreLpa, Kal evamLOTrjTes 
aTTeLpoL TO) evl VTrdp^ovoLV. el Be tovto, ovk eoTaL 
ovT€ oplaaadaL ovBev oxrre yeveadaL- Be-qaeL ydp, 
el dXXo eoTaL e^ dXXov, ToaavTas BLe^eXdelv ev- 

10 avTioTTyTtt?, Kal eTL TrXeiovs, ojot et? evLa p.ev 
290 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5 

first of these. Similarly, D will also belong to F ; there 
fore a change into Water will be possible also for Fire 
(F) ; for it has qualities which are contrary to those of 
Water, since Fire was first black and then dry, while 
Water was first moist and then white. It is clear, then, 
that the change of all the elements from one another 
will be possible, and that, in the above examples, E 
(Earth) will possess also the two remaining " corres- 
ponding qualities," blackness and moisture (for these 
have not yet been in any way coupled together). 

That the process cannot go on to infinity — which 
was the thesis that we were about to prove when we 
digressed to the above discussion — will be clear from 
the following considerations. If Fire (F) is to change 
in turn into something else and not to revert again, 
for example into Z, another contrariety other than 
those already mentioned will belong to Fire and Z ; 
for it has been laid down that Z is not the same as 
any of the four, E, W, A and F. Let K belong to 
F, and <t> to Z ; then K will belong to EWAF ; for 
they change into one another. But, let us admit 
that this has not yet been demonstrated ; yet this is 
evident that, if Z in turn is to be changed into 
another element, another contrariety will belong 
both to Z and also to Fire (F). Similarly, with 
each addition which is made, a fresh contrariety will 
attach to the preceding elements of the series, so 
that if the elements are infinite in number, infinitely 
numerous contrarieties will also attach to the single ele- 
ment. But if this is the case, it will be impossible to 
define any element and for any element to come-to-be. 
For if one is to result from another, it will have to 
pass through so many contrarieties and then through 
still more. Therefore (a), change into some elements 

291 



ARISTOTLE 

333 a 

ouSeTTor' earai fjcera^oX'^ , olov et ctTreipa to. /xerafu* 
dvayKT] S', etVep anetpa ra aroix^la' en 8' oyS' 
e^ depos els Trvp, el drreLpoL at €vavTLOT7]Tes. ytve- 
rai 8e Koi Trdvra ev dvdyKTj yap Trdaas VTrapx^iv 
Tois ^€V Karco tov 11 Ta? roJv dvcodev, tovtols Se 

15 TO.? TcDv KarcoOev, ware Trdvra ev ear at. 

6. QavpidaeLe S' ar rt? rcov Xeyovrwv TrXeico 
evog ra aroL)(eLa rcov acojjiarajv coare fxr] fxera- 
jSaAAetv els dXXrjXa, KaOdnep ^KpLTreSoKXrjs (f)'qaL, 
7TCOS evSe'p^erat Xeyeiv avrols elvai avpi^Xrjrd ra 

20 aroL-)(ela. KairoL Xeyei ovrco' " ravra yap lad re 
TTOvra." el jxev ovv Kara ro ttooov, avayKTj ravro 
rt elvai VTrdpxov aTraai rols av^pXrjroLs a) fxe- 
rpovvrai, olov el i^ vSaros KorvXrjs elev depos 
SeKa' ro avro rt ■^v dpa dfjicl>co, el /xerpelrai rep 
avrcp. el 8e fxrj ovrco Kara ro ttooov avp.^Xrjra 

25 (hs TToaov eK ttooov, dXX oaov Bvvarat, olov el 
KorvXr] vSaros laov hvvarai ipvx^tv Kal SeVa depos, 
Kal ovrcos Kara ro ttooov ov^ '^ ttooov avjx^X'qrd, 
dAA' fj Svvavrai ri. e'ir] 8' av Kal fxr) r<p rov tto- 
oov jjLerpcp avpi^dXXeaOai rds Swdp^eig, oAAo, /car' 
dvaXoyiav, olov ws roSe XevKov roSe depjjLov. ro 

30 8' (l)s rohe arjixatvei iv fxev ttoiw ro opioiov, ev 8e 
TToao) ro 'laov. droTTov brj (jyalverai, el ra acofxara 
dpLerd^Xrjra ovra fxr] dvaXoyla avpL^Xrjrd eariv, 



" Fr. 17 line 27 (I)iels), 

* i.fi. if one element is as hot as another is white, they have 
" Ijy analogy " the same amonnt, one of heat, the other of 
whiteness. 



292 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, 11. 5-6 

will never take place, for instance, if the interme- 
diates are infinite in number (and they must be so if 
the elements are infinite) : and further (b), there 
will not even be a change from Air into Fire, if the 
contrarieties are infinitely many : and (c) all the 
elements become one, for all the contrarieties of the 
elements above F must belong to those below F, and 
vice versa ; they will all, therefore, be one. 

6. One may well express astonishment at those Examina- 
who, like Empedocles, declare that the elements of j.gf"tation 
bodies are more than one (and, therefore, do not of the 
change into one another), and ask them how they Empedo- 
can assert that the elements are comiparable. Yet ™*^*in^'ine(j 
Empedocles says," " For these are all not only that his four 
equal. ..." Now (a) if what is meant is that they co'uld'not 
are equal in amount, all the " comparables " must all be trans- 
possess something identical by means of which they into one 
are measured, if, for instance one pint of Water is ^^i^other. 
equivalent to ten pints of Air, in which case both have 
always had something identical about them, since 
they were measured by the same standard. But 
(h) if they are not comparable in amount (in the sense 
that so much of the one is produced from so much 
of the other), but in power (for instance, if a pint of 
water and ten pints of air have an equal cooling 
power), even so they are comparable in amount, 
though not qua amount, but qua so much power. 
And (c) it would be possible also to compare their 
power not by the measure of quantity, but by an 
" analogy " : for example," as Xis hot, so Yis white."* 
But " analogy," while it signifies similarity in quality, 
signifies equality in quantity. Now it is obviously 
absurd that the bodies, though unchangeable, are 
comparable not merely by " analogy," but by the 

293 



ARISTOTLE 

333 a 

(xAAo. fierpcx) rwv hvvdfxeoiv /cat rch elvai taoj?^ 

depfxov rj ofioiajs^ TTvpos roaovSl Kal depog TToXXa- 

TrXdcTLov TO yap avro irXelov tm ofioyeves elvai 

roiovTov €^€t Tov Xoyov . 

35 AAAa fXTjV 01)8' av^rjai? dv eif] /car' 'E/mttc- 

333 b So/cAea, aAA' ri Kara Trpoadeaiv rrvpl yap av^ei 

TO TTVp- " av^ei 8e p^^tov p-ev a^erepov Sejuas"," 

aWepa S' aW-qp." ravra 8e Trpoarideraf hoKel 

8' ovx ovTiog av^eadat rd av^av6p.eva. rroXv 8e 

)(aX€7r(x)T€pov aTToBovvai irepl yeveaewg rrjs Kara 

5 <f>vaiv. rd ydp yivo/jueva (f)va€i Trdvra yiverai rj 

del 6L>8t iq CO? €776 TO TToXv , rd 8e irapd rd del Kal 

cos €7tI ro TToXv (1770 ravrofxarov Kal dnd rv^'q'S. 

ri ovv rd atriov rov i^ dvOpcoTTOv dvdpojTTOv rj del 

7j COS" CTTt TO TToAu, Kal €K rOV TTVpOV TTVpOV dXXd 

/X17 eXaiav ; rj Kai, idv (LSI ovvredfj, darovv; ov 

10 ydp OTTcos erv)(e avveXdovrcov ovhkv yiverai, Kad^ d* 

€K€lv6s (f>'qai.v, dXXd Xoyoj rivL ri ovv rovroiv 

atriov ; ov ydp 817 irvp ye r) y?]. dXXd p-riv o?38' 

Tj (fiiXia Kal rd veiKos' uvyKpiaecus ydp fxovov, rd 

Be hiaKpiaecxis alriov. rovro 8' earlv rj ovaia rj 

eKaarov, aAA' ov fiovov " fxi^is re 8taAAa^tV re 

15 fjLtyevrcDV," woirep eKelvos ^rjaiv. TV)(rj 8' eTrt 

rovrojv dvopLdt,erai, dAA' ov Xoyos' eari ydp fu- 

■)(drjvai (hs erv)(ev. rcjv Srj (^vaet ovrojv airiov 

^ taws : taov codd. * ofioicos K : ofxoiov VllLi. 

» 8€/ias H : Y^vos EV\.. * Kada EHL. : Kaddirep F, 

" Empedocles, fr. 37 (Diels). 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6 

measure of their powers ; that is, that so much Fire 
and many times as much Air are comparable because 
they are equally or similarly hot. For the same 
thing, if greater in amount, will, by being of the same 
kind, have its ratio increased correspondingly. 

Further, according to Empedocles, growth, too, 
would be impossible except by addition : for in his 
view Fire increases by Fire and " Earth increases its 
own body, and ether increases ether," " and these are 
additions ; and it is not generally held that things 
which increase do so in this way. And it is much 
more difficult for him to give an account of coming-to- 
be by a natural process. For the things which come- 
to-be naturally all come-to-be, either always or 
generally, in a particular way, and exceptions or 
violations of the invariable or general rule are the 
results of chance and luck. What, then, is the reason 
why man always or generally comes-to-be from man, 
and why wheat (and not an olive) comes-to-be from 
wheat ? Or does bone come-to be, if the elements are 
put together in a certain manner ? For, according to 
Empedocles, nothing comes-to-be by their coming 
together by chance but by their coming together 
in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of 
this ? It is certainly not Fire or Earth ; but neither 
is it Love and Strife, for the former is a cause of 
" association " only and the latter of dissociation only. 
No : the cause is the substance of each thing and not 
merely, as he says, " a mingling and separation of 
things mingled " '' ; and chance, not proportion, is the 
name applied to these happenings : for it is possible 
for things to be mixed by chance. The cause, then, 
of things which exist naturally is that they are in 

* Empedocles, fr. 8 (Diels) ; see also above, 314 b 7 f. 

295 



ARISTOTLE 

333 b 

TO ovrois ^x^tv, Kal rj eKdarov cf)vais avrrj, rrepi 

'TIS ovSev Xiyei. ovhev dpa rrepl (f)va€OJS Aeyei. 
dXXa fxrjv Kal ro ev rovro Kal dyaOov o Se rrjv 

20 fil^iv [jiovov eVaivet. Kairoi rd ye aroix^la Sta- 
Kpiv€L ov TO V€LKos, aAA' Tj (fnXia rd ^vaei TTporepa 
rod deov- deol 8e /cat ravra. 

"Ert 8c TTepl KLvqaecos aTrAois" Aeyef ov yap 
iKavov eiTTelv hiori rj ^lAi'a Kal to veiKos klvcl, et 
fiT] tout' rjv (f)iXia elvai to Kivqaei ToiaSl, v€lk€i 

25 8e TO Tota8t. e8et ovv ^ opiaaadai r^ vrroQeadai 
t) a7ro8er^at, r] dKpt^ai'S t) [xaXaKcbs, t} aAAcos" ye 
TTOiS. €Tt 8' eTTet <j>alveTai Kal jSta /cat Trapd (fyvoLV 
KtvovfX€va TCt G(x)fxaTa, Kal Kara (f)vaiv [olov to 
TTvp dvw [xev ov jSia, /caTCO Se j8ta), tw 8e jSta to 
Kara (f)vaLV ivavTiov, eoTi 8e to ^ia, eoTiv dpa 

30 Kal TO Kara ^vaiv Kiveladai. TavTTjv ovv r) (^lAt'a 
Kivei, Tj ov; TOVvavTLOv yap Trjv yrjv Kdro)^ Kal 
htaKpioei €OLK€v Kal fxaXXov to veiKog aiTLov T-fj^ 
Kara (f)vcnv Kivrjcrewg t] rj ^iXia. atOTe Kal oXtos 
napd (fiVGLV rj (l>iXia dv e'irj fxaXXov. drrXcos 8e el 
fir] rj ^iXia rj to veiKos Kivel, ayTcDi/ tcov acD/xdTwv 

35 ovBefxla KLvrjOLS ioTiv ovhe jxovrj. aAA' aTorrov. 

33iti eTL 8e /cat (f)aiv€Tat Kivovixeva- BieKpive jxev yap 

TO veiKos, ■fjvexO'^ 8' dvo) 6 aWrjp ovx vtto tov 

veLKovg, aAA' ore jxev (f)rjaLV worrep drro tv^t^S 

^ KaTW EH : avu) FL. 



" Although it is entitled nepl (Duaccos. 
* i.e. natural motion. 



296 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- AW AY, II. 6 

such and-such a condition, and this is what constitutes 
the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing. 
There is nothing " About the Nature of Things " in his 
treatise." And yet it is this which is the excellence 
and the good of each thing, whereas he gives all the 
credit to the mixing process. (Yet it is not Strife 
but Love that dissociates the elements which are by 
nature prior to God, and they are also gods.) 

Further, his account of motion is superficial. For 
it is not enough to say that Love and Strife move 
things, unless Love has been given a certain faculty 
of movement and Strife a certain other. He should, 
then, have either defined or laid down or demon- 
strated their powers of movement either accurately 
or loosely, or at any rate in some manner. Further- 
more, since the bodies are seen to move by compul- 
sion (that is, unnaturally) and also naturally (for 
example, Fire moves upwards without compulsion, 
but downwards by compulsion), and that which is 
natural is contrary to that which is by compulsion, 
and movement by compulsion actually occurs, it 
follows that natural motion also occurs. Is this, then, 
the motion which Love sets going, or not ? No : for, 
on the contrary, it ^ moves the Earth downwards and 
resembles " dissociation," and Strife rather than Love 
is the cause of natural motion ; and so, generally 
speaking. Love rather than Strife would be contrary 
to nature, and unless Love or Strife is actually setting 
them in motion, the simple bodies themselves have 
no motion or rest at all. But this is strange ; and, 
moreover, they are actually seen to move. For 
although Strife caused dissociation, it was not by 
Strife that the ether was carried upwards, but at one 
time Empedocles talks as if it were due to chance, 

297 



ARISTOTLE 

334 a 

(" ovTio yap avv€Kvpae deojv t6t€, iroXXaKi 8 
dXXcos "), ore Se (firjai ire^vKevat, to TTvp avu) 
5 (fiepeadat,, 6 S' aldrjp, (jirjai, " fxaKpfjai Kara x^ova 
Suero pi^aig." dfia Se /cat rov Koapiov ofxoicog 
ex^iv (f)r]olv 6771 re tov vclkovs vvv /cat -npoTepov 
€ttI rrjs (fitXlag. ri ovv earl to klvovv Trpcorov Kat 
aiTLOV TTJs KiV7]a€(x)s ; ov yap brj rj cf}iXia Kat, to 
veiKog, dXXd rivos KLvqaecos ravra atria, et eariv 
eKilvo dpxrj. 
10 "AroTTov he /cat el rj tjjvx'r] eV rdjv aroix^tcov 7] 
ev Ti avrd)V' at yap dXXoLcoaei? at rrjg 4'^XV^ rrws 
ecfovrat, olov rd pbovatKov elvai /cat ndXiv dpiovaov, 
rj IJi'VTqixr] rj Xiqdrf; hrjXov ydp on el fiev TTvp rj 
tfjvx'Q, Ta TrdOrj vjrdp^ei avrfj daa TTvpt fj irvp- ei 
he jxiKTOV, rd aajfiariKa- rovrcov 8' ovhev auypia- 

15 riKOV. 

7. 'AAAtt TTepl fxev rovrcov erepas epyov earl 
decjjpias. irepl he rcjv aroix^lojv e^ cov rd awp^ara 
avvearrjKev , ocrot? ixev hoKel ri elvai kolvov rj [xera- 
PdXXeiv ei9 aAAr^Aa, dvdyKTj el ddrepov rovrwv, 
/cat ddrepov o-y/x^atVetv • oaot he ^.r] rroiovaiv e^ 
aAAT7Aa»v yeveaiv fnqh^ cos e| eKaarov, rrXr)v u)S eK 
20 roixov rrXivdovs, droTTOV ttoj? e^ eKeivcov eaovrai 
adpKes /cat oaTa /cat rd)v dXXoiv oriovv. exei he 
TO Xeyofxevov drropiav Kal rolg e^ aAAT^Acor yev- 

^ €1 eoTi EHJ : eariv V : et S' ecrri. 

« Vr. 53 (Diels). * Kr. 54 (Diels), 

298 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6-7 

saying, " For thus in its rush it encountered them 
then, but oft-times in other wise," " whereas on 
another occasion he says that it is the nature of Fire 
to be borne upwards, and ether, he says, " sank with 
long roots into the Earth." '' At the same time he 
also says that the Earth is in the same condition now 
under the rule of Strife as it was formerly under that 
of Love. What, then, is the "prime mover" and cause 
of motion ? It certainly is not Love and Strife ; 
but these are the causes of a secondary motion, if 
the " prime mover " is the original source. 

It is also strange that the soul should consist of the 
elements or be one of them ; for how, then, will the 
" alterations " in the soul take place ? How, for 
example, could the change from being musical to 
being unmusical occur, or could memory or forget- 
fulness occur ? For evidently, if the soul is Fire, only 
such effects will be produced upon it as can be pro- 
duced by Fire qua Fire ; whereas, if it is a mixture 
of elements, only the corporeal effects will be pro- 
duced ; but no one of these effects is corporeal. 

7. The discussion, however, of these questions is How single 
the task of another investigation. But, as regards c^bined^ 
the elements of which bodies are composed, those to form 
who think that they all have something in common 
or that they change into each other, if they hold one 
of these views, must necessarily hold the other. For 
those, on the other hand, who do not make them 
come-to-be out of each other nor one from another 
taken singly (except in the sense that bricks come- 
to-be out of a wall), there is the paradox as to how 
flesh and bones and any of the other compounds will 
result from the elements. This suggestion involves 
a difficulty also for those who generate the elements 

299 



ARISTOTLE 

334 a 

vAaLV, TLva rpoTTov yiverai i^ avrcov erepov ti 
Trap' avra. Xcyco 8' otov eariv Ik rrvpos vBcop 
Kal €K TOVTOV yiv^odaL Trvp- eari yap rt kolvov 

25 TO VTroKeifxevov . aAAo. 817 Koi uap^ e^ avrwv 
ytVerat koL fXveXos' ravra hrj ylverai ttcos; eKei- 
voLS re yap rots' Xeyovatv (Ls 'EjU-rreSo/cA'T]? Tt? 
ecrrat rpoTTos; dvdyKrj yap avvdeaiv et-vai KauaTrep 
€K irXivdoiV Kal Xidcov rolxos' Kal to ply pia 8e 
TOVTO e/c a(x)t,op,€vcov p,€v eoTai tcjv otolx^lcdv, 

30 Kara p^iKpa 8e rrap' d'AArjAa avyK€i.p,€vcov. ovru) 
Sr) adp^ Kal rcjv dXXojv eKaarov. avpL^alvei 817 
pLTj i^ orovovv p,€povg aapKos yiveadai TTvp Kai 
vhojp, oiOTtep Ik Krjpov yevoir^ dv €K p.€V rovSl 
Tov jjicpovs a(f)aLpa, 7Tvpap,ls 8' e^ aAAof rivog- 
aAA' iveSdx^TO ye e| eKarepov eKarepov yeveodai. 

35 TOVTO pb€v 817 TOVTOV yCverai rov rpoirov ck rrj^ 
334 b aapKO'5 e^ orovovv dp.(f)oj- rols 8' e/ceiVoi? Xeyovoiv 
ovK evhex^rai, aAA' (1)S eK tol^ov Xudos Kal irXivdos, 
eKdrepov e^ dXXov tottov Kal p^epovs. op-occog 8e 
/cat rot? TTOiovoi pclav avrcov vX-qv ex^i' rtvd arro- 
piav, TTots earai ri i^ dp.<j)OTepojv , otov i/jvxpov Kal 
5 deppLOv ri TTvpog Kal yrjs. el ydp eariv -q adp^ cf 
dp.cf)olv Kal pnqSerepov eKeivwv, p,r)S^ av avvdeais 
aajl^op,€VOJV, ri XeLverai ttXtjv vXtjv elvai ro ef 
300 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7 

from each other, namely, in what manner does any- 
thing else other than the elements themselves come- 
to-be out of them. The following is an example of 
what I mean : Water can come-to-be out of Fire 
and Fire out of Water (for their substratum is some- 
thing common to both), but flesh, too, and marrow 
come-to-be out of them ; how do they come-to-be ? 
What manner of coming-to-be is ascribed to them 
by those who hold such a view as that of Empedocles ? 
They must maintain that the process is composition, 
just as a wall comes-to-be from bricks and stones ; 
moreover, this " mixture " will consist of the elements 
preserved intact but placed side by side with one 
another in minute particles. This, supposedly, is 
what happens in the case of flesh and each of the 
other compounds. The result is that Fire and Water 
do not come-to-be out of any and every part of the 
flesh ; for example, while a sphere might come-to-be 
from one part of a piece of wax and a pyramid from 
another, yet it was possible for either shape to have 
come-to-be out of either part of the material. This, 
then, is how coming-to-be occurs when both Fire and 
Water come-to-be out of any part of the flesh. But 
for those who hold the above view this is impossible, 
but the process can only take place as stone and brick 
come-to-be out of a wall, that is, each out of a different 
place and part. Similarly, a difficulty arises also for 
those who make out that the elements have a single 
matter, namely, how anything will result from two 
of them taken together, for instance, cold and hot 
or Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and 
yet is neither of them, and again is not a compound 
in which they are preserved intact, what possibility 
remains except that the result of their composition 

301 



ARISTOTLE 

334 b ^ ^ ^ y * , ^ « 

eKeivojv ; rj yap darepov (f)9opa 'q darepov Trout rj 

Trjv vXr]v. 

*Ap' ovv eTTCiS'q eari koI p,dXXov Kal tjttov depjxov 

/cat i/jvxpov, OTOV [xev aTrAcD? fj darepov ivTeXex^t-a, 

10 Bvvdpi€^ darepov earav orav 8e fxr] iravreXtJos , aXX 
COS" p-ev deppiov \jjvxpov, ws 8e ifjvxpov 9epp.6v 8ia 
TO pLLyvvp,eva (f)deipeiv ras VTrepoxas dXXrjXojv, rore 
ovd' 7] vXt) earai ovre eKeivojv rcov evavnojv e/ca- 
repov evreXex^ia OLTrXcb?, dXXd p,era^v- Kara Be ro 

15 bwapbei p.dXXov etvai Oepp^ov rj i/jvxpov ^ rovvavriov , 
Kara rovrov rov Xoyov StTrAaatcus' deppiov hwdpLei 
r) ifjvxpdv, rj rpnrXaatcos, rj Kar* dXXov rpoTTOv 
roLovrov ; earai Br) p^LxOevrcnv raAA' e/c rcov evav- 
ricDV ri rdv CTTOi;(€ia>v, /cai rd aroix'^ta e^ eKeivcov 
Bvvdp,eL 7TOJS ovrcDV, ovx ovroj Be cos rj vXr], aAAa 

20 rov elprjpievov rponov Kal eariv ovro) pcev p-i^LS, 
eKeivoiS Be vXr\ ro yivopcevov. erTel Be Kal Trdaxei- 
rdvavria Kara rov iv rots TrpcoroLS Biopiapiov 
eari yap rd evepyeia depp,dv BwdpueL ijwxpdv Kal 
rd evepyeia ipvxpdv BvvdpieL 6epp,6v, coare edv p.rj 
ladl^r], pLera^dXXei els dXXrjXa. opLOLCjos Be Kal eirl 

25 rdv dXXojv evavrioiv Kai Trpdjrov ovrco ra aroi- 
veta puera^aXXei, €k Be rovrwv adpKeg Kal oar a 
Kal rd rotavra, rov p,ev deppLov yivopLevov ifjvx- 
pov, rov Be tpvxpov deppLov, orav vpds rd pLeaov 

" It is difficult to see any meaning in the words and they 
should perhaps be omitted. 

" i.e. the case where one contrary destroys the other, 
(lines 6, 7). 

« See 323 b 1 ff., where the law of the reciprocal action- 
and-passion of contraries is stated. 

302 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7 

is matter ? For the passing-away of either of them 
produces either the other or the matter. 

Is the following a possible solution based on the 
fact that there are greater and less degrees in hot 
and cold ? When one of them is actually in being 
without qualification, the other will be potentially 
in existence ; but when neither completely exists 
but (because they mix and destroy one another's 
excesses) there is a hot which, for a hot, is cold, and 
a cold which, for a cold, is hot, then the result will be 
that neither their matter nor either of the two con- 
traries will be actually in existence without qualifica- 
tion but an intermediate, and according as it is 
potentially more hot than cold or, vice versa, it will 
possess a power of heating greater in proportion — 
whether double or treble or in some such ratio — 
than its power of cooling. The other bodies will 
result from the contraries (that is, from the elements)" 
when mixed together, and the elements will result 
from the contraries existing somehow potentially — 
not in the sense in which matter exists potentially 
but in the manner already explained. Thus " mix- 
ture " takes place, whereas what comes-to-be in the 
other case *> is matter. But since the contraries also 
are acted upon according to the definition given in 
the first part of this treatise " — for the actually hot 
is potentially cold, and the actually cold is potentially 
hot, so that, unless the hot and cold are equalized, 
they change into one another (and the like happens 
in the case of the other contraries) — thus in the first 
place the elements are transformed ; but out of them 
flesh and bones and the like come-to-be when the hot 
is becoming cold and the cold becoming hot and they 
reach the mean, for at that point there is neither hot 

303 



ARISTOTLE 

334b 

eXdji' ivravda yap ovSerepov, to Se iieaov tto\v 

Koi ovK dSiaLperov . oijlolcos 3e /cat to ^rjpov /cat 
30 vypov /cat ra roiavra Kara jxeaoT'qTa ttolovol 
adpKa Kai oarovv Kai rdAAa. 

8. "Avravra 8e rd (jllkto. aca/xara, ocra Tre/at rov 

rov jxeaov tottov iarlv, i^ OLTTavrajv avyKcirai rcjv 

dirXwv. yrj juev yap ivv7Tdp)(€i Trdai Sid to e/caoTov 

elvai ixdXiara Kai TrXelarov ev rep oiKcicp tottco, 

35 vhiop he hid TO heiv fxev 6pit,eadai to ovvdeTov, 

335 a yiovov 8' elvai twv ctTrAoip' evopiOTov to vhcop, eVi 

he Kai TTjv yrjv dvev tov vypov pur] hvvaadat avp,- 

pueveiv, dXXd tout' elvai to avv€)(ov' el ydp i^- 

aipedeir] TeXecos i^ avTrjs to vypov, SiaTrtTTTOi dv. 

Trj pL€V ovv Kai vhcop hcd TavTas evvTrdpy^ei to,? 

5 avTias, drjp he Kai rrvp, oti evavTia €(7tI yij Kai 

vhaTL' yrj pcev ydp depi, vhcop he irvpl evavTiov eoTtv, 

(hs ivhex^Tai ovaiav ovaia €varTtav elvai. eTrel 

ovv at yeveaeis e/c tcDv evavTLOJV elaiv, evvTrapx^i 

he ddTepa a/cpa twv ivavTicov, dvdyKr) Kai daTepa 

evvTrdpyeiv , cuctt' ev aTravTi Tip avvOeTco irdvTa Td 

10 ctTrAa eveoTai. fxapTvpelv S' eoiKe Kai rj Tpo(l>r) 

eKaaTOJV drtavTa pcev ydp Tpe^eTai toIs auTots e^ 

(LvTTep eoTLV, arravTa he TrAet'oot Tpe^eTai. Kai ydp 

aTrep dv ho^eiev evl pLOVo) Tpe(j>eaQai, tco vhaTi Td 

(f)VTd, rrXeioai Tpe(j)eTaf fJcepiKTai ydp to) vhaTi 



" i.e. the Earth as the centre of the universe. 
"* i.e. because the region in which mixed bodies exist con- 
sists mainly of earth. 

' i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water). 
** i.e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire). 

304 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7-8 

nor cold. (The mean, however, has considerable 
extension and is not indivisible.) In like manner , 
also it is in virtue of being in a " mean " condition that 
the dry and the moist and the like produce flesh and 
bone and the other compounds. 

8. All the mixed bodies, which exist about the Every com- 
region of the centre," are compounds of all the simple must have 
bodies. For Earth enters into their composition, ^l^^"J 
because every simple body exists specially and in the bodies as 
greatest quantity in its own place ** ; and Water forms stttuents. 
part of them, because that which is composite must 
have limits, and Water is the only one of the simple 
bodies which is easily confined within limits, and 
furthermore, the Earth cannot remain coherent with- 
out moisture, and this is what holds it together ; for 
if the moisture were entirely removed from it, it 
would fall apart. 

Earth, therefore, and Water enter into the com- 
position of simple bodies for these reasons ; so also 
do Air and Fire because they are contraries of Earth 
and Water — Earth of Air, and Water of Fire, in the 
sense in which one substance can be contrary to 
another substance. Since, then, comings-to-be result 
from contraries, and one pair of extreme contraries 
is already present," the other pair ** must also be 
present, so that all the simple bodies are found in 
every compound. The food of each compound serves 
to supply evidence of this ; for they are all nourished 
by foods which are identical with their constituents, 
and all are nourished by more than one food. For 
indeed the plants, which would seem to be nourished 
by one food only, namely. Water, are fed by more 
than one food, for there is Earth mixed with the 
Water — and this, too, is why farmers experiment by 

305 



ARISTOTLE 

33Sa 

yrj- 8l6 Kal ol yeojpyol TreipcovTat [xi^avreg apoeLV. 

isr 67761 S' iarlv 7] jxev rpo^T] rrjs vXrjs, to Se rpe^o- 
fxevov avveiXrijjievov rrj vXj] rj iJ'Op<f)r] Kal ro elSos, 
evXoyov rfSrj to piovov tojv olttXcov acopiaTOJV rpe- 
(f)€GdaL TO TTvp oLTTavTajv 6^ dXXrjXcov yLvopblvoiv , 
oiOTrep Kal ol npoTepoi Xeyovaw pLovov yap eari 
Kal pidXiara tov e'lSovs to rrvp Sio. to 7T€(f)VKevat, 

20 (f)€pea6aL rrpos tov opov. cKaoTOV 8e 7T€(f)UKev 61? 
TTjv eavTov y^uiP^^ <f)€pea9aL- rj 8e pLop^r] /cat to 

6fSoS' CLTTaVTiXiV iv Tols OpOLS. OTL pL€V OVV O-TTaVTa 

TO. CTcojLtaTa 6^ aTTavTOiv avveaTr]Ke tojv olttXcov, 

6tp7JTat. 

9. 'ETTet 8' cgtIv evia yevqrd /cat (fidapTO., /cat 

25 rj yevecns Tvyxdvet, ovaa ev tco irepi to p,€aov to- 

TTCp, XcKTCov rrepl Trdarjg yeveaecos opLoicxJS vroaat Te 

/cat TtVe? avTTJs at dp-)(ai' paov yap ovtw to, Kad 

eKaoTov deoip-qaopi^v , oVav irepl tcov KadoXov Xa- 

j3a>/X6V TTpOiTOV. 

Eiatv OVV /cat tov dpidp.6v taat /cat to) yevet at 
30 awTai alrrep ev toi? dt8tots' re /cat TrpcoTois' rj piev 
yap eoTiv ojs vXrj, rj 8' ws piop(f)rj. Sel 8e /cat ttjv 
Tpirrjv eVt Trpoavvapx^iv ov yap t/cavai npos to 
yevvrjaai at hvo, Kaddrrep ovh ev Tots" rrpajTot?. 
COS" /xev OVV vXtj toZs yevrjroZs iarlv aiTiov to Sv- 
varov etvat /cat pirj elvai. to, /xev ya/a €^ dvay/CTj? 
35 iaTCV, olov TO. dtSta, Ta 8' e^ dvdy/crj? oi)/c eoTiv. 

« See 321 b 16 ff, 
806 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 8-9 

making mixtures and use them for watering. Now 
whereas food is of the nature of matter, and that 
which is fed is the " shape " and " form " taken to- 
gether with the matter," it is reasonable to suppose 
that of the simple bodies, while all come-to-be out 
of one another. Fire is the only one which is fed, as 
is the view also of the earlier philosophers. For 
Fire alone — and to a greater extent than the rest — 
is of the nature of " form," because it naturally tends 
to be borne towards the limit. Now each of the simple 
bodies tends to be borne to its own place, and the 
" shape " and " form " of all of them depend on their 
limits. It has now been explained that all the com- 
pound bodies are composed of the simple bodies. 

9. Since some things are of a nature to come-to-be Chapters 
and to pass-away, and since coming-to-be actually j^/*^ causes 
takes place in the region about the centre, we must coming-to-be 
discuss the number and the nature of the sources of away i 
all coming-to-be alike ; for we shall more easily form ^jmar'' 

a theory about the particulars when we have first and final 

J .1 . 1 causes. 

grasped the umversals. 

These sources, then, are equal in number to and 
identical in kind with those which exist among eternal 
and primary things. For there is one in the sense of 
material cause, a second in the sense of formal cause, 
and the third too must be present also ; for the two 
sources are not enough to generate things which 
come-to-be, just as they are not enough in the case 
of primary things either. Now cause in the sense 
of matter for things which are of a nature to come-to- 
be is " the possibility of being and not-being." For 
some things exist of necessity, for example, the things 
which are eternal, and some things of necessity do 
not exist ; and of these two classes it is impossible 

307 



ARISTOTLE 

335 8 

TovTcov Se Tct ix€v dSwaxov yui] elvai, to. Se ahv- 

335 b varov elvai Sta ro fxr] evhe-)(eaBaL Ttapa to dvayKoiov 
dXXws ^X^^^- ^'^'^ ^^ '^^'' ^*vaL Kal fxr) etvai hvvard, 
0776/3 earl ro yevrjTov Kal <j)dapr6v TTore fiev yap 
eart rovro, ttotc 8' ovk iariv. wot avdyKt] yi- 
5 veaiv €LvaL Kal (j>dopdv Trepl to SvvaTOV elvai Kal 
pit) eivai. 8to Kal cos P'CV vXr) tovt^ earlv aiTLov 
Tois' yevrjTois, cos" 8e to ov €V€K€V r] p.op(f>rj Kal to 
etoos'" TOVTO S' ecTTtv o Aoyo? o ttjs e/cacTou ovoias. 
Aet 8e TTpoueZvat /cat tt^v TpiTrjv, riv dnavTes 
p,€v oveipcoTTOvoL, Xcyei 8' oT38et?, aAA' ol p,ev 

10 iKavTjv a)7]6r]aav aLTtav elvai Trpos to yiveodai rrjv 
Tcov elScov cf)vaiv, a)aTrep 6 iv Oat8ajvi HoiKpaTrfS' 
Kat, yap eKelvos, imTtp.i^oag rot? aAAoi? co? ovBev 
eiprjKoaLV, VTroTiOeTai oti iarl tcov ovtojv to. p-kv 
eiOT] TO. 8e pLedeKTLKa t(x)v et8ajv, Kal otl elvat p,kv 
eKaoTov Xdyerai Kara to 6180?, yiveadai 8e Kara 

15 Trjv pbeToXrjijjLv Kal (jideip^aQai /caTo. t7]v aTTo^oXrjv, 
(DOT 61 TavTa dXrjdrj, rd etSr^ oieTat i^ dvdyKrjs 
aiTLa etvai Kal yeveaeojs Kal ^dopds. ol 8' avTTjV 
Tr]v vXr]v (XTTO TavTrjg ydp elvai Trjv KLvrjoiv. ov- 
o€T€poi 8e XeyovoL KaXcos. 6t p,€v .ydp cotlv aiTia 
Ta eiSry, 8ta tl ovk del yevva avvex^u)?, dXXd ttotc 

20 p.€V rroTe 8' ov, ovtojv Kal twv elSwv del Kal rdjv 



" Plato, Phaedo 96 a— 99 c. 
308 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9 

for the first not to be, while for the second it is im- 
possible to he, because they cannot be other than 
they are in violation of the law of necessity. Some 
things, however, can both be and not be. This is the 
case with that which can come-to-be and pass-away ; 
for at one moment it exists, at another it does not 
exist. So coming-to-be and passing-away must occur 
in the sphere of what can-be-and-not-be. This, then, 
is the cause, in the sense of material cause, of things 
which are of a nature to come-to-be, whereas cause, 
in the sense of their " end in view," is their shape and 
form ; and this is the definition of the essential 
nature of each of them. 

But the third source must also be present, of which criticism 
everyone dreams but never puts into words. But °j^ *'^® 
some people have thought the nature of the " forms " posed in 
was enough to account for coming-to-be. Socrates, p^^^o 
for instance, did so in the Phaedo "• ; for he, after and the 
finding fault with the other philosophers for having theory^ '** 
made no pronouncement on the subject, lays it down 
that some of the things which exist are " forms " and 
others " partakers in the forms," and that each thing 
is said to exist in virtue of the " form " and to come- 
to-be in virtue of its participation in the " form " and 
to pass-away because of its rejection of it. Hence 
he thinks that, if this is true, the " forms " are neces- 
sarily the causes of both coming-to-be and passing- 
away. On the other hand, some have thought that 
the matter in itself was the cause ; for it is from this, 
they said, that movement arises. But neither of 
these schools of thought is right. For, if the "forms " 
are causes, why do they not always generate con- 
tinually but only intermittently, since the " forms " 
and the partakers in them are always there ? Further- 

309 



ARISTOTLE 

335b 

^edeKTLKWv; en 8' ctt' ivicov decopovfxcv dXXo 



< > 



TO aiTiov ov vyLeiav yap o larpos epiTToiei /cat 
eTTLGT'qpbTjv 6 i7Ti,arrjfxo)V, ovarjs /cat vyieias avrijs 
/cat e7n(TTrifji7]s /cat rcijv [xedeKTiKcbv (haavrws 
8e /cat CTTt TcDv aAAcov tcDi' /caro. hvvapuiv Tvpar- 
ro[jL€va)v. el Se ttjv vXtjv tls cfi-qaeie yevvdv 8ta 

25 Ti^v KivrjOLV, (f)vat,Ka>r€pov /xev av Aeyot tcSv ovrio 
XeyovTOiv ro yap aXXoiovv /cat to pL€Taa^'i]ixarit,ov 
aiTicoTcpov T€ rov yevvdv, /cat ev aTracnv elcodafxev 
rovTo XeycLV ro ttolovv, ofioicog ev re rots" (f)va€i, 
/cat ev Tot? (XTTO re-)(yi)S, o dv rj KLvqriKov. ov fJLTjv 
dXXd /cat ovTOi ovk opdojs Xeyovcnv rrj^ /u.ev 

30 yap vXrjg to Traa^^etv ecrrt /cat to Kiveladai, to 8e 
/ctvetv /cat TO TTotetv cTcpag Swafxews {SrjXov 8e 
/cat 6771 TcDv Texvrj /cat ctti tcov (f)va€i yivofxevcov 
ov yap avTO Troiei to vSiop l^wov i^ avTov, ovSe 
TO ^vXov kXlvtjv, dAA' rj Texvf))- (x)(tt€ /cat outoi 
8ta TOVTO XeyovoLV ovk opdcos, /cat oVt TrapaXei.- 

35 TTovai TTjv KvpicoTcpav atTt'ttv e^aipovGL yap to tl 
336 a rjv etvat /cat ttjv p.op<j>riv. cti 8e /cat TCt? hwdpLeis 
d7ro8t8daCTt Tot? acu/xaai, 8t' cts" yei^vcDCTt, Ai'ai/ 
dpyart/ccD?, dcfiaipovvTes ttjv Kara to efSo? aiTtW. 
iTTeiSrj yap TvecfiVKev, co? <f>aaL, to p.kv deppiov 8ta- 
KpLveiv TO 8e ijjvxpov avvKXTavai,, /cat tcov dXXatv 
5 eKaoTOV TO fX€v TToieXv TO Se Trdcrx^iv, e/c toutcov 
AeyouCTi Kat 8td toutcov diravTa ToXXa yiveadat. 

310 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9 

more, in some cases we see that something else is the 
cause ; for it is the physician who implants health 
and the scientific man who implants scientific know- 
ledge, although health itself and science itself exist 
and also the participants in them ; and the same 
thing is true of the other operations carried out in 
virtue of a special faculty. On the other hand, if one 
were to say that matter generates by means of its 
movement, he would speak more in accordance with 
the facts of nature than those who state the view 
given above ; for that which " alters " and transforms 
is a more potent cause of bringing things into being, 
and we are always accustomed, in the products alike 
of nature and of art, to make out that whatever can 
cause motion is the acting cause. However, these 
thinkers are also wrong ; for to be acted upon, that 
is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to 
move, that is to act, is the function of another power. 
(This is evident both in the things which come-to-be 
by art and in those which come-to-be by nature ; 
for water does not itself produce an animal out of 
itself, nor does wood produce a bed, but art). So, for 
this reason, these thinkers are not correct in what 
they say, and also because they omit the most potent 
cause ; for they exclude the essential nature and the 
" form." Moreover, also, when they do away with 
the formal cause, the powers which they attribute 
to bodies and which enable them to bring things into 
being are too instrumental in character. For since, 
as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate 
and of the cold to bring together and of each of the 
other qualities the one to act and the other to be 
acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these, 
so they say, that all the other things come-to-be and 

311 



ARISTOTLE 

386 a 

Kai (f)d€Lpeadaf ^atVerat Se /cat to rrvp avro kivov- 
jxevov Kal Trdaxov. eVt 8e vapaTrXrjaLov ttoiovglv 
cooTTep el Tt? Toi TTpiovL Kal eKctCTTO) ra)v opyavcov 

10 aTTovepuoi ttjv alriav rcov yLVOfxevwv dvdyKrj yap 
TTpiovTos hiaipeZadai Kal ^eovros XeaiveaOac, Kal 
irrl rcbv dXXcuv ofioicos. cuctt' el on fidXiara 
TTOieX /cat Kivel to TTvp, dXXd ttcos Ktvel ov irpoa- 
OecopovGLv,^ OTL )(^elpov r) Ta opyava. rjpXv Se Kad- 
oXov T€ TTpoTepov e'lprfTai irepl tcov alTLCjov, Kal vvv 
StcopicTTai rrepi re rr^? vXrjs /cat Trjs ixop^r\s. 

15 10. "Eti 8e eTTel rj /cara ttjv (f>opdv Kivrjais Se- 
Sei/crat oVt atStos", dvdyKT] tovtcov ovtcov Kal yeve- 
aiv elvai avvexcos' r) yap (f>opd TTOii^crei ttjv yeveaiv 
evSeXe^di? Sta to Trpoadyeiv /cat dTrdyeiv to yev- 
vTjTLKOv. d[jLa Se SrjXov otl Kal Ta rrpoTepov KaXcos 

20 elprjTai, to rrpaiTrjv tcov pueTa^oXajv ttjv (f>opdv 
dXXd jjLT] T7]v yeveaiv eiTTelv ttoXv yap evXoyoj- 
Tepov TO ov Tw [xrj ovtl yeveaeoj^ aiTiov elvai ^ to 
fxrj ov TO) bvTi Tov eLvai. to pcev ovv (fyepopievov 
ecTTt, TO Se yLvofxevov ovk ecjTiv Sto Kat r] (f)opd 
TTpoTepa Trjg yeveaecos. enel 8' yTro/cetrat /cat Se- 

25 Set/crat avvex^jS ovaa rot? Trpdypcaai Kal yeveais 
Kal (f)dopd, (j>apLev 8' atrtW etvai ttjv (f>opdv tov 
yiveadat, (f>avep6v otc {juds ixev ovarjs ttjs (f>opd? 
OVK ivSexeTai yiveadai a/^^ct) 8ta to ivavTta elvat- 

^ ov TTpoadeuipovai, : ov TrpoadfCDpolaiv K : ov npodewpovaiv H : 
ovx opaiaiv FL. 

" Phys. ii. 3-9. " See 335 a 32-b 7. 

" Phys. viii. 7-9. ^ i.e. the sun, see below. 

' Phys. 260 a 26 ff. 

812 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9-10 

pass-away. But it is evident that Fire itself is moved 
and is acted upon ; moreover, they are doing much 
the same thing as if one were to ascribe to the saw 
or to any other tool the causation of objects which 
are brought into being ; for division must take place 
when a man saws and smoothing when he uses a 
plane, and a similar effect must be produced by the 
use of the other tools. Hence, however much Fire 
is active and causes motion, yet they fail to observe 
horv it moves things, namely, in a manner inferior to 
that in which the tools act. We have ourselves dealt 
with causes in general in a previous work," and we 
have now ^ distinguished between matter and form. 

10. Moreover, since the change caused by motion The 
has been proved to be eternal," it necessarily follows, eaiuse of 
if that is so, that coming-to-be goes on continuously ; coming-to- 
for the movement will produce coming-to-be un- passing- 
interruptedly by bringing near and withdrawing the gi'J^aannual 
" generator." ^ At the same time it is evident that movement 
our statement in a former work " was also right in ecliptic 
which we spoke of motion, not coming-to-be, as the circle. 
" primary kind of change." For it is far more reason- 
able that that which is should be a cause of coming- 
to-be of that which is not, than that that which is not 
should be cause of being to that which is. For that 
which is being moved exists, but that which is coming- 
to-be does not exist ; therefore movement is prior to 
coming-to-be. Now since it has been suggested and 
proved ^ that coming-to-be and passing-away happen 
to things continuously, and we maintain that motion 
is the cause of coming-to-be, it is clear that, if motion 
is simple, both processes cannot go on because they 
are contrary to one another ; for nature has ordained 

/ Cf. 317 b 33 ff. 

313 



ARISTOTLE 

336 a 

TO yap avro /cat (haavrcos ^X^^ ^^'' '^^ clvto 7T€<f)VK€ 
TTOielv. ware tJtol yiveaig ael earat rj (f)dopd. Sel 
30 8e TrAetous" clvat ras KLvqaeLS /cat evavrias , '^ rfj 
(f)opa rj rfj avtOjuaAta • rojv yap evavTLOJV ravavrta 
atTta. 

Ato /cat ovx "^ TTpcory] (f)opa alria earl yeveaecos 
/cat (f)dopds, aAA' rj Kara rov Xo^ov kvkXov iv 
ravrj) yap /cat ro avve)(es ean /cat to Kiveiadat, 
8vo KLVi^aeis' avdyKT] yap, et ye del earat avve-)(7]? 
336 b yeveais /cat (f)dopd, del fxev ri KiveZadai, Iva pir) 
imXeLTTOjaLV avrai at piera^oXai, Suo S , ottojs pir) 
ddrepov avpi^aLvrj piovov. rrjs p-ev ovv avvex^ias 
rj rod oXov <f)opd alria, rov Se vrpoaieVai /cat 
aTTtevat r) ey/cAtat?* avpL^atvei yap ore puev TToppco 
5 yiveadai ore S' eyyvs- dviaov he rov Siaarr]- 
piaros ovros dvwpiaXog earat rj Ktvrjaig' coar el 
ru) irpoatevat Kal eyyvg elvai yevva, rco amevai 
ravrov rovro Kal iroppco ytveadai (jydeipet, Kal el 
roi TToXXdKts TTpoatevat yevva, /cat toj TroAAa/cts' 
drreXQelv (f)detpef rcov yap evavrtwv rdvavria a'irta. 
10 /cat ev taip XP^^V '^°-'- V <f>^opd Kal r) yeveats rj 
Kara (f>vaiv. Sto Kal ol xp^vot Kal ot jStot eKdarcDV 
dptdpov exovat /cat rovrco htopit,ovraf rravriov yap 
eart rd^ts, Kal Trds jStos" /cat XP^^^^ pterpeirai 
TTepioSo), irXrjV ov rfj avrfj Trdvres, aAA' ot ptev 

" The revolution of the npwTos ovpavos or outermost sphere 
which revolves once every twenty-four hours. 

* The annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle. 

' i.e. of the TTpwTos ovpavos, which also involves the revolu- 
tion of the concentric spheres. 

'' The inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outer- 

314 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 

that the same thing, as long as it remains in the same 
state, always produces the same result, so that either 
coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. 
The movements, however, must be more than one 
and contrary to one another either in the direction 
of their motion or in their irregularity ; for con- 
traries are the causes of contraries. 

It is not, therefore, the primary motion " which is 
the cause of coming-to-be and passing-away, but the 
motion along the inclined circle ^ ; for in this there 
is both continuity and also double movement, for 
it is essential, if there is always to be continuous 
coming-to-be and passing-away, that there should be 
something always moving, in order that this series 
of changes may not be broken, and double movement, 
in order that there may not be only one change 
occurring. The movement of the whole '^ is the cause 
of the continuity, and the inclination '^ causes the 
approach and withdrawal of the moving body ; for 
since the distance is unequal, the movement will be 
irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching 
and being near, this same body causes destruction 
by withdrawing and becoming distant, and if by 
frequently approaching it generates, by frequently 
withdrawing it destroys ; for contraries are the cause 
of contra I'ies, and natural passing-away and coming- 
to-be take place in an equal period of time. There- 
fore the periods, that is the lives, of each kind of 
living thing have a number and are thereby dis- 
tinguished ; for there is an order for everything, 
and every life and span is measured by a period, 
though this is not the same for all, but some are 

most sphere ; according to Aristotle, the equator of the 
Universe is in the same plane as the earth's equator. 

315 



ARISTOTLE 

336 b 

iXdrrovL oi 8e TrAetovt* toXs fxkv yap ivtavros, rols 

15 Se }xeil,oiv, rot? Se iXdrrojv Trepiohos^ icrrt to 
jjierpov. 

^aiveraL Se /cat to." Kara ttjv aiaOriaiv ofioXoyov- 
fieva Tols Trap* rjjjicov Aoyois" opcofxev yap on 
rrpoaiovTos /xev rod rjXiov yeveai's iariv, aTTtovTos 
Se (^6iois, Kal iv locp xpovcp eKarepov Laos yap 6 
Xpovos TTJs (f)dopds Kal rrjs yeveaecos rrjs Kara 

20 (f)vcnv. dXXd cru/x/SatVei TToAAa/cts" iv iXdrrovt 
(jyQelpeaBai Stot rrjv TTpos dXXrjXa avyKpaaiv dvcu- 
p.dXov yap ovarjg rrjg vXrjg Kal ov rravraxov rrjs 
avrrjs dvdyKrj Kal rds yeveaeig dvco/xdXovs elvai 
Kal rds fjiev ddrrovs rds Se ^pahvripas , coare 
avfx^aiveL Sia rrjv rovrcov yiveatv dXXois yiveodai 
^dopdv. 

25 'Aei 8', coCTTTep €Lp7]raL, avvexrjs earai r) yiveaig 
Kal 7) (f>dopd, Kal ovherrore VTroXeiipii St' rjv eLnofxev 
air lav. rovro S' evXoycos avp^^e^riKev cttcI yap 
iv aTTaaiv del rov ^eXrlovos opeyeadal <^a/xev rrjv 
(f)vaLV, ^eXrLov Se to etvat r) to [xt) clvai (ro S' efrai 

30 7Toaa)(d)S Xeyojxev, iv dXXois e'lpr^rai), rovro 8' 
dSwaTOV iv aTraatv imapxeLV Sta ro TToppco rrjs 
dpx^js d(f)laraa6ai, rep XeLiropivcp rpoircx) avve- 
TrXiqpojae ro oXov 6 deos, ivheXexrj^ TTOirjaas rrjV 
yevecTLV ovro) yap dv pudXiara avvelpoiro ro etvai 
Sta ro iyyvrara etvai rrjs ovalas ro ylveadai del 

337 a Kal rrjV yiveaiv. rovrov 8' atVtov, CLyarrep eiprjrai 

1 ij ante irepioSos oiiiisi. 

* TO add id i. 

' evSeXexfj FH : evreXexT] E. 

<• See 318 a 9 ff. 
* Metaphysics, passim, 

316 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 

measured by a smaller and some by a greater period ; 
for some the measure is a year, for others a greater 
or a lesser period. 

The evidence of sense-perception clearly agrees 
with our views ; for we see that coming-to-be occurs 
when the sun approaches, and passing-away when it 
withdraws, and the two processes take an equal time ; 
for the space of time occupied by natural passing- 
away and coming-to-be is equal. It often happens, 
however, that things pass away in too short a time 
owing to the commingling of things with one another ; 
for, their matter being irregular and not everywhere 
the same, their comings-to-be must also be irregular, 
sometimes too quick and sometimes too slow. The 
result is that the coming-to-be of certain things 
becomes the cause of the passing-away of other 
things. 

As has already been remarked, coming-to-be and Aristotle 
passing-away will take place continuously, and will Jiis'Sieory 

never fail owinff to the cause which we have mven." explains 

now 
This has come about with good reason. For nature, coming-to- 

as we maintain, always and in all things strives after pagg^ng. 
the better ; and " being " (we have stated elsewhere away main- 
the different meanings of " being " *) is better than continuous 
" not-being," but it is impossible that " being " can be alteration. 
present in all things, because they are too far away 
from the " original source." God, therefore, following 
the course which still remained open, perfected the 
universe by making coming-to-be a perpetual pro- 
process ; for in this way " being " would acquire the 
greatest possible coherence, because the continual 
coming-to-be of coming-to-be is the nearest approach 
to eternal being. The cause of this continuous pro- 
cess, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical 

317 



ARISTOTLE 

337 a 

TToXXaKi^, rj kvkXo) (f)opd' [xovrj yap avve-xrj?. Sio 
/cat TaAAa oaa /xera^aAAet etV aAATjAa Kara ra 
TTOidr] Kat ra? Suva^aet?, olov ra airXd crcujU-ara, 
/Lti/ietrat r7)v kvkXco (f)opdv orav yap i^ ySaros" 
5 ai^^ ydvrjrai Kal e| depos nvp /cat TraAtv e/c TTvpos 
vhoip, kvkXio (jiapiev it epLeXrjXvdiv at rr^v yeveatv 8ta 
TO TrdXiv dvaKdpLTTTeiV. cocrre /cat t) evOela (jyopd 
piLp,ovpievrj rrjv kvkXo) avvex^'S ecrrtv. 

"A/Lta 8e S^Aov e/c rovrojv 6 rtve? aTTOpovaiv, 
Sta Tt, eKdarov tcov acjpidTWV els rrjv ot/cetav 0e- 

10 popLevov "x^Lopav, iv ro) aTreipcp XP^^V ^^ oieardai 
rd acopLara. atriov yap tovtov iarlv i^ etV dXX-qXa 
pcerd^aaLS' et yct/o eKaarov epcevev iv rfj avrov 
X^P9- '<^o.^ I^V jLtere/SaAAev utto tou TrArjatov, -^'Sry 
av 8iecrTT7/c€CTav. puera^dXXei p,ev ovv 8ia tt7v 
(f)opdv SLTrXrjv ovaav 8ta 8e to pLera^dXXcLV ovk 

15 evSexerai pbiveiv ovhkv avrdJv iv ovSep.ta X^P9- 
reraypievrj . 

AiOTt pL€V ovv iari yiveais /cat (f)6opd /cat 8ia 
TtV alriav, /cat rt to yevTjTov /cat (j)dapr6v, <j>a- 
vepov eK TU)v clprjpiivcDV. CTrei 8 avayKT] eivat 
Ti TO /ctvow, et Kivr](7LS 'iarai, warrep eip-qrat irpo- 
repov iv iripois, Kal el del, on del tl 8et efi^ai, /cat 

20 et avvex'^S, ev to avro Kal dKLvrjrov Kal dyevrj- 
rov Kal dvaXXoiatTov Kal el rrXelovs elev at kvkXw 
/ciVTjo-et?, TrAeiou? pcev, Trdaas 8e' ttcds elvai ravras 
dvdyK-q vtto /xtav dpx'r]V crvvexovs 8' ovtos rov 

« Phys. 255 b 31 flP. 
318 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 

motion, the only motion which is continuous. Hence 
also the other things which change into one another, 
for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon 
or having power to act, imitate cyclical movement. 
For when Air comes-to-be from Water, and Fire from 
Air, and Water again from Fire, we say that coming- 
to-be has completed the cycle, because it has come 
back to its starting-point. Hence motion in a straight 
line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical 
motion. 

This at the same time clears up a point which some 
people find puzzling, namely, the reason why, since 
each of the bodies is being borne along towards its 
own place, the bodies have not become separated 
in the infinity of time. The reason is their reciprocal 
change of position ; for if each remained in its own 
place and was not transformed by its neighbour, 
they would have long ago been parted. Their trans- 
formation, then, is due to the movement of a double 
kind ; and, owing to their transformation, none of 
them can remain in any fixed position. 

From what has been said, it is evident that coming- 
to-be and passing-away take place, and why this is 
so, and what it is that comes-to-be and passes-away. 
But if there is to be movement, there must, as has 
been explained elsewhere in an earlier treatise," be 
something which causes movement, and if movement 
is to go on always, that which causes it must go on 
always and, if it is to be continuous, that which causes 
it must be one and the same and unmoved, un- 
generated and unalterable ; and if the cyclical move- 
ments are to be more than one, they must, in spite 
of being more than one, be all subject somehow to 
one cause ; and since time is continuous, the move- 

319 



ARISTOTLE 

337 a 

Xpovov avayKT} ttjv KLvqaiv avvex'^ elvai, eiTrep 
aSvvarov XP^'^^^ X^P''^ Kiviqaecos etvai. crvvexovs 

25 dpa TLvog api^jLto? o ^povos', rrjs kvkXo) dpa, Kad- 
o-TTcp iv Tots" €v dpxfj ^oyois SicoplaOrj. avvexi)s 
8' 7] KLvrjaLS TTorepov ro) to Ktvovpievov auvex^s 
elvai rj ra> ro iv (h KLveirai, otov rov tottov Xeyoj 
■^ TO TrdOos ; hrjXov Srj on ro) to Kivovpievov tto)? 
ydp TO TTados avvex^S aAA' rj tco to Trpdy/Jia (h 
avfjL^€^T]K€ avvex^s elvat; el 8e /cat tco ev to, 

30 fjLovo) TOVTO TO) TOTTO) VTTapx^L' p^eyedos ydp Ti e;(ei. 
TOUTOU 8e TO kvkXco p.6vov avvex^s, coaTC avTO 
avTih del avvex^S. tovto dpa eaTLV o TTOiel avvex^ 
KLvrjaiv, TO kvkXo) acop^a (f)€p6p.€vov rj 8e Kivrjaig 
Tov xpovov. 

11. 'Evrei 8' €v tols avvexdis KLVovp.ivoL'S Kara 

35 yeveaiv rj dXXoicoatv rj oXcos p,€Ta^oXrjv 6pdjp,ev 
337 b TO e<j)€^rjs ov Koi ytv6p,€vov To8e jLteTo. To8e tSaTe 
pirj 8taAei7reiv', oKeiTTeov rroTepov eoTi ti o e^ 
dvdyKTjs eaTttt, rj ovhev, dXXd rravra ivSex^Tat, p,rj 
yeveadai. otl pkv ydp eVta, 8'^Aoi', Koi evQvs to 
eoTai Kal to pteXXov erepov Bid tovto- o p,ev yap 
5 dXrjOe? elrreXv otl eoTai, Sel tovto elvai rroTe dXrjdes 
OTL eariv o 8e vvv dXrjdes €L7T€lv otl /LteAAet, ovSev 

' Phys. 217 b29lf. 
320 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, II. 10-11 

ment must be continuous, because it is impossible 
for there to be time without movement. Time, then, 
is a way of reckoning some kind of continuous move- 
ment and, therefore, of cyclical movement, as was 
laid down in our original discussion.* But is move- 
ment continuous because that which is moved is 
continuous or because that in which it moves is con- 
tinuous (for example, the place or the quality) ? 
Clearly because that which is moved is continuous ; 
for how could the quality be continuous except 
because the thing to which it belongs is continuous ? 
And if it is because the place in which it occurs is 
continuous, continuity is to be found only in the place 
in which it occurs ; for it has a certain magnitude. 
But of that which moves, only that which moves in a 
circle is continuous in such a way that it is always 
continuous with itself. This, then, is what produces 
continuous motion, namely, the body which is moved 
in a circle, and its movement makes time continuous. 

11. When in things which are moved continuously Things 
in the course of coming-to-be or alteration or change ^*JjfJ!to-be 
generally, we observe a sequence, that is, one thing do so " of 
coming-to-be after another in such a way that there becaifs'e^a 
is no cessation, we must inquire whether there is cyclical 

1 scries 01 

anything which will necessarily exist in the future changes is 

or whether there is no such thing, or whether any "^oTneces- 

one of them may possibly fail to come-to-be. For sity." 

it is evident that some of them fail to come-to-be, 

and the readiest example is the difference which for 

this reason exists between " something will be " and 

" something is about to be " ; for if it is true to say 

" something will be," it must be true at some future 

date to say that it is. On the other hand, though it is 

true now to say that " something is about to happen," 

M 321 



ARISTOTLE 

337 b 

k(juXv€l fjiTj yeveadat- jxiXXoJv yap av jSaSt^etv ti? 
ovK av ^ahiaeiev. oXcos 8', enel ei^Sep^erai ev'ia 
Tcov ovTOJV /cat fiT] elvai, SrjXov otl /cat ra yivo^ieva 

10 ovrcos €^€L, Kal OVK €^ dvdyKrjs tout' earai. ttotc- 
pov ovv dnavra roiavra t) ov, dAA' evta avayKalov 
ctTT-Aco? yiveadai, /cat eariv cocrTrep ctti tou etvat 
TO. fxev dSvvara jxtj etvai Ta Se SyvaTCt, ouVai? /cat 
77epi Ti^v yevecrcv; olov rpoTrds dpa avdyKr] ye- 
veaOai, /cat ou;^ otov Te /Lfr) ivSex^aOai. 

El 8")^ TO Trporepov dvdyKT] yeveadat, et to 

15 varepov earai [olov el otVta, dejjLeXiov, et 8e 
TOVTO, TTTjXov), dp^ OVV /Cat et dep-eXios yeyovev, 
dvdyKTj oiKiav yeveadai; r^ ovKeri, et fir] /ca/cetvo 
avdyKT) yeveadai aTrXcog ; el 8e rovro, dvdyKT] Kal 
defxeXlov yevojjievov yeveadai oiKiav ovtcd yap rjv 
TO TTporepov exov Tvpog to varepov, war el eKelvo 

20 earai, dvdyKT] eKelvo irporepov. el roivvv dvdyKT] 
yeveadai ro varepov, Kal ro TTporepov dvdyKT]- Kal 
el ro TTporepov, Kal ro varepov roivvv avayKT], aAA' 
ov 8i' eKelvo, dAA' oVt VTre Keiro e^ dvdyKT]g iao- 
[xevov. ev ois dpa ro varepov dvdyKT] elvai, ev 
TOVTOis dvriarpe(f)ei, Kal del rov TTporepov yevo- 

25 fievov dvdyKT] yeveadai ro varepov. 
322 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, II. 11 

there is nothing to prevent its not happening — a man 
might not go for a walk, though he is now " about to " 
do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the 
things which " are " also " not to be," obviously things 
which are coming-to-be are also in this case and their 
coming-to-be will not necessarily take place. Are, 
then, all the things which come-to-be of this kind ? 
Or is this not so, but it is absolutely necessary for 
some of them to come-to-be } And does the same 
thing happen in the sphere of coming-to-be as in that 
of being, where there are some things for which it is 
impossible " not to be " and for others which it is 
possible ? For example, solstices must come-to-be and 
it is impossible that they should be unable to occur. 
If it is necessary for that which is prior to come-to- 
be if that which is posterior is to be — for example, 
foundations must have come-to-be if a house is to 
exist, and there must be clay if there are to be foun- 
dations — does it follow that, if the foundations have 
come-to-be, the house must necessarily do so ? Or 
is this no longer so, if there is no such absolute neces- 
sity ? In this case, however, if the foundations have 
come-to-be, the house must come-to-be ; for such 
was the assumed relation of the prior to the posterior 
that, if the posterior is to be, the prior must have 
preceded it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the 
posterior should come-to-be, it is necessary also that 
the prior should have come-to-be, and, if the prior, 
then also the posterior, not, however, because of the 
prior, but because the future being of the posterior 
was assumed as necessary. Hence, whenever the 
posterior is necessary, the reverse is also true, and 
always when the prior has come-to-be, the posterior 
must also come-to-be. 

323 



ARISTOTLE 

337 b 

Et [xev ovv et? aTTCipov elaiv cttI to Karco, ovk 

ear ai avdyKrj to varepov Tohe yevead ai olttXcos, 
aAA' e^ VTTodecreco?' ael yap erepov efxirpoadev 
avdyKT] €or ai, 8t' o eKelvo dvdyKT] yeveadai. coar 
el jxri iariv dpx'^ tov aTreipov, ovhe Trpajrov earai 

30 ovSev, St' o dvayKOLOV earat yeveadai. dXXd /jLrjv 
oj38' €v tols TTepas e-)(ovai tovt* earat elireZv dXrj- 
^co?, on olttXcos dvdyKri yeveadai, oiov OLKiav, brav 
OefxeXios yevqraL' orav yap yevqrai, el /xr) del 
rovro dvdyKTj yiveadai, avpL^ijaerat, del elvai ro 
evSexofjievov pcrj del etvai. dXXd Set rij yeveaei del 

35 etvai, el i^ dvdyKrjs avrov earlv rj yeveais' ro yap 

338 a e^ dvdyKrjs Kal del a.p.a' o yap elvat dvdyKTj ovx 

OLOV re (XT) elvaf oiar el eariv e^ dvdyKTjg, dtStov 
iari, Kal el dtSiov, i^ dvdyK-qg. Kal el rj yeveai's 
roivvv e^ dvdyKrjg, dtSios 7] yeveaig rovrov, Kal 
el atSios", e^ dvdyKrjs. 

Et dpa nvos e^ dvdyKrj^ (XTrAcD? rj yeveais^ 

5 dvdyKTj dvaKVKXelv Kal dvaKdp.7Treiv . dvdyKTj yap 

TjroL rrepas ^X^^^ '^W y^veaiv tj fxrj, Kal el p.Tj, tj 

" The argument is as follows : let x be one of the future 
members of the series of events, a;'s occurrence is contingent 
on the future occurrence of a still later member of the series, 
which is itself contingent on a still later member, y. The 
occurrence of every subsequent member of the infinite series 
is therefore conditionally, not absolutely, necessary. If ai's 
occurrence were absolutely necessary, x would be the begin- 

324 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, 11. 11 

Now if the series is to go on indefinitely down- 
wards, any particular later member of the series 
must come-to-be not by absolute, but only by con- 
ditional, necessity ; for it will always be necessary 
that another later member of the series should exist 
first in order to make it necessary that the earlier 
member of the series should come-to-be. Hence, since 
the infinite has no beginning, neither will there be 
any primary member of the series which will make 
it necessary for the other members to come-to-be." 
p^nd further, it will not be possible to say with truth, 
even in the case of members of a series which is 
limited, that there is an absolute necessity that they 
should come-to-be. For example, a house will not 
necessarily come-to-be when its foundations have 
come-to-be ; for unless it is always necessary for a 
house to come-to-be, the result will be that when its 
foundations have come-to-be, a thing, which need 
not always be, must always be. No : if its coming- 
to-be is of necessity, there must be an " always " 
about its coming-to-be ; for what must necessarily be, 
must at the same time always be, since what " must 
necessarily be " cannot " not-be " ; hence, if a thing 
is " of necessity," it is eternal, and, if it is eternal, it 
is "of necessity " ; if, therefore, the coming-to-be of 
a thing is " of necessity," it is eternal and, if it is 
eternal, it is " of necessity." 

If, then, the coming-to-be of anything is absolutely 
necessary, it must be cyclical and return upon itself ; 
for coming-to-be must either have a limit or not have 
a limit, and if it has not a limit, it must proceed either 

ning of the series (i.e. would necessitate the earlier members) ; 
but the series is infinite and therefore has no beginning or 
end. 

325 



ARISTOTLE 

338 a 

ets" ev6v 7] KVKXit). rovrcov 8' etnep earai aisles', 

ovK els evdv olov re Sio. to [x-qSafxaJs elvai, apx^jv 

pi'qr^ av Kara}, cos ctti tcov iaofMevcov, AajMj3avo/>tev, 

/xtjt' dvcu, CO? 6771 Twv yivofxevoiv avdyKH) §' eivai 

10 apx^iv, jXTj TTeTrepaaixevrjs ovarjs, koI dthiov elvai. 
Sto dvayKt] kvkXio eivai. dvriarpl(j)eLV dpa avdyKT] 
carat, olov el toSi e^ dvdyKrjs, Kal ro Trporepov 
dpa' dXKd iXTjv el rovro, Kal ro varepov dvdyKTj 
yeveaOai. Kal rovro del Srj avvexd)S' ovSev yap 
rovro SLa(f>epei Xeyetv Sia Svo r) ttoXXcov. ev rfj 

15 kvkXo) dpa Kivqaei Kal yeveaei earl ro e^ dvdyKrjs 
dTrAco?" /cat etre kvkXco, dvdyKi] eKaarov yiveadai 
Kal yeyovevai, Kal el avdyKT], rj rovrcov yeveais 
kvkXco . 

Taura fxev Br] evXoycos, enel diSio? Kal aXXcos 
i(f>dvr] rj kvkXco Kivrjais Kal r] rod ovpavov, on 
338 b ravra e^ dvdyKr]s yiverat Kal earai, ocrai ravrr]s 
Kivrjaeis Kal oaai 8id ravrr]V' el yap ro kvkXco 
Kivovp,evov del rt, Kivel, dvdyKr] Kal rovrcov kvkXco 
etvai rr]v KLvr]aiv, olov rrjs dvco cf)opas ovar]s kv- 
kXco 6 rjXios^ co8i, ivel 8' ovrcos, at copai 8id rovro 
^ KVK\<a 6 ijXios F, Bonitz. 

' Rectilinear movement, proceeding ad infinitum, does 
326 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, 11. 11 

in a straight line or in a circle. But of these alter- 
natives, if it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a 
straight line, because it can have no source," whether 
we take the members of the series downwards as 
future events or upwards as past events. But there 
must be a source of coming-to-be, though without 
coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be 
eternal. Therefore, it must be a cyclical process. 
It will, therefore, have to return upon itself ; for 
example, if a certain member of the series is neces- 
sary, then the one before it is also necessary, and 
further, if the latter is necessary, then the one which 
follows must necessarily come-to-be. And this goes 
on always continuously ; for it makes no difference 
whether we speak of a sequence of two or many 
members of the series. Therefore, it is in cyclical 
movement and cyclical coming-to-be that absolute 
necessity is present, and if the process is cyclical, 
each member must necessarily come-to-be and have 
come-to-be, and, if this necessity exists, their coming- 
to-be is cyclical. 

This conclusion is only reasonable, since cyclical 
movement, that is, the movement of the heavens, 
has been shown ^ on other grounds to be eternal, 
because its own movements and the movements 
which it causes come-to-be of necessity and will con- 
tinue to do so ; for if that which moves in a cycle is 
continually seeking something else in motion, the 
movement of those things which it moves must also 
be cyclical. For example, since the upper revolution 
is cyclical, the sun moves in a particular way, and 
since this is so the seasons come-to-be in a cycle and 

not involve an dpxrj from which coming-to-be might derive 
its necessity. * Phys. viii. 7-9. 

327 



ARISTOTLE 

338 b 

5 kvkXo) yivovrai kol avaKdinrrovaiv , Tovroyv 8 ov- 

TO) yivofievcov rrdXiv ra vtto tovtcov. 

Tt ovv hrj TTore rd fzev ovrcu ^atVerai, olov vSara 

Kal drjp kvkXco yivofjueva, Kal el fxev ve<j>os earai, 

Set vaai, Kal el vaei ye, hei /cat ve(f)os etvaL, dvdpco- 

TTOL Be Kal t,aia ovk dva/ca/xTTTOucrtv eis avrovs ware 

10 TTttAiv yiveadai rov avrov [ov ydp dvayKT), el 6 
TTarrjp iyevero, ae yeveadai' dXX ei crv, eKelvov, 
els evdv he eoiKev elvai avrrj r] yeveais) ; o-PXV ^^ 
rrjs (jKeipeoJS ttoXiv avrrj, irorepov opLoiws dnavra 
dvaKafXTTrei rj ov, aAAa rd fiev dptdixo) rd 8e etSet 
ixovov. oauiv fxev ovv d(f)dapros rj ovaia rj klvov- 

15 [xevr], (f)avep6v ore /cat dpidpLip ravrd ear at {rj ydp 
KLvrjais aKoXovdet rco KLVOVjxevcp) , oaoiv he jjltj dXXd 
^daprrj, dvdyKTj rep et8et, dpLdjJicp he jxtj dva- 
Kajirrreiv. hid vhojp i^ depos Kal drjp e^ vharo? 
eihei 6 avros, ovk dpidfxcp. el he Kal ravra 
dpidfMcp, aAA' ovx ojv rj ovaia ylverat ovaa roiavrrj 
Ota evhe-)(eadai jirj etvai. 



" The sun moves in a circle in the ecliptic, and solar motion 
causes the cyclical changes of season, on which depend the 
vital periods of living things upon the earth. 

* And not to be cyclical. 

" In some cycles the same Individual always recurs, in 
others successive individuals of the same species. 

•* As was the doctrine of Empedocles (r/. 815 a 4 ff.). 



328 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING- A WAY, II. 11 

return upon themselves ; and since they come-to-be 
in this manner, so do those things which they cause 
to come-to-be.* 

Why, then, is it that some things evidently come- 
to-be cyclically, for example rains and air, and if 
there is to be cloud, it must rain, and if it is to rain, 
there must also be a cloud, yet men and animals do 
not return upon themselves, so that the same creature 
comes-to-be a second time ? For there is no neces- 
sity, because your father came-to-be, that you should 
come-to-be ; but if you are to come-to-be, he must 
have done so ; and in this case the course of coming- 
to-be seems to be in a straight line.'' The starting- 
point for the discussion of this problem is this, to ask 
the question again whether all things alike return 
upon themselves, or whether some things recur 
numerically and others only specifically." Therefore, 
obviously, those things of which the substance (which 
is what is moved) is imperishable will be numerically 
the same ; for the nature of the movement depends 
on that of the thing moved ; but those things which 
are not of this kind but perishable must recur speci- 
fically and not numerically. Hence, when Water 
comes-to-be from Air or Air from Water, the Water 
or the Air is the same specifically but not numeri- 
cally ; and if these things also do seem numerically 
the same,** yet this is not true of those things whose 
" substance " comes-to-be, when it is such that it is 
possible for it not to be. 



S29 



PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE 
DE MUNDO 



INTRODUCTION 

Analysis 

The treatise opens with a short introductory chapter, 
commending to Alexander the study of " the cosmos 
and the greatest things in the cosmos," and continues 
with a description of the various parts of the cosmos, 
working from the region of the aether on the outside 
of the sphere to the earth at the centre. Chapter 2 
describes the shape, the arrangement and the material 
of the heavens, and indicates very briefly the nature 
of the " fiery element " and the air that lie inside the 
outer sphere of aether. Chapter 3 describes the 
geography of the sea and the earth ; the author 
naturally concentrates on the " inhabited world," 
though he maintains that there are other inhabited 
worlds also, beyond the seas. Chapter 4 is a very 
summary account of the " most notable phenomena 
in and about the inhabited world " ; a section on 
meteorology, including an elaborate catalogue of 
winds, is followed by a description of the things that 
happen on or in the earth or sea — volcanic eruptions, 
earthquakes, tidal waves, etc. 

The last sentence of Chapter 4 introduces the main 
theme of the work : there are many changes in the 
sublunary world, but the system as a whole remains 
constant, and is subject neither to generation nor to 

333 



[ARISTOTLE] 

destruction. In Chapter 5 the language is heightened 
in what is virtually a hymn to the eternal cosmos. 
Chapters 6 and 7 tell of the cause that ensures its 
eternity — the god who rules everything with his all- 
pervading power. This god is described in Chapter 
6 by means of a series of similes, which show how a 
remote and transcendent god can maintain the order 
and arrangement of the cosmos without personal 
intervention ; Chapter 7 lists a number of names by 
which God is known and shows how they arise from 
various aspects of his function. 

Philosophy and Religion 

Before examining the problem of the authorship 
and date of the De Mundo, we must consider its pur- 
pose and its philosophical position. It is an open 
letter, written with the most careful attention to 
style and language, summarizing persuasively the 
results of a study of the cosmos. The open letter was 
a common form of literary expression, particularly 
for protreptic discourses ; the outstanding examples 
are Isocrates' Ad Nicoclem and Aristotle's lost 
Protrepticus, addressed to Themison, the prince of 
Cyprus. The De Mundo shows many similarities to 
these protreptic addresses in style ; but the author's 
purpose, emphasized several times, is to provide a 
summary of his subject, and in this he approaches the 
pattern of Epicurus 's letters or the popular " Intro- 
ductions " (e/'traywyai) of the Hellenistic period. 

The author's attitude of mind is given in a word 
in the first chapter : " let us theologize (OeokoytTinev) 
about all these things." A. -J. Festugi^re has sliown " 

" Le Dieu cosmique, pp. 341 flf. 
334 



ON THE COSMOS 

how typical this is of that " koine spirituelle " which 
grew in the late Hellenistic age and flowered in the 
Roman Empire ; nature is explored, not as the object 
of scientific enquiry, but as the expression of the 
cosmic deity, and the results are presented straight- 
forwardly as dogma. 

The theology and cosmology of the T>e Mundo is, 
in general. Peripatetic, but the author borrows his 
details from many schools. Parallel passages and 
possible sources have been analysed in great detail by 
W. Capelle, W. L. Lorimer and Joseph P. Maguire," 
and there is no need to repeat their analysis. Capelle 
traced many of the details to Posidonius, and this 
view was for many years generally accepted. Maguire, 
however, found no reason to believe that anything 
came from Posidonius except some of the meteoro- 
logy, and showed that the closest parallels are in 
the Neo-Pythagorean writers ; he established at least 
that we cannot attribute a doctrine to Posidonius 
simply because it occurs in the T)e Mundo, but it 
would be surprising if a work written after the time 
of Posidonius were not considerably influenced by 
him. The paramount diflRculty is that the author 
was an eclectic, living in an age when eclecticism was 
the fashion and there was a great deal of common 
ground between different schools ; it is therefore 
sometimes impossible to say which authors, or even 
which schools, were chosen as sources. 

The scientific chapters of the De Mundo are typical 
of many " introductions " and summaries, and very 
likely are themselves derived from similar elementary 
handbooks rather than from the detailed expositions 
of original authors. The doctrine of the cosmic deity, 

" See Bibliographical Note, below. 

335 



[ARISTOTLE] 

which is the climax of the book, developed gradually 
in the history of Greek religion. Its chief exponents 
were the Stoics, and no doubt the De Mundo is in- 
fluenced by Stoic religious thought. But the author 
rejects an important part of the Stoic doctrine : his 
god is not immanent in the world, interpenetrating 
all things, but remote, unmoved and impassive. He 
maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an 
undefined " power," which relieves him of the dis- 
honourable necessity of personal intervention. 

Clearly we have here a development, however 
remote, of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. At first 
sight the god of the De Mundo seems far removed 
from the god of Physics viii and Metaphysics \ , who 
is inferred as the necessary result of a theory of 
motion, whose only activity is thought which has 
itself as its object, and who moves " as the object of 
love." Aristotle himself, however, seems to have 
spoken with a rather different voice in his published 
works. In the De Philosophia he said that the orderly 
movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the 
reasons for man's belief in gods. Cicero reports an 
elaborate passage from Aristotle to this effect " : 
suppose there were men who had lived all their lives 
in caves under the earth and were then released ; 
" when they saw, suddenly, the earth and seas and 
sky, when they learnt the vastness of the clouds and 
the force of the winds, when they beheld the sun 
and learnt its great size and beauty and the efficacy 
of its work, that it spreads its light over all the sky 
and makes day, and when night darkened the lands 
and then they saw the whole sky adorned with a 
pattern of stars, and the changes in the moon's light 

" Cic. De Nat. Deor. ii. 37 = Arist. fr, 12 Rose. 
336 



ON THE COSMOS 

as it waxes and wanes, and the rising and setting of 
them all, and their courses planned and immutable for 
all eternity — when they saw this, they would think 
at once that there are gods and that these mighty 
works are the works of gods." This is close to the 
spirit of the De Mundo. 

In one other important respect the author sides 
with the Peripatetics and Neo-Pythagoreans against 
the Stoics. Most of the Stoics believed that the 
element of fire was more powerful than the other 
elements, and that it periodically enveloped the 
cosmos in a universal conflagration {iK-n-vpuHTi^). 
Pseudo- Aristotle is emphatic in his rejection of this 
doctrine : the elements are equally balanced and 
there is no universal conflagration, nor any other kind 
of cosmic destruction. The eternity of the cosmos 
was maintained by Aristotle in the lost De Pkilo- 
sopkia,"' and in the De Caelo.^ In Hellenistic times 
it was believed by the Stoic Panaetius, but his 
successor Posidonius apparently reverted again to 
(KTrvpioaii. There are two Hellenistic treatises extant 
which argue that the cosmos is eternal — De Universi 
Naiura, falsely attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus 
of Lucania, and Philo (or Pseudo-Philo), De Aeterni- 
tate Mundi. 

Author and Date 

It is almost universally agreed that this treatise is 
not a genuine work of Aristotle. The style and vari- 
ous details of doctrine all make it unthinkable that 
it was written either by Aristotle himself or during 
his lifetime ; but no such certainty is possible about 
the identity of the author or the date of composition. 

» Cf. fr. 22 Rose. " Bk. I. 10-12. 

337 



[ARISTOTLE] 

The first problem to be decided is whether the 
treatise was attributed to Aristotle by the author or 
by someone else. The probability is that it was a 
deliberate forgery. Attempts have been made to 
show that the Alexander to whom the work is ad- 
dressed is someone other than Alexander the Great : 
but it is difficult to find another Alexander who might 
be called " the best of princes." " Probably the 
author followed the example of an earlier forger, the 
author of the Rhetoric to Alexander, in the hope that 
his work might be taken as a respectful tribute from 
the master to his most famous pupil. 

The late Hellenistic author Demetrius ^ says that 
Aristotle's letters to Alexander were more like 
treatises (o-vyypa/x/xara) than real letters. A man 
called Artemon, who is mentioned by Demetrius, 
arranged the letters then supposed to be by Aristotle 
into eight books. We can conclude from this that 
at the time of Demetrius, who was roughly contem- 
porary with Pseudo- Aristotle, there was in circulation 
a collection of Aristotle's letters, which included 
letters to Alexander which were in the form of 
" treatises." It would seem therefore that the author 
of the De Mundo had ample precedent for the form 
of his work, whether the De Mundo was known to 
Demetrius or not. 

The habit of attributing one's writings to an older 
and greater author in the same tradition was par- 

» Max Pohlenz {Die Stoa, 1948, pp. 361-362) returns to a 
suggestion of Bernays that the addressee is Tiberius Alex- 
ander, nephew of Philo and governor of Egypt soon after 
A.D. 63. 

^ On Style iv.2S4'. Demetrius wrote some time after 100 b.c. 
(see J. F. Lockwood, in C.R. Hi (19.38), p. 59) and pro- 
bably before a. u. 100. 

338 



ON THE COSMOS 

ticularly common among the Pythagoreans of the 
Hellenistic age ; the author of the De Mundo owes 
much to these Neo-Pythagoreans, and he certainly 
reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought 
to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp 
Aristotle's name. 

This is an important point. Those who have proved 
that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked 
that it is a forgery of Aristotle, and that in this fact 
we might find a little help in dating the treatise. For 
if the author is imitating Aristotle at all, it is surely 
the Aristotle of the Protrepticus and De Philosopkia, 
the Aristotle whose " flumen orationis aureum " was 
praised by Cicero," rather than the Aristotle of the 
school-treatises which survive to-day. The school- 
treatises were either lost or disregarded after the 
death of Theophrastus, and did not begin to occupy 
the attention of the learned world again until the 
appearance of Andronicus's edition in the late first 
century e.G.** 

These considerations will be variously interpreted. 
Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle's work 
was absolutely confined to the published writings until 
Andronicus's edition, will say that the author of 
the De Mundo shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of 
the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the 
De Philosopkia, and various meteorological details) 
which were known only after Andronicus. But it is 
likely that much of Aristotle's doctrine was known 
throughout the period, at least in his own school, 

« Acad. Pr. ii. 38. 119. 

* The date usually given for this is c. 40 b.c. I. During 
{Noteit on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's 
Writings, Goteborg, 1950) thinks this is the earliest possible 
date, and would prefer 40-20 b.c. 

339 



[ARISTOTLE] 

even though it did not appear in the published works. 
I am indined to beheve that the author of the De 
Mundo could have known all the Aristotelian matter 
that he reproduces before the publication of Andro- 
nicus's edition, and that the style and manner of 
the work indicate a date before this edition made 
Aristotle's school-treatises more widely known. 

Other evidence for the date is confused and diffi- 
cult. It is certain that Apuleius De Mundo is a 
translation of the Greek, but it is not quite certain 
that this is genuinely by Apuleius. If it is, we have 
a terminus ante quern of c. a.d. 140. The work seems 
to have been known to Maximus of Tyre and must 
therefore be before a.d. 180-190. From other reports, 
references and imitations in later authors nothing 
firmer than this can be deduced. 

To reach a terminus post quem by an analysis of the 
sources is equally difficult, since it is usually hard to 
say who was the first to express a particular doctrine. 
Nevertheless some of the meteorology appears to 
depend on Posidonius and his pupil Asclepiodotus, 
and we might therefore give c. 50 b.c. as the terminus. 
There is no agreement about the date of the Neo- 
Pythagorean sources. Attempts have been made 
to argue from the silence of Cicero, Seneca and Pliny, 
but arguments from silence do not carry much 
weight. 

The date has been given by various scholars as 
follows : Zeller, 1st cent. a.d. ; Diels, in the reign 
of Augustus ; Wilamowitz, in the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty ; Capelle, the first half of the 2nd cent. a.d. ; 
Lorimer, probably a.d. 40-140 ; Maguire and Festu- 
giere, the first few decades of the 1st cent. a.d. In 
my view there is some slight r(;ason for saying that 

340 



ON THE COSMOS 

it was written before or not long after Andronicus's 
edition, and virtually no reason for choosing any 
other time within the limits already mentioned." 

Bibliographical Note 

The editio princeps (1497) was based on a single ms., 
and this remained the common text until Bekker 
added the results of collation of four more mss. in the 
Berlin Aristotle (1831). Parts of the treatise were 
edited by Wilamowitz and Wendland and printed in 
Wilamowitz's Grieckisches Lesehuch, Text II (1906), 
pp. 188-199. 

W. L. Lorimer took into account the readings of 
over seventy mss., the quotations in Stobaeus and 
others, the Latin version of Apuleius, the Armenian 
and Syriac versions, and two mediaeval Latin versions. 
He published his results in three books : The Text 
Tradition of Ps.- Aristotle " De Mundo " (St. Andrews 
University Publications, xviii, 1924) ; Some Notes on 
the Text of Ps.-Aristotle " De Mundo " (St. Andrews 
University Publications, xxi, 1925) ; and Aristotelis 
De Mundo (Paris, 1933). The last of these contains 
the Greek text with a very detailed apparatus criticus 
and a German translation by E. Konig of the Syriac 
version (chaps, v-vii only). 

On the sources, the most important works are : 
W. Capelle, " Die Schrift von der Welt," Neue Jahrh. 
f d. klass. Alt. xv (1905), pp. 529-568 ; and Joseph 
P. Maguire, " The Sources of Ps.-Aristotle ' De 
Mundo,' " Yale Classical Studies, vi (1939). 

The important article by Hans Strohm, " Studien 

" Prof. E. H. Warmington has pointed out to me that the 
geography of eh. 3 confirms an early date. 

341 



[ARISTOTLE] 

zur Schrift von der Welt," Mus. Helv. ix (1952), 
pp. 137-175, did not reach me until this book was 
in proof. Strohm agrees with me in minimizing 
the influence of Posidonius and in marking the con- 
nexions with early Aristotle. 

The late Prof. E. S. Forster translated the De 
Mundo for the Oxford translation of Aristotle (IQl*). 
A.-J. Festugiere translates most of it into French, and 
adds important comments, in La Revelation d' Hermes 
Trismegiste, vol. ii, Le Dieu cosmique (Paris, 194'9). 

I am indebted to all these, and particularly (as all 
students of the De Mundo must be) to W. L. Lorimer. 

Text 

The text is based on Bekker's edition in the Berlin 
Aristotle ; I have indicated deviations from Bekker, 
except those that seem trivial. 

The four mss. used by Bekker are designated as 
follows : 

= Vat. 316. 
P = Vat. 1339. 
Q = Marc. 200. 
R = Paris. 1102. 

Where necessary I have added references to mss. 
collated by Lorimer, as follows : 

B = Hieros. Patr. 108. 
C = Laur. 87, 14. 
D = Paris. 1302. 
E = Vat. Urbin. 125. 
F = Laur. 87, 16. 
G = Vat. 1025. 
W = Paris. 1038. 
Z = Paris. 2381. 
342 



ON THE COSMOS 

Stob, =Stobaeus. Ap. indicates reading confirmed 
by the Latin of Apuleius, De Mundo. 

Nearly all the deviations from Bekker follow 
Lorimer ; to avoid complicating the notes unduly, 
where I have followed Lorimer against Bekker and 
the Mss. are fairly equally divided, I have used the 
abbreviations " Bekk. " and " Lor." without listing 
the MSS. " Lor. (Notes) " refers to the second and 
" Lor. (De Mundo) " to the third of Lorimer 's works 
cited in the Bibliographical Note above. 

I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor 
T. B. L. Webster for reading my work in typescript ; 
I am very grateful for his criticisms and suggestions. 

D. J. F. 



343 



APISTOTEAOT2 
nEPI K02M0T 

391 a 1 1. YloXXaKLS jxev efxoiye delov ti koI 8at/xoviov 
ovrcos XPVI^'^> ^ 'AAe^avS/ae, rj (j)iXoao<f)ia eho^ev 
elvat, ixdXtara he iv ols fxovrj hiapa^evq Trpos rrjv 
rcov oXoiV deav icTTovSaae yvcovai rrjv ev avrolg 
5 aA^j^etav, Kal t<x)V aXXcov ravrrjs aTToaravroyv 8ta 
TO vijjos KoX TO fieyeOos, avrr] ro Trpdyfxa ovk 
eSetaev ouS' avrrjv rcov KaXXiarcxJV airri^LOjaev , 
dAAa /cat avyyeveararriv iavrfj /cat fidXicrra rrpe- 
TTovuav evojxioev elvai rrjv e/cetvcur piddrjaLV. eTrethri 
yap ovx olov t€ rjv tco aajpLan et? tov ovpaviov 
d(f)LKeadai, tottov /cat rrjv yrjv c/cAtTrovTa tov ovpd- 

10 vtov eKclvov )(copov KaroTTrevcrat, Kadarrep ol avor]- 
roi 7TOT€ eTTevoovv 'AAojctSat, 7) yovv ijj^xV ^''^ 
<^iXoao<j)ias , Xa^ovcra r)yep.6va tov vovv, iTTepaicvdrj 
/cat e^eSr^/XT^crev, dKoiriaTOV Tiva ohov evpovaa, /cat 
TO, TrAetCTTOV dXXrjXcjv d^ear<jora rols tottols rfj 
Stavoia avv€^p6vr](je , paStco?, of/xai, Ta crvyyevrj 

16 yvcjpiaaoa, /cat deio) if^vxyjs o/A/z-aTi ra ^eta /cara- 

" See Introduction, p. 338. 
344 



ARISTOTLE 
ON THE COSMOS 

1. I HAVE often thought, Alexander," that philosophy 
is a divine and really god-like activity, particularly 
in those instances when it alone has exalted itself 
to the contemplation of the universe and sought to 
discover the truth that is in it ; the other sciences 
shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity 
and extensiveness ; philosophy has not feared the 
task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things, 
but has judged that the study of these is by nature 
most closely related to it and most fitting. It was 
not possible by means of the body to reach the 
heavenly region or to leave the earth and explore that 
heavenly place, in the manner once attempted by 
the foolish Aloadae ^ : so the soul, by means of philo- 
sophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the 
frontier, and made the journey out of its own land 
by a path that does not tire the traveller. It has 
embraced in thought the things that are most widely 
separated from each other in place ; for it had no 
difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were 
related to it, and with " the soul's divine eye " " it 

* Otus and Ephialtes, the mythical Giants, who tried to 
reach heaven by piling Pelion on Ossa. 

" Probably a quotation : cf. the eye of the soul in Plato, 
Rep. 533 D. 

345 



[ARISTOTLE] 

391 a 

Xa^ovaa, rols re avdpcoTTOiS npocjirjTevovaa. rovro 
8e eTTade, Kad^ oaov olov re rfv, Trdaiv d(/)66va)(; 
jxeTaSovvai ^ovXrjdelaa rcov Trap* avrfj tlixlojv. Sto 
/cat Toys' jLiera aTTovhrjs hiaypdi/javras rjfjuv ivog 
T07T0V (f)vat,v T] fitdg a-)(rjpLa iroXeois r] TTorapiov p.eye- 

20 do's r] opovs KoXXos, old rives TJSrj TreTToti^/cacrt, 
(f>pdt,ovr€s ol fiev rrjv "Oacrav, ol 8e rrjv Nvacrav,^ 
ol 8e ro Kojpu/ciov dvrpov, ol 8e oriovv ervx^ rcov 
6771 [jiepovs, OLKTiaeLev dv ns rrjs pbiKpoipuxiO-s, rd 
rv)(ovra eKTreTTXrjyjJievovs koL pceya (f)povovvras errl 

25 decopia puKpd. rovro 8e rrdaxovai Sid ro ddearoi 
rdjv Kpeirrovoiv eivai, Koafxov Xiyco koL rdjv ev 
Koofxcp [xeyLarojv ouSeVore ydp dv rovroLs yvrj- 
391 b (JLCDS eTTiarT^aavres idav/Jia^ov rt rdJv dXXojv, dXXd 
iravra avrols ra dXXa p,t,Kpd Kare(/)aLvero dv /cat 
ovSevos a^ta Trpos rrjv rovrcov vrrepox'^v. 

Aeyoifiev Brj rjfiels /cat, /ca^' oaov i(f>i,Kr6v, 
OeoXoywfjiev irepl rovrcov avpLTravrajv, co? cKaarov 
5 ex^i (f)vaecos /cat deaeios /cat KLvqcreojs- Trperreiv 8e 
ye olfxai /cat crot, ovri -qyepLOvajv dpiarcp, rrjv rcov 
fxeytarojv loropiav fxerievai,, (f)iXoao^La re fX7]hev 
pLiKpov eTTivoeZv, dXXd roZs rotovrois SwpoLs 8e^t- 
ovardai rovs dpiarovs. 

2. KocryLto? p^ev ovv eari avarrjp.a i^ ovpavov /cat 

10 yrjs /cat tcDv ev rovrois 7Tepi€xop.evcov (f>vaecov. 
Xeyerai Be Kal ereptos /cocr/xos" fj rdJv oXcov ra^is re 
/cat hiaKoafXTjats , vtto deov' re /cat 8ta deov' <j>vXar- 

* NuWai' Lor. : NJaai' Bekk. 
* d€ov codd. Stob. Lor. : dctLv codd. al. Bekk. 
' deov codd. Lor. : Qewv codd. al. Stob. Bekk. 

' Cf. Pausanias x. 32. 2. 
* Cf. Introduction, p. 334. 
346 



ON THE COSMOS, 1-2 

grasped things divine, and interpreted them for man- 
kind. This came about because it wished to impart to 
all unsparingly, as far as possible, a share of its own 
privileges. So those who have earnestly described 
to us the nature of a single place, or the plan of a 
single city, or the size of a river, or the beauty of 
a mountain, as some have done before now — some 
of them tell us of Ossa, some of Nyssa, others of the 
Corycian cave," or whatever other detail it hap- 
pens to be — all these might well be pitied for their 
meanness of spirit, since they are overawed by 
commonplaces and pride themselves on insignificant 
observations. The reason is that they are blind to the 
nobler things — I mean the cosmos and the greatest 
features of the cosmos. For if they once genuinely 
gave their attention to these things, they would never 
wonder at any other ; everything else would appear 
small and worthless to them, in comparison with the 
matchless superiority of these. 

Let us, then, take up the subject, and so far as they 
are attainable let us theologize ^ about all the greatest 
features of the cosmos, discussing the nature, position 
and motion of each. It is right, I think, that even 
you, the best of princes, should undertake the study 
of the greatest things, and that philosophy should 
have no humble intentions, but should greet the most 
excellent men with worthy gifts. 

2. Cosmos, then, means a system composed of 
heaven and earth and the elements contained in 
them." In another sense, cosmos is used to signify 
the orderly arrangement of the universe, which is 
preserved by God and through God. The centre of 

" So also ChrysippusajD. Arius Didymusfr. 31 (Diels, Doa;. 
Graec. pp. 465-466), and Posidonius ap. Diog. Laert. vii. 138. 

347 



[ARISTOTLE] 

391 b 

Toiiivrj. ravrrjg Se to [xev fieaov, aKivrjTov re koI 

eopalov ov, 7) ^epea^ios e"LXrj-)(^e yrj, TTavrohaTToJv 
l^cpiov iaria re ovaa /cat fjiT^rrip. to Se VTiepdev 

15 avTTJs, TTav re /cat Travrr^ Trene par wpLevov et?^ ro 
avcoraro), dea)V oiKrjr'qpLov, ovpavos (hvofxaarai. 
TiX'qp'qs Se cov CTco/xarcov deiwv, a hrj /caAetv darpa 
eiwdafxev, /ctvou/xevo? KivrjaLV ollSlov, yua TTepiayioyfj 
/cat kvkXo) avvavaxopcvei vdcrL rovroLs dTravarcjs 
St alcbvos. rod Se avpLrravros ovpavov re /cat 

20 KO(jp,ov a(f)aipoeSovs ovros /cat Kivovfxevov, Kad- 
avrep enrov, evSeAe^^cD?, Svo a/ctVi^ra e^ dvay/ci^? 
ecTTt arjpLeta, KaravrtKpv aAA-jyAcov, Kaddnep rrjg ev 
Topvcp KVKXo(j)opovpL€vri'5 a(f>aLpas , arcped puevovra 
/cat avvexovra ttjv (j(f)dlpav, rrepl d 6 Tra? oy/co? 

25 kvkXco arpi<l>€r at^- KaXovvrat Se ovroi ttoXol- St' 
cov et vo-qaaL/jLcv eTret^evypbivqv evdelav, rjv nves 

392 a d^ova KaXovGL, hidpierpos eorai rov Koapcov, fxecrov^ 

[xev exovcra rrjv yqv, roiis Se 8vo noXovs Trepara. 

rojv Se a/ctvryrcuv ttoXojv rovrcov 6 ptev del ^avepo's 

eariv vrrep Kopvi^rjv cov /cara to ^opeiov /cAt/Lta, 

dpKriKos /caAoy/xevo?, o Se vtto yrjv del /cara/ce'- 

5 KpvTTr at, Kara ro voriov, dvrapKriKos /caAoJ/xevos-. 

Ovpavov Se /cat darpcov ovaiav pikv aWepa koXov- 

^ els codd. I.or. : ■^s P Bekk. 

* nds oyKOS kvkXu) (TTpe^erai Stob. Lor. : -nas Koafios Kivdrai. 
6 fiiv oSv Koofios €v kvkXo) n€piaTp€<f>€Tai, codd. Bekk. 

348 



ON THE COSMOS, 2 

the cosmos, which is unmoved and fixed, is occupied 
by " Hfe-bearing earth," " the home and mother of 
living beings of all kinds. The region above it, a 
single w^hole with a finite upper limit everywhere, 
the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. It is full 
of divine bodies which we call stars ; it moves eter- 
nally, and revolves in solemn choral dance * with all 
the stars in the same circular orbit unceasingly for 
all time. The whole of the heaven, the whole cosmos,'' 
is spherical, and moves continuously, as I have said ; 
but there are necessarily two points which are un- 
moved, opposite one another, just as in the case of 
a ball being turned in a lathe ; they remain fixed, 
holding the sphere in position, and the whole mass 
revolves in a circle round them ; these points are 
called poles. If we think of a straight line joining 
these two together (some call this the axis), it will be 
a diameter of the cosmos, having the earth at its 
centre and the two poles at its extremities. One of 
these two stationary poles is always visible, above our 
heads in the North : it is called the Arctic '' pole. The 
other is always hidden under the earth, in the South : 
it is called the Antarctic pole. 

The substance of the heaven and the stars we call 

<• Cf. Hesiod, Theog. 693. 

* Ps.- Aristotle seems to recall Euripides, Ion 1079 on koI 
Aio? aoTepuiTTOS dvexopevaev ald-qp, xopevet, 8e aeXdva. Cf. also 
Soph. Ant. 1146 f. He develops the same image below, 
399 a 14. 

" Ps. -Aristotle here uses Koofios in a third sense, as a 
synonym for ovpavos. This sense is quite common from Plato 
onwards. 

•^ The terms Arctic and Antarctic do not appear in extant 
literature before Hipparchus (2nd cent. b.c). 

^ fMeaov TWZ I,or. : yiiarjv codd. cet. Bekk. 

349 



[ARISTOTLE] 

392 a 

/xev, ov)(, to? Tives, 8ia ro nvpcohrj ovaav aWeadai, 
TrXrjijLiJieXovvres Trepl rrjv TiXelarov nvpos aTnrjXXay- 
[xev7]v hvyafiLV, dXXa Sea ro del dciv KVKXo(f)opov- 
fi€vr]v, aroL-^eZov ovaav erepov rcov rerrdpcov, 
dKriparov re Kal deZov. rcov ye ^rjv ifXTrepLexofjieviov 

10 aarpcov rd fxev dTrXavrj ro) avpLTravn ovpavw avfx- 
TrepLarpe<j)eraL, rds aura? e^ovra eSpag, tvv jxeao? 
6 t,cx)0(j)6pos KaXovjxevos kvkXos lyKdpatos Sict rci)V 
rpoTTiKcov hie^coarai, Kara [xepos ScrjprjpLevos ei's" 
ScoSe/ca ^otStcuv -)(^copa^, rd he, TrXavrjrd ovra, ovre 

15 TotS" irporepoLS op.ora^cj's Ktveladat 7Tecf)VKev ovre 
dXXy^XoLg, dAA' iv erepois Kal erepois kvkXols, ware 
avrcov ro^ jxev Trpoayeiorepov elvai, ro^ he dvcorepov. 
ro fxev ovv rcov aTrAavajv ttXtjOos eariv dve^evperov 
avdpcx)7TOL£, Katnep errl fxids Ktvovfievcov imcfiaveias 
rrjs Tov avfjLTTavrog ovpavov- ro 8e rcov TrXavrjrcDV, 

20 eiS" €7rrd fJieprj Ke(f)aXatovfievov, ev roaovrois iarl 
kvkXois icf)e^rjs KeLfievoig, ware del rov dvwrepw 
fxei^w rod VTTOKdrw elvai, rovs re errrd ev dXXr\- 
Aois" e[nrepLe')(eaQai, rrdvras ye prr^v vtto rrjs rwv 
(XTrAavajv a^ai'pa? 7TepLeLX'q(f)dat. avvex^j he e^^i del 
r7]V deaiv ravrrj 6 rod ^aivovro^ d/jia Kat K.p6vov 

25 KaXovfjievos kvkXos, e^e^rj? he 6 rov ^aedovros 
Kal^ Aio? XeyofjLevos, eW^ 6 Wvpoeis, 'WpaKXeov? 
re Kal "Apeos TTpoaayopevofxevos , e^rjs he 6 Srt'A- 
^wv, ov lepov ^pjxov KaXovaiv evtoi, riveg he 

^ TO ... TO Lor. : TOV . . . tov Bekk. 
* Koi Lor. : o Kal BD : om. cett. 

» The author follows Aristotle in making aether a fifth 
350 



ON THE COSMOS, 2 

aether,'^ not, as some think, because it is fiery in nature 
and so burns (they fall into error about its function, 
which is quite different from that of fire), but because 
it always moves in its circular orbit ; it is an element 
different from the four elements,'' pure and divine. 
Now, of the stars which are encompassed in it, some 
axe fixed and move in concert with the whole heaven 
always keeping the same position in it ; in the middle 
of these the circle of the zodiac, as it is called, set 
obliquely through the tropics, passes round like a 
girdle, divided into the twelve regions of the zodiac. 
The others, the planets, move, according to their 
nature, at speeds different from the fixed stars and 
from each other, each in a different circle, in such a 
way that one is nearer the earth, another higher in 
the heavens. The number of the fixed stars is not 
to be known by men, although they all move on one 
visible surface, namely that of the whole heaven : 
but the class of planets contains seven units, arranged 
in the same number of circles in a series, so that the 
higher is always greater than the lower, and all the 
seven, though contained one within another, are 
nevertheless encompassed by the sphere of the fixed 
stars. The circle which is always in the position next 
to this sphere is that which is called the circle of 
Phaenon (the Bright one) or Cronus (Saturn) ; then 
comes the circle of Phaethon (the Shiner) or Zeus 
(Jupiter) ; next Pyroeis (the Fiery one), named after 
Heracles or Ares (Mars) ; next Stilbon (the Glittering 
one) which some dedicate to Hermes (Mercury), some 

element : the Stoics identified it with fire. He rejects the 
derivation of the word from aWeoOai (to burn) and relates it 
to act deiv (move always), as Plato and Aristotle did {rf. Plato, 
Crat. 410 B, Aristot. De Caelo 270 b 22). 
* Earth, air, fire and water. 

351 



[ARISTOTLE] 

392 a 

'AttoAAcovos" fied^ ov 6 rod ^a>cr(f)6pov, ov 'A^/oo- 
Sirrj?, ol 8e "Hpag vpoaayopevova-LV , elra 6 rjXiov, 
Kal reXevroiog 6 rrjs aeX-^vrjs p^^XP^ VV^ opi^erat. 

30 o 8e aWrjp ra re deZa ip,7T€pL€)(ei CTto/xara Kal t7]v 
rrjs KLvqaeiog rd^tv. 

Mera 8e rrjv aldepiov Kal deiav (f)vaiv, TJvrtva 
reraypievTjv dirocfjaLvopiev, erL Se drpcTTrov /cat av- 
erepoicorov Kal aTradrj, crvvexris eanv rj 8t' oXcov 
Traidr]rr] re Kal rperrrrj, Kal, ro avpurrav ciTrelv, 

35 (f)6aprrj re Kal eTTtKrjpos. ravrrjs he avrrjg rrpcorr] 
392 b jtxe'v iariv rj XeTrropLeprjs Kal (f)Xo'ya)8r]s ovata, vtto 
rrjs aldepiov (f)vaea)s nvpovpLevr] 8ia to pLeyedos 
avrfjs Kal rrjv o^vrrjra rrjs KLVT]aea)s- iv 8e rrj 
TTvpcoSei Kal draKrcp Xeyop.evr) rd re aeXa Bidrret 
Kal cf)X6yes dKovrl^ovrai, Kal SoKlSes re Kal ^oOvvot 
5 Kal KopiTJraL XeyopLevoi arrjplt^ovrai Kal a^evvvvrai 

TToXXdKLS . 

'E^-^? 8e ravrrjs 6 drjp vrroKexvrat, t,o(j)u)hr]s 
wv Kal TTayerwSrjs rrjv (f)vaLV vtto be Kivrjaews 
XapLTTopLevos dpia Kal hcaKaiopLevos XapiTTpos re 
ylverat Kal dXeeivos, ev 8e rovrco, rrjs 7Tadr]rrjs 
ovri Kal avrcp Svvdpieojs Kal TravrohaTrios dX- 
10 XoLovpLevcp, v€(f)r] re crvvlararat Kal opu^poL Kar- 
apdaaovGL, vidve? re Kal Trawat Kal ;i^aAa^at 
TTVoai re avep,(DV Kai rvcpwvojv, eri, re ppovrai /cai 

1 eKeivrjs BCWZ Stob. Ap. Lor. : Kivijaews codd. cet. Rekk, 
* Xafinpos Lor. : XafnrpoTepos Bekk. 

" This is the " Pythagorean " order of the planets, adqpted 
by Aristotle, Eudoxus, Eratosthenes, and probably the early 
Stoics. The other order commonly given by ancient writers, 
the " Chaldean," puts Venus and Mercury lielow the sun ; 
this order was adopted by Panaetius, and probably also by 

352 



ON THE COSMOS, 2 

to Apollo ; after this is the circle of Phosphorus (the 
Light-bearer), which some call after Aphrodite 
(Venus) and others after Hera ; then the circle of the 
sun " ; and the last, the circle of the moon, is bounded 
by the terrestrial sphere. ** The aether, then, contains 
the divine bodies and their ordered orbits. 

After the aetherial and divine element, which is 
arranged in a fixed order, as we have declared, and is 
also unchangeable, unalterable and impassive, there 
comes next the element that is through the whole 
of its extent liable to change and alteration, and is, 
in short, destructible and perishable. The first part 
of this is the fine and fiery substance that is set aflame 
by the aether because of the latter 's great size and 
the swiftness of its motion. In this Jiert/ and disorderly 
element, as it is called, meteors and flames shoot across, 
and often planks and pits and comets, as they are called, 
stand motionless and then expire.'^ 

Next under this is spread the air, opaque and icy 
by nature, but when it is brightened and heated by 
movement, it becomes bright and warm.'' In the 
air, which itself also has the power to change, and 
alters in every kind of way, clouds are formed and 
rain falls in torrents ; there is snow, frost and hail, 
and gales and whirlwinds ; thunder and lightning, 

Posidonius. Lorimer writes {Azotes, p. 51) that there were 
few upholders of the " Pythagorean " order after 200 b.c, 
though it appears in an unknown astronomer in Rhodes of 
about 100 B.C. {I.G.Ins. i, 913). 

* yij here must refer to the whole " sublunary " sphere, not 
to the earth proper. 

" This is inconsistent with 395 a 29 ff. where these pheno- 
mena are put in the air. 

"* The coldness of the air is a Stoic doctrine ; Aristotle said 
it was warm and capable of being inflamed by motion 
{Meteor. 341 a 18). 

N 353 



[ARISTOTLE] 

392 b 

dcTTpaTTai Kal Trrayaets KepavvoJv ixvpiojv re yvocfycjov 
av yLTrXriy ahes . 

3. 'E^'^s' 8e rrjs aepiov ^vaecos yrj koL ddXaaoa 

15 iprjpetarai,, ^vroZs ^pvovaa Kal t,a>OL? TTiqyaLS re /cat 
TTora/xots', rol? fxev dva yrjv iXirTOfxevoig, rols 8e 
dvepevyojxevoL's et? ddXaaaav. TTeTTOiKiXraL 8e /cat 
yXoais ijivptaLS opeai re vijjrjXoi? Kal ^adv^vXois 
hpvfxols Kal TToXeatv, a? ro ao(f)6v t,cpov, 6 dvOpwrros, 

20 IhpvGaro , vt^aois re ivaXiois Kal rjTrelpois. ttju jxev 
ovv OLKovfJievrjv 6 ttoXvs Xoyog ets re vqaovs Kal 
rj7T€Lpovg SietAev, dyvodJv on /cat rj av/XTraaa pna 
vrJGOs iariv, vtto rrjg 'ArAavrt/cfy? KaXovp.ivrj'S da- 
XduGrjs TTepippeopLevrj. iroXXas 8e /cat aAAa? ei/co? 
TT^ahe dvTLTTopdpiovs drrcjdev Kcladai, rds />tev /net- 

25 foils' avrrj9, to.? 8e iXdrrovs, rjfuv 8e irdaas rrX'qv 
TTJahe dopdrovs' OTrep yap at Trap rffxlv vrjaoi 
TTpos ravrl rd TreXdyrj TreTrovOacTL, rovro T^8e rj 
oiKovfJievr] irpos rrjv ^ ArXavrLKTjv ddXaaaav jToXXai 
re erepai irpos avp^iraaav rrjv ddXaaaav Kal yap 
avrai jxeydXat rives elai vrjaoL jLteyaAot? Trept/cAu- 

30 ^d/xevat TreXdyeaiv . rj 8e avjXTraaa rov vypov 
(f)vais eTTLTToXd^ovaa, /caret Ttva? rrjs yfjs aTriXovs 
rds KaXovfxevas dvarre^ay/cuta^ oLKOVfxevas, i^TJs 
dv etTj rijs depiov jidXtara (f>vaeoJS. jierd 8e ravrrjv 
iv rols ^vdoLS Kara ro jieaairarov rov Koa/xov 
avveprjpeiafjievrj yrj irdaa Kal ireTneapievrj avvearrj- 

35 Kev, dKLvrjros /cat dadXevros' /cat toiJt' etrrt rod 

^ ava-nc^ayKvla coni. Usener Lor. : dvan€<f>vKvta codd; Bekk. 

" Aristotle apparently thought nothing but sea lay from 
Gibraltar westwards to India {Meteor. 862 b 28). Strabo (i. 
4. 6 — 65 c) notices the possibility of other inhabited worlds 
in his discussion of Eratosthenes. 

354. 



ON THE COSMOS, 2-3 

too, and falling thunderbolts, and the clash of 
innumerable storm-clouds. 

3. Next to the element of air comes the fixed mass 
of earth and sea, full of plants and animals, and 
streams and rivers, some winding about the surface 
of the earth, others discharging themselves into the 
sea. This region is adorned with innumerable green 
plants, high mountains, deep-shaded woodland, and 
cities established by the wise creature, man ; and 
with islands in the sea, and continents. The iw- 
habited ivorld is divided by the usual account into 
islands and continents, since it is not recognized that 
the whole of it is really one island, surrounded by 
the sea which is called Atlantic. Far away from this 
one, on the opposite side of the intervening seas, 
there are probably many other inhabited worlds," 
some greater than this, some smaller, though none 
is visible to us except this one ; for the islands we 
know stand in the same relation to our seas as the 
whole inhabited world to the Atlantic Ocean, and 
many other inhabited worlds to the whole ocean ; for 
these are great islands washed round by great seas. 
The whole mass of the wet element lies on the surface 
of the earth, allowing the so-called inhabited worlds 
to show through where there are projections of the 
earth ; it is this element that would propei'ly '' be 
next in order to the air. After this, set in the depths 
at the centre of the cosmos, densely packed and com- 
pressed, is the whole mass of the earth, unmoved and 
unshaken. And this is the whole of that part of the 

'' Taking ^idXiara with the verb ; it is probably postponed 
for rhythmic effect. The meaning is that water is in theory 
next to air, but earth sometimes protrudes through the water. 
aiTiXovs (properly " stains " or " marks ") in the previous line 
seems to be used in the sense of crmAaSas (" projections "). 

355 



[ARISTOTLE] 

392 b 

KoajJiov TO TTctv o KaXov^cv Kara). Trevre Srj aroi- 

393 a x^^*^ ravra eV nevre )(^(xjpais a(f)aipLK(jjg cyKeLfxeva, 

Tr€pL€)(Oix€vrjs aet ttj? eAaxTOVo? rf^ pLeit,ovL — Xeyco 
8e yrj? pikv iv vhari, vSaro? Se iv aepi, aepo'S Se 
eV TTvpi, TTvpos 8e ev aWepc — rov oXov Koafjiov avv- 
eaTT^aaro, /cat ro piev dvco vdv decov airehei^ev 
5 olKrjrrjpiov, ro Kara) 8e i(f)'rjp.€pcov Iwojv. avrov 
ye purjv rovrov ro piev vypov eartv, o KaXelv rrora- 
pLovs Kal vapcara Kal daXdaaa? eLdlapieua, ro oe 
^7]p6v, o yijv re Kal rjTreipou? KaJ vrjaovs oi'o/xa- 
^o/xei/. 
Tctjv Se v^uojv at /itei' etcrt /neyaAai, Kadanep tj 

10 avpLTTaaa rjhe otKovpievrj XeXeKrai TToXXai re erepai 
/xeyaAots" Trepcppeopievai, TreXdyeatv , at 8e eAarrou?, 
(f)avepaL re rjpiLV Kal ivros ovaai. /vat tovtcov at 
jaev a^ioAoyoi, St/ceAta /cat 2ap8co /cat Kupvo? 
KprjTT^ re /cat Eu'^oia /cat KvTrpo? /cat Aea^o'S, at 

15 8e VTToheearepat, a>v at jitev 27ropa8es", at 8e Ku- 
KAa8es", at 8e a'AAcu? 6vopidt,ovrai. 

neAayo? 8e to /xev e^co Tr)? OLKOvpievrjs ^ArXav- 
riKOV re Kal 'Q/ceavo? /caAetTat, jrepippeuiv -qpids. 
iv Be rep Trpos hvaeis arevoiropcp hiaveoiyois^ 
aropiari, Kara rds 'Hpa/cAetou? Xeyop-evas arrjXas 

20 rov eiapovv els rrjv eaco ddXaaaav dts av els Xipueva 
TTOieirai, Kara puKpov he eTmrXarvvopLevos dva- 
■)(elrai, pieydXovs TrepiXapL^dvcov koXttovs dAAT^Aot? 
avva^els, tttj pukv Kara. arevoTTopovs av-)(evas av- 
earopLwpLevos, tttj Be iraXiv irXarvvopievos ■ -Trpcorov 
pcev ovv Xeyerai eyKeKoXircjadai ev Be^id eloTrXeovri 

25 TO.? 'Hpa/cAetou? OTr^Aa?, BixdJs, els rds KaXov- 
pievas TiVpreis, oiv rrjv pLev MeyaAr^v, rr^v Be MtKpav, 
KaXovatv eVi ddrepa Be ovKeri opiOLcos olttokoXttov- 
356 



ON THE COSMOS, 3 

cosmos that we call the lower part. So these five 
elements, occupying five spherical regions, the larger 
sphere always embracing the smaller — earth in water, 
water in air, air in fire, fire in aether — make up the 
whole cosmos ; the upper part as a whole is distin- 
guished as the abode of the gods, and the lower part 
as that of mortal creatures. Of the latter, some is 
wet, and this part we call rivers and springs and seas ; 
the rest is dry, and this part we name land and con- 
tinents and islands. 

There are various kinds of island : some are large, 
like this whole inhabited world of ours, as I have said, 
and many others which are surrounded by great 
oceans ; others are smaller, visible to us and \vithin 
the Mediterranean. Some of these are quite con- 
siderable — Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Euboea, 
Cyprus and Lesbos ; some are smaller, like the Spo- 
rades, the Cyclades, and others with various names. 

The ocean that is outside the inhabited world is 
called the Atla7itic, or Ocean, and surrounds us. To 
the West of the inhabited world, this ocean makes 
a passage through a narrow strait called the Pillars 
of Heracles, and so makes an entry into the interior 
sea, as if into a harbour ; gradually it broadens and 
spreads out, embracing large bays joined up to each 
other, here contracting into narrow necks of water, 
there broadening out again. They say that the first 
of these bays that the sea forms, to starboard, if you 
sail in through the Pillars of Heracles, are two, called 
the Syrtes, of which one is called the Major, the other 
the Minor ; on the other side it does not form gulfs 

^ 8iav€0)y<l)s Lor. : Siavewyos Bekk. 

357 



[ARISTOTLE] 

393 a 

[xevos rpia TTOieZ TreXdyrj, to re HapSovLov /cat to 

TaXaTLKOv KaXovfX€Vov /cat 'ASptav, i^rjs 8e rovrcov 

iyKapcrtov to St/ceAt/cdv, fxcTO. 8e tovto to K.prjTt,Kov, 

30 uvv€X€S 8e avTov, ttj {jl€v to AlyvrrTiov re /cat 

Y[ap,cf)vXLov /cat Suptop', T7y Se to Atyatov re Kat 

MvpTwov. dvTC7Tap'^K€L he TOLS elprjfxevoL? ttoXv- 

fiepeaTaTos cov 6 HovTog, ov to [xev p,v)((UTaTov 

393 b MatoDTts" /caAetrai, to he e^u) Trpos tov 'EAAi^ct- 

7TOVTOV (JvvaveaToixcDTat, ttj KaXovp-evrj UpoTTOVTthL. 

Ylpos ye jxrjv rat? dvaaxecreaL tov -qXiov ttolXlv 

elarpecov 6 'H/ceavos", tov 'IvSt/cdv re /cat YiepaiKov 

Stavot^a? koXttov, dvacfyalvei avve^^fj ttjv ^KpvOpav 

5 ddXaaaav hieiXrjcfxI)^ . enl darepov he Kepag Kara 

arevov re /cat eTnpufiKrj 8ii^/cct>v av')(eva, ttoXlv 

dvevpvveTai, Tr)v 'TpKaviav re /cat KaaTrtav opi^cov 

TO he VTTep TavTrjV ^advv e;^ei tov inrep ttjv MatoiTtv' 

Xifxvqv TOTTov. etra /caT* oAtyov UTrep tou? S/cu^as" 

Te /cat KeATt/cT^v a<f)iyyei ttjv OLKovfjievrjv Trpog 

10 Tc TOV TaXaTLKov koXttov /cat to.? TTpoeipriixevag 

' H/aa/cAetous crTi^Aa?, (Lv e^co rrepippeeL ttjv yrjv 6 

" The Ocean makes three separate incursions into the in- 
habited world — the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the 
Caspian (see n. c below). Festugiere (op. cit. p. 465) thinks 
these Eastern seas are spoken of as prolongations of the 
Mediterranean ; but irdXiv elapecjv here is parallel to tou 
eiapovv . . . TToteiTai at SOS a 19. 

'' Are these two gulfs or one ? If two, they are respectively 
the Gulf of Cutch (or the Oulf of Cambay) and the Persian 
Gulf ; if one, probably the Persian Gulf is meant. The Greek 
could be interpreted either way. 

' By 'Epvdpd (red) the author probably means what was 

358 



ON THE COSMOS, 3 

at first in the same way, but makes three seas, the 
Sardinian, Galatian and Adriatic ; next to these, and 
across the line of them, is the SiciUan sea ; after this, 
the Cretan ; and continuing this on one side are the 
Egyptian and PamphyUan and Syrian seas, on the 
other the Aegean and Myrtoan. Lying opposite 
these that I have described, in another direction, is 
the Pontus, and this has very many parts : the inner- 
most part is called Maeotis, and the outermost part, 
towards the Hellespont, is joined by a strait to the 
sea called Propontis. 

In the East, the Ocean again penetrates (the in- 
habited world) * ; it opens out the gulf of India and 
Persia ^ and without a break reveals the Red Sea," 
embracing these as parts of itself. Towards the other 
promontory (of Asia),** passing through a long narrow 
strait and then broadening out again, it makes the 
Hyrcanian or Caspian sea * ; beyond this, it occupies 
a deep hollow beyond Lake Maeotis. Then little by 
little, beyond the land of the Scythians and Celts, it 
confines the inhabited world as it passes towards the 
Galatian Gulf and the Pillars of Heracles, already 
described, on the farther side of which the Ocean 

generally called the Erythraean Sea, which might include 
our Red Sea (called the .Arabian Gulf at 893 b 28). 

■* Lorimer {Notes, p. 80, n. 3) quotes Mela i. 2 (9) to confirm 
this interpretation. In Mela, the two promontories are the 
land between the Nile and the Red Sea, and that between the 
TanaTs and the Caspian. 

' Or " bounding the Hyrcanian and Caspian country " 
(Forster). But ^aAaCTcrai' is easier to understand here than 
y-^v ; admittedly opi^uiv has an odd sense (perhaps " marking 
out "), but the author is running short of synonyms for 
" forming " seas. At all events, he means the Caspian Sea, 
which was thought of as a gulf of the Northern Ocean from 
the time of Alexander to Ptolemy. 

359 



[ARISTOTLE] 

393 b 

'Q.K€av6g. iv tovtw ye firjv vrjcrot /xeyto-rat^ rvy- 
xdvovGtv ovaai hvo, BperravcKal^ Xeyofjievai, 'AAjSi- 
cov^ /cat lepvq, rcbv TTpo'CaroprjfjievcDV pLeil^ovs, VTrep 
rovs ¥s.eXrovs K€.ijX€vai. rovrojv Se ovk iXdrrovs 

15 7] re TaTTpo^dvrj rrepav 'IvScov, Xo^r) rrpos rrjv 
OLKovfiev'qv, Kal r) OejSoA KaXovpievrj, Kara rov 
'ApajSi/cov KeipLevT] koXttov. ovk oXlyat Se fxiKpal 
rrepl rag BperraviKas Kal rrjV ^l^rjptav kvkXco 
TTepLeaTe<j)dvoL>VT at rrjv oiKovpLeviqv rauTrjv, tjv hrj 
vrJGOv elprjKajJiev rjs irXdro'S fxev eari Kara to ^adv- 

20 rarov rrj^ rjTrelpov ^p^X^ drroSeov rerpaKLapLvpiajv 
araStajv, cu? (f>aaLv ol ev yecoypa(j>r]aavreg, ixrJKog 
he TTcpl €TTraKLcrfxvpLovs fxaXicTTa. oLaipeirai he 
e'is re l^vpconrjv Kal Aatav Kal Ai^v'qv. 

KvpcoTTTTj puev ovv ioTLV rjg opoi kvkXco arrjXai 
re 'HpaKXeovg Kal p.v)(ol Ylovrov ddXarrd re 'Tp- 

25 Kavia, Kad' t^v arevoraros ladpios els rov Ilovrov 
hcqKeL' rives Se avrl* rov laOpiov TavalV TTorapcov 
elprjKaaLv. 'Aaia Se' eart ro aTTo rov elprjfxevov 
ladjxov rov re Wovrov /cat t-^? 'YpKavias daXduarjs 
fiexpi' darepov laOixov, os [xera^v Ketrai rov re 
'Apa^tKov koXttov Kal rijs eaco daXdaarfs , Txepi- 

^ post ^fyiarai add. re Bekk. 

^ BperravLKal Lor. : JiperavviKal liekk. 

» 'AXpiwv Lor. : 'AX^iov liekk. 

* avTt Stob. IjOt. : OTTO codd. Bekk. 

" Very mysterious. It might well be Socotra, as Bochert 
suggests {Arist. Erdkunde, p. 9.'i) ; Capelle {op. cit. p. 539) 
suggests Madagascar; MullenhofF {Deutsche Alterlums- 
kunde, pp. 322 f.), quoted with approval by Lorimer {Notes, 
p. 37, n. 1), suggests it is the island in Lake Tana {Psebo in 
Strabo) in Abyssinia, magnified and transplanted. 
360 



ON THE COSMOS, 3 

flows round the earth. There are two very large 
islands in it, called the British Isles, Albion and 
lerne ; they are larger than those already mentioned, 
and lie beyond the land of the Celts. No smaller than 
these are Taprobane (Ceylon) beyond the Indians, 
which lies obliquely to the inhabited world, and the 
island known as Phebol," by the Arabian Gulf. There 
is quite a number of other small islands round the 
British Isles and Spain, set in a ring round this 
inhabited world, which as we have said is itself an 
island ; its breadth, at the deepest point of the con- 
tinent, is a little short of 40,000 stades, in the opinion 
of good geographers,*" and its length is approximately 
70,000 stades. It is divided into Europe, Asia and 
Libya. 

Europe is the area which is bounded in a circle by 
the Pillars of Heracles and the inner parts of the 
Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, where a very narrow " 
isthmus passes between it and the Pontus ; but some 
have said the river Tanais, instead of this isthmus.^ 
Asia is the region from this isthmus of the Pontus 
and the Hyrcanian Sea to another isthmus, which lies 
between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean ; 

* Posidonius put the length of the oiVou/xeVTj at 70,000 
stades, but no one reports his figure for the width ; since he 
thought the Ocean was quite close to Maeotis in the North, 
his figure would presumably be under 30,000 stades " in 
agreement with the view then current " (Thomson, History 
(if Ancient Geography, p. 213). Eratosthenes estimated the 
length at 70,800 stades (with the addition of 7,000 for bulges 
and possible islands), and the width at 38,000. 

" Strabo reports (xi. i. 5 = 491 c) that Clitarchus and others 
made this isthmus al)surdly narrow, while Posidonius thought 
it was 1500 stades. 

"* These variant opinions are noted by Eratosthenes ap. 
Strabo i. 4. 7 (65 c). 

361 



[ARISTOTLE] 

393 b 

30 e)(6fJL€Vog VTTO re TavrT]g Kal tov TTepi^ ^Q.Keavov' 

TLves 8e^ aTTO Tavd'iho'S f^^XP^ Net'Aou (TTOfjidTWv 
TOV rrj? 'Acria? rtOevTat opov. A.L^vrj he to cltto 
TOV 'Apa^LKov ladjxov eto? 'HpaKrAeous OTfiXcbv. 

394 a ol he 0.770 TOV NciAou (f)aaLV ecu? eKelviov. ttjv he 

AlyVTTTOV, VTTO TWV TOV NciAoU CrTOpbOLTCDV 7T€pLppeO- 

fxevT]v, ol fjiev rfj 'Aata, ol he tjj Al^vt) irpoa- 
OLTTTovai, Kal Ta? vijaov? ol puev e^atpeTovg TToiovcnv, 
ol he TTpoavepuovai rat? yeiToaiv aei pioipais. 
5 Tri'5 [xev hrj Kal daXaTTrjs (f)vaLV Kal decnv, -qPTLva 
KaXelv elwdajxev olKovpLevr]v, Toidvhe tlvo. larop-q- 
KajJiev. 

4. Vlepl he tcDv a^ioXoycoTaTCDV ev avTrj Kal Trepl 
avrrjv rradcov vvv AeycD/xev, aura to, dvayKala Kecf)a- 
XaiovfJievoL. 

Avo yap hrj nves drr^ avTrjs dvadvpudaeis dva- 

10 ^epovTat avvexcos et? tov VTrep rjpidg depa, XeiTTO- 
piepels Kal dopaToi rr avT dn aa iv , et [rt] pur] Kara 
TO,? ecpa's eoTiv at [re] Sta' TTOTapicov re /cat vapid- 
TOJV dvacf)ep6pievaL deojpovvTat. tovtwv he 7] p,ev 
ecTTL ^rjpd Kal KaTTVcohrjs , dno Trjs yrjs aTtoppeovaa, 
7] he voTepd Kal aTpLcohrjs, drro Trjg vypds dvadv- 

15 jLitcojLteVrj (f)vaea)s. yivovTaL he avro p-ev TavTrjg 
OjLtt;)(Aat Kal hpoaoi Kal ndycov Iheai ve<f>r] t€ /cat 
6p.Ppoi Kal xi-oveg Kal ^aAa^at, aTTO he rrjs ^rjpds 
dvepLOL re Kat 7Tvevp.dTOJV hia^opal ^povrai re /cat 
doTpaTral Kal TTprjarrjpes /cat Kepavvol /cat to, aAAa 

^ post U add. TO CGZ Bekk. * n seel. Lor. 

362 



ON THE COSMOS, 3-4 

it is surrounded by the Mediterranean and the en- 
circling stream of the Ocean ; but some say that Asia 
stretches from the Tanais to the mouths of the Nile. 
Libya lies between the Arabian isthmus and the 
Pillars of Heracles (but some say from the Nile to 
the Pillars). Egypt, which is encompassed by the 
mouths of the Nile, is attached by some to Asia, and 
by others to Libya, and some make the islands 
separate, others attribute them to their nearest 
region of mainland. 

We have now given some account of the nature 
and situation of the land and sea which we call " the 
inhabited world." 

4. Now let us turn to the most notable phenomena 
in and about the inhabited world, summarizing only 
the most essential points. 

There are two exhalations * from it, which pass 
continually into the air above us, composed of small 
particles and entirely invisible, except that in the 
early mornings some can be observed rising along 
rivers and streams. One of these is dry and like 
smoke, since it emanates from the earth ; the other 
is damp and vaporous, since it is exhaled from the 
wet element. From the latter come mists, dews, the 
various kinds of frost, clouds, rain, snow and hail ; 
from the dry exhalation come the winds and various 
breezes, thunder and lightning, fiery bolts (TTp7](nrjpts) ^ 
and thunderbolts and all the other things of the same 

" For the two exhalations and their products cf. Aristot. 
Meteor, i. 4-12. Much of this chapter derives, ultimately, from 
Aristotle ; the proximate sources are discussed by Maguire 
{op. cit. pp. 128-183). * Cf. 395 a 10 and note. 

' a* [re] 8ia scripsi : at re Sta vel at t6 e»c codd. : oTe airo 
Lor. {De Mundo) : at [re] dno Lor. {Notes). 



[ARISTOTLE] 

394 a 

a Brj TOVTOLS icrrl av^(j)v\a. ecrrt Se o^t;\;A7j jLtev 

20 aTfxcohrjs dvadvfitaais ayovo? vharos, depos ju-ev 
7Ta)(VT€pa, V€(f)OVS Se dpaioripa' yiverai Se i^Voi e^ 
dpx'fjs ve(f)OVS rj e^ VTroXeLfipiaros ■ dvrtTraXos Se 
auT^ Xeyerat re /cat eariv aWpla, ovSev d'AAo ouaa 
ttAi^v di^p dv€cf)€Xos Kal dvofiLxXos. Spoaos 8e eariv 
vypov i^ aldpias Kara avaracriv XerTTrjv cfjepopuevov, 

25 KpvaraXXos he dOpoov vhcop e^ aldpias TTeTrrjyos, 
irdxyrj 8e hpoaos TTeTrrjyvLa, SpoaoTrdxvrj Se i7/xi- 
rrayrj's hpoaos. vecjios Se' eari Trdxos dr/xoiSes' 
uvvearpajjiixevov , yovLpiov vharos' ofx^pos Se yit'erai 
ixev /car' eKmeapiov v€(f)ovs ev pcdXa TreTraxvapievov , 
hLa(f>opds Se i,'CT;i^et roudahe oaas Kal rj rod ve(f)ovs 

30 dXlifjLS' r^iria [xev yap ovaa [xaXaKas ipaKaSas Sia- 
GTTeipeL, a(f)oSpd Se dSporepas' Kal rovro KaXovp,ev 
verov, opi^pov juei^co Kal avvex^j avarpepcpiara erri 
yrjs (f)€p6pievov} ;;(tcov Se yiverai Kara ve(f)cov rre- 
7TVKva>pLevo)v dTTodpavaiv rrpo rrjg els vScop pLera- 

35 ^oXrjs dvaK07T€vro}v epyd^erai Se rj p,kv kottt] ro 
dcjypcoSes Kal eKXevKov, rj Se avpTT-q^is rov ivovros 
vypov rrjv i/jvxporrjra ovttco ;^u^eVTOS' oySe -qpaio)- 
39i b pievov. a(f)ohpd Se avrrj Kal ddpoa Kara(f)epop,evq 
VL(f)€r6s chvopLaarai. ;(dAa^a Se yiverai vc(f)erov 
avor pa(j>evros Kal ^pldos e/c TnXi^pLaros els Kara- 
(f>opdv raxvrepav Xa^ovros' TTapd Se rd pLeyedf] rcov 
diTopp'qyvvpLevwv dpavapudrcov 61 re oyKoi pLeit,ovs 
5 at re (f)opal yivovrat jStatdrepat . ravra pLev ovv 
e/c rrjs vypds dvadvpnaaecos rre(f)VKe GvpLTTiTTreiv. 

'E/c Se rrjs ^f]pds vrro i/jvxovs piev (vadelarjs ware 
pelv dvepLos eyevero' ovhev ydp eartv ovros rrX-qv 
364 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

class. Mist is a vaporous exhalation which does not 
produce water, denser than air but less dense than 
cloud ; it comes into being either from a cloud in the 
first stage of formation or from the remnant of a 
cloud. The condition contrary to this is rightly called 
a clear sky, for it is simply air, with no cloud or mist. 
Dew is moisture that falls out of a clear sky in a light 
condensation ; ice is solidified water, frozen in a clear 
sky : hoar-frost is frozen dew, and dew-frost is half- 
frozen dew. Cloud is a dense, vaporous formation, 
productive of water : rain comes from the compression 
of a well-compacted cloud, and varies in character 
according to the pressure on the cloud : if the pres- 
sure is light it scatters gentle drops of rain, but if it 
is heavy the drops are fuller : and we call this latter 
condition a downpour, for it is larger than a shower of 
rain and pours continuous drops of rain upon the 
earth. Snow occurs when well-condensed clouds 
break up and split before the formation of water : 
the split causes the foamy and brilliantly white con- 
dition of the snow, and its coldness is caused by the 
coagulation of the moisture contained in it, which has 
not had time to be either fused or rarefied. If there 
is a thick and heavy fall of snow, we call it a snow- 
storm. Hail occurs when a snow-storm is solidified 
and gathers weight because of its increased density 
so as to fall more rapidly ; the hailstones increase in 
size and their movement increases in violence accord- 
ing to the size of the fragments that are broken off 
the cloud. These then are the natural products of 
the wet exhalation. 

From the dry exhalation, when it is forced to flow 
by the cold, wind is produced : for this is nothing but 

^ <f>ep6iJi€vov I>or. : (f)€p6neva Bekk. 

365 



[ARISTOTLE] 

394 b 

drjp TToXvg pecov /cat dd poos' oans d[xa Kai TTvevpia 

10 Aeyerai. Aeyerat Se Kal irepcos rrvevfjia t] re iv 
cf)vroXg Kal ^coois Kal 8ia TrdvrcDV Sn^/coucra epnjiV)(og 
T€ Kal yovLfios ovaia, irepl rjs vuv Aeyetv ovk dvay- 
KaZov. ra Se ev aepi TTveovra TTvevfiaTa KaXovpcev 
dvejjiovs, avpas 8e Tots' e^ vypov (f)epoix€vas eKTTvods. 
rwv 8e avefiojv ot fxev e/c vevoriafxevqs yrjs TTveovre? 

15 aTToyeiot Aeyovrat, ot Se e/c koXttojv StefarTOvre? 
iyKoXTTiai' TOVTOtg 8e dvaAoyov rt e^^oucrtv ot ck: 
TTorafxojv Kal Xtjjivcov. ol 8e Kara pyj^iv ve^ovs 
yLVOjJievoL Kal dvaXvcrcv rod ird^ovg rrpos eavrovs 
TTOLovpievoL €Kve(f)iaL KoXovvrai- /xe^' vharos Se 
ddpoois payevres^ e^vhplai Xeyovrai. Kal ol p,ev 

20 ttTTo dvaroXris ovve-)(els evpoi KeKXrjvrai , ^opiai 8e 
ot diTo dpKrov, t,€cf)vpoL 8e ot dno Svaea>g, voroi 
8e ot 0.770 pbearjix^pias . rwv ye pi'qv evpcov /cat/cta? 
[xev Aeyerat o aTTo roi? Trept rds depivds dvaroXds 
roTTOv TTveojv dvifMos, dTTTjXicjorrjs 8e o aTTO rov Tvepi 
rds larjfxepLvds, evpos 8e o (xtto tou Trept rag ;^et- 

25 fxeptvag. Kal rdv ivavricov t,€(f)vpcov dpyearrjs fxev 
6 0.770 rrjs deptvrjs Svaeojs, ov rtve? KoXovaiv oXvjjl- 
rriav, ol he Idrrvya- ^e(f)vpog 8e o a.77o rrjs Lat)- 
jjLepivrjg, Atj/r 8e o a.770 tt^? ;^ei/xe/3tv'>^s'. /cat tcDv 
^opeoJv lSlcos 6 fxev e^rjs rep KaiKia KaXelrat ^opeas, 
dirapKrias he 6 €(f>e^rjg dno rov rroXov Kara ro 

30 [xearjfjiPpLVov rrveojv, QpaaKias he 6 e^rjs ttvccov rw 

^ payevres B Lor. : payevros codd. cet. Bekk. 

" This is a common Greek way of describing points of 
the compass. They divided each quarter by three ; so their 

366 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

air moving in quantity and in a mass. It is also called 
breath. In another sense " breath " means that sub- 
stance found in plants and animals and pervading 
everything, that brings life and generation ; but 
about that there is no need to speak now. The breath 
that breathes in the air we call wind, and the breath 
that comes from moisture we call breeze. Of the 
winds, some blow from the earth when it is wet and 
are called land-winds ; some arise from gulfs of the 
sea and are called gulf-ivinds. There is a similarity 
between these winds and those which come from 
rivers and lakes. Those which arise at the breaking 
up of a cloud and resolve its density against them- 
selves are called cloud-winds : those which burst out 
all at once accompanied by water are called rain-winds. 
Eurus is the name of the winds that blow steadily 
from the East, Boreas is the name of the North winds, 
Zephyrus of the West winds, and Notus of the South 
winds. One of the Euri is called Caecias : this is 
the one that blows from from the direction of the 
summer sunrise." Apeliotes is the one that comes 
from the direction of the equinoctial sunrise, and 
Eurus proper the one that comes from the direction 
of the winter sunrise. Of the Zephyri, which blow 
in the opposite direction, Argestes comes from the 
direction of the summer sunset ; some call this 
Olympias, and some lapyx. Zephyrus proper comes 
from the direction of the equinoctial sunset, Lips 
from the direction of the winter sunset. Of the winds 
called Boreas, the one properly so-called is next to 
Caecias ; next to it is Aparctias, which blows from 
the North pole to the South ; Thrascias is the one 

minor points cannot be translated simply into modern terms. 
Equinoctial sunrise and sunset can be taken as E. and W. 

367 



[ARISTOTLE] 

394 b 

apyeaTT], ov evioi KipKiav^ KaXovatv. Kal tojv 
voriov o fxev arro rov dcjiavovs ttoXov cf)€p6fJievos 
avTLTTaAos Tip aTTapKTta /caAetrai voros, evpovoros 
8e o fxera^v vorov Kal evpov rov Se cttI Odrepa 
fjiera^v At^o? /cat vorov ol p.ev Xi^ovorov, ol he 
35 Xi^ocfiolvLKa, KaXovcnv. 

Tcov 8e dvipLOiv ol fxev elaiv evdvTrvooi, oiroaoi 
hicKTrveovai Trpoaco /car' evdelav, ol Se dvaKapb^i- 

395 a rrvooLy Kadairep o /cai/cta? Xeyopievos, Kal ol [Jiev 

)(€Lp.a)vog, ixiarrep ol voroi, hvvaorevovres , ol 8e 
depovg, CO? ot irr^acat Aeyd/xevot, pu^iv exovres rojv 
re drro rrjs dpKrov ^epopievcov Kal ^e(f>vpo}v ol 8e 
opvidiai KaXovjjievoL, eapivoi nves ovreg dvepLOL, 
5 jSopeai elal rat yevei. 

Tcov ye p,r)v jStatcov TTvevjJidrcov Karatyls piev eari 
TTvevpua dva)dev rvirrov e^ai^vrjs, OveXXa 8e nvevpLa 
jSiaiov /cat d<j)V(x) TrpoaaXXopbevov, XalXai/j 8e /cat 
arpo^iXos TTvevpia elXovpLevov Karcodev dvcj, dva- 
<f>va'qpia Be yrjs 7Tveup,a dvoj (f)ep6p,evou Kara rrjv 
10 e/c ^vdov Ttvos" fj p-qypiarog dvdSoaiv orav Se 
elXovpievov ttoXv (f)epr]rai, Trprjarrjp x^ovlos eariv. 
elXrjdev Se irvevpia ev ve't^ei Trax^-l re Kal vorepcp, 
Kal e^coadev 8t' avrov, /Siai'to? prjyvvov rd avvexrj 
TTiXr^piara rov vei^ovg, ^popiov Kal rrdrayov pueyav 
direLpydaaro , ^povrrjv Xeyop-evov, cooTTep ev vhari 

^ KipKiav F'orster : KaiKiav codd. Bekk. 

" Phenomena connected with wind and those connected 
with thunder and lightning are not clearly distinguished in 
Greek, and translation is difficult. Here irpTjai^p seems to 

368 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

next Argestes, though some call this Circias. Of the 
winds called Notus, the one that comes from the 
invisible pole, opposite to Aparctias, is properly called 
Notus, and Euronotus is the one between Notus and 
Eurus. The one on the other side, between Notus 
and Lips, is sometimes called Libonotus, sometimes 
Libophoenix. 

The current of some winds is direct — that is, they 
blow straight ahead ; the current of others varies 
in direction, as in the case of Caecias. Some of them 
prevail in the winter, like the Noti ; some prevail in 
the summer, like those called Etesian winds, which 
are a mixture of North winds and Zephyri. Those 
which are called Ornithian winds, which occur in the 
spring, belong to the class Boreas. 

Of the violent types of wind, a squall is a wind that 
strikes suddenly from above ; a gust is a violent wind 
that suddenly jumps up at you ; a whirlwind, or 
cyclone, is a wind that whirls upwards in a spiral. A 
blast of wind from the earth is a gust caused by the 
expulsion of wind from some pit or chasm ; when it 
moves with a fierce whirling motion, it is an earth- 
hurricane (7rp7/o-T7/p)." When the wind whirls round 
in a thick cloud full of water and is pushed out through 
it and forcibly breaks up the closely packed material 
of the cloud, it makes a great din and crash, which is 
called thunder — as air does when it is passed violently 

mean some kind of whirlwind, but in 394 a 18 and 395 a 24 
it is a sort of thunderbolt. Aristotle says {Meteor. 371 a 15) : 
" When it {i.e. the cloud pulled down by a descending whirl- 
wind) is inflamed as it is pulled downwards ... it is called a 
TTpTqaT-qp ; for it inflames {avveKTrifiTTpTjai) the neighbouring air 
and colours it with its fire." The name implies a connexion 
with fire and perhaps here the nprjar-qp comes up from a fiery 
chasm (c/. 395 b 20). 

369 



[ARISTOTLE] 

395 a 

15 TTvevfjia a(J)oSpa)s iXavvoficvov . Kara Se ttjv rod 
V€(f>ovs CKprj^LV TTvpcoOiv ro TTvevixa Kal Xdpujsav 
aarpaTTTj Xeyer ai' o 817 TTporepov rrjs ppovrrjs 
TTpoaerreaev, varepov yevofievov, enel ro aKovarov 
v7t6 rov oparov 7T€(f)VK€ (^ddveadai, rod fiev Kal 
TToppcodev opcofjievov, rod 8e CTretSav iixTreXaar) rfj 

20 d/corj, Kal p^dXiara orav ro fiev rdxt-crrov fj rcov 
ovrojv, Xeyoj Se ro TTVpcoSes, ro Se rjrrov ra^v, 
depwhes ov, iv rij ttXtj^cl Trpos dKorjv d(j>iKvovp,evov . 
ro 8e darpdijjav dvairvpajdlv, jStato;? o-xpt- ttjs yijs 
bieKdeov, Kepavvog KaXelrai, idv 8e -qfjiiTTvpov rj, 
a^ohpov 8e dXXcx>s kol ddpoov, rrprjar7]p, eav Se 

25 drrvpov navreXcos , rv(f)a)v cKaarov 8e rovroiv Kara- 
(jKrjijjav els rrjv yijv (jKr]7Tr6s ovo/za^erai. rdJv oe 
Kepavvdjv OL /xev aWaXcoSeis i/joXoevreg Xeyovrai, 
ol Se rax^cos Btdrrovres dpyrjres, eAt/ciai Se ot 
ypa/x/xoeiScL)? (f)ep6pi€voL, aKr^nrol Se oaoi Kara- 
aKT^TTrovGLV et's" Tt. 

HvXXij^brjv Se rwv iv dept (f)avraGjjLdro)v rd pL€v 

30 eari /car' €fi(f)aaiv, rd 8e Kad* vTToaraaiv — /car 
epL(f)aaLV pukv tpiSe? Kal pd^hot Kal rd roiavra, Kad 
VTToaraaiv Se cre'Aa re Kal hidrrovres Kal Kop^-qraL 
Kal rd rovroLS vapaTrX'qaia. Iptg puev ovv eariv 
epL^aaig rjXiov rpirjpLaros ri aeXrjvrig, ev vecftei vore- 
po) Kal KoiXu) Kal avvex^i Trpos ^avraaiav, d)S ev 

35 KaroTTrpo), deajpovp-evr] Kara kvkXov TTepL(f>epeiav . 

pd^hos Se' eariv IpiSos ep.(j>aaLs evdela. dXws Se' 

395 b eariv epi^aais XaiXTTporrjros darpov irepiavyos ' 

» See p. 368, n. o, 

* Tv<f>cov is often a typhoon or hurricane (c/. 400 a 29), but 
here it is connected with lightning. In mythology Typhon 

370 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

through water. Because of the breaking up of the 
cloud the wind is set on fire, and flashes : this is called 
lightning. This lightning falls upon our senses before 
the thunder, though it occurs later, because what is 
heard is by nature slower than what is seen : for the 
latter is seen a great way off, the former only when 
it approaches the ears ; particularly when one is that 
swiftest thing of all, the element of Fire, while the 
other is less swift, since it is of the nature of air and 
impinges upon the hearing by physical contact. 
When the flashing bolt is aflame and hurtles violently 
to the ground it is called a. thunderbolt; if it is half alight, 
but in other respects strong and dense, it is called 
a. fiery holt °- ; if it is altogether fireless it is called a 
smoking holt ^ ; but each one of these when it falls upon 
the ground is called a falling-bolt. Lightning " is 
called smoky when it looks dark, like smoke ; vivid, 
when it moves very rapidly ; and forked, when it 
moves along jagged lines ; but when it falls on to 
something it is called a. falling-holt. 

Briefly, the phenomena of the air are divided into 
those which are mere appearances and those which 
are realities : the appearances are rainbows and 
streaks in the sky and so on ; the realities are lights 
and shooting stars and comets and other such things. 
A rainbow is the appearance in reflection of a portion 
of the sun or moon, seen, like an image in a mirror, 
in a cloud that is wet and hollow and presents an 
unbroken surface, and shaped like an arc of a circle. 
A streak is a straight rainbow. A halo is an appear- 
ance of brightness shedding its light round a star ; 

is the son of Typhos, the giant, who causes the eruption of 
Etna ; hence the connexion with fire. 

' Kepavvos is used for " lightning " and " thunderbolt." 

371 



[ARISTOTLE] 

395 b 

Sia(f)€peL 8e tpiSos on rj [xev tpi? e'^ evavrias ^ai- 
verat rjXlov Kal aeXT^vrjs, r] Se d'AcD? kvkXo) Travros 
aarpov. aeXas Se iari rrvpos ddpoov e^aifiLS iv 
dept. TOJi' Se CTeAacDV a /xev d/covrt^^rat, d Se 
5 arr]ptl^eTai. 6 jxev ovv i^aKovnajJios eari TTvpos 
yeveais €K Traparpli/jeajs iv depi (jyepopievov ra^^oj'S 
Kal (jiavraaiav p,rjKovs ip.(j)aivovros Std to ra.-)(OS, 
6 he arripLypLos iari x^P''^ ^opd? TTpopLrJKrjg €K- 
raais Kal otov aarpov pvoLS' TrXarvvojJievT] 8e 
Kara ddrepov Kopi'qTrjs /caAetrai. TroAAd/ci? 8e tcov 

10 aeXdcDv rd fxkv imfievei irXeiova xpdvov, rd 8e 
7Tapaxp'f]P'0. a^evvvrat. rroXXal Se Kal dAAat (f)av- 
Taa/jbdraiv tSeat deajpovvrai., XapLTvdSes re KaXov- 
/xevat Kal SoKiSes Kal ttWol Kal ^odvvoi, Kara rrjv 
Tvpos ravra 6piOLor7]ra cSSe rrpoaayopevdelaaL. /cat 
TO, /xev rovrcDV eaTrepia, rd 8e ecoa, rd 8e d/x^t^ai^ 

15 deojpelraL, aTTavtojs 8e ^opeia Kal vor la. Trdvra 
he djSe'jSaia* ovheTTore yap ri rovrcov del ^avepov 
laroprjraL Kare(jrrjpiyp,evov. rd piev roivvv depia 
roiavra. 

'E/X7repte;)(ei 8e Kal 7] yrj TToXXds ev avrfj, Kaddnep 
vharo^, ovrios Kal -nvevpiaros Kal TTvpos Trrjydg. 

•20 rovrcDV he at p,ev vtto yrjv elatv doparoi, iroXXal he 
dvarrvods exovai Kal dva(f)varjaeLs , uiartep Knrdpa 
re Kal Acrvq Kal rd ev AloXov vtjotol^- at hr}^ Kal 
peovGt TToAAd/cts" TTorapLov hLKr]v, Kal pivhpovs dvap- 
pLTTrovat. hiaTTvpovs • evtat 8e vtto yrjv ovaai ttXtj- 
aiov TTTjyaLOJV vhdrcov OepfxaivovGi ravra, Kal rd 

25 fiev ;^Atapd rcov vapidrcov dvtdtrt, rd he V7Tept,eara, 
rd he eS e^ovra Kpaaetog. 
372 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

it differs from a rainbow in that the rainbow appears 
opposite the sun or moon, but the halo is in a circle 
round the whole of the star. A light is the kindling 
of a mass of fire in the air. Some lights shoot like 
javelins, others are set in one position in the sky. 
The shooting is a generation of fire by friction in the 
air ; the fire moves rapidly, giving the impression 
of length because of its rapidity. The latter, the 
stationary light, is extended and lengthy but keeps 
the same position, as if it were an elongated star ; if 
it spreads out towards one end it is called a comet. 
Often there is a variation in the duration of the light, 
some lasting a long time, some being extinguished 
at once. There are also many phenomena of different 
kinds to be seen, called torches and planks a,nd jars 
and pits, taking their names from their likeness to 
these objects. Some of these can be seen in the West 
and some in the East, and some in both ; they rarely 
appear in the North and South. All of them are 
unstable ; for none of them has ever been described 
as always visible in the same place. So much, then, 
for the things of the air. 

The earth contains in itself many sources, not only 
of water, but also of wind and fire. Some of these 
are subterranean and invisible, but many have vents 
and blow-holes, like Lipara and Etna and the vol- 
canoes in the Aeolian islands. These often flow like 
rivers and throw up fiery, red-hot lumps. Some of 
the subterranean sources, which are near springs of 
water, impart heat to these : some of the streams 
they make merely lukewarm, some boiling, and some 
moderately and pleasantly hot. 

^ at 8ri codd. Lor. : at 8e Bekk. 

373 



[ARISTOTLE] 

395 b 

O/Motco? Se Kal TCJbv TTvevfMoirojv ttoXXo. TToXXaxov 
yijs aroixia dvecvKraf wv ra [xev evOovaidv ttolcl 
rovs efiTTeXd^ovras , rd §e drpo(f)eiv, rd 8e XP""?" 
or/xajSeiv, warrep rd iv A€X(f)OLS Kal Ae^aSeta, rd 

30 Se Kal TTavraTTaaiV dvaipel, KadaTrep to eV Opu- 
yia. TToXXaKi^ 8e Kal avyyeves TTvevpua evKparov 
ev yfj TTape^ioadkv eiV nvx^ovs arjpayy as avrrjs, 
e^eSpov yevofxevov ck rwv OLKeicov tottcov, TToXXd 
fxeprj (TvveKpdSavev. TToXXaKLs Se ttoXv yevofxevov 
e^codev iyKaretX-^drj rots ravrrjs /cotAoj/xao-t /cat 

35 aTTOKXeicrdev i^oSov fxerd ^ias avrrjv avveriva^e, 
l^r^Tovv k^oSov eavTO), Kal aTrecpydaaro irddos 

396 a Tovro o KaXciv elwOafiev aeiafjcov. tcov 8e aetaixdjv 

ol pukv et? TrXdyia aeiovres Kar d^eias yojvias €7n- 
/cAiWat KaXovvrai, ol 8e dvco ptTTTovvres Kal Kdrio 
/car' opQds ycovtag ^pdarai, ol Se avvL^rjaei'S ttol- 
ovvres els rd KolXa It^rjjxariai}- ol 8e ■)(^dapLara dvoL- 
5 yovres /cat rr^v yrjv dvapprjyvvvres prJKrai KaXovvrai. 
TovTCov 8e ol ixev Kal TTvevfxa rrpoaava^aXXovcnv , 
ol 8e 7T€rpas, ol 8e ttt^Xov, ol 8e nrjyds (f>aLvovuL ra? 
TTporepov ovK ovaas. rives 8e dvarpeTTovai^ Kard 
/Ltiav TTpocoaiv, ovs KaXovaiv ojaras". ol 8e avrairo- 
rraXXovres* /cat rats et? CKarepov iyKXiaeai Kal 
10 dTTOTrdXaeat Stopdovvres del ro aeioixevov TraXfjuarlaL 
Xeyovrai, rpofio) Trddos dpioiov dTrepyal^ofievoL. yi- 
vovrai 8e /cat p,UKr)ral aetapioi, aeiovres rrjv yijv 
fxerd PpojjLov. TroAAa/ctj 8e /cat p^oj/ais' (reiafiov 
yiverai jx-UKr^fia yrjs, orav rd Trvev/xa aeUiv p.kv fj-rj 
avrapKes fj, iveiXov/xevov Se ev avrfj KOTTrrjrat jxerd 

^ iC-qi^arlai Z Lor. (cf. Johann. I^yd. De Ost, 54) : ;^to/iaTiat 
Stob. : xo^'M*'''''"* co<ld. cet. Bekk. 
374 



ON THE COSMOS, 4 

Similarly, too, there are in many places on the 
earth's surface open vents for the winds, which- have 
various effects on those who approach them, causing 
ecstatic inspiration, or wasting sickness, or in some 
cases prophecy, like those at Delphi and Lebadeia, 
or even complete destruction, like the one in Phrygia. 
Often, too, a moderate earth-born wind, forced into 
deep, hollow caves in the earth and becoming dis- 
lodged from its home, causes shocks in many places. 
Often when a large quantity from outside is confined 
within the hollows of the earth and cut off from exit, 
it shakes the earth violently, seeking an exit for 
itself, and produces the effect that we call an earth- 
quake. Earthquakes which shake the earth obliquely 
at a very acute angle we call horizontal ; those which 
blast upwards and downwards perpendicularly are 
called heaving earthquakes ; those which cause a 
settlement of the earth into hollows are called sinking 
earthquakes ; and those Avhich open up chasms and 
split the earth are called splitting earthquakes. Some 
of them stir up a wind, or rocks, or mud ; and some 
reveal springs that were not there before. Some, 
called thrusting earthquakes, overturn things with a 
single heave. Others cause recoil this way and that, 
and in the process of lurching to one side and re- 
bounding again the things that are shaken are held 
upright : these are called oscillating earthquakes, 
and their effect is a sort of trembling. There are also 
roaring earthquakes, which shake the earth with a 
great din. There is often, also, a roaring of the earth 
without an earthquake, when the wind is not sufficient 
to shake the earth but lashes about enveloped in the 



* avarpiiTOvai. Lor. : avarpeirovTes Bekk. 
avTaTTOTTokXovTis Lor. : avairaXXovTes Bekk. 



375 



[ARISTOTLE] 

396 a 

15 podiov ^ias. avaaa>fjiaT07T0L€iTaL §e ra elatovra 
TTvevjxara /cat vtto rcbv eV rfj yfj vypcov KCKpvfx- 
fxevcov. 

To, Se dvdXoyov avfiTTLTrrcL tovtols /cat iv 9a- 
Xdaarj' ^^dafiaTd re yap ytverai daXdaarjg /cat ava- 
XCopijp-OiTa TToXXdKLS /Cat KV[xdrcov eTrtSpo/xat, nore 

20 /X6V dvTavaKOTTTjv exovaat, TTore 8e Trpocoaiv jxovov, 
coanep laropelTai, rrepl 'EAt/ci^v re /cat Bou/aav. 
TToAAa/cts' 8e /cat dva<j>va'iqp.ara yiverai rrvpos iv rfj 
daXdaar) /cat Trrjyojv dvaf^Xvcretg /cat TTorafxcov e/c- 
^oXal /cat SevSpcuv €K(f)va€LS poai re /cat Stvat rat? 
Tcor 7TV€vp,dTa)v dvdXoyov, at juev eV p,iaoi9 rre- 

25 Aayeatv, at Se /cara tou? evpLTTovs re /cat TTopdfjLovs. 
TToAAat re dpLTTCoreLS Xeyovrai /cat Kvp^drajv dpaeis 
av/XTTepLoSeveLV del rfj aeX-qvrj /caret rtva? wpiafxe- 
vovs Kaipovs. 

'Q? 8e TO Trav etTretv, rail' aroL-^eiojv ey/ce/cpa- 
jxevcvv dXXtjXois iv dipt re /cat y^ /cat daXdcrarj 

30 /cara to et/co? at riov Tra^coi' ojJiOLorrjTis avviarav- 
rat, rots' /xev eTTt jxepov? (f)dopd^ /cat yeveaeig 
cf)€povaai, TO Se avpLirav avcoXedpov re /cat dyivrjrov 

(f)vXdTTOV(Tai . 

5. KaiTot ye' rt? idavpiaae ttw? Trore, et e/c rcov 
ivavTLiDv dpx^v avviarrjKev 6 Koajxos, Xiyoj Se 
35 ^nqpcbv re /cat vypcov, ipv^piov re Kai deppbchv, ov 
396 b TTCiAai SL€(f)dapTat /cat aTToAo^Aer, cu? /cai^ et tto- 
Atv rtve? davixdt,oi,ev, ottcos Sta/xeVet avvearrjKvla 
iK rdJv ivavTicordTiov^ idvcov, Treviqrcov Xiyco /cat 
TrXovaiojv , vicov yepovrcov, dadevcov laxypiov, ttovt)- 
pcbv ;^pi7ara)v. dyi^ooyot Se ort rovr^ rjv ttoXltl- 

^ cVavTtwTOTwi' codd. pier. Lor. : eVavrioji' codd. cet. Bekk. 
376 



ON THE COSMOS, 4-5 

earth with tumultuous force. The blasts of wind that 
enter the earth are recondensed also by the moisture 
that is hidden in the earth." 

There are also analogous happenings in the sea : 
chasms occur in the sea, and its waves often withdraw ; 
and there are incursions of waves, sometimes with 
a recoil, sometimes with a forward rush only, as they 
say was the case at Helice and Bura.** Often too 
there are exhalations of fire in the sea and eruptions 
of fountains, and rivers are shot forth, and trees groM', 
and there are currents and vortices like those of the 
winds, some in the middle of the oceans, some in the 
narrows and straits. There are many tides and tidal 
waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the 
moon at certain definite times. 

To sum up, since the elements are mingled one with 
another, it is natural that phenomena in the air and 
land and sea should show these similarities, which 
involve destruction and generation for the individual 
parts of nature, but preserve the whole free from 
corruption and generation. 

5. Some people, however, have wondered how the 
cosmos, if it is composed of the " opposite " principles 
(I mean dry and wet, cold and hot), has not long ago 
been destroyed and perished ; it is as if men should 
wonder how a city survives, composed as it is of the 
most opposite classes (I mean poor and rich, young 
and old, weak and strong, bad and good). They do not 
recognize that the most wonderful thing of all about 

" i.e., wind entering the earth may (a) cause an earth- 
quake, (6) cause a roar only, or (c) be recondensed and so 
cause neither. 

" Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 2 (384 c), i. 3. 10 (54 c), Aristot. Meteor. 
343 b 1, etc., on the destruction of these two cities in Achaia. 
The date was 373/2 b.c. 

377 



[ARISTOTLE] 

396 b 

5 KTJs ofjiovoias TO 6av[ji,aaLcoraTov, Xeyco Se t6^ e/c 
TToXXaJv jjiiav Kal ofxoiav i^ dvofjbOLCL>v aTToreXelv^ 
Stddeaiv, v7To8e)(oix€vrjv^ Traaav Kal (j)vaiv Kal rvxriv. 
'lacjs 8e Kal raJv evavricov r] (f)vats yXtxeraL Kal eK 
TOVTCOV aTToreXei to av[j,(f}(x)vov, ovk €k tcov ofxoLCov, 
(LuTTep dfJieXeL ro dppev avvr^yaye rrpos ro drjXv Kal 

10 ovx eKarepov irpos to 6ixo(j)vXov, Kal ttjv TrpwTTjv 
ojJiovoLav Bid Tcov ivavTicov arjvrji/jev , od Sid tojv 
ofjLoicov. eoiKC 8e Kal rj Tcxyrj ttjv (jivatv fUfxovfJLevrj 
TOVTO TTOielv. t,a>ypa(f)ia /xev ydp XevKwv re /cat 
fieXdvcov, wxpdjv re Kal epvdpcdv, ;^/3a>/xaTa>v iy- 
KepaaajjLevrj (f)va-€L^ ra? eiKovas rot? Trporjyov- 

15 [xevofs dneTeXeae avix(f)a)vovs, IjLovglktj 8e o^et? 
djjia Kal ^apels, [xaKpovg re Kal ^pax^ts (f)d6yyovs 
jjbL^acra iv hLa(j>6pois <j)covals filav dneTeXeaev dpfio- 
viav, ypajxpiaTLKT] he. e/c (fxxjvqevTCov Kal di^cjviov 
ypapLpidToyv Kpdaiv TTOLrjaafxevr] tyjv oXt^v Texvqv 
dir^ avTiov avveoTrjaaTO. TavTO Se tovto ■^v Kal 

20 TO TTapd TO) aKOTeivo) Xeyofxevov ' Hpa/cAeiVct) • 
" avvdi/jies oXa Kal ovx ^^'^> crvfi(f)€p6fJi€vov Stac^epo- 
jxevov, GvvaSov StaSov /cat e/c TrdvTOJv ev Kal e^ 
evo? TTavTa. ovtcos ovv Kal ttjv tcov oXiov av- 

GTaoLv, ovpavov Xeyco Kal yijs tov re avfjLnavTos 

25 KoapLov, 8ta TTJg tcov eVavrtcuTarcov Kpdaecus dpxcov 

^ TO . . . aTTOTeXelv Lor. : on . . . arroTeXel Bekk. 

^ vTroSeYOfjLevTjv Lor. : v7ro8e;^o/x€W Bekk. 

' sic Diels ( Vorsokr.^ 22 B 10) : v. Lor. ad loc. 

" The idea that art imitates nature occurs in Aristotle's 
Protrepticus (see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 74 f.), and in Phys. 
B 199 a 15, Meteor. 381 b 5, De Part. Anhn. 6.S9 b 15 flF. liut 
in Aristotle the point of comparison concerns teleology, not 
378 



ON THE COSMOS, 5 

the harmonious working of a city-community is this : 
that out of pluraHty and diversity it achieves a homo- 
geneous unity capable of admitting every variation 
of nature and degree. But perhaps nature actually 
has a liking for opposites ; perhaps it is from them 
that she creates harmony, and not from similar things, 
in just the same vv^ay as she has joined the male to 
the female, and not each of them to another of the 
same sex, thus making the first harmonious com- 
munity not of similar but of opposite things. It seems, 
too, that art does this, in imitation of nature " : for 
painting mixes its whites and blacks, its yellows and 
reds, to create images that are concordant with their 
originals ; music mixes high and low notes, and longs 
and shorts, and makes a single tune of different 
sounds ; by making a mixture of vowels and con- 
sonants, grammar composes out of them the whole of 
its art. This is precisely what Heracleitus the Dark *" 
meant when he said " Junctions are wholes and not- 
wholes, concord and discord, consonance and disso- 
nance. One out of All ; All out of One." So in the 
same way the complex of the Universe, I mean heaven 
and earth and the whole cosmos, by means of the 
mixture of the most opposite elements has been 

the harmony of opposites. The four colours mentioned by 
Pseudo- Aristotle are the colours of the restricted palette used 
by the Four Colour Painters, of whom the earliest recorded 
is Polygnotus and the latest Action in the age of Alexander 
the Great. Cf. Pliny, N.ll. xxxv. 50, and A. Rumpf, J 11^ 
Ixvii (1947), p. 16. It has been suggested that Empedocles' 
comparison of painting and creation (Diels, For.voAr." 31 
B 23) was inspired by Four Colour Painting. 

"" It is not likely that the author read Heracleitus in the 
original, or that the whole context is to be attached too 
closely to Heracleitus. Maguire {pp. cit, pp. 134 if.) finds the 
closest parallels to this passage in the Neo-Pythagoreans. 

379 



[ARISTOTLE] 

396 b 

jLtta SteKoafjirjaev dpfxovla- ^rjpov yap vypw, depfxov 

8e i/jvxp<^, ^ap€L re Kov(f)ov pitydv, kol opdov rrepL- 
<f)epel, yrjv re rrdaav Kai daXaaaav atdepa re /cat 
tJXiov i<al aeXT^VTjv Kal rov oXov ovpavov hieKoapirjae 
fxia 7] hid Trdvrwv Si-^KOvaa Svvapus, e/c rdJv djXiK- 

30 rcov Kal erepoicvv, aepos re /cat y^s" /cat TTvpo? Kal 
vSaros, rov ovfJiTTavra KoapLov S'qpnovpyqaaaa Kal 
pud hiaXa^ovaa a^aipas eTTK^aveia rds re evavricxi- 
rdras ev avrcp <f)vaeLs dAAi^Aats" avay/caaaaa op^o- 
Xoyrjuai Kal e/c rovra>v pir))(^avr]aapi€vrj ra> iravrl 
acx)r7]piav . alria he ravrrjs p^ev rj rcov aroi-)(^eia)v 

35 opLoXoyia, rrjs he opboXoyiag rj laop^oipia /cat to 

397 a /ATySev avrcbv rrXeov erepov erepov hvvaadaf rrjv 

yap "(jTjv avriaraoLV e^ei rd ^apea rrpds rd Kov<j)a 
/cat TO. Oeppid irpos ddrepa^ rrjs (f)va€COS cttI rwv 
/xet^dvcuv hihaaKovarjs on ro taov aioariKov rrcjs 
eariv o/xovota?, 17 he opiovoLa rov navrcov yeverijpos 
5 /cat TTepiKaXXeardrov Koapiov. ris ydp dv etrj (f)vaLS 
rovhe Kpecrrcov; rjv ydp dv ecTrrj^ ris, piepos earlv 
avrov. ro re KaXov rrdv eTToyvvpiov iorrc rovrov Kal 
ro reraypievov, drro rov Koapiov Xeyopievov KeKo- 
crpirjadaL. ri^ he rcov IttI pbepovs hvvatr^ dv i^iaco- 
drjvai. rfj Kar' ovpavov rd^ei re Kal (f)opd rwv 
10 darpcov -qXiov re Kal aeXrjvr]^, Ktvovpuevcov ev a/cpt- 
^eardroig pierpois e^ alcovos els erepov alcova; rig 
he yevoir' dv d^evheia rotdhe, rjvriva (f)vXdrrovaiv 
at KaXal Kal yovipcoL rcov oXojv copai, deprj re Kal 
)(eLpL<x)vag eirayovaai reraypievajg rjpiepag re /cat 

^ Odrepa ETZ Lor. : to. Odrepa codd. cet. Bekk. 
380 



ON THE COSMOS, 5 

organized by a single harmony : dry mixed with 
wet, hot with cold, light with heavy, straight with 
curved- — the whole of earth and sea, the aether, the 
sun, the moon and the whole heaven have been set 
in order by the single power which interpenetrates 
all things : from things unmixed and diverse, air and 
earth and fire and water, it has fashioned the whole 
cosmos and embraced it all in the surface of a single 
sphere, forcing the most opposite elements in the 
cosmos to come to terms, and from them achieving 
preservation for the whole. The cause of its pre- 
servation is the agreement of the elements, and the 
cause of the agreement is the principle of equal shares 
and the fact that no one of them has more power than 
each of the others : for the heavy is in equipoise with 
the light, and the hot with its opposite. In these 
greater matters nature teaches us that equality is the 
preserver of concord, and concord is the preserver of 
the cosmos, which is the parent of all things and the 
most beautiful of all. For what being could be better 
than this ? Anything that might be suggested is a 
part of it. And everything that is beautiful takes its 
name from this, and all that is well-arranged ; for 
it is called " well-ordered " (K€Koo-/x7yrr(^ai) after this 
" universal order " (^Koirfjios:). What particular detail 
could be compared to the arrangement of the heavens 
and the movement of the stars and the sun and moon, 
moving as they do from one age to another in the 
most accurate measures of time ? What constancy 
could rival that nnaintained by the hours and seasons, 
the beautiful creators of all things, that bring summers 
and winters in due order, and days and nights to make 



eiTTTj EP Lor. : etnoi codd. cet. Bekk, 
^ tC Lor. : Ti's Bekk. 



381 



[ARISTOTLE] 

397 a 

vvKras et? yut^vos o-TroreAeCT/xa kol iviavrov; /cat 

15 jXTjV fJieyeOei /xev ovtos^ TTavvTrepraros, Kivqaet Se 
o^vraros, XafXTrporrjTi, 8e evavyeaTaro'S , Swa^et Se 
ayi^pajs re kol a^dapro's. ovros ivaXtcov t^wojv 
Koi Tret,wv kol aepicov (f)vaeis ex(ji)pioe koL ^iovs 
ep-eTpiqae rals iavrov Kcvrjaeaiv. €k rovrov mavra 
e/jLTTvel re Kal tp'^XW '-'o'X^'' '^^ C^^ct- tovtov kul at 

20 TTapdSo^oL veoxp-coaets Terayfievcog dTToreXovvrai, 
avvaparrovTCov fiev avejxcov TravroLOiv, TnTnovrojv 
he e^ ovpavov Kepavvcov, prjyvvpievcov he xetficovcov 
e^aioiojv. hid he tovtojv to vorepov eKTVLet^oyievov 
TO re TTvpcohes StaTrveo/xevov els ojudvotav d'yet to 
Trdv Kal Kadi(TT7]GLV. 7] re yrj (f)VToXs Kop,cx)aa rravTo- 

25 SaTTots" vdfMaai. re 7Tepi,^Xvll,ovaa Kal Treptoxovfxevrj 
l^cpois, Kara Kaipdv eKcjtvovad re rrdvra kol rpe- 
(f>ovaa Kal hexop^evq, fivplas re (f)epovaa Iheas Kal 
Trddr], rrjv dyiqpco (f)vaLV o/xoto*? rrjpel, KairoL Kal 
aetapiolg rivacraopievr) Kal irXiqjxvpLaLV imKXvl^oiJLevr] 

30 TTvpKa'Cats re Kara /xepos (f)Xoyit^op,ev7]. Tavra he 
rrdvra eoiKev avrfj Trpos dyadov yivopueva rrjv 8t' 
atdjvos aa)T7]piav Trapex^iv creto/jievrjg re yap 8t- 
e^drrovGLV at rcbv TTvevpbdroiV TTapeiXTTTwaetg Kara 
rd p-qy/jiara rag dvarrvods taxovaai, Kadcos dvco 
XeXeKrai, KaOaipofjievrj re djx^poi? dnoKXv^erat, 

35 rrdvra rd voacohr], TreptTTveofxevq he avpais rd re 

utt' avrrjv Kal rd vrrep avrrjv elXiKpivelrai. Kal 

897 b nr]v at (f)X6yes jxev rd Trayerojhes rjiriatvovatv ,' at 

TrdyoL he rds (f>X6yas dvidcnv. Kal rcbv irrl jxepovs 

rd [xev yiverai, rd he d/c/xct^et, rd he (f)deiperaL. 

^ ovTos Ivor. : 6 avros Bekk. 
* riiTiaLvovai{v) BCFG Lor. : TrtaiVoufft;' codd. cet. Bekk. 

382 



ON THE COSMOS, 5 

up the number of a month or a year ? In size too the 
cosmos is mightiest, in motion swiftest, in brightness 
most briUiant, in power never-aging and indestruc- 
tible. It is this that has given a different nature to 
the creatures of the sea, the land and the air, and 
measured their lives in terms of its own movements. 
From this all creatures breathe and take their life. 
Of this even the unexpected changes are accom- 
plished in due order — the winds of all kinds that dash 
together, thunderbolts falling from the heavens, and 
storms that violently burst out. Through these the 
moisture is squeezed out and the fire is dispersed by 
currents of air ; in this way the whole is brought into 
harmony and so established. The earth, too, that 
is crowned with plants of every kind and bubbles with 
springs and teems with living creatures everywhere, 
that brings forth everything in season and nurtures 
it and receives it back again, that produces a myriad 
shapes and conditions — this earth still keeps its never- 
aging nature unchanged, though it is racked by 
earthquakes, swamped by floods, and burnt in part by 
fires. All these things, it seems, happen for the good 
of the earth and give it preservation from age to age : 
for when it is shaken by an earthquake, there is an 
upsurge of the winds transfused within it, which find 
vent-holes through the chasms, as I have already 
said * ; when it is washed by rain it is cleansed of all 
noxious things ; and when the breezes blow round 
about it the things below and above it are purified. 
Furthermore the fires soften things that are frozen, 
and frost abates the force of the fires. And of the 
particular things on the earth some come into being 
while some are in their prime and others are perishing : 

• 395 b 26. 

383 



[ARISTOTLE] 

397 b 

Kal at fiev yevecreis enavaareXXovai ra? (f}9opds, 
5 at 8e (f)dopal Kov^il,ovaL ra? yeveaeis. /xta he €K 
TTOLVTCDV 7T€pai.vofjL€vr] acoTTjpLa Sto, reXovs dvTLTrepL- 
larapievajv aAAr^Aot? Kal rore fxev Kparovvrojv, rore 
8e Kparovpbevcov, (^uAarret to avfJLTrav dcf)dapTov 8t' 
atajvos. 

6. AoLTTov 8e 81^ TTepl rrjs rcbv oXcov avveKTiK-i^s 

10 atTta? K€(f)aXaio)Scos elTrelv, ov rponov /cat 77ept tcop' 
aAAcov TrAT^jU./xeAes' yap vrepi KoayLov Xeyovrag, el 
Kal pLTj 8t' a/cpt^eia?, aAA' ouv ye c5? et? rviriLhrj 
fxadrjaiv, to tov Koajxov KvpicoTaTov TTapaXiTrelv. 
dp^o-los ixev ovv rt? Adyo? Kal TraTpios eart rrdaLV 
dvdpa)Trots cos ck deov rrdvTa Kal 8ta deov rjfjuv 

15 avveaTTjKev, ovhepula he ^vais avrrj KaO^ iavTijv 
eoTtv avTdpKrjs , ipr^/jicoOeLaa Trjs eK tovtov goj- 
Trjplas. 8to Kat tcDv TraXaccov etTretv Tives TTporj)(d'r]- 
aav OTL irdvTa Tavrd eoTi dewv rrXea ra /cat 8t' 
o(f)daXfjia>v IvhaXXofieva rjpXv kol hC dKorjs Kal 
Trdarjs alad-^aecos , ttj jxev deia hwajxei TTpenovTa 

20 /carajSaAAdjLtevot Adyov, ov pcrjv ttj ye ovaia. aoiTr^p 
jLtev yap ovTtxjg aTravrwv ecrrt /cat yeveTwp tcov 
OTTCoah'qTTOTe /cara Tovhe tov Koa/xov GvvTeXov- 
fjievcov 6 deog, ov /xrjv avTovpyov kol einTTovov 
t,(x)OV KdjxaTov VTTopbevcov, dXXd hwdpcet xP^f^^^og 
dTpvTcx), hi Tjs Kal Tcov TToppco hoKovvTa>v etvai 

25 Trepiy tVerat . Trjv fiev ovv dvwTaTO} Kal TrpwTrjv 
ehpav avTog eXa^^-V, vrraTog re 8ta tovto <1)v6- 
juaarat, [/catj^ /cara tov ttoltjttjv " aKporaTr) ko- 

1 Kox oin. BCG Lor. 
884 



ON THE COSMOS, 5-6 

and generation is set in the balance against destruc- 
tion, and destruction lightens the weight of genera- 
tion. There is one single principle of preservation, 
maintained without interruption among all these 
things that interchange with one another, ascending 
to power and declining in turn, and this keeps the 
whole system safe, eternally indestructible. 

6. It remains now to discuss summarily, as the rest 
has been discussed, the cause that holds the world 
together ; for in describing the cosmos, if not in 
detail, at least sufficiently to convey an outline, it 
would be wrong for us to omit altogether that which 
is supreme in the cosmos. It is indeed an ancient 
idea, traditional among all mankind, that all things 
are from God and are constituted for us by God, and 
nothing is self-sufficient if deprived of his preserving 
influence. So some of the ancients were led to say 
that all the things of this world are full of gods," all 
that are presented to us through our eyes and hearing 
and all the senses ; but in saying this they used terms 
suitable to the power of God but not to his essence. 
For God is indeed the preserver of all things and the 
creator of everything in this cosmos however it is 
brought to fruition ; but he does not take upon him- 
self the toil of a creature that works and labours for 
itself,* but uses an indefatigable power, by means 
of which he controls even things that seem a great 
way off. God has his home in the highest and first 
place, and is called Supreme for this reason, since 
according to the poet " it is on " the loftiest crest " 

" Cf. the saying attributed to Thales (Diels, IW.vo/tr.* 
11 A 22 = Aristot. De Anima 411 a 7). 

'' The avTovpyos {cf. 398 a 5, b 4) is the man who works his 
own land without a slave, e.g. Electra's husband in Euripides' 
Electro. « Horn. II. i. 499. 

o 385 



[ARISTOTLE] 

397 b 

pv(f)fj " Tov avfjLTTavros eyKadihpv^lvos ovpavov' 

jxdXiara Se tto)? avTov rrjg Swdfjiecos (XTToXavcL ro 
ttXtjolov avTov acojjia, Kal eVetra ro /xer' €K€lvo, 

30 Kal i(f)e^rjs ovrcos cL^pi tojv Kad^ rjfj.ds tottojv. Sio 
yij re Kal rd €77t yrjs eoLKev, iv diroardaeL TrXelarr) 
rrjs e/c deov ovra oi^eAeta?, dadevrj Kal aKardXXrjXa 
elvai Kal TToXXrjg fxcarrd rapax^^S' ov p,rjv dXXd 
[/cat]' Kad^ OGOV errl rrdv SuKveiadai 7T€(f}VK€ ro 
delov, Kal rd Kad^ rjjjidg ojxoiays avpL^aivei rd re 

35 VTTep rapids, Kara ro eyyiov re Kal TToppcorepco deov 

398 a elvai pcaXXov re Kal rjrrov (h^eXeias p-eraXapL^d- 

vovra. Kpelrrov ovv vrroXa^elv, o Kal vpeTTov earl 
Kal deep pidXiara appb6t,ov, (hs rj ev ovpavo) hvvapn^ 
ISpvpievrj Kal roZs irXeZarov d(f)ear'r]K6aiv, cos evi 
ye eiTrelv, Kal avpLTraaiv alria yiverai aa>rrjpias, 
5 pbdXXov rj CO? Si'qKovcra Kal (f>OLra><ya evda pL-q KaXov 
pLrjhk eva^ripiov avrovpyeZ rd errl yrjs. rovro p.ev 
ydp ovhe avdpiOTTCOV rjyepLOCTLV appuorrei, Travrl Kal 
rd) rvxdvTL e^iaraodai epycp, otov ar par ids dp^ovrL 
^ TToAeco? r) o'lkov, [/cai]^ el XP^^^ arpcopiaro- 
heapiov etrj Srjaai, Kal et ri (fyavXorepov aTToreXeZv 
10 epyov, o^ Kav ro rvxdv dvSpaTToSov TTOLrjaeiev , dXX 
olov eirl rov pieydXov ^aaiXecos laropeZr at. rd 
(ydpy KapL^vaov^ Zep^ov re Kal Aapelov npo- 

1 KoX om. CGZ Lor. 

* Koi del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 

* o . . . Kaft^vaov sic I.or. : o enl tov fxtyaXov ^aaiXecos ovk 
av TO Tvvov dvbpd'TToSov noi'qaftef dXX' olov loTopeiTO Ka/x^vaou 
ktX. hek\i. : v. I. or. ad loc. 

386 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

of the whole heaven that he dwells : his power is 
experienced most of all by the body that is closest to 
him, less by the next, and so on down to the regions 
inhabited by us. So earth and the things that are on 
earth, being at the farthest remove from the help of 
God, seem to be feeble and discordant and full of 
confusion and diversity ; but nevertheless, in that 
it is the nature of the Divine to penetrate to every- 
thing, even the things around us occur in the same 
way as the things above us, each having a greater 
or smaller share of God's help in proportion to its 
distance from him. So it is better to suppose, what 
is also fitting and most appropriate to God, that the 
power which is based on the heavens is also the cause 
of preservation in the most remote things, as we 
may say, and indeed in everything, rather than that 
of itself it carries out its tasks on earth by penetrating 
and being present where it is not honourable or 
fitting that it should." For it is not fitting even among 
men for princes to superintend each and every action 
that may have to be done — for example, the com- 
mander of an army or leader of a city or head of a 
household, if it were necessary to pack up bedding or 
perform some other menial task which could be done 
by any slave — but rather it is fitting that they should 
act in the manner which was adopted, according to 
the records, under the Great King.'' The pomp of 
Cambyses and Xerxes and Darius was ordered on a 

" The " power " has here become identified with god ; 
this is literally inconsistent with 397 b 19 above. 

* Pseudo-Aristotle describes the King of Persia in his 
glory in the 6th/5th century b.c. He accords well with 
Herodotus's (i. 98) account of Deioces' palace and regime at 
Ecbatana. This is a description of a fabulous past such as 
Aristotle would hardly have given. 

S87 



[ARISTOTLE] 

398 a 

a^rjixa els oefjivoTrjTos Kal vrrepoxrjg vipos fieya- 
XoTTpevcbs 8L€K€K6a[jirjro- avros fi€V yo-p, co? Xoyos, 
Ihpvro iv SovCTot? rj 'E/c/Saravots', Travrl doparos, 

15 davpuaoTOV eTre^oiv ^aatXeiov olkov Kal Trepi^oXov 
XpvGcp Kal TjXeKrpcp Kal eXecfyavn aarpairrovra' 
TrvXa>v€s Se TroAAot Kal uvvex^iS rrpodvpa. re gvxvols 
elpyop^eva (rraStotS' a^r' dXXijXwv 6vpat,g re p^aA/cat? 
Kal r€L)(€aL p^eyaXots (Jix^pcoro- e^o) he tovtojv 
dvbpes ol TTpcoroi Kal hoKLpicoraroi, SieKeKoapi'qvTO, 

20 ol piev dpicf)^ avTOV rov jSacriAea hopvcjiOpoL re Kal 
depaTTovres, ol he eKaarov irepi^oXov (f)vXaKes, 
TTvXojpol re Kal chraKovaraL Xeyop,evoL, chs dv o 
^aatXevg avros, SeoTTorrjs Kal deos ovopLa^opLevos, 
TTavra puev ^Xerrot, rravra he d/couoi. ;\;6t»pts' he 
rovrwv dXXoi KaOeiarrJKeaav rrpoaohiov rapiiai Kai 

25 arparrjyol 7ToXep,ojv Kal Kvvrjyeaicov hiLpiov re 
drroheKrripes rdjv re Xolttcjv epycov eKaaroi Kara 
ra? xpeias empieX-qraL rrjv he ovpiTTaaav dpx'rjv rrjg 
^AalaSy TreparovpLevqv 'EAAt^ctttovto) piev eK rd>v 
TTpos eanepav piepdJv, 'IvSoi he eK rdJv rrpos ea>, 
hLeiXij(f>e(jav Kard edvrj arpar'qyoi /cat aarpairai 

30 Kal jSao-tAets", hovXoi rov pceyaXov ^amXeojs, 'qp.e- 
pohpopiOL re Kal okottoI Kal dyyeXia(f>6poL (l>pvK- 
rojpta>v^ re erroTTrrjpes . roaovros he rjv 6 Koap-og, 
Kal pLaXiara rcov (f)pvKrojpiO}v,^ Kara htahoxds 
TTvpaevovrwv dXXr]Xois^ eK Trepdrojv rrjs dpx^S 
piexpi- luovcrojv Kal ^KK^ardvojv, ware rov ^aai- 

35 Xea yivoiOKeiv avdrjpLepov navra ra ev rij Aaia 

398 h KaivovpyovpLeva. vopnareov hrj rrjv rov p.eya- 

Xov ^aaiXeoJS inrepox^v rrpos rrjv rov rov Koap-ov 

^ <l>pvKT(t)piwv . . . <f>pvKTit)pla>v scripsi : ^pvKJwpicJv . . . 
(f>pvKTcopiu)v Bekk. 
388 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

grand scale and touched the heights of majesty and 
magnificence : the King himself, they say, lived in 
Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, in a marvellous 
palace with a surrounding wall flashing with gold, 
electrum and ivory ; it had a succession of many gate- 
towers, and the gateways, separated by many stades 
from one another, were fortified with brazen doors 
and high walls ; outside these the leaders and most 
eminent men were drawn up in order, some as per- 
sonal bodyguards and attendants to the King himself, 
some as guardians of each outer wall, called Guards 
and the Listening- Watch, so that the King himself, 
who had the name of Master and God, might see 
everything and hear everything. Apart from these 
there were others appointed as revenue officials, 
leaders in war and in the hunt, receivers of gifts to 
the King, and others, each responsible for administer- 
ing a particular task, as they were necessary. The 
whole Empire of Asia, bounded by the Hellespont in 
the West and the Indus in the East, was divided into 
nations under generals and satraps and kings, slaves 
of the Great King, with couriers and scouts and 
messengers and signals-officers. And such was the 
orderly arrangement of this, and particularly of the 
system of signal-beacons which were ready to burn 
in succession from the uttermost limits of the Empire 
to Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same 
day all that was news in Asia. Now we must suppose 
that the majesty of the Great King falls short of the 
majesty of the god who rules the cosmos by as much 

* nvpafvovTCDv oAAijAots Lor. : nvpoeiMvowv oAAijAais Bekk. 

389 



[ARISTOTLE] 

398 b 

€TT€xovTos deov TooovTov Karaheeoripav oaov rrjs 

€K€LVov rrjv Tov (fyavXordrov re /cat aaOevcard- 

rov t,d>ov, ujare, e'lTrep dae[jLvov rjv avrov avrw 

5 SoKCLV acp^rjv avTovpyelv diravTa koL eTTiTeXelv d 

^ovXono /cat ecfuardjxevov Stot/cetv, 77oAu /xaAAov 

aTTpenes dv elrj dew. aepLvorepov Se /cat TTpe- 

TTdyhecTTepov avrdv f^ev eVt rrjs dvcordTO) )(a)pag 

ihpvadai, TTjv 8e hvvapnv Std rov avfiTravrog k6- 

a/xov Si'qKovaav tJXlov re Kivelv /cat cr€X'qv7]v /cat rov 

10 TTavra ovpavov Trepidyeiv atriov re yiveadai rols 
em rijs yrjs Gcxjrrjpia's . ovhev yap e7nre-)(yrjaea)s 
avrco Set /cat VTT7]peaias rijg Trap' erepojv, waTTep 
rots nap* r^plv dpxovoL rrjs TToXvx^ipta^ Sta rrjv 
dadeveiav, dXXd rovro rjv ro deiorarov, ro fierd 
paarcovqs /cat drrXi^s KLvqaecos TravroSaTrds drro- 

15 TeAetv Iheas, coairep dfieXet Bpajaiv ol fxrixfivoTTOLoi,^ 
Sta /xias" opydvov axo.arrjpia's ttoAAo.? /cat TTOi/ctAa? 
evepyeias drroreXovvres . ofxoioj? Be /cat ol vevpo- 
GTTaarai pn,av /JLTjpcvdov eTnairaadpievoi ttolovgi /cat 
av;^eVa KiveZadai /cat p^etpa rov t,a)ov /cat cofxov /cat 
o(f>daXpi6v, earL Be ore rrdvra rd p-ep-q, fxerd rivos 

20 evpvdfjLLas. ovrcog ovv /cat r] dela (f>vais diro rivos 

^ fj/qyavo-iToiot. 7i Lor. {Notes) : urjxavoTixvai. Lor. {De 
Mundo) : /xeyoAdrexvot codd. pier. Bekk. 

" It is not clear what kind of machine is meant ; the 
390 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

as the difference between the King and the poorest 
and weakest creature in the world, so that if it was 
beneath the dignity of Xerxes to appear himself 
to be the actual executor of all things, to carry out 
his wishes himself and to administer the Empire by 
personal supervision, it would be still more unbe- 
coming for God. It is more noble, more becoming, 
for him to reside in the highest place, while his power, 
penetrating the whole of the cosmos, moves the sun 
and moon and turns the whole of the heavens and is 
the cause of preservation for the things upon the 
earth. He has no need of the contrivance and support 
of others, as rulers among us men need a multitude 
of workers because of their weakness ; the most 
divine thing of all is to produce all kinds of result 
easily by means of a single motion, just like the 
operators of machines, who produce many varied 
activities by means of the machine's single release- 
mechanism." In the same way too the men who run 
puppet-shows,^ by pulling a single string, make the 
creature's neck move, and his hand and shoulder and 
eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according 
to a rhythmical pattern. So also the divine being, 

" varied activities " probably refer to the various parts of 
the machine, and do not imply multi-purpose machines. 
Mechanopoios is most frequently used of military engineers. 
Schasteria is used of the release mechanism of catapults and 
ballistae. It is also used of the release-mechanism of auto- 
matic machines (such as Hero's machine for providing holy 
water) ; but in conjunction with mechanopoios and organon 
a reference to catapults, etc., seems more likely. 

* Plato twice refers to puppets in the Laws (644 d, 804 b) 
as well as in the shadow-theatre of the Republic (514) ; in the 
Laws the puppets are worked by wires. Aristotle uses the 
example of puppets to illustrate a scientific theory in De Gen. 
An. 734 b 10 ff. 



[ARISTOTLE] 

398 b 

ctTrA'^S" KLViqaeois rod TTpcurov rrjv SwajUii^ et? to. 

avvexyj SiSojcrt /cat oltt^ eKeivcov TrdXiv els ra TTop- 
poirepoi, fjbexpi'S oiv Sea rod Travro? 8ie^eX9rj- ki- 
vrjdev yap erepov v(J)' irepov /cat avro ttciXlv e/civr^crev 
d'AAo avv Koajxcp, Spcovrcov fxev iravrajv oLKeiiD? rals 

25 a(f)€Tepais KaTaoKevaZs, ov Tr]s avrfjs 8e o8ou Trdaiv 
ovarjs, dXXa Scat^opov /cat irepoias, eari 8e ot? /cat 
evavrias, Kairoi rrjs Trpcorrjg olov ivhocreojg els 
KtvqcTLv puds^ yevofxevrjs' oiOTcep d.v e'i tls ef aiTTovs^ 
opLOV piifjete acf)aLpav /cat kv^ov /cat kcovov /cat kv- 
XivSpov — e/cacTTOV yap avrcov Kara ro t'Stov klvt]- 

30 driaerat a)(i)ixa — ^ el rts ofiov l^coov evvhpov re /cat 
X^pcralov /cat irrrjvov ev rocs koXttols excov eK^dXof 
hrjiXov yap on ro [xev vrjKrov aAo/itevov els rr^v 
eavrov hiairav eKvrj^erai, ro he X'^paalov els rd 
a<f>erepa TJdrj /cat vofiovs hie^epTTvaei, ro he depiov 
e^apdev e/c yij? p.erdpaiov olx'rjoerai Treropievov, 

35 piids rrjs TTpcorrjs alrlas Trdaiv dvohovarjs rrjv 

399 a oi/ceiav evp-apetav. ovrojs ^x^c Kal errl Koapiov 

Sta yap dTrXrjs rod (jvpLiravros ovpavov TrepiaycDyrjs 
rjp^epa /cat vvKrl Treparovp^evris dXXolat rrdvrcov 8t- 
e^ohoL yivovrai, Kairoi vrrd pads a(f>alpas nepiexo- 
/xevcov, rcx)v piev ddrrov, rcbv he axoXaiorepov 
5 Kivovpievcov TTapd re rd ru)v hiaarrjp,drojv pLi^Kr) 
Kal rds Ihias eKdcrrcov KaraoKevds. aeX'qvT] piev 
yap ev pbrjvi rov eavrrjs hiarrepaLverai kvkXov av^o- 
pL€V7] re Kal pLeiovpuevrj Kal <j>divovaa, tJXios he ev 
392 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

with a single movement of the nearest element dis- 
tributes his power to the next part and then to the 
more remote parts until it permeates the whole. One 
thing is moved by another, and itself then moves 
a third in regular order, all things acting in the manner 
appropriate to their own constitution ; for the way 
is not the same for all things, but different and 
various, in some cases quite opposite, though the 
key of the whole movement, as it were, is set by a 
single opening note. For instance, a similar effect 
would be produced if one threw from a height a 
sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder, all together : 
each of them will move in the manner appropriate 
to its own shape ; or if one held in the folds of one's 
cloak an aquatic animal, a land animal and a winged 
animal, and then threw them out all together ; clearly 
the animal that swims will leap into its own habitat 
and swim away, the land animal will crawl off to its 
own customary pursuits and pastures, and the winged 
creature will rise from the ground and fly away high 
in the air ; a single cause has restored to all of them 
the freedom to move, each in the manner of its 
species. So too in the case of the cosmos : by means 
of a single revolution of the whole heaven completed 
in a night and a day, the various motions of all the 
heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are 
embraced in one sphere, some move rapidly and 
others more slowly, according to their distances and 
their individual characters. For the moon completes 
its orbit in a month, waxing and waning and dis- 
appearing ; the sun and those which have an equal 

^ fiids Lor. : fiiav codd. Bekk. 

' atirovs scripsi : ayyovs codd. Lor. Bekk. : opovs L : 'per 
proclive Ap. 



[ARISTOTLE] 

399 a 

ivLavTip /cat ol tovtov laoSpojjiOL, o re ^wacfiopog 
Kal 6 'E/3/XOU Xey6fJL€vos, 6 8e HvpoeLs iv hmXaaiovL 
10 Tovrojv XP^^V' ^ ^^ Aids' iv i^aTrXaaiovi tovtov, 
Kal TeXevTOios 6 K.p6vov Xeyofjievos iv hnrXaaiovL 
KoX rjp^iaet tov vTroKaTco. /xta Se iK ttolvtcov ap- 
jxovia avvahovTCOv kol ^(opevovTOiv Kara tov ovpavov 
i^ ivos re yivcTai kol els iv aTToXr^yei, Koafiov 
iTVfiojs TO avpiTrav aAA' ovk aKoapiiav ovofiaaaaa. 

15 Kaddrrep 8e iv X^PV Kopv<j>aiov KaTap^avTos 
avveTTTjX'el rrds o ;^op6s' avSptDv, ead^ otc Kal yv- 
vaiKcx)v, iv Sia^dpois' (ficovals o^VTepais Kal ^apv- 
Tepat-s jLttav dppLoviav ipLpLeXyj KcpavvvvTCOv, ovtojs 
€^€1 Kal irrl tov to avfiTvav SUttovtos deov- /caro. 
yap TO dvcoOev ivSocripLov vtto tov (f>€ptovv[jicos dv 

20 Kopv(/)a(ov TTpoaayopevdivTos KiveiTai puev Ta doTpa 
del Kal 6 CTU/xrras" ovpavos, TTopeveTai he Sitto.? 
TTopetas 6 7Taix<f)ar)s tJXlos, ttj piiv rjfMepav Kal 
vvKTa hiopitjCJV dvaToXfj Kal hvaei, ttj Se ras" recr- 
aapas ajpas dyu)v tov eTovs, Trpoacj re ^opeio's Kal 
* OTTiaoj voTios hie^epTTOJV. yivovTai he veTol Kara 

25 Kaipov Kal dvepLOL Kal hpoaoi Ta re nddrj Ta ev tw 
rrepiexovTi avpL^aivovTa hid ttjv npiOTr^v Kal ap^i- 
yovov^ atTiav. enovTai he tovtols TTOTa/xaJv eKpoai, 
daXdaarjg dvoih-qcreis , hevhpcov iK(f)vaeis, Kapnajv 
TTeTTavaeig, yoval t,it)a)v, iKTpo(f)ai re Trai/Ttov /cai 
d/c/Ltai Kal (fydiaeis, avfi^aXXop^evrjg TTpds Taxha Kal 

30 TT]? e/cctcTTOu KaTaaKevrjs, (hg €(f)7]v. OTav ovv o 
ndvTWV r^yepuLv re /cat yeveTOjp, dopaTog cov aXXw 

^ apxfyovov Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor. : dpxaioyovov 
codd. Bekk. 

394 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

course with it, namely Phosphorus (Venus) and Her- 
mes (Mercury), complete their course in a year, 
Pyroeis (Mars) in twice this time, Zeus (Jupiter) in 
twelve years, and lastly the star called after Cronus 
(Saturn) in two and a half times the period of the 
one below it.** The single harmony that is produced 
by all these as they sing and dance in concert round 
the heavens has one and the same beginning and 
one and the same end, in a true sense giving to 
the whole the name of " order " (/co<r/ios) and not 
disorder " (^fi.KO(r/j.ia). Just as in a chorus at the 
direction of the leader all the chorus of men, some- 
times of women too, join in singing together, creating 
a single pleasing harmony with their varied mixture 
of high and low notes, so also in the case of the god 
who controls the universe : the note is sounded from 
on high by him who might well be called the chorus- 
master ; then the stars and the whole heavens move 
continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double 
journey, dividing night from day by his rising and 
setting, and bringing the four seasons of the year 
as he moves forwards to the North and back to the 
South. There are rains in due season, and winds, 
and falls of dew, and all the phenomena that occur 
in the atsriosphere — all are the results of the first, 
original cause. These are followed by the springing 
up of rivers, the swelling of the sea, the growth of 
trees, the ripening of fruit, the birth of animals, the 
nurture, the prime and the decay of all things ; and 
the individual constitution of each thing contributes 
to the process, as I have said. So when the leader 
and author of all things, unseen except to the eye of 

" i.e. thirty years. These periods correspond to those of 
Eudoxus (ap. Simplic. In de Caelo 495. 26 ff.). 

395 



[ARISTOTLE] 

399 a 

ttXtjv XoyLGfjicp, arjiJLT^vrj Trdarj (jyvaei /xerafu ovpavov 

re Kal yfjs (fiepoiMevrj, Kivelrai rrdaa eV8eAe;^a;s" iv 
kvkXols Kal nepacTLV ISlocs, rrore fx,€v d(f)avLt,oix4vri, 

35 TTore 8e ^atvo/xevi^, pivpias tSea? dva^aivovcrd re 
Kal ndXiv dTTOKpvTTTovGa CK pads dp)(7J^. eoiKe 
399 b 8e Kopuhfj TO SpwpLevov tols cv iroXipbov Kaipol'S 
juaAiCTTa yivopbivois, eTrethdv r] adXiTLy^ arjpL-qvr) ru) 
arparoTTehcp- rore yap rrjg cfyojvrjg cKaaros aKov- 
cras" o /xev daTTiSa dvaLpelrai, 6 Se OcopaKa evSverat., 
5 o 8e KvrjpuSas rj Kpdvos rj ^cuarrjpa TrepLrlderaf 
Kal 6 fxev liTTTOv ■)(^aXivol, 6 he avvcopiSa avajSatVet, 
o Be avvdrj pia rrapeyyvd' KadiararaL Be evdews 6 
piev Xoxo-yos els Xoxov, 6 Be ra^iapxo? els rd^iv, 
6 Be Imrevs errl Kepas, 6 Be ijjiXos els rrjv t8tav 
eKTpex^i' x^P^^' "^dvTa Be i50' eva arjpidvropa Bo- 

10 veZrai Kara Trpoard^LV rod ro Kpdros exovros rfye- 
p,6vos. ovro) XP^ '<^ci^ TTepl rov avpLTravros (f>povetv 
VTTO yap pLids porrrjs drpwopuevcov airavrajv yiveraL 
rd ot/ceta, Kal ravrrjs dopdrov Kal d<f>avovs. orrep 
ovBapLcos eariv epLTroBiov ovre eKelvrj Trpos to Bpdv 
ovre rjpuv Trpos ro marevaai- Kal yap rj ip^xV' ^^' 

15 7]v ^djpiev re Kal o'Ikovs Kal TToXeis exopiev, aoparos 
ovaa rols epyois avrrjs^ opdrai- irds yap 6 rod ^tov 
Sia/cocr/AOS' vtto ravrrjs evprjrai Kal BiareraKrai /cat 
avvex^rai, yrjs dpoaeis xal <j}vrevaeLS, r€xv7]S ein- 
voiai, XRV^^*-^ vopujjv, Koapios TToXireias, evBiqpiOL 
irpd^eis, VTTepopios TToXepLos, elpi^vr). ravra XPV 

20 Kal TTepl deov BLavoeladaL, Bwdpiet p,ev ovros Laxv- 
pordrov, KdXXei Be evTrperreardrov , t,o)fj Be a^ai^a- 
rov, dperfj Be Kpariarov, Biori Trdarj Ovrjrfj (f)vaet, 

396 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

reason, gives the sign to every moving thing between 
heaven and earth, everything is moved continually 
in its orbit and within its peculiar limits, now dis- 
appearing, now appearing, revealing innumerable 
different forms and concealing them again, all from 
a single beginning. The process is very like what 
happens, particularly at moments in a war, when the 
trumpet gives a signal in a military camp ; then each 
man hears the sound, and one picks up his shield, 
another puts on his breast-plate, and a third his 
greaves or helmet or belt ; one harnesses his horse, 
one mounts his chariot, one passes on the Avatchword ; 
the company -commander goes at once to his company, 
the brigadier to his brigade, the cavalryman to his 
squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own 
station ; all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a 
flurry of motion according to the orders of the supreme 
commander. It is a similar idea that we must have 
of the universe : by a single inclination all things 
are spurred to action and perform their peculiar 
functions — and this single agent is unseen and in- 
visible. Its invisibility is no impediment either to 
its own action or to our belief in it ; for the soul, 
whereby we live and build households and cities, 
though it is invisible is perceived through its deeds : 
for all the conduct of life is discovered, arranged and 
maintained by the soul — the ploughing and sowing 
of land, the inventions of art, the use of laws, the 
order of a city's government, the activities of people 
in their own country, and war and peace with foreign 
nations. This is what we must also believe about 
God, who is mightiest in power, outstanding in beauty, 
immortal in life, and supreme in excellence, because 

^ avrrjs codd. Lor. : avrols codd. al. Hekk. 



[ARISTOTLE] 

399 b 

yevojxevos adewp'qros oltt* avrcbv twv epyojv deoj- 
peZr ai. ra yap Tradrj, Kal to, St' aepos dnavra Kal 
TO, €771 yrjs Kal ra iv uSart, deov Xeyoir* av ovrcos 
25 epya etvai rov tov KoapLov enexovTos' i^ ov, Kara 
rov (fiVOLKov 'E/x7re8o/cAea, 

TTavd^ ocra t' rjv ocra r' ea^' oaa t' earat oTriaaoi, 
SevSped t' i^XdcTTrjae Kal dvepes rjSe yuvai/ce? 
drjpes t' oloivoi re Kal vharodpepip,oves Ix^vs. 

eoiKe Be ovrojg, el Kal puKporepov Trapa^aXeZv ^ 
30 Tors' 6pL(f)a\ois XeyopLevoLs Tot? ev ralg ipaXlaiv 
[At^oi?],^ ot pbeaoL KeijjLevoi Kara ttjv els eKarepov 
jxepos evBeaiv ev appLovta riqpovai Kal ev rd^ei ro 
TTav ax^p-o. TTJg 0aAt8o9 /cat aKLvrjrov. (f)aal Se Kal 
TOV dyaXpiaroTTOLOV OetStav KaTaaKevdt,ovra^ rrjv ev 
35 aKpoTToXei ^AO'qvdv ev piear) rfj ravrrjg dcrTriSL ro 
eavTOV rrpoaoiTTov evrvmoaaadaL, Kal avvSrjaai tco 

400 a dydXpiaTL Sta rivos dtfiavovs BrjpLLovpyia^ , oiore e^ 

dvdyKTjs, €L Tis ^ovXoiTO avTo TTepLaipelv, to avpLTrav 
dyaXpba Xveiv re /cat avyx'^^v. tovtov ovv ex^i' tov 
Xoyov 6 deos ev Koapiip, avvexo^v rrfv twv oXiav 
5 dppiovtav re /cat acoTTjpiav , TrXrjv ovTe pceaos wv, 
evda 7] yrj re /cat o doXepos tottos ovto'S, aAA' dvu) 
Kadapos ev Kadapco xcopoi ^ePrjKcog, ov eTVpiCog /ca- 
Xovp-ev ovpavov p-ev dno tov opov elvaL tov dvco, 
"OXvpLTTov Se olov oXoXapLTTTJ T€ Kal TTavTos t,6(jiov /cat 

^ fiiKpoTepov TTapapaXelv I>or. : fiiKporepov, irapa^aXXeiv tov 
Koofxov Rekk. 

^ At'^ois del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 

* KaraoKevdCovTa BDZ ; [Arist.] De Mir. Aiifie. 1.55; I.or. : 
KaTaaK€vat,6fi€vov Bekk. 

398 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

though he is invisible to every mortal thing he is seen 
through his deeds. For it would be true to say that 
all the phenomena of the air, the land and the water 
are the works of the God who rules the cosmos ; from 
whom, according to Empedocles" the natural philo- 
sopher, 

grows all that is and was and is yet to come, 
the trees and the whole race of men and women, 
beasts, birds and water-nurtured fish. 

Though it is rather a humble comparison, he is truly 
like the so-called " keystones " of vaults, which lie 
in the middle and by their junction with each side 
ensure the proper fit of the whole structure of the 
vault and preserve its arrangement and stability. 
They say too that the sculptor Pheidias, when he 
was making the Athena on the Acropolis, carved his 
own face into the middle of her shield, and by some 
hidden trick of craftsmanship attached it to the 
statue in such a way that if anyone tried to remove 
it he inevitably destroyed and demolished the whole 
statue.* And this is the position held in the cosmos 
by God, who maintains the orderliness and preserva- 
tion of the whole : except that he is not in the centre — 
for here lies the earth, this turbulent, troubled place 
— but high aloft, pure in a pure region, which we 
rightly call " heaven " (oi'pai/ds) because it forms the 
uppermost boundary (opos . . . avw) or " Olympus " 
because it shines brightly all over (oAoAa/x7r/ys) and is 

" Diets, Vorsokr.^ m B 21. 

" Cf. Ps.-Aristot. De Mir. Ausc. 846 a 19 ff. ; Plut. Pericles 
31 ; Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 15. 34 ; Val. Max. viii. 14. 6. Cicero 
and Plutarch only mention the portrait. The statue was the 
gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon. In several economic 
crises the gold was removed and melted down and later 
restored. 

399 



[ARISTOTLE] 

400 a 

droLKTOv KLvq/xarog Ke^o^pia^evov , ola yiverai Trap 
10 rjfuv Bid ;^ei/xa)vo? /cat dvefJLcov j8ta?, loarrep €(f)7] 
Kal 6 7TOLr)rrjS ["Op.rjposY 

OuAujUTTOvS', odt, (j)aat decov eSo? da^aAe? aiei 
e/Lt/xevai* out' dvefioiai TLvaaaerai ovre ttot 

OjJi^pCp 

Several, ovre )(Ld}v eTTLTTiXvaraL, dXXd /xaA' aWpf] 
TTeTTraraL dve(j>eXog, XevKTj S' emhehpopiev atyXn]. 

15 GweTTifiaprvpel Se Kal 6 ^ios aTras, rrjv dvoj ;^cu/)av 

dTToSovs deep' Kal yap iravres dvdpojTTOi avareivop^ev 

rds x^^P^^ ^^S' Tov ovpavov evxds TrotovpLevoi. Ka9^ 

ov Xoyov ov KaK(x)'5 KaKelvo dvanecfxjovT^TaL 

Zeu? 8' ^Aa;!^' ovpavov evpvv iv aldepi Kal ve<j>eXrjaL. 

20 8to Kal Tcov aladiqrcjv rd TL/xiwrara tov avTov 
eTTexei tottov, doTpa re Kal rjXios Kal aeXiqvT]- 
fiova Te rd ovpdvia 8ta tovto del rrjV avrrjv aw- 
t,ovra rd^LV StaKeKoafirjraL, Kal ovnore aAAotco- 
devra fxeTeKivrjdr], Kaddrrep rd errl yrjs evrpeirra 
ovra TToXXd? erepoLOjaeis Kal rrddrj dvaheSeKraf 

25 aeiafjioi. re ydp rjSrj ^mlol rroXXd piepiq rr\'s yrjs 
dvepprj^av, opu^poL re KareKXvaav e^n^ioi Karap- 
payevres, eTrtSpo/xat re Kvpidrcov Kal dvaxcoprjcreis 
TToXXaKLS Kal rjTTeLpovs edaXdrrcxiaav Kal BaXdrrag 
rjrreLpa)aav, /Stai re 7TV€vp,driov Kal rvcfyiovcov eariv 

30 ore TToXetg oXas dverpeipav, TTvpKa'Cai re Kal ^Xoyes 
at piev i^ ovpavov yevop^evai Trporepov, uoGTrep 
(f>aaLV, eirl ^aedovros rd irpos ecu piepr) Kare(f)Xe^av, 
at Se Trpos earrepav eV yrj'S dva^Xvaaaai Kal eK(f)V- 
aiqaaaai, Kaddirep rojv iv Airvr) Kparrjpcov dvap- 
payevrcov Kal dvd rrjV yxjv (jyepopievojv ;j^et/Aap/3oi> 
400 b StKrTyi'. evda Kal rd rcov evae^dJv yevos e^oxi^i'S 

400 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

removed from all darkness and disorderly motion 
such as occurs among us when there is a storm or a 
violent wind ; as the poet says,** 

To Olympus, where they say the gods' dwelling stands 

always safe ; it is not shaken by winds, nor drenched 

by showers of rain, nor does snow come near it ; always 

unclouded 
the air spreads out, and a white radiance lies upon it. 

And all ages bear witness to this fact, and allot the 
upper region to God : all of us men stretch out our 
hands to the heavens when we pray. According to 
this reasoning, the following also has been well said *" : 

To Zeus belongs the wide heaven in the clouds and the 
aether. 

So also the same place is occupied by the most honoured 
of perceptible things, the stars and the sun and the 
moon ; and for this reason only the heavenly bodies 
always keep the same order and arrangement, and are 
never changed or altered ; while the transient things 
on earth admit many alterations and conditions. For 
violent earthquakes before now have torn up many 
parts of the earth, monstrous storms of rain have burst 
out and overwhelmed it, incursions and withdrawals of 
the waves have often made seas of dry land and dry 
land of seas ; sometimes whole cities have been over- 
turned by the violence of gales and typhoons ; flaming 
fires from the heavens once burnt up the Eastern parts, 
they say, in the time of Phaethon, and others gushed 
and spouted from the earth, in the West, as when the 
craters of Etna erupted and spread over the earth 
like a mountain-torrent. Here, too, the race of pious 

" Horn, Od. vi. 42-45. * Horn. II. xv. 192. 

^ 'Ofi-qpos om. Z Lor. 

401 



[ARISTOTLE] 

400 b 

eri^rjae^ to Sai/xdv'tov, TrepLKaraXri^devriov vtto 
Tov pevfjiaros 8ta to ^aardl^eLv yepovras eTtl rcbv 
co/jiajv yov€ts /cat aa)t,eLV TrXrjaiov yevop^evos 6 tov 
TTvpos TTOTapLOS i^eaxt'oOrj TrapeTpeipe re tov (f)X.oy- 
5 p,ov TO fxev €v9a, to 8e evda, /cat eT-qprjoev d^Xa- 
^elg dp,a tols yovevai tovs veavlaKovs. 

Ka^oAov 8e o7T€p iv vrjl p^ev Kv^epv^T-qg, iv 
dppiaTL Se rjVLoxos, iv X^PV ^^ Kopv(f)alos, iv TroAet 
oe vopio(deT'r])g,^ iv OTpaTOTTeSo) 8e r)yep.a)v, tovto 
aeo? €v KOopLcpy TrXrjv /ca^' oaov tols p-iv Kap.aT7j- 

10 pOV TO dpX^CV TToXvKLVTjTOV T€ /Cat 7ToXvp.epi,p.VOV, TOt 

0€ aXvTTov anovov re /cat ndaT^g Kcxcopi-crpLevov 
GcopLaTLKTJg aadeveLas- iv dKivrfTcp yap lSpvp,evos 
TravTa KLvel /cat rreptayet, onov ^ouAerat Kal ottujs, 
€v 8ta(/iopots" ISiaLS re /cat (^uo-efftv, warrep dp-iXet 
/cat o T';^? TToAeco? vopbos dKLvr]Tog cov iv rat? rail' 

15 xpi^l^iviov i/jvxcus TtdvTa olKovop.€L TO, /card ti^v 
TToXiTeiav i(l>€7T6p,€voi yap auroi 87^AovdTt i^iaatv 
apxovTCS p^iv eVi rd dp;^eta, deapLodeTai he elg Ta 
ot/ceta 8t/cacrT7ypta, ^ovXevTal 8e /cat iKKXrjaLaa- 
rat et? avveSpia Ta TrpoarjKovTa, /cat o )LteV rt? etV 
TO TTpvTavelov ^ahit,€L aiTr^aopLevos, 6 8e Tr/ads' TOi)? 

20 8t/caaTds' aTroAoyryCTo/Ltevo?, d 8e et? to SeopiCDTT]- 
pcov a7Todavovp,evos. ylvovTac 8e /cat hrjp.odoiviai 
vopiLpLOL /cat TTavrjyvpeLg iviavaioi dedJv t€ dvaiai 
/cat r]pw<jiv QepairelaL /cat ;)^oat KeKpL-qKOTCuv ctAAa 
8e ctAAoj? iv€pyovp.€va KaTa piav TrpooTa^iv 'q v6- 
p,Lp.GV i^ovaiav awl^ei. to tov Trotrjo-avTO? ovtojs otl 

25 TToAts" 8' d/xou /Ltei' dvpLiap,dTO)v ye/xet, 

d/xoi5 8e Traidvcov tc /cat OTCvaypidTcov, 

' vofio<d(Trj>s coni. Lor. : vo/xo; codd. Bekk. 
402 



ON THE COSMOS, 6 

men was especially honoured by the divinity,'* when 
they were overtaken by the stream of lava, because 
they were carrying their old parents on their shoulders 
to keep them safe ; for when the river of fire drew 
near them it was split in two and turned one part to 
this side and the other to that, and preserved un- 
harmed both the young men and their parents. 

In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the 
charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as 
the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military 
camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their com- 
mand is wearisome and fraught with many movements 
and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free 
from all bodily weakness : for he is established in the 
immovable, and moves and directs all things as and 
where he wishes, among the varieties of form and 
nature ; just as the law of the city, itself immovably 
established within the minds of those who observe 
it, disposes all the activities of the state : for in 
obedience to the law the magistrates go to their 
offices, the judges to their appropriate courts, the 
councillors and members of the assembly to their 
appointed meeting-places ; and one man goes to the 
prytaneum for his meals, another to the law-courts to 
defend himself, a third to prison to die. The law also 
ordains public feasts and annual festivals, sacrifices to 
the gods, cults of heroes and libations to the dead : 
and other varied activities, all arising from a single 
ordinance or authority of the law, accord well with 
these words of the poet ^ : 

The city is full of heavy incense-fumes, 
with crying for deliverance, and laments. 

" The story is told of Amphion and his brother by the poet 
of the Aetna (625 f.) " Soph. O.T. 4-5. 

403 



[ARISTOTLE] 

400 b 

OVTiOS VTToXrjTTTeOV /cat tTTt T'^? iJieit,ovo? TToAeo)?, 
Aeyo) 8e rov Koofiov vofjios yap rjjXLV laoKXivr^g o 
0eo?, ovhejxiav e7riSe;^o^evos' hiopdwaiv 7] /Ltera- 
30 deoLV, KpecTTCov he, olfiat, Kal ^e^aiorepog tcov iv 
Tat? Kvp^eaiv dvayeypafipbdvcov. riyov/xevov Se 
OLKLvqraJS^ avrov Kal e'jLtyaeAcos" o avfiTrag oIkovo- 
jxeXraL Sict/coCT/xos" ovpavov Kai yrjs, ju.e/xeptcr/xev'os' 
/cara to,? (f)vcj€i,s TTaaas Std tcov olKetcov aTrepixdrcov 
et? re ^ura /cat ^oia /cara yevr] re Kal eihr]- Kal yap 

401 a dpLTTeXoL Kal (f>OLViK€s Kal TTepaiai 

avKeai re yXvKepal /cat eAatat, 

CO? (f>rjaLV 6 TToifjrris, rd re aKaprra p,ev, dXXas 8e 
■nape-)(op.eva ■^(peias, TrXdravoi Kal irirves /cat ttv^ol 

KXi]dpr] r aiyeipog re Kal evoiSrjs KVTrdpiaao'S , 

5 at re Kapirov oTTwpag rjSvv aAAco? 8e hvadrjaav- 
piarov (jjepovGai, 

oxvat Kal poial /cat fxrjXeai dyXaoKapTTOi, 

TCOV re ^ojcov Tct re dypia Kal rjfiepa, ra re ev aepi 

Kal eTrl yrjs Kal ev vSari poaKopLeva, yiverai /cat 
10 d/c/za^et /cat (j)deiperaL rols rov deov 7T€td6p.eva 

deapiOLS- " TTctv yap eprrerov TrXrjyfj vepierai," cus 

^T^CTtv Hpct/cAetTo?. 

7. El? 8e cov TToXviovvpLos eari, KarovopLa^opLevog 

rols TrdOeoL Trdatv dnep avros veoxp-ol. KaXovp,ev 

he avrov Kal Zrjva Kai Ata, Tra/aaAAT^Aco? ;^pc6/Ltevot 
15 Tot? ovopLaaiv, co? /cdv el XeyoLptev 8t' ov i^iopLev. 

Kpdvou 8e Trats /cat XP^^^^ Xeyerai, 8t7^/cct>v c^ 

atcovo? dreppiovos els erepov atcova* aCTTpaTraio? 

Tt /cat ^povralos Kal aWpios Kal aldepios Kepavvtos 
^ uKivi^Tius Stob. Lor. : deiKiinJTMs codd. Bekk. 

404 



ON THE COSMOS, 6-7 

So it is, we must suppose, with that greater city, the 
cosmos : God is a law to us, impartial and admitting 
no correction or change ; he is surely a stronger and 
more stable law than those inscribed on tablets." 
Under his motionless and harmonious guidance all 
the orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is 
administered, extending over all things through the 
seed proper to their kind, to plants and animals 
by genus and species ; vines, palms and perseae, 
" sweet figs and olives," ^ as the poet says, and those 
that bear no fruit but serve some other purpose, 
planes and pines and box-trees, " the alder, the 
poplar and the sweet-scented cypress-tree " '^ ; and 
those which in the autumn bring forth a harvest that 
is sweet but hard to store, " pears and pomegranates 
and apples with shining fruit " <* ; and animals, some 
wild, some tame, that live in the air and on the earth 
and in the water, — all these come into being and grow 
strong and perish, obedient to the laws of god. " For 
every creature that crawls is driven to pasture by his 
goad," * as Heracleitus says. 

7. Though he is one, he has many names, accord- 
ing to the many effects he himself produces. We call 
him both Zena and Dia, using the names interchange- 
ably,^ as if we were to say " Him through whom (8td 
oV) we live (Cv^')'" He is called the Son of Cronus and 
of time (Chronos), because he lives from endless age 
to another age ; God of Lightning and of Thunder, 
God of the Air and Aether, God of the Thunderbolt 

" At Athens, tablets on which the early laws were written. 
* Horn. Od. xi. 590. " Horn. Od. v. 64. 

<* Horn. Od. xi. 589. 
' Diels, Vorsokr.^ 22 B 11. 

' Z^va and Ai'a are used interchangeably as accusatives of 
Zeus. 

405 



[ARISTOTLE] 

401 a 

re /cat V€tlos avro rcov veToJv /cai Kcpavvwv Kal twv 
oAAcov KaAeirai. Kai fjurjv eTTiKapTTios fi^v ano tojv 

20 KapTTCov, 7ToXi€vg Se (XTTo rcbv TToXeojv ovofxa^eTai, 
yevedXtos re Kal ipKelos Kal ofjLoyvLos Kal naTpwos^ 
aiTO TTJs TTpos ravra Koivioviag , iraLpelog re Kal 
(piXiog Kal ^evLos Kal crrpdrLos Kal TpoTTaiov^os, 
Kaddpaios re Kal naXapivalos Kal LKeaios Kal [xeiXi- 
X''OS, wairep ol Trotrjral Xeyovcn, acorT^p re Kal 

25 eXevdepios ervfjLws, cLs he ro ttoLv elTrelv, ovpdvios 
re Kat x^^viog, Trdaiqs eTTcLvvfxog (f)vaea)s coy Kal 
rv)(r\S, are rravrajv avros a'inos <jov. 8to Kal ev 
rols Op(f)LKoZs ov KaKcos Xeyerai 

Zei)? TTpcoros yevero, Zeu? voraros dpxtKepavvos*' 
Xeiis Ke(f)aX-rj, Zevs" jxeaaa, Aioj 8' eV Trdvra 
rervKr at • 
401 b Zej)? TTvOfiTjv yalrjs re Kal ovpavov darepoevros' 
Z,evs dparjv yevero, Z.evs afx^poro? errXero vvix(f>rj- 
Zeu? TTVoiTj Trdvrwv, Zei)? dKapudrov TTvpog opjji-q' 
Zei)? TTovrov pit,a, Zeu? t7Aios' y]he aeXrjvq' 
5 Zeus" ^acnXevs, TLev<5 dpxo<5 aTTOvriMV dpxtKepav- 
vos^- 
TTavras yap Kpvipas au^i? •^ao? is TToXvyrjOeg 
e^ leprjs KpaSir]? dveveyKaro, fiepjxepa pet,oiv. 

Olfiai Se Kal rrjv ^AvdyK'qv ovk dXXo ri Xeyeadai 

ttXtjv rovrov, olovel dvLK7]rov alriav* ovra, Ei/nap- 

10 fievrjv Se 8ia to etpeiv re Kal x^P^^^ dKwXvrcos , 

^ naTp(bos VV^endland et Wilamowitz, Lor. : Trdrpios codd, 
Bekk. 

* apxi.K4pawos P Lor. : dpyiKepavvos codd. cet. Bekk. (et 
401 b 5). 

406 



ON THE COSMOS, 7 

and the Rain — he takes his name from all these 
things. He is called Harvest-God and City-God, God 
of the Family and the Household, God of Kinsmen 
and Ancestral God, because of his connexion with 
these things ; God of Fellowship and Friendship and 
Hospitality, of War and Victory, of Purification and 
Vengeance, of Supplication and Grace, as the poets 
say, and in a true sense Saviour and Liberator. To 
sum up all, he is a God of Heaven and God of Earth," 
and takes his name from every kind of nature and 
estate ; for he himself is the cause of all. So it is 
rightly written in the Orphic books * : 

Zeus is the first-born, Zeus is last, the lord of the lightning ; 

Zeus is the head, Zeus the centre ; from Zeus comes all 
that is ; 

Zeus is the foundation of the earth and the starry heavens ; 

Zeus is a man, Zeus an immortal maid ; 

Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the spring of tire- 
less fire ; 

Zeus is the root of ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon ; 

Zeus is king, Zeus is the master of all, the lord of the 
lightning. 

For he hid all men away, and has brought them again to 
the lovely light 

from the holiness of his heart, working great marvels. 

I think too that Necessity ('AvayKiy), is nothing but 
another name for him, as being a cause that cannot 
be defeated (ai/tKi^ros) ; and Destiny (l^l/jLap/ievrf), 
because he binds things together (ecpew) and moves 

" Xdovios usually implies the Underworld ; but Pseudo- 
Aristotle is probably stretching the meaning slightly to suit 
his own cosmology. 

* Kern, Fragm. Orph. 21a. 



' vid. 401 a 28. 
alriav CG Lor. : ovalav codd, al. Bekk. 



407 



[ARISTOTLE] 

401 b 

Ile7Tpoj[jLev7]v Se 8ta to TreTreparcoadaL rravra /cat 

pirjhev ev toXs ovaiv aTreipov eivai, /cat Motpav pikv 
arro rov fxeixepiadai, Nepieaiv Se oltto rrjg iKaaro) 
h lav e ixTja ecos , 'ASpacrreiav Se avaTTohpaurov airiav 
ovaav Kara ^vatv, Aicrav Se aet ovaav. ra re Trepi 

15 TO,? M.otpas Kal rov arpaKrov et? ravro ttcos vevef 
Tpels [xev yap at Motpai, Kara rovs -x^povov? fxe- 
jxepLCjpLevaL, vrjixa Se arpaKrov ro fxev e^eipya- 
apuevov, ro Se /xe'AAov, ro Se TrepiarpecfjoijLevov 
reraKraL Se Kara fxev ro yeyovos /xt'a rcx)v MoipoDv', 
"ArpoTTos, CTTet TO, napeXOovra iravra arpeirra eari, 

20 Kara Se ro /xe'AAov Att;^ecri? — [ctV]^ Travra yap rj 
Kara (f>VGLV /xeVei Xrj^Ls — Kara Se to eveaTO? 
KAco^co, avpLirepaivovad re Kal K/{(x)dovaa eKaarco 
ra oLKeZa. Trepaiverai Se Kal 6 pivdos ovk araKrcos. 
TauTa Se ndvra earlv ovk d'AAo ri rrXrjv 6 deos, 
Kaddrrep Kal 6 yevvalos WXdrcov ^rjaiv " 6 fxev hrj 

25 deos, cjarrep 6 TraAatoj Adyo?, dpx''^v re Kal reXevrrjv 
Kal [xeara rcov ovrcov cLTrdvrcov e)(a)V, evdeia Trepaivei 
Kara (fjvaiv TTopev6p,evos' rco Se del ^vverrerat StKi^, 
Tojv dTToXeLTTO/xevcov rov deiov vofiov rip^copos—^s 
6 yevqaeadai" jxeXXcov p.aKdpi6s re Kal ev8aip,cov 
ef dpx'^S evdvs pceroxo? ei-q." 

^ ek del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 

^ yevrjaeadat, Biicheler : evSaifi-ovrjaetv vel evBaifjiovijaai. codd. 
(cf. Plato, Laws 716 a). 



408 



ON THE COSMOS, 7 

without hindrance ; Fate (rieTrpwyuei/iy), because all 
things are finite (TreTreparQo-dai) and nothing in the 
world is infinite ; Moira, from the division of things 
Qxepi^eLv) ; Nemesis, from the allocation of a share to 
each (Stai/e/xr/crts) ; Adrasteia — a cause whose nature 
is to be inescapable (^dvaTroSpaa-ros alria) ; and Aisa — 
a cause that exists for ever (del oixra). The story of 
the Fates (Molpai) and the spindle also has much 
the same tendency : there are three Fates, corre- 
sponding to different times, and part of the yarn on 
their spindles is already completed, part is still to be 
spun, and part is now being worked. The past is the 
concern of one of the Fates, called Atropos, because 
all past things are irreversible (arpeTrra) ; the future 
belongs to Lachesis, for a fortune allotted (A.?}^/.?) by 
nature awaits all things ; the present is Clotho's 
province, who settles each man's own destiny and 
spins (K-Aw^etv) his thread. So the story ends, and it 
is well said. 

All these things are no other than God, as the great 
Plato tells us " : " God, as the ancient story says, 
holding the beginning and the end and the middle of 
all things that are, moves by a straight path in the 
course of nature, bringing them to fulfilment ; and 
behind him, taking vengeance on all that fall short of 
the divine law, follows Justice — let no man be without 
this, even from his earliest years, if he is to live in 
blessed happiness." 

" o fiev . . . Tifiojpos Laivs 715 e — 716 a ; -i^s . . . etr] 
Laws 730 c. The antecedent of ^s in Plato is aAr/^eia. 
Pseudo-Aristotle runs the two passages together, making 
SiKT] the antecedent of •^s. 



409 



INDICES 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 

References are given according to page, column and line of Bekker's 
Berlin edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin; other- 
wise references are to chapters (Roman figures). 

I. GREEK INDEX 



dyvoia (tov eXeyxov) 166 b 24, 

167 a 21 if., 168 a 19 if. 
aSoXeax^lv 165 b 16, 173 a 

32 if., 181 b 25 if. 
afjifcpoMa 165 b 26, 166 a 7 if . 

See ambiguity 
' AvaXvTiKOL 165 b 9 
dnfipov 165 a 12, 167 b 13, 170 

a 23 if. 
airXcJs (to a. Xeyeadai) 166 b 

23, 37 if., 168 b 11 if., 

169 b 9 if. 
aTroSeiKTiKoj (Adyos) 165 b 9 
aTrdSei^is 170 a 24 if., 172 a 

15 if. 

^ap^apiliw 165 b 22 

yivos (school of philosophy) 

172 b 30 
yvwfiai 176 b 18 

Siaipems 165 b 27, 166 a 33, 

168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a 

33 ff., 179 a 14 



diaXeKTiKT], see dialectic 
Sidvoia 170 b 13 if. 
SiSacr/coAi/cds (Adyoy) 165 a 

39 if. 
8i8d.aKeiv 171 a 32 

eXeyxos, def. 165 a 3, 167 a 

22 if. ; false def. of 167 a 

22, 168 b 17 if. ; and cruA- 

Aoyicr/Ltd? 171 a 3 if. 
eXXT]vl^etv 182 a 34 
e-irdyeiv, iirayary^ 165 b 28, 174 

a 34 
enofievov 166 b 25, 167 b 1 if., 

168 b 28 if., 169 b 7 if., 

XXVIII 
epiariKos 165 b 1 if., 171 b 8 if., 

175 a 33 if. 

Ccp-q 167 b 28 if. 

vofios (opp. (f>vms) 173 a 11 if. 

6fioioa)(T)iJLoavvT] 168 a 26, 170 a 
15 

411 



INDICES 



o/xoiru/iia 165 b 26, 29 ff., 169 a 

^ 23 ff., 170 a 14 
6vofj,a (dist. Trpdyiw.) 165 a 7 fF., 
b 29, 167 a 24 ; (dist. 8ia- 

^ voia) 170 b 13 ff. 
ofyyr) 174 a 21 

TTiipaartKos 165 b 1 ff., 169 b 
25 ff., 171 b 5 ff. See ex- 
amination 

TTpoacoBia 165 b 27, 166 b 1, 168 
a27, 169a29, 177b3,35ff., 
179 a 15 

arjixdov (aTToSetfis Kara to a.) 

167 b 10 
aoXoLKiafios 165 b 15. See 

solecism 
ao(f>i(mK6s 169 b 21, 171 b 7 ff. 

and passim ; a. Te;^Tj==def. 

165 a 22 



avKo<jxxvrrnia 174 b 9 
criiAAoyi(T/i.os passim ; def. 165 

al 
avixPePr/KOS 166 b 22, 28 ff., 

168 a 34 ff., b 27 ff., 169 

b 3 ff., 179 a 27 
awdems 165 b 27, 166 a 22 ff., 

168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a 

33 ff., 179 a 13 

TerpayajvLafios, TerpaycovL^eiv 
171 b 15 ff., 172 a 3 ff. 

(j>iXoi>€iKia 174 a 21 

(^iXoao^ia 175 a 5 

^u'ai? (opp. I'Ojuoy) 173 a 7 ff . 

ili€v8oYpd<l>T]fta, i/iev8oypd<f>os, 
ip€v8oypa<l>etv 171 b 14 ff., 
36 ff. 



II. INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS 



absolute (opp. qualified) use 
of expressions 166 b 23, 
37 ff., 168 b 11 ff., 169 b 
11 ff., 180 a 23 

accent 165 b 27, 166 b 1, 
168 a 27, 169 a 29, XXI, 
179 a 15; written 177 b 3 

accident (an/x^e/Siyjcd?) 166 b 
22, 28 ff., 168 a 34 ff., b 
27 ff., 169 b 3 ff., 179 a 27 

Achilles 166 a 38 

ambiguity (d/x^i/3oAia) 165 b 
26, 166 a 7 ff., XVII, 177 
a 16 ff., 179 a 20 

Antiphon 172 a 7 

babbling, see aboXeaxflv 
breathings, written 177 b 4 

412 



Callias 176 a 1, 7 
Callicles 173 a 8 
Calliope 173 b 31 
case-forms 173 b 26 ff., 182 a 

12 ff. 
category-mistakes 168 a 26, 

169 a 35, 178 a 6 ff., b 

24 ff. 
cause, fallacy of mistaken 

166 b 26, 167 b 21 ff., 

169 b 14 
Cleon 182 a 32 
Cleophon 174 b 28 
consequent {to fnofievov), 

fallacy of 166 b 25, 167 b 

1 ff., 168 b 28 ff., 169 b 

7 ff., XXVIII 
contentious argument 165 b 



ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 



1 ff. and passim ; five 
aims of III 
Coriscus 166 b 33, 173 b 31, 
39, 175 b 20 fF., 176 a 7, 
179 a 1, b 3 ff., 181 a 11, 

182 a 20 

demonstrative adjectives 175 

b20ff. 
demonstrative arguments 165 

b 9, 170 a 24 ff., 172 a 

15 ff. 
dialectic 165 a 39 ff., 169 b 

26, 171 b 1 ff., 174 a 16, 

183 b 1 

diction, see language 
didactic argument 1 65 a 39 ff., 
171 a 32 ff. 

equivocation (o/Luuvo/xia) 165 
b26, 30ff., 168 a 25, 169 a 
23 ff., XVII, 177 a 10 ff., 
178 a 24 ff., 179 a 17 
Ethiopian 167 a 12 
Euthydemus 177 b 12 
examination 165 b 1 ff., 169 b 
25 ff., 171 b5ff., 172 a 28, 
183 b 1 
expression, see language 

genitive (ambiguity of) 180 

a9 ff. 
Gorgias 183 b 37 

Hippocrates 171 b 15 
Homer, Iliad 171 a 10; 
quoted 166 b 4 ff., 180 a 22 

ignoratio elenchi 166 b 24, 
167 a 21 ff., 181 a 1 ff. ; 
other fallacies reducible 
to 168 a 18 ff. 



Indian 167 a 8 

induction 165 b 28, 174 a 34 

language, fallacies dependent 
on IV, 166 b 10, 168 a 
24 ff., 169 a 37 ff., XIX- 
XXIII 

length (as confusing device) 
174 a 17 ff. 

Lycophron 1 74 b 32 

Lysander 176 b 5 

Mandrobulus 174 b 28 
Melissus 167 b 13, 168 b 36, 

181 a 28 

names, symbols for things 

165 a 7 ff. See ovofia 

paradox 165 b 15, 172 b 1 1 ff., 
174 b 13 ff., 175 b 33 ff. 

Parmenides 182 b 27 

petitio principii 166 b 25, 
167 a 37 ff., 168 b 23 ff., 
169 b 13, 181 a 15 ff. 

Piraeus 177 b 12 

Plato, Gorgias 173 a 7 

proposition (TrpoVao-i?) 169 a 
7 ff., b 17, 172 b 8 

Protagoras 173 b 20 

qualified use of expressions 

166 b 23, 37 ff., 168 b llff., 
169 b 11 ff., 180 a 23 ff. 

Sicily 177 b 13 

Socrates 166 b 34, 183 b 7 

solecism 165 b 15, 173 b 17 ff., 

182 a 8 ff. 

sophistry 171 b 25 ff., 172 b 
12, 174 b 13; def. 165 a 
22 



413 



INDICES 



substance 168 a 26, 169 a 35, 
170 a 15, 178 a 6 ff., 178 b 

24 ff 

Themistocles 176 a 1 



" third man " argument 178 
b 87 

Zeno 172 a 9, 179 b 20, 182 b 

27 



414 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 

For a Greek index see the edition by H. H. Joachim 
(Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922), 
pp. 278-296. 

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS 

Beferences are given according to page, column and line of Bekker's 
Berlin edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin; other- 
wise references are to chapters (Roman figures for book, followed by Arabic 
figures for chapter). 



action (opp. passion) 322 b 
7 if,, 323 b 1 If., I. 7-8 

air 328 b 35 ff. See elements 

alteration {aXXoicoais) 327 a 
16, 329 b 2 if., 331 a 9, 
332 a 8 if., 337 a 35 ; dist. 
coming-to-be I. 1-4 ; dist. 
growth I. 5 ; illogical for 
Pluralists 314 b 15 if., 329 
b 2 ; Atomists on 315 b 
7 ; = change of quality 
319 b 6 if., 329 a 19 ; in 
the soul 334 a 10 

analogy 333 a 29 flf. 

Anaxagoras : " elements " 
of 314 a 12 if., fr. B 17 
314 a 12 

(Aristotle, other works) : 
Phynics 3l6h 18,317 b 14, 
318 a 4, 320 b 28, ,323 a 3, 
329 a 27, 336 a 13, 19, 337 
a 18,25; De Caelo 315 b 



31, 325 b 34, 331 a 7; 

Metaphysics 336 b 29 
art (opp. nature) 335 b 28 if. 
association {avyKpiais) 315 b 

17,317 a 13 if., 322 b 7 if., 

329 a 4 if., b 27, 333 b 

12 if. 

Atomists, see Democritus, 

Leucippus 
atoms 314 a 21 if., I. 2, 325 a 

28 if., b 34 

categories 317 b 6 if., 319 a 

11 
cause, eificient opp. material 

318 a 1 if. ; eificient ,324 b 

13 if., II. 10; material 
318 a 1 if., 319 a 19, 335 
a 30 if . ; formal 336 a 3 ; 
final 335 b 6 ; causes of 
coming-to-be II. 9-11 

chance 333 b 7 if . 

415 



INDICES 



cold, def. 329 b 29. See con- 
traries 

colour, Democritus on 316 
a2 

coming-to-be : dist. altera- 
tion, growth I. 1-5 ; pro- 
duced by elements I. 6- 
II. 8 ; material and formal 
causes of II. 9 ; final and 
efficient causes of II. 10 ; 
necessity in II. 11 

composition (avvdems) 315 
a 23, 317 a 12, 327 a 18, 
334 a 27 ; dist. mixture 

328 a 6 ff. 

compound bodies, how 

formed II, 7-8 
condensation 330 b 10 
contact 316 a 30 ff., 322 b 

22 ff., 328 b 26 
contraries 314 b 26, 319 a 

20ff., 324a2ff., 328a31, 

329 a 32 ff., II. 2-8, 336 
a 31 

cycle of coming-to-be 331 b 
3ff., II. 10-11 

Democritus 316 a 1, 323 b 
10, 325 a 2 ff., 326 a 1 ff., 
327 a 19; elements of 314 
a 17 ff., 315 b 29 ff . ; 
praised 31 5 a. 34 ff. 

diminution 314 b 15 ff., 319 
b 32, 320 b 31, 322 a 33, 
327 a 23 

Diogenes fr. B 2 322 b 13 

dissociation (SiaKpiaiy) 315 
b 17, 317 a 13 ff., 322 b 
7 ff., 329 a 4 ff., b 27, 333 
b 13 ft'. 

division : of bodies 316 a 
16 ff., 318 a 21, 325 a 8, 



327 a 10 ff. ; and mixture 

328 a 15 ff. 

dry, def. 329 b 31. See con- 
traries 

earth, see elements 

elements (earth, air, fire, 
water) II. 1-8 ; in Pre- 
Socratics 314 a 11 ff. (see 
also Empedocles) ; inter- 
change of 318 b 4 ff., 322 
b 2 ff., .331 a 7 ff„ 333 b 
14, 337 a 8 ; only four 3.32 
a 26 ; in compounds II. 
7-8 

Empedocles 324 b 33, 325 b 
1 ff., 329 a 3, b 1, 330 
b 20, 334 a 27 ; elements 
of 314 a 12 ff., II. 6; 
frr. B 8 314 b 7, 333 b 14 ; 
B 17 333 a 19; B 37 333 
b 1 ; B 53 334 a 3 ; B 54 
334 a 5 

ether 333 b 2, 334 a 2 

farmers 3.35 a 14 

fire 318 b 3 ff., 319 a 15 ff., 
.320 b 20 ff., 322 a 10 ff., 
323 b 8 ff., 324 a 9, .325 a 
20, 327 a 4 ff., b 11 ff., 
328 b 35 ff., II. 3-8, 3.36 
a 7 ff., 337 a 5 ff. ; only 
element fed 335 a 16 ; 
like form 335 a 19. Se<- 
elements 

food 321 a 32 ff., 322 a 1 ff., 
327 b 14 ff., 335 a 10 ff. 

form 324 b 5 ff., 328 b 11, 
.335 a 16, 338 b 13 ff. ; 
dist. privation 318 b 17 ; 
dist. matter 321 b 21 ff., 
322 a 2 ff., 28 ff. ; = final 



416 



COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 



cause 335 b 6 ; Platonic 
Forms 335 b 11 ff. 

God 333 b 21, 336 b 33 
growth 314 a 3, 315 a 28 ff., 
325 b 4, 333 a 35 ; and 
diminution 314 b 15 ff., 
327 a 23 ; dist. coming- 
to-be I. 5 

heat 314 b 18 ff., 318 b 16, 
322 b 16, 324 b 19, 326 a 
4, 327 a 3 ff., 329 a 12 

heavens 338 a 19 

homoeomeries : in Anaxago- 
ras 314 a 17 ff. See parts 
(uniform) 

hot 329 b 27, See contraries, 
heat 

increase, see growth 
indivisible magnitudes I. 2 
intermediate (element) 332 a 
19 ff. 

Leucippus 325 a 2, 23 ff. ; 

"elements" of 314 a 12 ff.; 

on alteration, etc. 315 b 

6ff. 
liquid 314 b 19, 322 a 2, 327 

a 17 ff., 328 b 4, 329 b 

19 ff., 332 b 20 ff., 334 b 

29 ff., 335 a 1 ff. 
Love (in Empedocles) 315 a 

17, 333 b 12 ff. 
Lynceus 328 a 15 

matter I. 6-10, 328 b 33 ff., 
332 a 18, 35, 334 b 3, 335 b 
18 ff.; def. 320 a 2; in- 
separable 320 a 33, 329 a 
10,30 



mean (between contraries) 
332 a 35, 334 b 27 ff. 

Melissus, see 325 a 3 

mixture 315 b 4,321 b 1, 322 b 
8, 327 a 30 ff., 328 a 6 ff., 
b 22, 333 b 19, 334 b 19 ; 
" pores " theory of 324 
b32 

moist 329 b 31. See con- 
traries, liquid 

Monists 314 a 7 ff. 

motion 315 a 28, 323 a 18, 
324 a 27 ff., 334 a 8 ff., II. 
9-10, 338 b 2 ff. ; in 
Empedocles 3.S3 b 23; 
natural 333 b 27 ff. 

necessity 335 a 34, II. 11 
nutrition iTpo<l>ri) 322 a 23, 
See food 

Parmenides 330 b 14 ; fr. B 
8 318 b 6. See 325 a 3 

parts (uniform and non- 
uniform) 321 b 18 ff., 322 
a 19 ff. 

perception : and mixture 327 
b 34 ff. ; perceptibility= 
reality 318 b 19 

physical method : dist. dia- 
lectical 316 a 10 ff. 

place 320 a 20 ff., 323 a 1 ff., 
334 b 2 ff., 337 a 27 ff. 

planes, indivisible 315 b 
30 ff., 325 b 26 ff., 33, 326 
a 22 

plants 335 a 12 

Plato 315 a 29 ff., 325 b 
25 ff., 329 a 14, 332 a 29 ; 
" Divisions " of 330 b 16; 
Timaeus 315 b 30, 325 b 
24, 329 a 13, 330 b 16, 



417 



INDICES 



332 a 29 ; Phaedo 333 b 

11 ff. 
pores 324 b 26 ff., 325 b 2 flf., 

326 b 7 ff . 
potentiality 316 b 21, 317 b 

16 ff., 318 a 21, 320 a 13 ff., 

320 b 26, 322 a 6 ff., 

28 ff., 326 b 31 ff., 327 b 

23 ff., 334 b 9 ff , 
privation 318 b 17, 332 a 23 

rarefaction 330 b 10 

Socrates 335 b 10 
solstices 337 b 12 
soul (in Empedocles) 334 a 

10 
Strife (in Empedocles) 315 a 

5 ff., 333 b 12 ff. 
substance 314 b 14, 317 b 

6 ff., 318 b 15, 35, 319 a 
13 ff., 321 a 34, 328 b 33, 
335 a 6, 338 b 14 ff. 

substratum 315 a 1 ff., 317 a 



23, 318 b 9 ff., 322 b 19, 
324 a 17, 329 a 16 ff., 334 
a 25 ; in Pre-Socratics 314 
b 3 ff . ; = material cause 
319 a 19 ; dist. property 
319 b 6 ff. 
sun : in Empedocles 314 b 
20 ff., 315 a 10; motion 
of 336 b 18, 338 b 4 

time 337 a 22 ff. 
transparency 324 b 29, 326 
b 11 

Unmoved Mover 318 a 4, 324 
a 30 ff., 337 a 19 ff. 

void 320 b 27 ff., 325 a 4 ff., 
b 3 ff., 326 a 24, b 15 ff. 

water 328 b 35 ff. See 

elements 
weight 323 a 8, 326 a 7 ff.. 

329 a 12, b 19 ff. 



418 



ON THE COSMOS 



References are given according to page, column and line of BeJcker's 
Berlin Edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin. 

I. GREEK INDEX 



ayoA/ia 400 a 1 

dyoA/xaToiroid? 399 b 33 

ayyeXiatjjopos 398 a 31 

ayovos 394 a 20 

dSpacrreia 401 b 13 

aiWpto? 392 a 31, b 1, 401 a 17 

aWrip 392 a 5, 30, 393 a 3, 396 

b27 
aWpla 394 a 22 ff. 
aidpios 401 a 17 
alnos 398 b 27 
aiaa 401 b 14 
aiVia 397 b 9, 398 a 4, b 35, 399 

a 26, 401 b 9 
alwv 391 b 19, 397 a 10, 11, 31, 

b 8, 401 a 16 
aK-qparos 392 a 9 
d/<r/xij 399 a 29 

dKovTil^eadai. 392 b 3, 395 b 4 
aKoafiLa 399 a 14 
d/cpoTToAij 399 b 34 
dAecivd? 392 b 8 
aXriOeia 391 a 4 
oAAoioOa^ai 392 b 9, 400 a 22 
aXuis 395 a 36 flF. 
d/xTraiTts 396 a 26 
am<f)i.<j)arjs 395 b 14 
dm/3Au(T6j 396 a 22 



avayicq 391 b 21, 400 a 1, 401 

b8 
dcdSoffi? 395 a 9 
dvadvfiiacris 394 a 9, 19, b 6 
dvaKafju/jLTjvoos 394 b 36 
dvoAuai? 394 b 17 
drnwoT; 395 b 20, 397 a 32 
avdaxeais 393 b 2 
dvaroX^ 394 b 19, 23, 399 a 

22 
dva<f>v(rr)fia 395 a 8, 396 a 21 
dva<f>vcrri(7is 395 b 21 
dvaxd!)pr]fj,a 396 a 18 
dvaxc!>pr)ais 400 a 27 
dv8pd-!ToSov 398 a 10 
dvT?/) 399 a 16 
dvdpwTTos 392 a 17, b 19, 397 b 

14, 398 a 6, 400 a 16 
dvoLtrjais 399 a 27 
dj'Tttva/c'OTTTj 396 a 19 
dvrapKTiKos 392 a 3 
dm-iTTaAos 394 a 22 
dirriiTopepLos 392 b 23 
dm-toTaais 397 a 1 
dvrpov 391 a 21 
d^coi/ 391 b 26 
dnapKTMs 394 b 29, 32 
aTnjAiwTij? 394 b 23 



419 



INDICES 



dirXavijs 392 a 10, 17, 22 
oLTToyetos 394 b 14 
dnoSeKTiqp 398 a 25 
dnoOpavms 394 a 33 
aTroTToXais 396 a 9 
dfyyecrrrjs 394 b 25, 30 
apyi?? 395 a 27 
dpcTTy 399 b 21 
dpKTiKos 392 a 3 
dpKTos 394 b 20, 395 a 3 
ap/Litt 400 b 7 
d/)/iow'a 396 b 17, 25, 399 a 12, 

17, b 31, 400 a 4 
apoms 399 b 17 
dpois 396 a 26 
appei', TO 396 b 9 
dpXT? 396 a 34, b 25, 398 a 27, 

33, 399 a 35 
dcrms 399 b 3, 35 
daTpavatos 401 a 16 
darpa-m] 392 b 12, 394 a 18, 

395 a 16 
darpov 391 b 17, 392 a 5, 10, 

395 b 1 ff., 8, 397 a 9, 399 

a 20, 400 a 21 
driMoS-qs 394 a 14, 19, 27 
drpaKTOS 401 b 15 
drpo^elv 395 b 28 
avpa 397 a 35 
avrovpyelv 398 a 6, b 4 
airrovpyos 397 b 22 
avxnv 393 a 22, b 6, 398 b 17 
d<f>pa)87]s 394 a 35 
dipevBeia 397 all 

^aflu'^uAos 392 b 18 
jSafftAeios 398 a 15 
PaaiXevs39S a 11 ff. 
/Si'oto? 395 a 5 ff., 22, 400 a 25 
/3ios397 a 18, 399 b 16, 400 a 15 
^odwos 392 b 4, 395 b 12 
popeas 394 b 20, 28 ff., 395 a 4 



pdpeios 392 a 3, 395 b 15, 399 
a 23 

^ovXevrrjs 400 b 17 

ppdarr}? 396 a 3 

^pWos 394 b 2 

jSpd^oj 395 a 13, 396 a 12 

^povToios 401 a 17 

^/)ovT^ 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 395 

a 13, 16 
^vdos 392 b 32, 395 a 9 

yeWffi? 395 b 5, 396 a 30, 397 

b3 
yivcTrjp 397 a 4 
yci-eTwp 397 b 21, 399 a 31 
yeVo? 400 b 1,34 
yipwv 396 b 3, 400 b 2 
y€a)ypa<l>e2v 393 b 20 
yvo^s 392 b 12 
yovevs 400 b 3, 6 
yovTj 399 a 28 

yovifios 394 a 27, b 1 1, 397 a 12 
ypdufxa 396 b 18 
ypap.(j.aTiK-q 396 b 17 
ywTj 399 a 16 

Sat/xwios 391 a 1,400 b 1 
SeVSpo.^ 396 a 23, 399 a 27 
SeafuoTTJpLov 400 b 20 
SeaTrorrjs 398 a 22 
87)[iiovpyeiv 396 b 31 
Srifj,covpyla 400 a 1 
Srjfiodotvla 400 b 21 
8iaypd<f>€iv 391 a 18 
Sid^ecTis 396 b 6 
Staira 398 b 32 
hiaKoapiriais 391 b 1 1 
8ictKO(7/A09 399 b 16, 400 b 32 
8idfifTpos 391 b 26 
8(di'0(a 391 a 14 
8iaTTei»'392b3,395a32 
biKacrnjpiov 400 b 17 



420 



ON THE COSMOS 



SiKacrrqs 400 b 19 

SiVt? 396 a 23 

Stop^ojCTts 400 b 29 

So/CIS 392 b 4, 395 b 12 

8opixf)6pos 398 a 20 

SovXos 398 a 30 

bpoaoTrdxyri 394 a 26 

Spo'ffos 394 a 15, 23 flF., 399 a 25 

hpvfxos 392 b 18 

SuVa/iij 392 a 7, b 9, 396 b 29, 

397 a 16, b 19 ff., 398 a 2, 

b 8, 20, 399 b 20 
hwaareveiv 395 a 2 
hvms 393 a 18, 394 b 21 fF., 399 

a 22 

iapivos 395 a 4 

iyKapaios 392 a 12, 393 a 28 

ey/cAi(7ts 396 a 9 

tyKoXiTLos 394 b 15 

eSpa 397 b 25 

edvos 396 b 2, 398 a 29 

eiSos 400 b 34 

cIkwv 396 b 14 

ei(j,apfj,€vr] 401 b 9 

elp-qvr) 399 b 19 

eK^oXr] 396 a 23 

eKSrjfjLetv 391 a 12 

eKKX-qaiaarrjS 400 b 18 

e»cAeD/cos 394 a 35 

eKv€<f>ias 394 b 18 

eKpTj^is 395 a 15 

(KTaais 395 a 8 

l/<:<^uOT? 396 a 23, 399 a 27 

eXevdepios 401 a 24 

eXe^as 398 a 16 

e'Ai/fi'a 395 a 27 

€/i^a(Tis 395 a 29 if. 

e/xi/fuxo? 394 b 11 

evavTios 396 a 34, b I ff., 24, 

^ 32, 398 b 26 

evBoai/jLos 399 a 19 



IvSoai? 398 b 26 

evepyeia 398 b 16 

ivdovaiav 395 b 27 

iviavTos 397 a 14, 399 a 8 

i^aKovTiapLOS 395 b 5 

e^ai^ts 395 b 3 

e'^vSpio? 394 b 19 

imbpofirj 396 a 19, 400 a 26 

emKapTTLOs 401 a 19 

imK-qpos 392 a 34 

emKXivT-qs 396 a 1 

e'77t^'oet^' 391 b 7 

eVtVoia 399 b 17 

emT€Xi"r]cns 398 b 10 

€m(f>dv€ia 392 a 18, 396 b 31 

eTTOTmrjp 398 a 31 

eTTotvvfios 397 a 6 

ep/cetoj 401 a 20 

ioTTepios 395 b 14 ; c/. 398 a 

28, 400 a 32 
iaria 391 b 14 
eraipeios 401 a 22 
eViJfftos 395 a 2 
ero? 399 a 23 
evdvTTvoos 394 b 35 
evfidpeia 398 b 35 
evpiTTos 396 a 25 
eupdi'OTos 394 b 33 
evpos 394 b 20, 22 ff. 
evpvdfiia 398 b 19 
fvaepeis, ol 400 a 34 
eu^^ 400 a 17 
i^rfpLipos 393 a 5 
e'cDoj 394 a 11, 395 b 14 ; cf. 

398 a 29, 400 a 31 

t,4(fivpos 394 b 20, 25 ff., 395 a 3 

Co<t>u>Sr]s 392 b 6 

^coypa^ia 396 b 12 

CcuSlov 392 a 13 

Ccurj 399 b 21 

^wov 391 b 14, 392 b 15, 19, 



421 



INDICES 



393 a 5, 394 b 10, 397 a 17 ff., 
b 23, 398 b 3, 18, 30, 399 a 
28, 400 b 34, 401 a 7 

i,ojo^6pog 392 all 

CwoT-jp 399 b 4 

riyeixMv 391 b 6, 398 a 6, 399 a 

30, 400 b 8 
^Oos 398 b 33 
■^XeKTpov 398 a 15 
ijAtos 392 a 29, 393 b 2, 395 a 

33, b 2, 396 b 27, 397 a 9, 398 

b8, 399 a 8, 21, 400 a 21 
rifiepa 397 a 13, 399 a 2, 22 
rjfj,€po8p6fj,os 398 a 30 
■fjvioxos 400 b 7 
^Treipos 392 b 19, 21, 393 a 7, 

b 19, 400 a 27 
i7/)w? 400 b 22 

eaviw.l,eiv 391 b 1 

^ews 391 a 1, 15, b 16, 392 a 9, 

30 f., 397 b 19, 33, 398 b 13, 

20 
dioXoyelv 391 b 4 
^€os 391 b 10 ff., 393 a 4, 397 b 

14 ff., 398 a 22, b 2, 6, 399 a 

18, b 19, 400 a 3, 16, b 8, 22, 

28, 401 a 10, b 23 
OepaTTeia 400 b 22 
eepivos 394 b 22 ff. 
depos 395 a 2, 397 a 12 
deais 391 a 5, .392 a 23, 394 b 5 
deafioOerrfs 400 b 16 
deap.6s 401 a 10 
decjpia 391 a 24 
dijXv, TO 396 b 9 
dXu/ji,s 394 a 30 
dpaoKias 394 b 30 
dpava/xa 394 b 4 
tfv'eAAa 395 a 6 
dvpa 398 a 18 



0;^ato 400 b 22 
floipa^ 399 b 4 

I'ttTTu^ 394 b 26 

I8ea 394 a 16, 395 b 11, 397 a 

27, 398 b 14, 399 a 34, 400 

b 13 
tepos 392 a 26 
t^rjfjLaTla 396 a 4 
iKeaios 401 a 23 
Imrevs 399 b 7 
iTTTTos 399 b 5 
tpis 395 a 30, 32 ff. 
larqfjLepivos 394 b 24 ff. 
ladfios 393 b 25 ff. 
laoiioipia 396 b 35 
ioTopia 391 b 6 

KaOdpaios 401 a 23 
KacKias 394 b 22, 28, 395 a 1 
Kaivovpyovfxeva, rd 398 a 35 
Kaipos 396 a 27, 397 a 26, 399 a 

24, b 1 
Kanvd)8r]s 394 a 13 
*:ap7ros 399 a 28, 401 a 19 
Karaiyis 395 a 5 
KaraoKfirq 398 b 24, 399 a 6, 30 
KaroTTTpov ,395 a 34 
Kepas 393 b 5, 399 b 8 
Kepavvios 401 a 17 
K-fpawos 392 b 12, 394 a 18, 395 

a 22 ff., 397 a 21, 401 a 18 
Kivrjais 391 b 5, 16, 392 a 30, 

b 2, 7, 398 b 13 ff. 
KipKias .394 b .31 
KXifj-a 392 a 3 
KvrjixiS 399 b 4 
KoiXcu/jLa 395 b 34 
koAttos 393 a 21, b 3 ff., 394 b 

15, 398 b 31 
KOfirj-rris 392 b 4, 395 a 32, 

b9 



422 



ON THE COSMOS 



Koirri 394 a 34 

Kopv(l>aLos 399 a 15, 19, 400 b 8 

Koanos 391 a 26, (def.) 391 b 
9 ff., 19, 26, 392 b 33 ff., 393 
a 4, 396 a 34, b 34, 30, 397 a 
4 ff., b 11 flF., 22, 398 a 32, 
b2, 8, 23, 399 a 1, 13, b 18, 
25, 400 a 3, b 8, 27 

Kpdvos 399 b 4 

Kpaais 396 b 18, 25 

KpaT-qp 400 a 33 

KpvaToKXos 394 a 25 

Kv^epinfrrjs 400 b 6 

Kvpos 398 b 28 

/cJAivSioos 398 b 28 

Kvixa 396 a 19, 26, 400 a 28 

Kvvrjyeaiov 398 a 25 

/cup/Seis- 400 b 30 

XaZXaifi 395 a 7 

Aa/X7ra? 395 b 1 1 

Xenropuprfs 392 a 35, 394 a 10 

Ai/3dwTos 394 b 34 

h^o^oivi^ 394 b 34 

Ai/iiyv 393 a 20 

Xlp.vTj 393 b 8, 394 b 16 

Xiifj 394 b 27, 34 

Aoyia/xds 399 a 31 

Adyo? 397 b 13, 20, 398 a 13, 

400 a 3, 17 
Ao|d? 393 b 15 
Ao^ayds 399 b 5 
Adxos 399 b 6 

/xa077<ns391 a 8, 397 b 11 
/xe'ye^o? 391 a 5, 19, 392 b 1, 

394 b 4, 397 a 14 
/xeiAi'xios 401 a 24 
/A€0T7/xjSpia 394 b 21 
ftecnrjfi^pivos 394 b 29 
(jieaov {tov Koapuov), to 391 b 12, 

cf. 392 b 33 



fieTaOeais 400 b 29 
fterpov 397 a 10 



fterpov csyv a lU 
lUT^/co? 393 b 21, 395 b 6 
/xT^v 397 a 14, 399 a 6 
pLripLvOos 398 b 17 




/iii^t? ^595 a 2 
/xot|Oa 401 b 12, 14 ff. 
fiovaiKTJ 396 b 15 
fj.v8pos 395 b 23 
ixvdos 401 b 22 
^vKTjfta 396 a 13 
fjLVKrjTTjs 396 all 
fjLvxi-os 395 b 31 
Ittuxds 393 b 24 

vdfta 393 a 6, 394 a 12, 397 a 25 

vavs 400 b 6 

veavLOKog 400 b 6 

vipxais 401 b 12 

re'os 396 b 3 

veoxfuoais 397 a 20 

vfvpoaTrdaTrfs 398 b 17 

v€<l>os 392 b 9, 394 a 16, 21, 26, 

28, 33, 394 b 17, 395 a 11 ff., 

33 
vijfia 401 b 16 
vrjaos 392 b 19 ff., 393 a 9 ff., 

b 11, 18, 395 b 22 
vi^eros 394 b 1 
vo/MoOeTris 400 b 8 
voftos 399 b 18, 400 b 14, 28 
vofios 398 b 33 
vorios 392 a 4, 395 b 15, 399 a 

24 
voTos 394 b 21, 31 ff. 
vovs 391 a 12 
vvi 397 a 13, 399 a 2, 22 

^eVios 401 a 22 



423 



INDICES 



oyKos 891 b 24, 394 b 4 
oiKTjTrjpiov 391 b 15, 393 a 5 
oiKovnevT] 392 b 20, 26, 393 a 

10, 16, b 9, 15, 18, 394 a 6 
oIkos 398 a 8, 15, 399 b 14 
oiKril,eiv 391 a 22 
oAa, Ttt 391 a 3, b 11, 396 b 23, 

397 a 12, b 9, 400 a 4 
6Xvfj.mas 394 b 26 
ofi^pos 392 b 10, 394 a 16 ff., 

397 a 34, 400 a 26 
o/xixAt; 394 a 15, 19 
ofioyvios 401 a 21 
o/ioAoyeiv 396 b 33 
ofioXoyia 396 b 34 
ofiovoia 396 b 4, 10, 397 a 4, 

23, 400 a 4 
6fji6(f>vXov, TO 396 b 10 
6n<f>aX6s 399 b 30 
wo/xa 401 a 14 
OTTUipa 401 a 5 
opyavov 398 b 15 
opvidias 395 a 4 
opos 391 a 20, 392 b 17 
opoj 393 b 22, 31, 400 a 7 
ovpdvios 391 a 9, 400 a 21, 401 

a 25 
ovpavos 391 b 9, 15, 19, 392 a 

5, 10, 18, 396 b 23, 397 a 9, 

21,b27,398a2, b9,399al, 

13, 20, 32, 400 a 7 ff., 30, 

b32 
ovala 392 a 35, 394 b 11, 397 b 

20 

nayercoSiis 392 b 6, 397 b 1 
TToyof 394 a 16, 397 b 1 
TToAaioi, 01 397 b 16 
iraXaiMvalos 401 a 23 
naXfiaTias 396 a 10 
Trav, t6 396 b 34, 397 a 24, 398 
b22 

424 



TTavifyvpis 400 b 21 

Trapdrpu/jis 395 b 5 

TTOLTayos 395 a 13 

TTdrpios 397 b 13 

TTarpdtos 401 a 21 

TraxvTj 392 b 10, 394 a 25 

■jrdxos 394 a 27, b 17 

nevris 396 b 2 

TreVavCTts 399 a 28 

7reTTpcjfJi.ei>r] 401 b 10 

nepMovv 391 a 12 

77€/)iaya>yTy 391 b 18, 399 a 2 

■nepi^oXov 398 a 15, 22 

■nepUxov, TO 399 a 25 

Trept/cAu^eii' 392 b 29 

TTiTpa 396 a 6 

TTTjyi?' 392 b 15, 395 b 19, 396 a 

6,22 
7r7;Ad? 396 a 6 
■nidos 395 b 12 
■niXt]p.a 394 b 3, 395 a 12 
nXavT^Tos 392 a 14, 19 
TrAaTo? 393 b 18 
TrXrjfMfMeXeLv 392 a 6 
nXrifivpis 397 a 28 
ttA^^is 395 a 21 
nXovaios 396 b 2 
■nvtvixa 394 a 17, b 9, 396 a 5, 

15, 24, 397 a 32, 400 a 28 
TToirjT'^s 397 b 26, 400 a 10, 401 

a 1,24 
TToiKiXXetv 392 b 17 
TToXeixos 398 a 25, 399 b 1, 19 
noXievs 401 a 19 
TToXis 391 a 19, 392 b 18, 396 b 

1 , 398 a 8, 399 b 14, 400 a 29, 

b 7, 27, 401 a 20 
noXiTeia 399 b 18, 400 b 15 
TToXos 391 b 25, 392 a I, 2, 394 

b 29, 32 
TToXvx^i-pioL 398 b 12 
noXvwvvfios 401 a 12 



ON THE COSMOS 



■nop9fj.6s 396 a 25 

nptjanjp 394 a 18, 395 a 10, 23 

npodvpov 398 a 17 

irpoayeios 392 a 16 

TrpoCToSos 398 a 24 

TrpoaojTTov 399 b 35 

Trpo^TjTeueii' 391 a 16 

npoajais 396 a 8, 20 

TTpvraveiov 400 b 19 

TTuAoii^ 398 a 16 

TruAto/ad? 398 a 21 

TTvp 395 b 3 if., 19, 396 a 22, 

b30 
nvpKcua. 397 a 28, 400 a 29 
TTu/jo'eis 392 a 25, 399 a 9 
nvpd>8ris 392 a 6, b 2, 395 a 20, 

397 a 23 

pa^Sos 395 a 30, 35 ff. 
pevfj-a 400 b 2 
pijy^ua 395 a 9, 397 a 32 
pT^KTTjs 396 a 5 
p^^is 394 b 17 
poTj 396 a 23 
poTT-q 399 b 11 
pvms 395 b 8 

aaXmy^ 399 b 2 

aarpa-Trqs 398 a 29 

aeia/Lids 395 b 36 ff., 397 a 28, 

400 a 25 
aiXas 392 b 3, 395 a 31, b 

4ff., 9 
aeXqvTi 392 a 29, 395 a 33, b 2, 

396 a 27, b 28, 397 a 10, 398 

b 9, 399 a 6, 400 a 21 
aefivoTTjs 398 a 12 
wqpAvTwp 399 b 9 
a-rip.e'iov 391 b 21 
CT^pay^ 395 b 31 
CTK-7?7rro's 395 a 25, 28 
oKOTTos 398 a 3i 



oKoreivos 396 b 20 

ao4>6s 392 b 19 

oTrepfxa 400 b 33 

CTTTOuSd^eiv 391 a 3 

(TTTovhrj 391 a 18 

trraSia 393 b 20 

arriXq 393 a 19, 24, b 10, 'i'2, 

32 
(m]piyfj,6s .395 b 7 
aTTjplCeadai, 392 b 5, 395 b 4 
ILtD^cov 392 a 26 
CTToixetoi' 392 a 8, b 35, 396 a 

28, b 34 
(TTo/xa 393 a 18, b 31, 394 a 2 
aropnov 395 b 27 
crTparrjyos 398 a 25, 29 
arpaTia 398 a 8 
cn-pdrios 401 a 22 
CTTpaToVeSov 399 b 2, 400 b 8 
arpopiXos 395 a 7 
arpcofxaroSeafios 398 a 8 
CTuyyer^S 391 a 6, 14 
avfinav, to 396 a 31, 397 b 7, 

399 a 18, b 10 
avpiTrq^iS 394 a 35 
avuTrXyjydSes 392 b 13 
avn<f>pov€Xv 391 a 14 
avfi.(fHovos .396 b 8, 15 
awavaxopeveiv 391 b 18 
awihpiov 400 b 18 
avveKTiKos 397 b 9 
awd-qfia 399 b 6 
Gwil,r]ms 396 a 3 
avvcDpis .399 b 5 
orvCTTacTts 394 a 24, 396 b 23 
avaTTjfia 391 b 9 
avoTpepnia 394 a 32 
acf>alpa 391 b 24, 392 a 22, 396 

b 31,. 398 b 28, 399 a 3 
CT^aipoeiSi^s- 391 b 19 
a(f>iyy€iv 393 b 9 
crxaaTTjpia 398 b 15 



425 



INDICES 



au>fia 391 a 8, b 16, 392 a 30, 

397 b 28 
acooTiKos 397 a 3 
aarrrip 397 b 20, 401 a 24 
aorrtipia 396 b 34, 397 a 31, 

b 5, 16, 398 a 4, b 10, 400 

a 4 

Ttt/ii'a? 398 a 24 

ra^iapxos 399 b 7 

Talis- 391 b 11, 392 a 31, 397 a 

9, 399 b 7, 32, 400 a 22 
Ta/3ax-7 397 b 32 
raxos 395 b 7 
rerxos 398 a 18 
Texi^396 b 11, 19,399 b 17 
Tfjirjfia 395 a 33 
Topros- 391 b 22 
rpofios 396 a 10 
TpoTToiovxo? 401 a 23 
rpoTTLKa, rd 392 a 12 
Tu^wv 392 b 1 1 , 395 a 24, 400 a 

28 
TuxT? 396 b 7, 401 a 26 

venos 401 a 18 

uerdj 394 a 31, 399 a 24, 401 a 

18 
vnaros 397 b 25 
vnepox-q 391 b 4, 398 a 12, b 1 
VTrrjpeala 398 b 11 
uTToAct/x/xa 394 a 22 
VTTOcrrams 395 a 30 ft. 
il^os 391 a 5, 398 a 12 

(!>aivu}v 392 a 23 
^avraala 395 a 34, b 6 
^a.rraa/xa 395 a 29, b 11 
^epea^LOS (yv) '^91 ^ '^ 
^flt'ais 399 a 29 
^fldyyos 396 b 16 
<f>eopd 396 a 30, 397 b 4 



^I'Aios- 401 a 22 

<f>iXoao(f>ia 391 a 2, 11, b 7 

(f>X6y€s 392 b 3, 397 b 1 ft"., 400 
a 29 

<j>Xoyij.6s 400 b 4 

<f>XoYa)8r)s 392 a 35 

<j)pvKT(j3piov 398 a 31 

<t>vXa^ 398 a 21 

(jivaiKos 399 b 25 

<i>vaLs 391 a 19, b 4, 10, 392 a 31, 
b 1, 6, 14, 32, 394 a 5, 15, 
396b6ff.,32,397a3ff., 17, 
27, b 15, 398 b 20, 399 a 32, 
b 22, 400 b 13, 33, 401 a 26, 
b20 

<f>vTevais 399 b 17 

(I,ut6v 392 b 15, 394 b 10, 397 a 
24, 400 b 34 

<f>ajvj 396 b 16, 399 a 16, b 3 

(^a)(7<f>6pos 392 a 27, 399 a 8 

xdXaCa 392 b 11, 394 a 16, 

bl 
Xdofia 396 a 4, 18 
XfifJiappos 400 a 34 
Xeifiepivos 394 b 24 ff. 
X€Cfia>vS95 a 1, 397 a 13, 22, 

400a9 
xOovios 395 a 10, 401 a 25 
Xtwv 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 32 
xXoT} 392 b 17 
Xo-q 400 b 22 
Xopeveiv 399 a 12 
Xopos 399 a 15, 400 b 7 
Xprfap-whilv 395 b 28 
Xpovos 401 a 15, b 16 
Xpvaos 398 a 15 
Xpcofia 396 b 13 

tpaKds 394 a 30 
^oAt's- 399 b 30, 32 
V^iAdj 399 b 8 



426 



ON THE COSMOS 



i/roAoets 395 a 26 

4>vxri 391 a 11, 15, 397 a 19, 

399 b 14, 400 b 14 
ijjvxo^ 394 b 7 



J)pai 397 a 12, 399 a 23 
(varrjs 396 a 8 
MTaKovaT-qs 398 a 21 
co<^eAeta397b31,398al 



II. ENGLISH INDEX 



Abyssinia 393 b 15 n. 
Acropolis 399 b 34 
Adriatic Sea 393 a 28 
Aegean Sea 393 a 30 
Aeolian Islands 395 b 21 
aether 392 a 5 
Action 396 b 12 n. 
air 392 b 5, 396 b 29 
Aisa 401 b 14 
Albion, see England 
Alexander 391 a 2 
Aloadae 391 a 11 
Antarctic Pole 392 a 4 
Aparctias (wind) 394 b 29 
Apeliotes (wind) 394 b 23 
Aphrodite (planet), see Venus 
Apollo 392 a 27 
Arabian Gulf (Red Sea) 393 

b4n., 16, 18 
Arabian Isthmus 393 b 32 
Arctic Pole 392 a 3 
Ares (planet), see Mars 
Argestes (wind) 394 b 25 
art : imitates nature 396 b 12 
Asia 393 b 22, 26 ff. 
Athena, statue of (simile) 

399 b34 
Atlantic Ocean, see Ocean 
Atropos 401 b 18 
axis 391 b 26 

Boreas 394 b 20, 28 
breezes 394 a 17, 397 a 34 
British Isles 393 b 12, 17 
Bura, Achaia 396 a 21 and n. 



Caecias (wind) 394 b 22 
Cambay, see Cutch 
Cambyses 398 a 1 1 
Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea 393 

b 3 n., 5 n., 24, 27 
catapults 398 b 15 
Celts 393 b 9 
Ceylon 393 b 14 
chariot (simile) 400 b 7 
chorus (simile) 399 a 15, 400 

b7 
Circias (wind) 394 b 31 
city 396 b 1, 400 b 7, 14 
Clotho 401 b 21 
clouds 392 b 9, 394 a 16, 

26 
comets, 392 b 4, 395 a 32 
continents 392 b 21, 393 a 

7 
Corsica 393 a 13 
Corycian Cave 391 a 21 
Cosmos, defined 391 b 9 ff. 
Cretan Sea 393 a 29 
Crete 393 a 13 
Cronus (planet), see Saturn 
Cutch 393 b 4 n. 
Cyclades 393 a 15 
Cyprus 393 a 13 

Darius 398 a 12 
Deioces 398 a 10 n. 
Delphi 395 b 29 
Destiny 401 b 9 
dew 394 a 15, 23 
dynamis, see power 

427 



INDICES 



earth (element) 392 b 14, 33, 

396 b 30 

earth, the 391 b 13, 397 a 24, 

b30 
earthquakes 395 b 36, 397 a 

28 ff., 400 a 25 
Ecbatana 398 a 10 n., 14, 

34 
Eg^^3t 394 a 1 
Egyptian Sea 393 a 29 
elements 392 a 8, b 35, 396 

b34 
Empedocles 396 b 12 n., 399 

b25 
England 393 b 12 
Ephialtes, see Giants 
Erythraean Sea 393 b 4 n. 
Etesian winds 395 a 2 
Etna 395 a 24 n., b 21, 400 

a 33 and n. 
Euboea 393 a 13 
Euronotus (wind) 394 b 

33 
Europe 393 b 22 ff. 
Eurus 394 b 20, 24 
exhalations 394 a 9 and n. 

Bate {TreTTpcDfievT)) 401 b 10 

Fates, the 401 b 15 

fire (element) 392 b 2, 395 a 

20, 396 b 30 
fire, subterranean 395 b 19 ff. 
flames 392 b 3 
floods 397 a 28 
frost 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 26, 

397 b 1 

Galatian Gulf 393 b 9 
Galatian Sea 393 a 27 
gales 392 b 1 1 
Giants 391 a 11 n., 395 a 

24 n. 



Gibraltar 392 b 23 n, 

God 391 b 11, 397 b 14 ff., 

398 a 22 
gods 391 b 15, 397 b 17 
gods, abode of the 391 b 16, 

393 a 4 

hail 392 b 11,394 a 16, b 1 
halo 395 a 36 
harmony 396 b 8 ff., 25 
heavens [oipavos), 391 b 16 ff., 

400 a 7 
Helice, Achaia 396 a 21 

and n. 
Hellespont 393 b 1, 398 a 

27 
Hera 392 a 28 
Heracleitus 396 b 20, 401 a 

11 
Heracles, Pillars of 393 a 24, 

b 10, 23, 32 
Hermes (planet), see Mer- 
cury 
Hero 398 b 15 n. 
Herodotus 398 a 10 n. 
Hyrcanian Sea, see Caspian 

Sea 

lapyx (wind) 394 b 26 

ice 394 a 25 

lerne, see Ireland 

India 392 b 23 n. 

India, Gulf of 393 b 3 

Indians 393 b 14 

Indus 398 a 28 

inhabited world {oikoumene) 

392 b 20 ff. ; dimensions 

of 393 b 18 
inhabited worlds, plurality 

of 392 b 23 ff. 
Ireland 393 b 13 
islands 392 b 20, 393 a 8 ff . 



428 



ON THE COSMOS 



Jupiter (planet) 392 a 25, 
399 a 10 

keystones (simile) 399 b 30 

Lachesis 401 b 20 
land 393 a 7 
law (simile) 400 b 14 
lawgiver (simile) 400 b 7 
Lebadeia 395 b 29 
Lesbos 393 a 14 
Libonotus (wind) 394 b 34 
Libophoenix (wind) 394 b 

34 
Libya 393 b 22, 31 
lightning 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 

395 a 16, 25 n. 
Lipara 395 b 21 
Lips (wind) 394 b 27 

machines 398 b 15 and n. 
Madagascar 393 b 15 n. 
Maeotis, Lake 393 a 32, b 7 
Mars 392 a 26, 399 a 9 
Mediterranean, geography 

of 393 a 12. 16 ff., b 3 n., 

29 
Mercury 392 a 26, 399 a 9 
meteors 392 b 3 
military camp (simile) 399 b 

2, 400 b 8 
mind 391 a 12 
mist 394 a 15, 19 
moon 392 a 29, 396 a 27, 397 

a 10, 398 b 9, 399 a 6, 400 

a 21 
music 396 b 15 
Myrtoan Sea 393 a 30 



Necessity 401 b 8 
Neo-Pythagoreans 
20 n. 



396 b 



Nile 393 b 5 n„ 31, 394 a 2 
Notus (wind) 394 b 21, 32 
Nyssa 391 a 21 

Ocean 392 b 22 ff., 393 a 

16 ff., b 3 n., 30 
oikoumene, see inhabited 

world 
Olympias (wind), 394 b 26 
Olympus 400 a 7 
" opposite principles " 396 

a 31 
Ornithian winds 395 a 4 
Orphic books 401 a 27 
Ossa391 a 11,21 
Otus, see Giants 

painting 396 b 21 
Pamphylian Sea 393 a 30 
Parthenon 399 b 34 n. 
Pelion391 a 11 n. 
Persia, Gulf of 393 b 3 n. 
Persia, King of (simile) 398 

a 10 n. 
Persian Empire 398 a 27 
Phaethon 400 a 31 
Phebol 393 b 15 
Pheidias 399 b 33 
philosophy 391 a 2, b 7 
Phosphorus (planet), see 

Venus 
Phrygia 395 b 30 
pits (in the sky) 392 b 4 
planets 392 a 13 
planks (in the sky) 392 b 4 
Plato 401 b 24 
poles 391 b 25 ff. 
Polygnotus 396 b 12 n. 
Pontus 393 a 32, b 24 ff. 
power 396 b 29, 397 b 23 ff. 

and n., 398 b 8, 20 
Propontis 393 b 1 

4^ 



INDICES 



puppet-shows 398 b 16 and n. 
Pyroeis (planet), see Mars 

rain 392 b 10, 394. a 16, 27, 

397 a 33, 400 a 26 
rainbows 395 a 30 
Red Sea, see Arabian Gulf 
rivers, 392 b 15, 393 a 6 

Sardinia 393 a 13 
Sardinian Sea 393 a 27 
Saturn (planet) 392 a 24, 399 

a 11 
Scythians 393 b 8 
sea 392 b 14, 393 a 6 
ship (simile) 400 b 6 
shooting stars, 395 a 32 
Sicilian Sea 393 a 28 
Sicily 393 a 12 
snow 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 

32 
Socotra 393 b 15 n. 
soul 391 a 11, 399 b 14 
Spain 393 b 17 
Sporades 393 a 14 
springs 393 a 6 
stars 391 b 17, 392 a 10, 

397 a 9, 399 a 20, 400 a 

21 
streams 392 b 15 
sun 392 a 29, 397 a 9, 399 a 

8, 21, 400 a 21 
Susa 398 a 14, 34 
Syrian Sea 393 a 30 
Syrtes 393 a 25 



Tana, Lake 393 b 15 n. 
Tanais, River 393 b 5 n., 26, 

30 
Taprobane, see Ceylon 
Thrascias (wind) 394 b 30 
thunder 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 

395 a 13 
thunderbolts 392 b 12, 394 a 

18, 395 a 22, 397 a 21 
tides 396 a 26 
tropics 392 a 12 
Typhon 395 a 24 n. 
typhoons 400 a 29 
Typhos 395 a 24 n. 

Venus (planet) 392 a 28, 399 

a 8 
volcanoes 395 b 21 

water (element) 392 b 30. 

395 b 19, 396 b 30 
waves, tidal 396 a 17 If. 
whirlwinds 392 b 1 1 
wind, names and types of 394 

b 8—395 a 10 
wind, subterranean 395 b 19, 

26 ff. 

Xerxes 398 a 11, b 4 

Zephyrus (wind) 394 b 20, 25 
Zeus (god) 400 a 19, 401 a 14, 

28 
Zeus (planet), see Jupiter 
Zodiac 392 a 1 1 



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VIII-X 2nd Imp.) 
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Pbocopius : HiSTOBY OF THE Wabs. H. B. Dcwing. 7 Vols. 

(Vol. I 3rd Imp., Vols. II-VII 2nd Imp.) 
Ptolemy: Tetbabiblos. C/. Manetho. 
QuiNTUs Smybnaeus. a. S. Way. (3rd Imp.) Verse trans. 
Sextus Empibicus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vols. I-III 

2nd Imp.) 
Sophocles. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 9th Imp., Vol. II 6th 

Imp.) Verse trans. 
Stbabo : Geogbaphy. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. I, 

V and VIII 3rd Imp., Vols. II-IV, VI and VII 2nd Imp.) 
Theophbastus : Chabactebs. J. M. Edmonds ; Herodes, 

etc. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.) 
Theophbastus : Enquiby into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort. 

2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (\^ol. I ith Imp., Vols. 

II-IV 3rd Imp.) 
Tbyphiodobus. C/. Oppian. 
Xenophon : Cybopaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 

^th Imp., Vol. II 3rd Imp.) 
Xenophon : Hellenica, Anabasis, Apology, and Sympo- 
sium. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I 

and III 3rd Imp., Vol. II 4,th Imp.) 
Xenophon : Memobabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Mar- 
chant. (3rd Imp.) 
Xenophon : Scbipta Minoba. E. C. Marchant. (2nd Imp.) 

{For Volumes in Preparation see next page.) 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 
VOLUMES IN PREPARATION 



•GREEK AUTHORS 



Aristotle : Histohy of Animals. A. L. Peck. 
Plotinus. A. H. Armstrong. 

LATIN AUTHORS 

St. Augustine : City of God. 

CiCEBO : Pro Sestio, In Vatinium, Pro Caelio, De Pro- 

viNciis CoNsuLARiBus, Pro Balbo. J, F^. Frcese and R. 

Gardner. 
Phaedrus and other Fabulists. B. E. Perry. 

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION 

LONDON CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 

WILLIAM HEINBMANN LTD HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 

Cloth 158. Cloth J2.50 



028280030 



MOV 2 2 1990